← 297-037297-039 →

Conversation 297-038

TapeTape 297StartFriday, November 12, 1971 at 2:20 PMEndFriday, November 12, 1971 at 2:25 PMTape start time02:00:58Tape end time02:09:20ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate the messaging for an upcoming troop withdrawal announcement and to assess the status of ongoing negotiations with North Vietnam. They discussed the tactical use of 'protective reaction' bombing raids in North Vietnam and the strategic communication of US offers regarding the potential resignation of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. The conversation also touched on managing domestic political credibility and the importance of maintaining flexibility in public policy regarding the South Vietnamese military's defensive capabilities.

Vietnam WarTroop withdrawalPeace negotiationsProtective reaction strikesNguyen Van ThieuForeign policy strategy
AudioNARA Description

On November 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:20 pm to 2:25 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 297-038 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 297-38

Date: November 12, 1971
Time: 2:20 pm - 2:25 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam
            -The President's forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
                 -Possible press questions
                       -Residual force
                              -South Vietnamese military capability
                              -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                                    -Wives
                                    -North Vietnamese
            -Negotiations with North Vietnam
                 -Ronald L. Ziegler
                       -Briefing
                 -Xuan Thuy
                       -Paris
                 -Le Duc Tho
                 -Nguyen Van Thieu
                       -Possible resignation
                              -Election
                                    -US offer
                 -The President's conversation with Josip Broz Tito
            -Bombing of North Vietnam

                  -Weather
                  -Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
                  -Possible targets
                        -Vinh
                               -“Protective reaction”
             -The President's forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
                  -Timing
                  -Kissinger's note and conversation with William P. Rogers
                  -Melvin R. Laird
                        -Credibility
                  -Gerald R. Ford and Leslie C. Arends
                        -The President's handling
                  -Credit
                  -Possible press questions
                  -Negotiations in Paris
             -Handling
                  -Compared with other wars
                        -Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt and [Thomas] Woodrow
                               Wilson
                        -Public reaction
             -The President's forthcoming troop withdrawal announcement
                  -Kissinger's forthcoming call to Ronald W. Reagan

       The President's schedule
            -National Security Council [NSC]
                  -Agenda
                         -Anti-ballistic missiles [ABMs]
                         -Kissinger, Gerard C. Smith and Rogers

Kissinger left at 2:25 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

President, I thought about this revision four times, but I would keep that other criterion of ability of the Vietnamese to defend themselves in it.
It's vague enough.
You can always get off it by saying you're now able.
But if you tie yourself too much to the prisoner issue, you're going to make yourself prisoner of the wise.
And above all, they're going to come up with some figures who are very, very meaningful.
okay
Mr. President, I thought about this through this report, but I would keep that other criterion of ability of the Vietnamese to defend themselves in it.
It's vague enough.
You can always get off it by saying you're now able.
But if you tie yourself too much to the prisoners, you're going to make yourself prisoner of the wise.
And above all, they're going to come up with some figures, won't they?
What do you mean, people aren't being punished?
I said, if that's raised, raise it.
I think it's raised.
I'm not going to be pushing the wheel here.
I'm going to say, well, that's not going to happen.
I'm not going to say, well, that's not going to happen.
And we've got to be totally relaxed about it and totally ruthless.
Mr. President, we may have to throw you into the equation at some point.
But not in a way that .
We've already offered to resign a month before the election.
Yeah, and we presented that.
That we've offered.
Yeah, we are in a great shape in terms of our offer.
We've offered that.
They know that already or you can offer that.
They know that.
What they don't know is that you had told them that he won't drunk.
But that guy don't trust.
Don't give him a damn thing on that.
And I'm not sure they would have given him that.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know at all.
But they won't take it on the basis that you resigned.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I think what we can do then, of course, is that
I think we've got a rough, about a two-day raid.
We're going to call it protective reactions.
That's what we're going to do.
That's what we're going to do.
We're going to do that.
But the weather will be pretty good at that time.
The weather will be pretty good.
The weather will be pretty good.
I don't know what to do with the weather.
It will be bad.
It will be bad.
It was a great time.
There ought to be some stuff in the truck.
There ought to be something in the license.
Oh, yeah.
There's a lot of issues.
How about, like, how about taking that out at the same time?
Just do something with it.
See what I can do.
Just take it.
Have some reaction.
Like, you know, there's a lot going on.
So, you know, most of them, you know, most of them, you know, most of them, you know,
Two months.
Out of Rochester.
I had to send him.
But I had to talk to him.
He's fine.
You have no problem with that.
He's put himself up for this.
He's trying to get the impression.
He's thought out the whole thing.
He's talking to the congressman.
He is.
And he said, well, his credibility is affected.
He said, it's a nutty way of looking at one's job.
Because you did one of the most difficult jobs I've ever seen.
But you take a normal president who doesn't know his subject as well as you do, confronted with two senior congressmen with a specific proposal.
would have one hell of a time.
What these fellows don't understand is that anything that fills you up with some credit, if you're part of a good administration, there's enough credit for everybody.
I'm going to leave it very pleasant to you regarding future control and regarding the duration of the next announcement.
I'm going to say all that and then we'll come back.
I'm going to just really leave a lot of that
They're all going to reject this anyway.
We'll get the domestic thing done.
But I am going to play it so that your people in Paris will know that I've got something else in mind.
They're going to make sure that the text is the best kind of accessibility.
They don't want the whole text.
We don't want the whole text.
What we really want is the
In a way, it would be much better to run a real war.
← 297-037297-039 →