Conversation 296-016

TapeTape 296StartSunday, November 14, 1971 at 5:02 PMEndSunday, November 14, 1971 at 6:41 PMTape start time03:40:48Tape end time05:15:13ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Connally, John B.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On November 14, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and John B. Connally met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:02 pm to 6:41 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 296-016 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 296-16

Date: November 14, 1971
Time: 5:02 pm - 6:41 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with John B. Connally.

     Connally’s schedule

     Redskins-Bears game
         -Field goal attempt
          -Larry Brown's injury

          -Score

     Connally's recent trip to Asia
         -Saigon
                -Ellsworth F. Bunker
                -Nguyen Van Thieu
                     -Inauguration ceremonies
                -Ceremonies
                      -Reception
                             -Presentation of credentials
                      -Dinner
                      -Attendance
                -Prime Minister Chong Pil Kim of South Korea
                -Vice Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo of Taiwan, Republic Of China
                      -Conversation With Connally
                             -United Nations [UN] vote
                             -US support
                                  -International Monetary Fund [IMF] , World Bank and Asian
                                        Development Bank
                                  -UN
                                  -UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
                                        [UNESCO]
                -Kim
                      -Conversation with Connally

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 01/19/2018. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[296-016-w001]
[Duration: 56s]

     John B. Connally's recent trip to Asia
          -Saigon
               -Prime Minister Pil Kim Chong of South Korea
                     -Conversation with John B. Connally
                           -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                           -United Nations [UN] vote
                           -South Korean troops in South Vietnam for all of 1972

                        -Encouraging US talks with Nguyen Van Thieu
                        -South Vietnamese political parties

**************************************************************************

    John B. Connally's recent trip to Asia
         -Saigon
              -Meetings
              -Senate vote on foreign aid
                    -Subsequent Senate votes
                          -John C. Stennis Amendment
                                 -Humanitarian provisions
                                 -House vote
              -Thieu
                    -Conversation with Connally
                          -Prospects for 1972
                                 -Possible Communist offensive
                          -Rice production
                          -Government reorganization
                                 -Customs ministry
              -Connally’s conversations
                    -Finance, economics, foreign ministers
              -Economics minister
                    -Program
              -Thieu
                    -Conversation with Connally
                          -Recent election
                                 -Lt. Gen. Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Cao Ky
                          -Political party system
                                 -Compared to Mexico
                          -Military situation
                          -Economic reforms
                    -Corruption in government
                          -Customs ministry
                          -Military
                                 -Drug trade
                                       -Threats
              -Bunker
              -US personnel
                    -Tour of Delta area

             -Rice production
             -Need for foreign aid
                  -Stennis amendment
        -Bangkok
             -Thanom Kittikachorn
             -Thanat Khoman
             -Connally's meetings
                  -US Ambassador Leonard Unger
                  -Thanom
                  -Henry A. Kissinger
                        -Message
                              -Saigon
                        -Talking paper
                  -The President's instructions
                        -Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to People's Republic of China [PRC]
                  -Talking paper
                        -Points
                  -Thanat
                        -Manner
                        -Nationality
                  -Thanom
                        -PRC
                        -Insurgency in North
                        -Foreign aid
                        -Chinese in Thailand
                        -Cambodia
                        -US troop movements
                              -Taiwan
                                    -Radio broadcast
                        -The President's forthcoming trip to PRC
                              -Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai
                              -North Vietnam
                              -Lin Piao
                                    -Kissinger’s trip
                        -PRC’s possible future
                              -Mao
                        -Military situation in Laos and Cambodia

*****************************************************************

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and
released 04/29/2019.]
[Unintelligible]
[296-016-w010]
[Duration: 8s]

     John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
          -Bangkok
               -John B. Connally’s meetings
                     -Thanom Kittikachorn
                           -Unknown person’s statement

*****************************************************************

     John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
          -Bangkok
               -John B. Connally’s meetings
                     -Thanom Kittikachorn
                           -Military situation in Thailand
                                 -Cambodian border
                                       -Unknown place

**************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 01/19/2018. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[296-016-w009]
[Duration: 18s]

     John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
          -Bangkok
               -John B. Connally’s meetings
                     -Thanom Kittikachorn
                           -Military situation in Thailand
                           -Air power

**************************************************************************

     John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
          -Bangkok
               -John B. Connally’s meetings
                     -Thanom Kittikachorn
                           -Military situation in Thailand
                                 -Terrain
                           -Concerns
                                 -US-PRC relations
                                 -US intent
                                       -Southeast Asia

     US policy in Southeast Asia
         -Laos and Cambodia
         -South Vietnam
         -Thailand
                -Treaty obligations

     US policy toward Taiwan

     Connally's recent trip to Asia
         -Bangkok
                -Festival
                      -Thanom
                      -Floating baskets
                -Thanom
                      -Home
                      -Dinner
                      -Festival
                             -Fireworks
                             -Prizes
                -King Bhumibol Adulyadej
                      -Conversation with Connally
                             -Queen Sirikit

**************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 01/19/2018. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]

[296-016-w003]
[Duration: 6m 2s]

    John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
         -Bangkok
              -King Bhumibol Adulyadej
                    -Conversation with John B. Connally
                          -King Bhumibol Adulyadej opinion on US understanding of Chinese
                          -Criticism of Thai government
                    -President’s opinion
                          -Emotional
                          -Meeting with Queen Sirikit Kitiyakara
                          -President’s previous meeting with King Bhumibol Adulyadej
                    -Expenditures
                    -Conversation with John B. Connally and Leonard Unger
                          -Corruption of Thai government
                          -Jamming issues with US weapons
                                -AR-15
                                -M-16
                          -Criticism of Thai government
                                -Corruption
                                -Out of touch with people
                          -King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s expenditures
                          -US policy
                                -Military
                          -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                                -Competition
                                -Patience
                          -Insurgency in northern Thailand
                          -Corruption of Thai government
              -Thanom Kittikachorn
                    -Activities
                          -Popularity
                          -Lack of ill will

**************************************************************************

    John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
         -Indonesia
              -Lt. Gen. T.N.J. Suharto

            -Conversations with Connally
                  -US ambassador [Francis J. Galbraith]
                  -US aid
            -Visit to Cambodia
                  -Lon Nol
                        -Norodom Sihanouk
            -Meetings with Connally
                  -Cambodia
                  -The President's forthcoming trip to PRC
                        -Trade
                              -Taiwan
                  -Nixon Doctrine
                  -US foreign aid program
                        -Congress
                              -Protectionism
                        -Administration efforts
                  -US presence in Southeast Asia
            -Wife
       -Cabinet
            -Connally's meetings
            -Backgrounds
            -Relations with Suharto
                  -Military aides
       -Suharto
            -Conversations with Connally
                  -US military aid
                        -State Department
                        -Cambodia
-PRC
      -Information
-Philippines
      -President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos
            -Ceremony for Connally
            -Conversation with Connally
                 -Recent elections in Philippines
                       -Senate
                       -Provincial governors and mayors
                 -Insurgency
                 -Forthcoming election
                       -Prospects
      -Imelda Marcos

                   -Conversation with Connally
                         -Political futures
             -President and Mrs. Marcos
                   -Conversation with Connally
                         -Brother of Philippine Vice President
                               -Corruption
                         -Connally's subsequent briefing for Kissinger and State Department
                         -Forthcoming meeting in Kuala Lumpur
                               -Military bases
                                     -Malaysia
                               -Great powers' role in Southeast Asia
                                     -Possible non-aggression pact
                               -South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia
                               -US military aid
                         -Nixon Doctrine
                               -South Korea, South Vietnam
                         -US aid
                               -Need for training, planning
                         -Subversion
                               -Chinese
                                     -Insurgency
                                     -Luzon
                         -Kissinger's visit to PRC
                         -Mrs. Marcos
        -Japan
             -Connally's meetings
                   -Cabinet ministers
                         -Kakuei Tanaka, Takeo Fukuda and Eisaku Sato
                         -The President's forthcoming trip to PRC
                         -Mikio Mizuta
                   -Sato
                         -International monetary system
             -Senate vote on Okinawa reversion
                   -Japanese reaction
             -Sato
                   -Conversations with Connally
                         -Okinawa
                               -The President's conversation with Nobusuke Kishi

**************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 01/19/2018. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[296-016-w008]
[Duration: 1m 20s]

     John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
          -Japan
               -Eisaku Sato
                     -Conversations with John B. Connally
                           -Okinawa
                                 -Statements by William P. Rogers and David Packard
                                       -Reassured Japanese
                                 -John B. Connally's conversation with Henry A. Kissinger
                                 -US bases
                                       -Sizes
                                       -Special Forces

**************************************************************************

     John B. Connally’s recent trip to Asia
          -Japan
               -Eisaku Sato
                     -Conversations with John B. Connally
                           -International economy
                           -Okinawa
                                 -Reversion
                                       -Diet
                           -Timing
                           -Fukuda
                           -The President's forthcoming visit to PRC
                           -International economy
                                 -Trade mission
                                       -Japanese businessmen
                                             -Meeting with Connally
                                                  -Kishi
                                                  -Devaluation
               -Tanaka
                     -Conversation with Connally

      -Connally’s meetings
            -Mizuta
            -Paul W. McCracken's counterpart, Toshio Kimura
            -Agriculture Minister Munenori Akagi
            -Tanaka
            -Fukuda
            -Sato
            -International economy
                  -Group of Ten
      -Okinawa
            -Reversion
      -Textiles
      -PRC
      -Sato
            -Political position
                  -UN vote on Taiwan
            -Conversation with Connally
                  -Supersonic transport [SST]
                        -Concorde
                        -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                        -Possible joint venture
            -Fukuda
-International monetary situation
      -Indonesia
      -Gold prices
      -Group of Ten
      -Japan
-Japan
      -Connally's conversations
            -Japanese economy
                  -Growth
                        -Compared to US economy
                              -Unemployment
            -West Germany’s economy
                  -Recession
            -Japanese economy
                  -Sliding scale
                  -Reserves
            -International economy
                  -The President’s August 15, 1971 statement
            -Exports

                     -Imports
               -Okinawa
                     -Reversion
                           -Diet debate
               -US foreign aid
               -US military dispositions
                     -South Korea
                     -Taiwan
               -Tanaka
          -Possible settlement with US
               -Timing

International economy
      -Connally's forthcoming speech to Economics Club
      -Import surcharge
           -Views of Henry C. Wallich, Paul A. Samuelson and Milton Friedman
           -Samuelson
                 -Japan
                       -Connally’s remarks
           -Arthur F. Burns's views
           -Politics
           -Rogers's and State Department’s views
           -The President's schedule
           -McCracken
           -Peter G. Peterson
           -Wallich's and Samuelson's views

National economy
     -The President's meeting with Burns
           -Money supply
     -Memorandum to Herbert Stein
     -Pay Board and Price Commission
           -Performance
                 -C. Jackson Grayson, George H. Boldt and Donald H. Rumsfeld
     -Pay Board
           -Wage increases
     -Price guidelines
           -Business's reaction
                 -Profit margins

Businessmen

     -Compared to labor leaders

International economy
      -Burns's views
      -Press
      -The President's program
            -Goals
                  -US military establishment
                        -Security
                  -Foreign aid
            -Prosperity
                  -West Germany and Japan
            -Protectionism
            -The President’s forthcoming trip to PRC, USSR
            -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
      -Foreign aid program
            -Senate action
                  -Michael J. Mansfield and J. William Fulbright
            -Isolationism
                  -India
                  -Southeast Asia, Japan, South Korea and Europe
      -The President's economic program
            -International aspect
            -Opponents
      -US role in world
      -Grain deal with USSR
      -Balance of trade
      -Unemployment
      -US prosperity
            -Vietnam
                  -Troop withdrawals
      -Monetary situation
            -Negotiations
                  -Europe
                  -Japan
      -The President's August 15 program
      -Burns's view
      -Paul A. Volcker's view
      -The President's meeting with George P. Shultz

National economy

     -The President's program
          -Freeze
          -Opponents
                 -Press
                 -Wall Street
          -Phase II
          -Inflation
          -Wage rates
     -Effect of international monetary situation
     -The President's program
          -Foreign affairs
                 -USSR
                 -Vietnam
                       -Announcement
          -Reaction to critics
     -The President’s schedule
     -Connally’s forthcoming speech
     -Retail sales
     -Pending Tax Bill
          -Budget deficit
     -Money supply
          -Shultz's views
          -Gustave L. Levy's views
          -Peter M. Flanigan
          -Views of Stein, Ezra Solomon and McCracken
          -Burns
                 -View
                 -Federal Reserve Board
                       -Appointments

Secretary of Agriculture
     -Earl L. Butz
           -Background
           -Corn and hog prices
           -American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange and National Farmers'
                Union
           -National Farmers Organization [NFO]
     -Selection process

National economy
     -Corn prices

          -Clifford M. Hardin's view
          -The President's conversation with Butz
     -Grain sale to USSR
          -Thomas W. (“Teddy”) Gleason
                -[International Longshoremen’s Association]

International monetary situation
      -Kissinger's previous briefing of Lyndon B. Johnson
      -Johnson
           -Kissinger
           -Criticism of the President’s policy
           -Possible conversations
                 -Walter E. Heller
                 -Walt W. Rostow
                 -Heller
                       -Partnership
                             -Background
                                   -Minnesota
                             -Compared to Samuelson
                 -Kermit Gordon
           -Forthcoming speech, November 15, 1971
                 -Connally's possible reaction

The President's press conference, November 12, 1971
     -Foreign Aid Bill
          -Jim Deakin of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
                 -Cambodia
     -Vietnam
          -Decisions by John F. Kennedy and Johnson
     -Cambodia
          -Nixon Doctrine

The President's critics
     -Responses
          -Rogers
          -U. Alexis Johnson
          -Melvin R. Laird
          -Rogers

Vietnam
     -Troop withdrawals

                -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                -US forces
           -Possible enemy action
                -Response

     International Monetary situation
           -US efforts
                 -Currency floatation
           -Others' efforts
                 -Price of gold
           -Connally's possible conversation with Kissinger
           -US program
           -Price of gold
                 -Shultz's views
                       -Convertibility
           -Convertibility
                 -France
                       -The President's forthcoming meeting with Georges J.R. Pompidou
           -Press

The President and Connally left at 6:41 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, the traveler's home, I guess.
Well, Washington lost, 16 to 15.
But did it end that way?
Yeah, yeah.
It was a real battle that Washington had in front of you, though, in the last nine seconds.
Just a little short.
Oh, that's it.
I saw a part of it.
Well, actually, a couple of them.
See, Washington's got it.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
They're running back.
I thought Washington had it.
I was in the shade.
And then I heard a huge roar.
And I got to the bottom.
It was 57th, 57th, and I got up to 916th.
I mean, what's your observations?
Of course, I had a very, very good trip.
I've had a hard trip.
I know that.
You made a lot of trips.
You know what it is.
And starting in Saigon, everywhere I went, basically, I'm not going to talk anymore.
So that's the only place this occurred.
But, you know, this, I'm sure, was departed.
All right.
We saw, of course, the first chief.
The inauguration was a compression ceremony.
We presented our credentials.
We had dinner one night for all the students, too.
Not obviously for everybody, but I could welcome about 100 people.
And I decided to hit the table with them.
While we were in Saigon, we saw the President, the Prime Minister, Korea Kim.
He was a very, I suppose,
We spent an hour and a half with Jim.
The Vice President of the Republic of China was there.
Jim?
Yeah.
I know him.
He was a very articulate, nice man.
Very able-bodied.
We spent an hour and a half with Jim.
Good.
He was, you know, philosophical about things.
Disappointed, of course.
Hurt.
Obviously, knows the background.
You know, he's one of the four nations that helped him.
We created that.
But now, he wasn't crying.
He was very grateful for the United States' support.
Asked for our continuing support to stay in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Fund, and said that there
their membership there was not continuing.
As a matter of fact, the IMF and the World Bank were organized before the United Nations.
Well, that'll be our decision.
So I don't think we should have helped in any way we could, I'm sure.
We are an active member of the force there.
South Korea was very
relaxed, not really.
They were expressing great concern, obviously concerned about China and what was going to happen.
But indicated very strongly that we were going to lose to the Russians in the south of Vietnam for all of 1972.
So he was going to take out his Marines of duty.
But he said that he was talking to you.
He told you that he was going to trade with the U.S. Army.
He was very much hoping to leave.
The central thrust of what Ken said to us was really lobbying with us, with Bunker and me, to talk to you about, to organize a political party in South Vietnam, a running one, a really structured one.
He could have a succession, which is what Ken said to us.
Because Park, here in South Korea, it's a hell of a long time.
But I brought both people, which were very good.
Of course, all of these people, you have to remember, had to back off of their Senate action on Part A, so that it all worked out, and all of that stuff.
Well, as you know, that's practically turned around now, you know.
The Senate is acting on, even the Senate is acting on both, you know.
I think it's coming up pretty well.
The Stennis Amendment.
The Stennis Amendment.
The Stennis Amendment.
The CIG had the humanitarian system.
We didn't give a damn about that anymore because there was no one.
So we start from there with the house.
And I think it will come out pretty well.
I'm hoping that it will come out fairly well in terms of the amount.
Because the house will, I'm sure, will get their amount.
And the person will want it.
The management charge about farm aid says that 72 will be used
brought this from here, that militarily he thinks he can meet whatever events he can come and just launch.
He thinks they'll launch one more.
He doesn't know what it'll be, whether it'll be in January or February, but he's expecting one more which he thinks he can meet and contain.
You know, the other situation ahead of him, the Gallup-Faith movement's out there now.
They've got the rice production up.
There's an executive bill.
It's a relatively quiet country.
But each movement within the government changed its restructuring.
They had a new man in custody.
They had a brother who was an architect, which all thought was important.
But our custody people, our current resident service people, and other city people, all from our district, plus our district, his finance ministry, his economics ministry,
and a foreign minister, and a particular economic minister, who was a young fellow, very active, very interested.
And they developed a whole new economic program, which I think is going to announce this coming week, the 16th and the 18th.
You indicated that you were quite sensitive about the election.
And I told the sheriff that I had to run the opposition.
I said, the big man could run if he wanted to.
I said, he could run if he wanted to.
And I said, really?
No.
So they thought that they couldn't win.
And I said, get a higher percentage vote.
And we were able to get out to the United States and win the opposition.
I said, I didn't.
I said, y'all go and build a party.
Make it a one-party country that you want to if you can.
And I said, that's all you have to do.
You have to take some succession.
So anyway, we got into a very fine, open discussion.
I was impressed with him.
He indicated to me that he wasn't really on the military front.
It's obvious that he was.
Our people feel, when I say our, primarily I mean most of his customers and our resident people, they feel that he's cleaned up his government pretty well.
He has a young officer in his head of customs who is smart, tough, and honest.
The previous one was a crook, they say.
They say that customs is working, but still something wrong.
Military participation and high official participation is a good thing.
The customs will not touch the military because it's only customs people.
the government have actually threatened with their lives.
And our people said the question was, is it going to, is it going to threaten their families, their wives, their children?
And I said, well, our people quite felt something about it.
They said, well, I guess we'll go home.
They said, well, what has it been?
Well, it's been a hell of a change.
A change in about the, uh,
That's a quick summary of, besides, I was impressed with the attitude of our own people at Bunker.
We felt it made great fun of various people at the MNC, many of which, many of whom had been there before, went back to a second degree, and particularly our people, and I say our, these accredited customers,
because they're not career people and they're quite credible and they're pretty certain to justify it.
But at 3080, we took a chopper ride down over much of the Delta area.
Their barn is coming back.
The rice production will be the highest it's been in probably 70 years this year.
And they're obviously going to have to take this just a few minutes away from the portion where they're going to survive.
That's what I'm saying.
That's why this is so important.
That's the point we're trying to make.
The whole secret of Jimmy's withdrawal is communication.
And that's what we are discussing.
Of course, there's a bank account.
Again, we were proceeding with this very, very, very warmly, very cordially, at the motion kept between the primary and the prime minister, and Panop, Panop, the bar minister, Panop, and Panop.
I met with him there, and I met with him first.
That's a group that he had in Paris that Sheridan had talked to him about.
But, and our ambassador was not there at the time.
But I had told her before that I wanted to have a private meeting, which we did.
I had got an interesting message inside of this, this talking paper from each of these countries on what I did.
What we got down to, to that point, what I said to him was not that the President, I said, President Nixon, asked me to receive the United Nation as a private company, not in any sense to keep your people out of the United Nation.
I said to him, I said, President, when you go personally private, this has to do with the official description of the United Nation.
And I said, because there are a number of points, I said, if you don't mind, I'd like to get my paper done.
And I was down to the point where it was part of the point to be sure that everyone wants to be sure that they're very clear and very precise.
So I think it's quite a good way to ask this question.
I told you a hundred points, and one by one, and one by one, I was just getting a number of those here, and some of them were about four days ago.
And the impression is highly pleased.
I thought the Foreign Minister's job warmed up particularly well.
He was a little bit delusional.
He was the first out there.
Before that, the second day, though, he and I were joking and carrying on.
He's Chinese.
He is a Chinese.
He's educated in France.
He's smart and tough.
Very artistic.
But Tanang was very good.
He was concerned about...
about this China thing.
Very much concerned about insurgents to the north.
Things that were quite upset with the foreign aid thing.
They needed some reassurance.
And said that if they didn't have, if they had a large Chinese population there in Thailand, that they had assimilated
They always assumed that they did not have their own spirit, that they did not have their own practices, that they had many ties.
I don't know if they were actually ties or something.
And Bud said that with this move, that we have problems in Northeastern provinces, Northern provinces, Cambodia has a good problem, except we've been conditioning.
with the Jamborees, and we know they have, but they haven't discussed it.
He heard some rumors that the U.S. was being required to move the troops to Taiwan before the meeting with the Chinese.
They had a radio broadcast, and you all know that there's nothing to that.
I said, no, I shouldn't.
But there was not.
He wanted to know if you would meet with Mousetongue, or Chu, or Hoag.
And I told him it was my understanding that you would meet with Hoag and Chu, and also with Mousetongue.
And he asked me if you were going to ask the brother from China to help him, so I said no.
And I said no, that was my understanding that they would stop going there.
About third country interest, the one I was talking about, the United States-China relation.
As far as I know, they're not going to do the issue of third country interest, which is what I'd already told you.
I asked him, and he literally got me the information about what was happening inside China, about five million different places.
He said he didn't know, but he knew nothing more than just a little bit.
that everybody knew, but he personally felt, he asked him to do it, but his NPR had been there without testing him, and he said, well, he said, you probably won't be there with the president, but we all care regardless of that.
He said, well, that's good.
Does your NPR have a hard life?
And he said, no.
And he said, I would think that his actions serve for whatever reason, and it is good.
He said, my only expectation of what's happening to this is they're not going to have, after Mao Zedong, they're not going to have a one-man rule anymore.
He said, he was very concerned with the situation in Mao Zedong, and I told him the truth.
He survived the 11th.
And he said to Snowhole, he said, the support for the United States has to be behind the Brooklyn flood.
And he said, we're going to have that, and the troops are going to have to go.
And then he was talking about what Temple, Temple Hill, was attacked by the Comcast on the Tide when they were moving the border.
And Garrison was defending the capacity for health, and he sent, he sent troops, American air power was huge, he sent the air power,
was absolutely important in such cases.
One of those preventions, he said, we should talk to the ocean.
We told him the same thing.
The helicopters, the preventions, were an absolute exception.
He said, our problem here in Thailand and other provinces, he said, we have no roads.
He said, we have no communication.
He said, it's forest, jungle.
It's not discouraged.
He was more concerned than he appeared to be afraid to do it militarily.
He was concerned, one, with the extent of the China move.
Secondly, he was concerned about the intent of the United States with respect to South
There was no question whether we were going to get out of there.
Nobody took the time to sit down there.
Cambodia and Laos, whether Laos and Cambodia, Cambodia is great.
Laos and Cambodia both are about South Vietnam, but even more so, they're about Thailand.
Now, the difference, of course, between South Vietnam and Thailand, South Vietnam, we have, of course, an enormous state because we fought there.
But Thailand, we had a treaty.
Now, therefore, when we made Cambodian allowances, the question is, do we revert Cambodians and Laotians to do their own fighting, or do we want that to fall to the communists, and then be called upon by the communists to help them, and then we would have to do it or break a treaty.
Now, that's the whole of the proposition.
And Thailand is the only little country in that park that we can agree to.
We don't have any consent of the local nation.
I don't know if we can file a survey or not.
We don't really know.
But I did assure them that we were going to live up to our treatment.
Absolutely.
And in Thailand is what is Taiwan.
And that's another thing that they all want.
It's a good portrait.
I don't know what are we going to do with that one.
Are we going to support one of them?
I thought the meeting in Thailand was exceptionally good.
We went out one night with the prime minister.
They had a festival on the ground.
It's a huge festival that they celebrate once a year.
It's quite a light little floating bastion.
and put them on the water to make a wish.
So it was kind of a big year Christmas all rolled into one.
And he invited us out to his summer home and showed us all through the place.
He and his wife got a house up there that was made out of teak wood.
It was a lovely architecture.
He took us in and showed us his bed and his dressing room.
It was all this beautiful inlaid Chinese quarter of pearl and stuff.
Not my favorite part, but this was obviously a lot of stuff.
But he took us in and showed us a bit of the city and a whole lot of work.
There was a sports shirt up there, and then we had there, in his dining room, there was a barbecue there, kind of a barbecue.
They had shish kebab, but one of the fellas, he was importing a bunch of Santa Cruz cattle.
And there was a tight end that shook some wheat down.
He was down there and carried hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people up down the river.
And the boat and I got all over the fireworks.
The long fireworks that were there.
They had floating in them.
And he insisted that we just got wicky and stay with it.
And the minute he put this little boat in them,
And the water wouldn't let it out, so he put one in.
And he would sit back over and stand with him while he threw out all the prizes.
He was about to pour the prizes out of all the floaters.
And they're all water-borne.
It's a hell of a question.
Beautiful.
They're gracious people, aren't they?
They really are.
So they were very kind to us.
We once seen King the next day.
The Queen was not there.
I don't know why she was supposed to be there.
There was no difference to it.
He was upset about something.
He took off on quite a tirade and in effect said that we did not know, we did not know or understand the Chinese.
The Chinese were very wise people.
He was a boy who was very responsible, very pessimistic, and quite critical of his own country.
He was quite emotional.
And I think there's a, you met him before, he's a very critical person,
Could well be.
He told me that he was pretty much home to that.
Well, you don't have to give any aid.
You don't have to give any aid.
Anybody above is going to come to me.
He said, we've got such corruption here.
He said, they don't know what people want.
He said, I'm having to take my own money.
He said, I'm having to provide the guns.
And he took off on the AR-15 and the M16 rifles and talked about how they jammed and they were inefficient and they looked good.
We gave them all, we cast all the stuff.
And I thought all of that was quite a tirade.
And I said, well, I'll have you quickly follow me.
And I didn't signify before, but I actually did, so I could.
I thought it was quite critical of his own government.
As a matter of fact, he said, the government's corrupt.
He said, I don't think
But I think we've missed our time to be able to go along with the coaches and stuff.
Except 50 years ago, maybe we had a new shift to food coaches and doctors.
So they're completely out of touch with people.
They don't want people to want what they need.
So they don't want to know that we've been out in the country, we've been out in the forest, and they're the ones who go to the food on the back, and they're the ones that I'm trying to help with self-service operations.
He got some of the rifle for him.
He got so much food for him, he got to take it out of his pocket.
And out of the cherries that he put in his, you know, the army people and swine and food and stuff.
And he made such a point.
He kept on asking for the majesty of the United States.
It's not a policy.
It's certainly never a policy.
I think if we did what you suggest, that we come in and do it in a higher rank of the nation, in the entire army, and we get necessarily criticized in the US Pacific,
But we had quite a long, quite a long discussion.
He was, something might have happened that upset him.
But he worried about three things.
Our comprehension and understanding of the Chinese.
He said they have patience.
They have patience.
They will be fine.
And I said they will wait a long time.
Secondly, he was worried about the insurgency and all that.
I don't know if he's retired or not.
He said they're already doing it.
They've already lost it.
I don't take it back, but I don't think he was worried about the insurgency.
He was worried about our aid, the situation of our aid.
He was worried about our intentions.
And he was worried about, he was obviously worried about his own government.
and I told them what they were doing.
I doubt that they were concerned with nowhere else to be at with the judge or how corrupt they are or how bad they are.
I doubt that they are because I saw his mom that night and this fellow there.
He moved among those people.
And he handled himself like a politician.
He was out there doing the checking, and his wife was, his two sons, his brother.
You know, I just mentioned him in many ways.
And he led hundreds of people around him.
And he was outgoing, he was considerate, and he looked like he could deal well
Anywhere a man of interest, I certainly could not protect him, but I was all over him.
He had to stay in touch with me to listen to what his mom did.
The best perception we've got of him, I guess, is that he was a man of interest.
Ah, you're right.
Of course, it's a hard way to explain that kind of man.
I like to petify the people.
He's concerned about the same thing.
Concerned about the United States of Texas specifically.
Thirdly, he's directly concerned about Cambodia.
Apparently, a kid named Ron Moe was up there about a year ago and was there with him before he left the country.
And apparently, she had an interview with the chief of staff, Ron Moe, and said, I'm curious, man, I'm very much out to meet you.
And I said, Ron Moe's got an official.
And apparently, it formed a very fast friendship.
And he said, all right, gather here.
And he worried about the Chinese government very much.
They're all ancient.
They're all ancient.
They don't know whether your movement means that they ought to be there to start diplomatic relations or start trade relations or just what.
They don't know what to do.
And I basically said to them, I said, I tried to assure them that they ought not to get their expectations too high.
I said, just don't assume that we're going to be struck away by the emotional evening.
I said, because I know this real well, that it's a long, hard road.
And I said, we're all going to make it.
if we moved too fast, and if we were too eager, whatever we were doing.
And I went through, with each case, I went through these steps.
And that's a curse.
It's a reassurance on how you might do it.
So I gave him...
said the President's attitude to the United States was to follow the point that the United States was going to play a major role, and that she was going to be strong, and that she was going to be a great person, and that she was going to grow.
There's some documents that say she was going to grow, and so forth.
And then I talked about the foreign aid thing, and I told her that I felt the foreign aid picture, and said that she had recognized that there was some growth, some protectionism in the United States, largely because
I would have been happy if you took the steps in order to both correct the imbalance in our trade situation, and secondly, to try to still reinforce the protection before they became too open in the United States.
As part of that, you would have felt that you could cut bondage in.
did that was that the Congress then, because they were in control of the opposite party, they had to get in on some of the political popularity of the protectionism they saw coming in this country.
So they just cut it all out.
And I'm sure the party can't get it restored.
And I said, I don't know exactly what foreign department, but the administration should do everything in their power.
And I said, we're not going to leave you here.
We're going to stay outside of the station, military, financial, economic, because the president for as long as we've been asking.
And so this was quite reassuring to all of them.
And I think it particularly was to Shahar Khan.
We had a real good meeting with them on three different occasions.
We met with all of them.
I'm very impressed with them.
Are you in Indonesia?
Yes, sir.
That's an important country.
They're all archangels.
They're all highly educated.
They're all from Indonesia.
They're all graduates.
Most of them are United States students.
I spent four years in Berkeley.
I graduated from Pennsylvania.
One of them is from Purdue.
They all, I say, they're all damn smart, all of them for this.
Very aggressive, apparently all of them, extremely honest, extremely difficult.
And he's listening.
It's a hard-to-listen.
I say, he's got a couple of old military police, a couple of generals that are still around that our people don't like.
They think they're bad people.
We do.
But it's hard to raise the military age thing in the West.
That's reassuring.
And Prime Minister, he very much wants that military and the other age for the simple reason that he wants to help Cambodia.
And he wasn't good.
He wasn't good himself.
Or he wouldn't serve as a conduit, but he is extremely interesting.
I thought that was a really good point.
Well, Chinese, none of them had any good relations with China.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
In the Philippines, we got there, just spent about four hours.
President Marcos couldn't imagine what he saw.
Older than me.
Older than me.
Older than me.
Older than me.
Older than me.
Older than me.
Older than me.
They did what they really did.
The whole thing worked out for four hours.
How did they feel?
They had their action.
They had it?
We were there the day after we were there.
Were you happy about that?
Yes.
I would say he's a hell of a cool, cool, I should say.
Because he knows not one way.
This is their center.
Yes, and their provincial governors and mayors.
Well, he said that we lost ground.
He said we may lose five out of eight.
But it's worse than that.
But he said we're going to carry the intervention of governors and mayors.
He said, you know, they're the ones that have to do it.
He said, you know, I probably understand more.
It hurts you.
He said, I can do all of the field control the same.
But he said, psychologically first.
He said, we've had some trouble.
He said, there's this bomb in here.
And he said, oh, it's not good.
He said, we've got some circuits in place.
And he said, it's a selection.
And I'm sorry, we're not doing that.
But he said, we're going to do very well.
And he promised.
And there it was.
And eventually it was.
She was quite upset about it.
She was playing it all over the head.
She was very confident.
But that didn't give me any indication.
Well, it's a long way off.
Well, I did.
She said, actually, I said that to her on this plane.
And I said, I don't know.
I said, I don't know.
I said, I don't know.
I said, I don't know.
And I said, I'll get you that.
And she had it.
And I said, well, I said, Mark was the least I could say.
But I had no clue who was going to push it.
And I said, how about you?
And she just had it.
And we turned it off that way.
But she was, she was disappointed that he is, that he was upset about the, the brother of the vice president.
He thought I was going to hear a little wrong.
And the brother owned that and he wanted to leave the Richmond.
Don't go to the country because she's really crazy.
And the brother, and he had really good work in Arkansas.
And they're right there.
And they said he's got to move the ballot from this election.
But his concern, and I passed this along to Henry, and I will now give him the floor.
And I also passed it on to the State Department.
And he said they're going to meet on November the 24th at Kuala Lumpur, the heads of all the Southeast Asian countries.
He wanted some guidance from the United States on the question of military bases in that part of the world.
He said Malaysia wants to outlaw the military bases in Southeast Asia.
And secondly, he said the Asian leaders may want to adopt a resolution calling on the great powers to adopt a new aggression pact with respect to Southeast Asia.
I'm sure before that, I said, on the basis, I said, I haven't gone through it.
And I said, just to talk to you about it.
Your brother took it from me.
I said, where?
I said, that's where I heard it.
So I said, no, I'm entitled to it.
And the great kid told me.
I said, now, you see, we can get the military assistance.
We can get it up to our committee.
If we're going to have some place out there, it's fine.
It's up to us.
to protect the people and to provide a shield on.
But if there's something else to it, well, you don't have the ability to even have laces in the country.
Now, he said, on military aid, that they really are a great discipline because they have no projections, no long-term plans.
And he said, President, we don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
We don't know where to go.
He said, I think South Korea had, South Vietnam perhaps was an exception, so maybe we had to send them down there.
But he said, you don't have to send them to the United States.
You can send them to other countries.
You can send the facilities and materials early enough and train them.
So for instance, here, we have plenty of men, but we need your facilities, your equipment, and your training.
So what would you do if you had four-year plans?
to know what material we're going to get, what facilities we're going to have.
And it's been four years, and we've set up a great old writing program, which I'd like to go into the example of the rest of the world.
Self-protection, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency.
And we want to be particularly looking to you for all of your help and all of your assurances that you work
He's very worried about the Chinese subversion.
He says, I'm not worried about it.
He said they were organized military.
We take care of those.
No problem at all.
We wipe them out.
But he said, it was the Suburban.
He said, it's not the Suburban.
It's the Suburban.
He said, the Chinese are experts at it.
He said, they're operating in the Philippines now.
That's a part of the time.
Right where I was in the years.
He said, right where I had to hook.
He said, I know the country and I know the people.
He said, they're in there.
He said, now there's no way back.
But he said, depending on what y'all do with the Chinese,
and what happens in the whole part of the world, it has become a very serious problem.
And he was, he was fishing.
He said that sometimes it's quite difficult for us to explain to others in our own country and in other countries the United States' actions because there's a great amount of information about what's
especially with the plantings and so forth.
So what are you doing with that?
So in each case, I told them about Henry's visit, about the conversations he had, the invitations, security, all the rest of it.
Half part of me was with him.
I had a long part of me
put me in, and the attitude could have been nice.
It could have been more fun to talk about politics.
And she was extremely cooperative.
They just couldn't have been more mean.
They couldn't have been nicer.
As a matter of fact, you're only there four hours.
And then we went right on in.
Well, we didn't want to go during the elections.
So we went the next day.
That was good for them.
You could go in four hours.
We never got to, you know, discompress everything.
Then we got all out.
We had an excellent meeting in Japan.
We didn't solve the problem.
We had a long announcement.
a farm, which must have been a nice, pretty place to knock on, and to cut it, and to glue it, and so we did.
We made ourselves a first, quite long, two hours of pay.
It was an hour of pay until we was done with shopping, and I know our neighbors, and I know our neighbors,
And that reassurance is very important.
And even with the last one.
When we started out, this is terribly important.
And so,
COULDN'T HAVE BEEN FIRMLY, COULDN'T HAVE BEEN NICELY.
WE TALKED ABOUT THE DEMONETARY THING, AND I SAID, WELL, WE'RE REGISTERED IN NEW YORK.
I SAID, NO, WE DON'T WANT IT.
I SAID, I DIDN'T WANT TO BE IN NEW YORK.
I DIDN'T WANT TO BE IN NEW YORK.
I DIDN'T WANT TO BE IN NEW YORK.
Were you there when they, or did it happen after you left?
I was there.
They were pleased with that.
That's very helpful.
Very explosive incident.
That's a very good question.
Very excellent question.
But they're right in the middle of it, and they just want to be held.
On the Okinawa version.
Yeah.
You discussed the matter of the land that you were paying for.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
He thought it up.
He told me we could be...
I told him that you had a business with the Prime Minister.
He should have got it.
But...
that wants to be helpful, that wants to be accommodated, and that's about everything.
And these trade and monetary matters should all be considered, and certainly, you know, federally considered, as far as the features, the size, the basis, to try to be helpful to people where they can.
But the thing they won't post right now is some letter to him or some kind of communication that, uh,
that at the time of the actual aversion of these nuclear weapons would be all over the island.
And Bill Rogers waffled on that a little bit before the debate.
Packard didn't.
Packard made a strong statement on the design of these little things.
And that was somewhat reassuring to him.
But they really are...
But they want a letter.
They won't stop until they show that he's under terrific question every day before the guy is going to do this.
They said it would be worth a week, a terminal discussion.
Every little bit takes a day to talk to.
But he mentioned the base sizes, the size of the bases, the features.
And I'll be sure he wanted special forces.
And it was very well.
We talked about the money bank, the conservative elite.
I gather that they are not quite ready to move, but they just totally saw it.
They stayed on that floor all day long.
They couldn't leave without permission of the guy.
He moved it up.
He was trying to get back to his bed.
I saw him and checked and pushed on myself.
The time was 6.05 to 8.30 at night.
And that night, we checked.
department of security has done it for me.
And, uh, Joshie and I were late for the deadline.
All of you, not even me.
And, uh, I was late.
And, uh, I was late.
And, uh, Joshie and I were late for the deadline.
He was very warm, very friendly, very concerned about the China thing.
He had a mission going over the next day, a trade mission, about 15, and they talked business.
I had lunch with him one day.
It was about 8 a.m. And he said, I'm going to go out there, and I'm going to give you a lesson today.
And he was all over the place.
And I said, I'm going to go out there, and I'm going to give you a lesson today.
I was trying to tell them what they had to do to be prepared to pose a problem and hope that they would come forth with suggestions about what they could do.
They were their own problems much better than we were.
But concessions, but trade concessions, they make at least economic and political advantage to themselves.
They look at it from the standpoint of re-evaluation, political and economic.
And whatever they can do, I'm sure there's going to be another.
And I don't think it's indicated that they have to be valued at 24%.
So I didn't try to do it.
And I said, I find it offensive to do that.
That's one thing.
I said, I don't have to do it.
That's the question.
Anyhow, all of the discussions were excellent.
We got into some potato, which is not going to be the first time I've been in a great industry.
We talked about a number of specific things.
I was not trying to
Negotiate was a total mess, because the way the meetings were set up, there wasn't a way out to do it.
The first day I met with the Missoula, and the second day I met with their equipment, and all the practice, and Tim Wood, head of the Economic Corp. of the state.
Then I met with the Akagi Agricultural Commission for an hour and a half.
And then I left him and immediately went to Tanaka, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and had an hour and a half with him.
Then I left for a luncheon.
And then, uh, the afternoon, it was a pretty bad evening.
I went with, uh, with, uh, Coquillette, who played with the prime minister.
So, uh, there was no, no opportunity to, to get into it, although I told him I was ready to do it.
And I said, we're ready tomorrow or the next week.
And I think they wanted to probably have one more attempt at the group attempt so that we could get a group attempt.
Before they did it bilaterally, I think they just, with this open-ended version of it, they just cleared the news.
Although I have the impression that
that even in the face of the textual thing and the China movement, that the repercussions have not been as bad or as disastrous as they all may have been.
As a matter of fact, I think there's some indication from Harvard over there that the Saudi situation is included because, as you know, we lost to China for the United Nations.
But people say, I haven't made a decision.
He made a decision.
He did something.
He did it on his own.
So apparently, his position is dominant.
But at the end of the day, it's strength.
I talked to him about the SST.
He had something like that.
He was not totally committed with it, so I had to go back and just be behind him and try to commercialize it.
and go back and kind of fit it in on the back of what was about the Concorde, the Russian deployment, and then about our SSP, so we've got a group of dollars in it.
And so we're very interested in thinking about going into the U.S. with a joint mission arrangement with us, using our technology to do pretty much what we're going to do as long as we can serve.
But he said, I would sure like to.
go into it and say, we have a great expertise on jet engines.
And I say, well, perhaps you don't have to.
You could obviously divide up the work on some basis and you could divide up the research and divide up the production.
And I suppose you could take the engines, you could take the airplanes or something of that sort.
So whether it be an equitable division of activity between the two nations,
And he said, well, I'm sure there are more things I can do.
So I told him that we'd better come back over and talk about it.
And he said, well, I'm sure I'm much better than you.
And I said, well, I'm afraid of everything I understand.
And he said, well, you probably would have heard more about it in the country.
And I said, well, that would be more educational.
the people around were not particularly concerned about that.
Indonesia expressed an interest.
They felt that
that whatever they've worked out, they hope that the blessed developed countries and the devoutly countries will have something to say about it.
They all say, of course, we hold dollars and we're not gold owners, so we're not going to exchange the price of gold.
But however you work it out, it's all right.
They just want to be sure that they
and so if there's a question possible and there's a need about it, we can ask them for a greater consultation.
And at times of the year, I put it in another bar, I put it about the fact that we've dominated Europe, and they want to speak for one voice, but they won't accept what we're doing.
And I said, well, we're going to have to do it with domination, and we're going to have to do it with some voice.
where that forms a new structure.
And that's part of what I'm going to do.
A lot of times, I don't have to be too specific about it, but I have to have that in mind.
So, a little criticism of your view, and some hope for that part of the world.
I said that to you, and you can say whatever you want.
And, obviously, he's going to want to move on this funny thing.
They just...
Instinctively, they can't stand uncertainty.
They're very meticulous, precise people.
And, uh, I, I think the, uh, the Twitter thing, uh, the wall thing, there's a plane that's been in a recession, this thing.
I always felt that what bad happens if you go to Japan, the hardship that, that might not have,
five or six percent .
So, I mean, it was this kind of thing, and I said, well, I appreciate all that, but I said, I hope you'll consider it.
We got zero proof.
And I said, we got five and a half million people on the floor.
And I said, so everything you brought me, I said, to us, you're five percent.
We approve.
It's great prosperity.
I said, now, a few years have gone by.
But I said, you can't, you can't measure the future value of that.
And I said, your base is already so big that you can't have the percentage growth that you had.
I said, you're talking 20 percent, it's not better.
And I said, that's just very much like Germany, talking about their inter-recession.
I said, it may be, but they've got to fire somebody from Spain, from Boston.
And they had plenty of money, but it didn't work because they were over-employed.
I said, my God, the level of their activity was such that they didn't have the manpower to do it.
I said, they brought people in all over Europe.
I said, now maybe they haven't the same skill at home.
I said, I regret that.
I said, that's a whole lot different from us having 5.5 million dollars of people in the country.
And I said, we don't win anything.
And I said, we all have the recession.
That's mine.
I said, we're in three weeks on the sliding scale.
I said, I've got no faith in you.
I said, you're going to have a hard time.
I said, we would have a fluctuating scale, but I said, it hasn't had a function.
My point, our country's point, I can't, I just can't see where he has a great, sad story to tell.
I said, this year he's had over $9 billion to reserve.
But they were trading from the time we started with the finance ministry, the ministry of trade, the ministry of payroll, I said, whatever.
Our contractors, I said, please, all these big teams that are out there, this is a bit terrible, I said, but I'm not.
I said, my information is just concrete.
I said, your customized figures, your certified customized figures for September and October after the birth of this action law are up considerably below what they were.
I said, as a matter of fact, your exports this year are 25% above what they were.
I said, that's up to 25%.
And I said, the exports last year were very high.
Well, they said, we've got a depression because our imports are down.
Our exports are up because our imports are down.
We're not the biggest here, so we're fighting for the export markets.
I said, well, that'd be fine.
They said, that'd be quite true.
I said, the imports are up 4.5%.
I said, now, they're not up quite 5%, like the exports, but they're up 4.5% above what they were.
Then I'm down.
Well, they said, on a relatively basic reason.
So we got this kind of a talk back and forth for the third part of two days.
Now, I think I could have probably pushed for a settlement with them.
And I'm not sure we would have gotten it, though.
I really think that they were so preoccupied at the moment with this diet debate on the Okinawa reverse
And they were so concerned about this foreign aid thing.
And my God, they wanted to know about South Korea.
And they were shocked when we went to the troops there.
And we went to the troops in Taiwan.
And we went to the troops in Taiwan.
Every single thing they would ask about that, that's what they asked about.
And this other came along.
It was all about all kinds of types of discussion.
Now, Tanaka, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the International Trading Industry, he did talk about China.
He talked about just trading on it and not trading on it.
He probably settled in Japan just prior to or just after the Mexican war.
He didn't.
And it went on like this until the end of this month properly.
I didn't call it a party.
I called it tomorrow.
It was the 30th of November, the 1st of December, or the 7th or 8th of December.
And you know what?
We were ready to settle this thing.
And in that connection, I'm going to make a speech to the economics club on Tuesday.
And what I'd like to do, Mr. President, is
I think we're getting a little bit of a trap.
We're not getting ourselves into it.
I don't know if it's all that bad, but I don't like to see people, I don't like to believe it myself.
Because it's not true, it's not justified.
But I just noticed the other day where it was, the deal with the Sandals and the Polo Sandals,
We've all talked about how bad this important subject was, and the notion that it put on.
As I said, my remarks in Japan were monstrous, and that our negotiating was just terrible, and this was the wrong way, the strong-arm tactic was terrible.
And I think this is going to be a failure.
I think this is going to be... That's the line that...
developing and the redlining.
And generally, you know, it's a line which is hard to take or begin to take.
There are great pressures.
And, uh,
Uh, I deliberately have, uh, sped it off everybody, and I haven't met with the whole group of people.
Peterson, of course, and Kevin, you know, he doesn't want to do these things.
He's going to have to start a radio.
That's one of the times I'm sure they'll come here.
That's what the current mood is here.
It may give it some...
reassurance that we are making progress, that we are doing something else.
What is your view?
Well, I've already had a chance to analyze all this stuff that you've come back.
No, but I've analyzed part of it, but I have to say, well, you don't need to analyze it anymore.
The law is set on your mind.
It's the law.
But most of our critics are both outside of that.
And those are my preference .
Oh, yes.
I get worked on.
Yes.
I think our community .
No question.
And I saw him once when he was .
And I was fairly comfortable with him.
So you've got to discover that they didn't do that thing.
I mean, obviously, that's discipline.
within our own shop at the other side of the other side I think we generally speak considering that we have a great hell of a time I mean we don't know what the meaning for it will be but I don't think
They voted against it, which is all right.
But on the other hand, they haven't walked out, which is important.
If they had voted for it, it would have been like a sell-out.
So that's a thing we're going to discuss tomorrow.
But I think they're pretty high marks for the grace and the hope that Matthew Rumsfeld has.
And I think we all agree that they're well worth it.
We were watching that closely, and I thought it was really important, particularly with regard to the table.
But, you know, that was a tough week.
It was really, really difficult.
is 5.5% for next year.
Let's face it, you're going to have to pay the rent-a-ride and stuff.
You can't write a contract.
You don't know that.
But if we can have 5% next year, that's half of what it has to do next year.
And that will be a hell of an issue.
And the life of the program, typically, is we don't get help.
And the rate of inflation is maybe 2.5 to 3.
That means you don't have a way to price question.
And it will be a fantastic thing, I'm sure.
Now, if you have some strains, I think it's really irresponsible to let all people, the business people, strain about the tax.
I mean, the price went underground, and they said the profit margins, the market should be limited, all the amount of profit should be limited.
And the business people are screaming, how the hell can they expect labor to be responsible if they say they won't do it?
You tell a business guy, you can make as much as you want, but you've got to get off your ass and sell more.
You know, but they, that business group is a pretty sad one.
They're a sad one.
But anyway, they talk so much, you know, about, and I say that, you know, a lot of the business, they talk so much about their labor boys, their bunch of guys.
And when it comes down to something like this, where the labor boys have to drink their face wheel,
All in all, I felt pretty good.
I want you to look into it.
You probably, you know, your people are sitting in on all this.
You know what the deals are.
But you've got that on that front.
But it seems to me that on the international front, what we have to do now is take a hard look at it and step in some course.
But one of the questions, what course we set this, I think, is for us to determine.
I think that we're going to be forced into something by emergency.
I mean, I, you know, it's really something we are in the closest game.
How we're going to handle it, I don't know.
I simply don't know, but we try to care.
Thank you.
So why didn't we have to come right down to it?
That's cutting the support for the law.
And it made me even do it.
I had to take the thing away.
But what are your feelings?
Well, the only thing that I think we ought to do at this point is spend a little time
with what press we have and using the opportunity to do that, which I'm going to be accusing you of.
Just take it easy.
Take it this way, basically.
Listen.
One of the reasons why you did what you did was in order to protect the capacity of the United States to maintain the military establishment and the security shield for the whole world.
and to be able to maintain the profession, to continue the aid that is so absolutely essential to the developing nation, that this is the only nation that can do it, that we have reached the point, the erosion of our international economic picture, and our domestic picture, to where we will not share in the, where's the word?
prosperity, where we were not sharing the prosperity that was so much a part of Germany and Japan going forward, let's say, without America to be going forward here, where the stagnant development, the stagnant economy, something had to be done.
Otherwise, protectionism was going to be going around the United States.
So that you took this move in order to strengthen the position of the United States, to provide the jobs here, to commit to continuation.
of the maintenance of the Shia and the economic assistance.
And this is particularly critical.
Any year, whether you're going to China, whether you're going to Moscow, whether you're hoping to make progress in the South Pole, wherever there's ever a time in the history of the United States where you need to leave, you're at that time now.
And if you anticipate it,
by shoring up the economic foundation of this nation.
And if that's what you set out to do, and if this is, at the very heart of this, anticipate that the continuing role in international affairs, you make a proportion.
But the thing that's been most devastating to us is the actions of the Senate.
In just one fell swoop, just cutting out all of our aid.
Now, sure, they've resurrected it.
But they resurrected it after the fact, and here, here in Manilife, Manitoba, there's always been strong supporters of foreign aid, who, when they have a Democratic president, call for bipartisanship.
But here, all at one time, in one fell swoop, they abandoned both the partisanship and the concept of foreign aid and become protectionist,
and provincial, and partisan.
But in effect, these are the protections.
These are the men that want to let go.
Those who voted to kill are basically the new isolationists.
The new isolationists is what they are.
The new unprotectionists.
The new, frankly, unilateral brawlers.
That's what it is.
They want to withdraw from the world.
I mean, the degree to come down to it, I don't want to reduce our management.
I don't want to reduce what they're doing.
Oh, they say, oh, let's help India.
Jesus Christ, they don't do that.
What they're going to do is go out for guns and make these damn things in us.
I got one in Southeast Asia, or Japan, or Korea, or Europe, for example.
Well, that's the type that I think will start something.
The very essence of your program is international in character and in execution.
It was conceived as an international program being administered and executed as an international program.
So we can continue.
these activities, that on the other hand, the very people that are being critical of you, and of me, and of the program, are the new isolationists.
Those who want to cut out all foreign aid, who really want to withdraw, who don't want to provide the military sheet, who don't want to live up to the responsibility imposed upon America, and we do pretty well.
I think this is the fact that at least for the international group, that we have to try to, and I think it's basically true,
The mere fact that we want a fair shake in international trade doesn't mean that we have to withdraw.
The point that is hanging, Solomon, is that a weak United States will be an isolationist United States.
The United States must make an international call.
It's an economic call.
But we will not play that call.
So we've got to restore that call.
One that I think will be very important is for a pretty positive line on how much the 1983 deal with the The fact that it was successful and it did start the line of practice, the fact that in addition to that, the whatever it's worth, the balance of trade did change, the fact that
prosperity which is not based on which is based on
in terms of the whole war piece that we have to remember.
As close as 1869, about 25 years ago, we had a situation where we had a war piece that, where by the end of January,
Uh, that will, will require the government and our agencies to be involved in the adoption of the pass-through requirement sheet.
Instead of one time out, we're going to back it up.
We, we might have already made two months to approve it.
So, we're going to try to shift the, uh, the plan a little bit from the current location.
Thank you.
I don't think it's a fair graph that they say, well, we're being counseled to.
We're trying to strong-arm and all that sort of thing.
I think the way to disarm them to a certain extent is to say that we are discussing, as we are discussing the committee, and lower levels and other levels of our discussions taking place in the European Commission.
and that we are .
Right.
And as a matter of fact, that you're confident that we are going to look this up.
I think the basis for it is that when he acted on August the 15th,
We acted to get rid of an unsound system.
Now, after having taken that tough, hard action, we must now replace it with another unsound system.
That's really the critical thing.
And here's where the burns are on.
And frankly, some of us in the national front, we had to go right back and say, God damn, no question.
What did you think, son?
No question.
I don't know what your people feel.
I don't know what everyone feels.
I don't know what your people feel.
I don't know what your people feel.
I don't know what your people feel.
I don't know what your people feel.
And that makes the proper thing to do.
Now that we're back in the middle, and we do what we can on a freeze, you know, at 100, sure.
And I don't think we've been hurt the particular day we get to do this on the 5th.
Now you, as a columnist, what do you think of, you know, you'll run into this, you know, the Wall Street crowd, and they're holding out on the streets, and someone else is there, and so it's really uncertain.
You're not hurt, but it's uncertain about days, you know, the answer to that,
Of course phase two is uncertain.
The way to have certainty is to have a totalitarian economy.
With a totalitarian economy, there's not a free time.
So ours is an uncertain and deliberately so.
But I got one that we know is certain, and that is the rate of inflation is going to come down and the rate of wage earnings are going to come down, and that's good.
And that's the way to crack an art of math.
The other thing is that they don't, then they said, there's a lot of uncertainty about our international market.
Now, for Christ's sake, the effect that should have on our economy is sillage.
So, right, you're sillage.
And then what happens?
Huh?
Well, here's what happens.
It's going to improve.
It's just a question of how much.
Well, that's what they said.
But what we want to do is we've got to, I think, the way to disarm is to mitigate it.
as far as even going on and negotiating something actually is.
I celebrate that with a lot of work.
But we have sort of set the subject on let's face it, the China initiative, the Soviet announcement, and all the rest gives an intent to even less the Obama announcement.
It disarms these people that we really don't expect.
And I hope that's the perfect studio for things that are going along.
I thought you were real talk about it in the morning again, and we had a chance to, I have a feeling myself that your speech in order to increase the amount of work that you've done, I don't think it's bad, but having to do that, I think it's, I would use it for the purpose of making some positive comments, and that's also,
The economy hasn't been flat for a couple of years.
It's now moving up.
Let's face it.
As a matter of fact, the big heroes coming out of George Roosevelt were the consumers.
And you'd be able to say there wasn't enough time.
The goddamned business people were there.
And also, as a matter of fact, the Congressmen.
I'm not concerned.
I'm sure you're not, for the fact that the Congressmen
to raise that transaction to $800, we can't fight it.
But then sign it, right?
Or they're going to blame that for the deficit.
I see no other choice.
But if they want to lose it, I'm just sorry they didn't give us the 10% of the investment.
That's another thing, you know, the interesting thing, John, is that all the business is waiting for the Congress to act on it.
If there's anything certain in this world, well, any distributist person knows that Congress is going to pass that tax bill.
Right.
But on the other hand, when it does, and the checks will go off, and maybe the people who are a million and a half have bought cars since August 15, and that will change the economy some.
Well, I think there's some positive that's going on here in the line.
In fact, I think there's a tendency, except I will say this, and you and I get one of those.
I want you to look at this once in a while.
If you reach the conclusion, show us that you should be very strong, if you would expect that from your partners.
But, frankly, the New York crowd, the best leaders in the rest, all agreed that the planet would feel this way.
The council was in action.
Stein, and I don't think Stein even got shot on, saw him, and the person crashed.
And here, our effort is out to fight the wind and the snow.
We feel it.
We feel it.
We wish to believe it.
But we've got to get going on this plan.
I think we should do it.
How do you feel about it?
Well, I think we have to get this done.
Well, when I saw it, when I left here, we said, well, we've just been zero for three, four months now.
And I don't know if I'm going to do it.
I'm going to do it my own time.
I'm going to do it my own time.
You wait too long.
We'll have to get up to the December of next year.
It's unbelievable.
It's unbelievable.
And I don't know.
He's a power runner.
I still haven't given him the punch.
Who's your new head coach?
Oh, my God, the agriculture is not good.
We went down the road for everybody and so forth.
We finally took a bus, a rural bus.
Our ticket was a low load.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
We went to the farm.
corn, hogs, it's the heart of the whole thing.
And the Farm Bureau, the Grange, and the Farm Regime, and all the people, the Farmers' Organization, the NFO, and our commission, that's the left-man, they said thumbs down, so I think we did fairly well.
However, we tried to, we went around and around the tracks, and kind of did a camel man, just like they do.
But with all of these things, you know, the kind of fighting that we have in some of the countries that we're in, you know, they're like, you know, they weren't definitely violent.
It's a fact of the being.
I was taking my job, and I was, you know, working.
And this is the right time, this fall, when I would like to think about whether or not we,
But here's the thing on the Quorra County equipment, all of those people said they were going to raise the prices going on.
They've got all of the technical arguments and products.
The next year should belong to them.
The difficult thing is, it's essentially too long.
With Quorra 90% and 90% lean, it's going to be awful tough.
So I will talk to the department.
And I do not need to do that again.
Human evolution is not totally responsible right now.
We had one that was strong, and I personally worked on this.
We've got the pedigree sequence, and the long time, and the pedigree sequence, and the long time, and the long time, and the long time, and the long time,
So we sold for $100 million.
Sorry, yeah, did that go through?
It did.
There'll be another one in the morning.
But the main thing is, I could assume that it's agreed.
Now, the slogan is that it didn't have to be shipped in America.
No, sir.
That's correct.
That's the only way it could go.
So we worked that out.
That's, you know, that was tried twice before.
Now, I said, oh, that's probably what you mentioned, too, you know.
I don't know what the hell he knows about it.
Well, Henry mentioned that to me, and I said, well, who in the hell has he been talking to?
He said, well, I don't know.
And I said, well, he never had a thought about it.
And I said, that's why we don't know.
He knows about it much better than I do.
I don't know him.
Well, he's never been in a relationship.
I don't know who that is.
Well, somebody could talk to him, even if it happened.
or Rostow, or Rostow, the goddamned Rostow.
I'm just thinking people, but I would say it would be, I would say it would be a hell of an opportunity.
I think he's a pretty good man, actually.
He's a free man, but I think he's a decent man.
He did that.
Well, he partied.
He partied.
He's from Minnesota.
And he manages the economic economy just like Samson does.
I'm sure Samson does exactly the same.
But it's either him or Kermit or someone else.
Well, I think if he does, I'll just touch him up a little bit.
We were just talking on the phone.
Well, he told me that I'll go up there, but I don't know.
I'm going to take you all home.
I'm going to take you all home.
I'm going to take you all home.
I think existently, and I think that's right.
And if he does, that's fine.
I'll just touch you a little bit.
You know, we had one, I guess we've got to go over there.
I had a restaurant that's driving me to the show.
It was a great feature.
I had a chance to go to that one.
I had to go to that one.
I had to go to that one.
I had to go to that one.
I had to go to that one.
I had to go to that one.
He said, I don't know, he said, we've got a new foreign aid bill that's going to pass with $365 million in Cambodia.
And he said, I was the president.
How can you put a show that's going to move with us to that amount to Cambodia?
Because we aren't going to slide into Vietnam.
I mean, in Cambodia, just like we have a split into Vietnam.
So we didn't slide into Vietnam.
I said, there was a conscious decision made by President Kennedy to send the first combat people to Vietnam.
President Johnson made a conscious decision to send people to Vietnam.
I'm not criticizing, but that was both a conscious decision for Americans to go there and become involved.
I said, we made a conscious decision not to have Americans involved in Cambodia.
There are no American combat people there.
There are no advisors there.
There are not going to be any.
I thought, this is the Nixon doctrine that's the purest form.
We're helping Cambodia, but it doesn't get solved.
And I said, we're not going to make a mistake.
We may be a problem.
I don't know where this is going, but I think it is.
First question, we let these people off to you.
We let everybody, we let all our critics off to you.
You've got them right.
Now, Bill Rogers doesn't.
He ought to be up.
He really ought to be.
He never does.
And Alexis Johnson, and all of us, and every part of it.
And I'm guilty of it.
I'm guilty of it.
Jesus Christ, he never fell there.
He's never criticized one human being.
I know that.
He's never fighting.
You've done it.
You know, we've probably got some jacked people who have done hell of a lot of it.
Well, I'll write this example.
He ought to be out there being a little bit of a right knee, rather than the left one.
You see, I should be a peacemaker.
I've always got a tendency, by God, we're only withdrawing $45,000.
The reason we're going to withdraw $45,000 is because we've got Americans who are in prison, and I'm not going to withdraw them down until we have money so we can have some influence.
And also, I've got to protect the lives of thousands of Americans.
They infiltrate January, February, December.
Who do you indicate?
Well, this is the only way to worry about this international market.
Not that we're not doing the right things.
The truth of the matter is that none of these people are given a niche.
Now, we portion the flow.
Yeah.
And the only way they're going to meet you is by phone, but other than that, they come forward with absolutely nothing.
Is that right?
Absolutely nothing.
Except they say, we'll cooperate, you know, we'll...
In other words, they come up, come forth with what, basically, as I understand, they want us to raise the price of oil for the last flood.
Well, you're going to, as I said, I want you to talk to me, we'll talk to Henry.
There's days where you wouldn't understand, and so on.
Now, this is really the problem.
Every time we have a situation like this, the United States is expected to be responsible.
The rest of the country, the nation, is going to be irresponsible.
That's correct.
Now, in this instance, we, of course, have to act as if we're being responsible.
We've got to be very clever.
But on the other hand, we've got to be very, very, very strong.
And that is the best part.
I don't know.
This whole bill, I don't know.
I don't know.
But it seems to me that the argument of choice matters, that if you raise the price of those which know better how you come,
that that really means that you're going back to some form of variability.
I guess it does, I don't know.
No, it doesn't necessarily, I don't think it does.
Well, it doesn't mean that.
What he's worried about is what I think all of them are worried about, and that's exactly the situation we find ourselves in now when we start giving them the gold.
Then these same internationalists, these same columnists, these same countries are going to be putting political pressure on us then to go back to convertibility.
Do you think we should go back to convertibility?
Hell no.
No, sir.
Not even gold.
No, sir.
I do not.
Now, the price of gold kind of depends on that.
Particularly, if we'll agree to demonetize it.
But if we're going to get right back in that trap.
Because maybe that's the deal we can make with the print.
That's probably the problem.
Probably the deal.
If we do that, we can make that kind of a deal around it.
You can make that kind of deal around it.
Why don't you walk over to the other side?
But I just...
I just don't think we ought to push into these things that we've got.
It's my fault.
It's my fault.
It's my fault.