Conversation 298-045

TapeTape 298StartThursday, November 11, 1971 at 6:30 PMEndThursday, November 11, 1971 at 6:55 PMTape start time03:58:48Tape end time04:20:07ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  White House operator;  McCloy, John J.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On November 11, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, and John J. McCloy met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 6:30 pm and 6:55 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 298-045 of the White House Tapes.

Recent ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery
          -Unknown soldier
                -Anniversary
          -Dwight D. Eisenhower
                -Korean War

Henry A. Kissinger entered at 11:31 am.

          -Honor guard
              -Unknown member

     Education
         -Writing
               -Books
         -Discipline
               -Staff
                     -Speechwriting
                     -Intelligence
                     -Teachers
         -Curriculum

     Vietnam
          -Cornell University study
                -Author
                      -The Economist
               -Bombing
                      -Figures cited
                            -1966, 1967
                            -1968
                                  -Peter M. Flanigan
                      -The Administration’s efforts
          -Casualties
               -Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] story
                      -News summary
               -World War I
                      -British casualties
                            -March 21, 1918
                      -World War II
                      -British, German, French
          -Kissinger's conversation with Henry A. Grunwald of Newsweek
               -People's Republic of China [PRC] and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
                      [USSR]
                      -Aid to North Vietnam
          -North Vietnam
                -Possible post-war period
          -Kissinger's conversation with Newsweek staff, November 9, 1971
                -Grunwald
                -Press
                      -Vietnam as issue
                -The Administration
                -Clark MacGregor's statements
          -Melvin R. Laird
          -Election
          -Use of US volunteers
                -Compared to draftees

     The President's schedule
          -Forthcoming press conference
          -[Earl L. Butz]

     Secretary of Agriculture
          -Clifford M. Hardin

*****************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/07/2018. Segment cleared for
release.]
[Privacy]
[298-005-w002]
[Duration: 4s]

       Secretary of Agriculture
              -Clifford M. Hardin
                      -Finances

*****************************************************************

     Cabinet
          -John N. Mitchell
          -Elliot L. Richardson
          -John B. Connally

     Latin America
           -Trip
                 -Robert H. Finch
                      -Conversation with Kissinger
                      -Charles A. Meyer

     The President's schedule
          -Georges J.R. Pompidou
          -French possessions
          -Canary Islands
          -Europe
          -Willy Brandt
                -Key Biscayne
                      -Compared to Chicago
                            -Accommodations
          -Europe
          -Pompidou
          -Virgin Islands
          -French possessions
                -Martinique
          -Europe
                -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] meeting
                -Kissinger's previous conversation with Arthur K. Watson
                      Economics
                      Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
                            -State Department
          -Pompidou
                -Possible message from the President
                -French Guiana
                -Martinique
                -Guadeloupe
                -San Martin
          -Possible state visit
          -Unknown Ambassador
          Chief of mission’s meeting
                -William P. Rogers's view
                -Pompidou
          -Brandt
          -Forthcoming announcement
          -Edward R.G. Heath
                -Bermuda
          -Pompidou
          -Separate meetings
          -Brandt
                -Chicago
                      -State Street
                -The President’s trip to Berlin

     International monetary situation
           -Japan
                -Connally

**************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 1/19/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[298-005-w003]
[Duration: 35s]
    International monetary situation
              -Japan
                     -Economic partnership with US
                            -Not reliable
              -Germany
                     -German economic plan
                            -John B. Connally’s opinion
                     -Germans compared to Japanese
                     -[Unknown first name] Moore

**************************************************************************

    International monetary situation
          -Brandt

    The President’s schedule
         -Trips
               -Summarized
                     -Key Biscayne
         -Heath
               -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with The Earl of Cromer
         -Pompidou
               -Possible message
         -Foreign visits
               -Possible demonstrations
                     -Netherlands
                          -Japan
                     -France
         -Europe
               -Timing
                     -USSR and PRC trips

    International monetary situation
          -Connally
          -Arthur F. Burns's view
                -Price of gold
                      -Speculation
          -Peter G. Peterson
          -George P. Shultz
          -Connally
                -Shultz
          -Price of gold
                -Convertability
                      -US responsibility
          -Connally's views
                -International system
                      -Structural reform
               -Past grievances
               -Balance of trade
               -West Germans
                     -Defense Minister [Helmut Schmidt]
          -Possible US action
               -Possible consequences

*****************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 01/19/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[298-005-w004]
[Duration: 4s]

       Japan
               -Non-cooperation with US

*****************************************************************

     International monetary situation
           -Western Europe
           -Texans
                -Connally and Lyndon B. Johnson
           -The President's methodology
                -Burns
                      -Methodology
                -The President's schedule
                      -Europeans

**************************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/07/2018. Segment cleared for
release.]
[Privacy]
[298-005-w013]
[Duration: 11s]

     Peter G. Peterson’s role
           -Mistake
           -Peter G. Peterson and Foster G. McGaw
           -Too talkative
           -President’s guidance

**************************************************************************

     International monetary situation
          -Kissinger's role
          -Shultz's role
                -Phase II
          -Peterson
                -Staff
                -Textiles
                      -Eisaku Sato
          -Connally, Shultz and Burns
                -Strategic outlook
          -Kissinger's conversation with Shultz, November 10, 1971
          -Kissinger's forthcoming conversation with Connally
                -The President’s schedule
                      -Connally
          -Trade
                -As percentage of Gross National Product [GNP]
          -Basis for decision
                -Peterson and Shultz
          -Connally
                -Views
                      -Trade
                            -US corporate activities
                -Paul A. Volcker
                -Staff
                      -International Monetary Fund [IMF] meeting
                      -Paper
                            -Volcker
          -Peterson
                -The President’s schedule
          -White House staff
                -Shultz and Roy L. Ash
                -National Security Council [NSC]
          -Politics
                -Shultz
          -Peterson

**************************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/07/2018. Segment cleared for
release.]
[Privacy]
[298-005-w014]
[Duration: 21s]

     Peter G. Peterson
           -Trustworthy?
           -H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman’s opinion
           -John B. Connally’s dismissal of Peterson
           -George P. Shultz’s opinion
**************************************************************************

     Peter G. Peterson
                 -Staff papers
                       -Commerce Department
                       -John N. Mitchell
           -Flanigan
           -Connally
                 -Peterson
                 -Flanigan
                 -[Richard V. Allen]
                 -Flanigan
                       -Shultz, Kissinger
           -Peterson
                 -Conversation with Haldeman, November 11, 1971
                       -Connally
                       -Shultz
                 -Views regarding Connally’s position on convertability
           -Convertability
                 -France
                 -Connally
           -Connally
                 -Shultz
                 -Forthcoming conversation with Kissinger
           -Price of gold
                 -Rogers's conversation with the President
                       -Meeting with businessmen
           -US program
                 -Connally
                       -Views
                       -Forthcoming speech
                             -New York Economic Club
                             -Connally’s schedule
                                  -Phase II
                             -Charls E. Walker

     Kissinger's schedule
          -Japanese ambassador
          -Gerard C. Smith

Kissinger talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 11:31 am and 12:50 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5A]

     Smith

     Japanese ambassador [Nobuhiko Ushiba]
[End of telephone conversation]

     Peterson
           -Role with administration
                -Haldeman's forthcoming conversation with Mitchell
                       -Commerce Department
                -Nassau, Jamaica
           -Possible role with administration
           -Connally
           -Shultz, Kissinger
           -Bureaucracy
           -Activities
                -Congress
                       -Wilbur D. Mills
           -Papers
                -Distribution
           -Possible role with administration
                -Commerce Department
                       -Mitchell
                       -Harvard School of Business
                       -David Rockefeller
           -Meeting with Katharine L. Graham

     Washington Post
         -New president [John S. Prescott, Jr.]
              -Philadelphia Inquirer

     Graham
          -Conversation with Kissinger
               -The President's demeanor
                    -Forthcoming election
                          -New York

     Peterson
           -Possible role with administration
                -Secretary of Commerce
                -Haldeman's forthcoming conversation with Mitchell

     Maurice H. Stans
         -Tenure in office
               -Mitchell's view
               -USSR trip
               -Mitchell
                    -Views
                    -Forthcoming position
               -The President's candidacy
                    -Nelson A. Rockefeller
               -Haldeman's forthcoming conversation with Mitchell
                    -Richard G. Kleindienst
     Mitchell
          -Tenure in office

     The President's schedule
          -Pompidou
                -Paris
                -Rogers's schedule
          -Jamaica
                -Rogers
          -Latin America
                -Meetings
                      -Panama
                           -Highway
                           -Darrien Gap
                           -Colombia
                           -Mexico
          -Jamaica

Kissinger talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 11:31 am and 12:50 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5B]

     Request to speak with an unknown person

[End of telephone conversation]

     The President's schedule
          -Forthcoming meeting with European leaders
                -Purpose
                      -The President’s forthcoming trips
          -Unknown person's schedule
          -Pompidou
          -Europe
                -Rogers

Kissinger talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 11:31 am and
12:50 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5C]

[See Conversation No. 14-35]

[End of telephone conversation]

     The President's schedule
          -Unknown Ambassador
               -Message

     Congress
         -Schedule
                -Rogers

Kissinger talked with Helmut Sonnenfeldt at an unknown time between 11:31 am and 12:50 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5d]

The President and Haldeman continued their conversation during the telephone call.

[End of telephone conversation]

     The President’s schedule
          -Sonnenfeldt's efforts
          -The President's conversation with Rogers, November 10, 1971
                -Forthcoming trip to PRC
                      -Preparation
                            -PRC
                            -Mao Tse-tung
          -Brandt
          -Pompidou
          -Europe
                -Possible problems
          -Pompidou
          -Announcements
                -Timing
                -Secretary of Agriculture
                -Secretary of Agriculture
                      -Hardin
                            -Wife, Martha L. (Wood) Hardin
                      -Mary E. (Powell) Butz
                      -Press coverage
                            -Television
                      -[Vietnam]
          -NSC meeting
                -The President's involvement
                -Agenda
                      -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                -Smith
                -Rescheduling
          -Press conference
                -Ronald L. Ziegler's schedule
                -Handling
                      -Ziegler

Haldeman talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 11:31 am and
12:50 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5E]

[See Conversation No. 14-37]
[End of telephone conversation]

     The President's schedule
          -Vietnam announcement
               -Timing
               -Location
                      -Technical considerations
                            -Press Room
                            -Oval Office
                                  -Pool camera
                            -Press Room
               -Timing
                      -Press follow-up
               -Location
               -Congressional reaction
               -NSC meeting
               -Duration
                      -Ziegler's possible conversation with Frank Cormier
               -Timing

Haldeman left at 12:50 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Troop withdrawals
               -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                     -Conversation with Laird
               -Forthcoming announcement
                     -Timing
                          -Rogers’s view
                     -Rogers
                          -Relationship with Kissinger
                                -Berlin
                                -Negotiations
                          -Conversation with Laird
                     -Timing
                          -Negotiations with North Vietnam
                          -Congress's possible reaction
                     -Residual forces
               -Possible January 1972 announcement
                     -Residual forces
                     -Draftees
                          -Volunteers
                     -Ground combat
                     -The President's trip to PRC
                          -Congress
                     -Negotiations with North Vietnam
                          -Disclosure
                          -Residual force
                                -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                            -Peace proposals
                                 -Terms
                                 -Forthcoming announcements
                                       -Timing
               -Level
               -Forthcoming announcement
                           -Paper
                           -Timing
                           -Possible motives
                     -Rogers's views
                           -Timing of announcements
                                 -1972 campaign
                                 -State of the Union Address
                           -John Foster Dulles's meetings with Dwight D. Eisenhower
                           -Kissinger's conversation with Haig
                                 -Laird
          -Richardson Dilworth
          -Joseph R. (“Dick”) Dilworth
               -Nelson A. Rockefeller

Haldeman talked with the President between 1:01 pm and 1:02 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5F]

[See Conversation No. 14-38]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Vietnam
          -Joseph Dilworth and wife, Elizabeth (Cushing) Dilworth

     Kissinger's schedule
          -[Nobuhiko Ushiba]

Kissinger talked with an unknown person in his office at an unknown time between 1:02 pm and
1:16 pm.

[Conversation No. 298-5G]

     Request for a call to the Japanese ambassador
         -Kissinger's schedule

[End of telephone conversation]

     Vietnam
          -Joseph and Mrs. Dilworth
                -Conversation with Kissinger
                     -The President's actions
          -As issue
          -Grunwald
               -Conversation with Kissinger, November 10, 1971
                     -Morality
          -The President's forthcoming announcement
               -The President's demeanor

     United Nations [UN] vote on Taiwan, Republic of China
          -Grunwald's views
          -Senate

     Foreign aid program
          -Rogers's conversation with the President, November 10, 1971
          -Senate vote

     India-Pakistan relations
           -Aid
           -State Department
           -John F. Kennedy

*****************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-017. Segment declassified on 01/19/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[298-005-w010]
[Duration: 9s]

     India-Pakistan
           -Wire to Henry A. Kissinger
           -Investments
           -People’s Republic of China [PRC]

*****************************************************************

     India-Pakistan
           -The President's schedule
                -Connally's schedule
           -Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan
                -Message

     Vietnam
          -Troop withdrawal
               -The President’s November 3, 1969 speech
               -Kissinger’s conversation with Haig, November 10, 1971
               -Future announcements
          -Negotiations
               -Rogers's knowledge
                     -Laird
                     -Haig
     -Bombing
     -Blockade
     -POWs
          -Nguyen Van Thieu
          -1972 campaign
          -Negotiations with North Vietnam
               -Record

November 9, 1971 dinner
    -Nelson A. Rockefeller
         -Speech
    -The President's speech
         -Rogers
    -Attendees
         -Bernard J. (“Bunny”) Lasker
    -Rockefeller
         -Conversation with Kissinger, November 10, 1971

The President's foreign policy
     -Laird
     -The President's opponents
           -Unknown reporter
     -Vietnam
           -Troop withdrawal
                 -Forthcoming announcement

Rogers's schedule
    -Europe
           -Rogers
                -New York Times
                -John N. Irwin, II's [?] trip
                     -Arthur K. Watson's conversation with Kissinger

The President's schedule
     -Forthcoming NSC meeting
           -Agenda
                 -European security
                 -India-Pakistan relations

Kissinger's schedule
     -Possible backgrounder

Rogers
    -Schedule
          -Council on Foreign Relations
    -Role

1972 election

Appointments
           -Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
                 -Possible role with administration
           -David Packard
           -Seamans
                 -Laird
           -Dr. Curtis W. Tarr
           -Packard

Kissinger left at 1:16 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I'm glad to call you, Mr. President.
John, I've been on the...
I actually...
I'm not kidding.
I'm on the phone on the base, too.
I know you were on the phone.
I've been here all day.
And that's what he wants to do, is lobby me on... Did he have a reason against the fours against the six?
I told him that evening that you did two of us, and you weren't going to make a big announcement in time for the conference.
You were just going to go for another two.
And then it all came out.
He said, oh, in that case, that's, then it's gone.
He said, that's all.
And Christ is even, what was he concerned about then?
He doesn't want to make it out of us in January.
No, he didn't.
It's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, In other words, he thinks that we'll put it out in January, and then your story about the negotiations will come out.
He didn't want that to come out before China.
Well, the Chinese don't know.
It just doesn't want to come out at all.
If Mao should have another, he's still not putting it out.
But at least it gets people really angry that he kept it.
You're getting into it.
Well, then I'd be very concerned.
No, no.
He's not going to come out.
He's happy as can be.
What, did you tell him for Christ's sake not to tell Larry?
No, no, I didn't tell him.
I didn't tell him.
I said, the one thing you didn't want is seven.
Tell him not to tell Larry.
I told him not to tell Larry.
I told him, yeah.
And what did you say to him when they made him want the seven?
Did he agree?
Yeah.
Or did he?
I don't know.
Oh, completely.
Now, Larry's for seven months, right?
Yeah.
And what did Bill say?
Is he on board on that?
Completely.
I told you.
We've covered the conversation.
I've got to hold him to this one.
Oh, I got it.
I got it.
And so he says, he says, all right, well, what did he say about seven months?
He says, well, that's the question.
He said, that's the biggest time he made a good case.
And then on four, he said he just wanted to give you a little more time to prove that he didn't have to make a big announcement.
So I said, well...
The president is serious.
He said, in four months, I just want you to know this, and he won't make, he won't be able to read AIDS now until tomorrow.
But even if he should go for two months, I said, his present thinking is to do two, and then another two.
And he said, well, in that case, I have no problem, you know.
So I said, in either case, it's going to wind up at four months.
Matter of fact, there's something to be said for going for two more months, or two at a time, in a sense, with any of them.
You know, the idea being that we're talking about our issue, and it shows we're winding it down.
Yes, there's a lot of people who believe what happens in these negotiations.
They may settle the whole problem, in a sense, and decide about it, because it may be easy to turn out.
It's good.
And that's it.
If it doesn't work, it's up to you then to decide when you'll do the most good.
If you'll take a lot of heat in January for being unresponsive to these moves, I think you ought to put out the history of these negotiations.
If you're not under great pressure, if you don't say it, then you might say it.
Then you do say everything you need.
So I think either way you're in good shape.
Well, I'm glad you got it.
I guess it's kind of a curious thing, though, that, uh...
I'm sort of thinking that we shouldn't tell later.
We shouldn't tell after something about an hour before this is gonna make, you know... No, so it appears that I just decided that you spent so much leads that I'm gonna go on and forth about it.
And at that point, you can call him and say, look, we're putting you in a seat, and you don't postpone it, you see, to last.
That's probably the only reason.
I don't think so.
Do you think it has been?
Well, I told all of them, I told them that to leave the NSC meeting, it's all right if it's been done, but to leave it on schedule at 4 o'clock, then to see it half past 3, because you're going to be used to say, look, the meeting will be at 5 rather than 4.
How does that sound to you?
That would be the right way to do it.
Do you think they've already called them?
If I'm in a judge, they have.
But that still, that doesn't mean, that my idea, in any event, my idea is this, that I just call Roberts at 3.30 and I just, that Ziegler just hasn't meant so much speculation about this.
With Roberts, I'd say that Laird's weak.
I just don't.
With Laird, now there's been so much speculation, he doesn't just go on and announce $45,000.
And just, with Laird, I'm not gonna mention him, but Laird, I mean, just cold turkey, you know, now,
Oh, there it is.
Well, what we found out is that Hankins is telling everybody that it's going to be two months, five months, or seven months.
In other words, it may have been the artist with your computer.
I have just marked and sent over to you that you will get that entire list of players.
I approved everything except the top man, whom I don't want to approve.
And the other one that I didn't know anything about is the one he wants for Armistead Selden.
Do you know Armistead Selden?
Yeah.
Who is Selden?
Secretary of the Air Force or something like that.
Who is Selden?
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Never heard of him.
Seldom, honestly.
Well, maybe on the congressional committee.
One of his cronies.
Well, anyway, I think it's a mess.
But I must say, at the top one, I don't know who the hell we can get.
Oh, Henry, I know one thing I want to ask you about.
You've got a name.
Tornado.
Tornado.
Why don't we ask Jack McCloy for a critical time
It was a tower figure.
I saw him at the dinner and he was very high on my speech.
You might just give him a call, I'd like for you to call him, it doesn't matter if I keep calling now, I don't know why I'm calling now.
I'll just say.
Could you get Mr. Jack McCloy, the lawyer in New York, for us, please?
You have his number, don't you?
McCloy, he's with the...
Well, he said, oh, you can get it if your kid is on the spot.
And then it just occurred to me, God damn, he knows more than anybody else.
He's tough and strong.
And he's a great internationalist.
And we'd say, now, Jack, we only asked you to go for a year.
I'd be, I mean, you're 74 years old, and that's the president of his conference.
But it shows that we're putting enormous emphasis on NATO.
And he can watch the MDFR.
I like it.
I love it.
I love it.
finally vote for the big man again.
It is the end of the idea.
And you just say now that the president doesn't, you say now I'm calling the jacks because the president, the president will ask you, but he doesn't want to put you on the spot knowing how great a patriot you are.
If you don't want to be put on the spot, but he feels strongly he's concerned about NATO and our relations with Europe and the rest, that we just need a powerful figure for that position.
And
Operator, I just placed a call with Mr. McCoy in New York.
I want Dr. Kissinger to talk on that call.
He's calling from my office, but I just wanted to give him a call.
Yeah, yes, John.
You might have him, didn't you?
Yeah.
Anyway...
Now, I read about, and I marked up some things, too, Peter, on MDFR.
I read Blair's memorandum.
I decided they're better on Europe.
He said, give it to you.
Well, I sent over to you, all marked up.
There's a lot of good ideas.
Yeah.
There's a lot of good ideas.
And also, I think Connelly should read it, so he'll get the deal on Europe.
You've got to get over to him.
Now...
We'll take a hold of this European Union.
We can turn it around so fast it'll make your heads spin.
There ain't any place else to go.
Mr. President, you are the answer.
That is your field.
It's absurd for you to get under political attack on NATO.
Yeah.
NATO, Christ, who fucked the man's field amendment?
Who went into Europe right after I was president?
Who has told the Russians, go to hell, and they have said make a deal with us about Europe?
Who has stood up with Heath, with Pompidou, with Brown?
Frank's been playing their line all the time.
Now, any of our...
I think on that one, as I said, we've got to get a game plan.
And I mean a ball control game plan on that one.
I think Rosio is fine.
What are you doing?
But I think Larry's right.
We've got to control that guy.
Absolutely.
Now, how do we get over with this?
I have...
suggested above an NSC meeting before the NATO ministerial meeting.
If you lay it down hard there, how are you going to handle it at NATO?
Well, maybe we could get this, now, the NSC meeting next week.
No, we're not ready for it yet.
And anyway, it is in this world they have too many items on them.
Next week, we'll do common.
And what else do they have?
Lay it down here.
Hello?
Hello?
Hello?
Hello, Jack?
Okay, Jack, you and I have been trying to reach each other and managed to miss each other for a week.
But I'm calling you today about the power.
The President and I have been talking about the active developments in Europe.
And I also told him about our meeting, my meeting with you with the advisory committee.
And we feel that it is, that we badly need to put our relations to Europe on a new and firm basis.
And also, frankly, to get somebody to get a hold of this MPFR business before it's used as a wedge to drive our allies totally into a total lack of confidence in us.
So, as you know, the NATO ambassadorship is waiting.
And the President has asked me to explore with you whether, knowing it would be an enormous sacrifice, you would agree to serve there for a year.
We need a towering figure there now.
And he will ask you himself, but for obvious reasons, he'd like me to find out first whether this is totally out of the ballpark.
There's really, there's a lot of people, and we have a lot of names, and it's a job that people are dying to get.
But there's only one person who represents this great tradition of U.S.-European relationships, who has the stature in Europe, who can be both firm and compassionate, and who would have a voice in our council that everyone would listen to.
We'd really like you to do that.
to watch our relationship with Europe from over there, I must tell you, I am speaking as an individual now, really profoundly concerned about the way things are going.
So we decided it would take longer for you.
When we say a year, we are just assuming that this is all you would be willing to do.
Look, Jack, we know it'd be a sacrifice, an enormous sacrifice.
And you, no, of course you have to sleep on it.
And I have to tell you honestly, we were thinking for a while along much more conventional lines.
But as the president studies the problem,
He feels, and also you've got yourself partly into this mess because I reported to him about what you said at the General Advisory Committee.
And I thought you didn't have it in mind, but he felt that this was the most perceptive view of it among, that he had heard.
And so he thought that he should, that he wanted to send one of our powering figures over there.
And I must tell you that we're towering criteria stairs.
And one of the points he asked me to tell you, I mean, is that we would want to have an understanding with you that you could watch the economics of it too.
Because as you know, we are developing this to be doing the increasing concern for that.
an increasing concern about the impact this is having.
Yeah.
We think that this would be a crucial year, and if you committed yourself only a year, that would be, it was completely understood.
And maybe that would ease your economic problems a little.
Don't, don't act on us, Jack.
Yeah, I'll see you tomorrow, and let me just say to all the queens and long-termers, Myra, I really think the country needs you right now.
Look, Jack, internally, we haven't told anyone else about this.
We haven't told the bureaucracy or anyone.
No, no, no, no, we wish you would.
Okay, but he's got to think about it.
He's got some major economic problems with him because he's got to make a living.
And he has no interest.
You know, he's a partner in one of the biggest law firms.
But like all, he has a life somewhere.
You know, you've got to say this for Bill.
Bill made himself 10 million bucks.
which I love.
I didn't make a nickel.
Well, I said I didn't make a nickel.
I made a living.
I made a living.
But my point is, my point is, here's McCoy, an honest man, an in and out of government.
Jesus Christ, he'd be worth $50 million if he'd been dishonest.
But you know, how does it strike you?
You know, I'll tell you one thing.
For an old man, to be asked this, I think, just means a lot to be asked.
He'll take it, and that's the answer.
You think he'll take it?
How did he react, though?
He said, I'm on the floor, and I've got to watch myself on the floor.
He did it?
Yeah.
But he's got the power to figure it out.
Well, you see, it ties me in, too, to the best part of the establishment.
You understand?
The council on foreign relations, the whole thing.
We now tie in to a real guy who would help us on a sole, I mean, a man's deal.
That's my point.
What do you think, Vincent?
He'll take the job, and also he'll listen to us and not to Rocky.
What do you think?
His views could be your views.
Well, but I can't say.
But Henry, he is, frankly, his views are closer than mine.
Oh, no, no.
He's no softliner.
He is a softliner.
I know.
But he's not a softliner on Europe.
Never has been, though.
That's because a softliner is something you know nothing about.
But he's on Europe.
He's exactly on Europe.
And BFR, by God, he's...
not even going to be watching the airport.
And McCoy says, not with those other European ambassadors, he'll power over them.
Oh, he'll be good.
He'll impress the Germans.
Oh, he'll be tremendous.
I just think it's a terrific idea.
And he'll help us with the New York Times and so forth.
And on the economics, he's just as good.
He's got power.
You know what I mean?
He's in that ballpark.
Now, you compare him with, say, a Cecil.
Oh, Mr. Besson, you are inspired by the text on there.
Text on is okay, but he won't learn it first.
He won't learn it for you either.
He won't learn how to talk.
You might want to in the cabinet in the second term.
He didn't impress me all that much.
No, he didn't that much, but I asked her.
I just think it's good.
Really good.
What would you say to Henry Peterson if he wanted to do it in the fashion industry?
Yeah.
No, you don't have to be that strong.
You know the stage.
Yeah.
That isn't a bad idea.
In fact, it's a good idea.
The whole operation with me, I said, well, I don't know.
We made, we made, we made our way to commerce.
That's a good idea.
Mitchell, I think, was an old friend of mine.
Basically, it's a desperately needed position.
In many ways, it's a better position
Would you want to go to England?
No.
France?
Italy?
Hello?
Russia?
Not really.
I mean, the Russians.
Incidentally, we've got to get a better ambassador in Russia eventually, or our relations start to get off.
But being there doesn't mean anything.
Don't you agree?
Maybe I want to consider stopping the toll on my way back home.
Of course I did that thing.
I did it.
I did it.
I hated it.
But neither did Satan.
Let me tell you why.
Henry, at this point, the game with Russia is so big.
Right?
I'll twist, kick him in the balls.
I'm going to remain, but not when we're playing that game.
For God's sakes, if you were to announce we were going to Russia, you're going to go to Poland on the way back.
You guarantee a lasting welcome in Russia?
No.
All the arguments that they wrongly made against going to Romania would apply to going to Poland after Russia.
You should go nowhere on the trip to or from Russia.
That's all right.
I think on the way to, you should go to our place for a rest.
Yeah, because it both gives you a better arrival time.
God damn it, we'd get McCoy unless he's coming down here.
He's coming through this old...
All right, I'm going to cut you an after.
I want you to sell them.
Jack, your country needs you.
Now, listen, Jack, let me tell you in all honesty.
The president has been thinking about this.
He's fairly efficient here.
He's busy with a lot of other things.
And it was his idea that he, after he saw you at the dinner in New York, he came back that night.
And the next day, he called in the morning and said, why not come forward?
I think, I am excited.
It's a really inspired idea, Mr. Kirsten.
The other thing I think you could tell us is...