Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 300 › Conversation 300-007

Nixon & Shultz on Economic policy and Wage and price controls

Tuesday, November 2, 1971 · 2:26 PM–2:34 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 6 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Shultz, George P.Conversation300-007 on Tape 300 (tape position 00:07:27–00:13:45)StartTuesday, November 2, 1971 at 2:26 PMEndTuesday, November 2, 1971 at 2:34 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 300-007 ↗ · National Archives Catalog, NAID 417185045 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and George Shultz discuss the administration's strategy regarding labor negotiations during the ongoing wage and price freeze. The President emphasizes a preference for reaching a settlement but expresses a firm willingness to engage in a public political battle against labor unions if they attempt to undermine the administration's economic plan. Nixon highlights the importance of leveraging public opinion to frame obstructionist labor leaders as the primary obstacle to national economic stability.

Audio

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NARA Description

On November 2, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:26 pm to 2:34 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 300-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 300-007

Date: November 2, 1971
Time: 2:26 pm - 2:34 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President talked with George P. Shultz.

[See Conversation No. 13-75]

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 1 minute of this recording (about 18% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Hello.
Uh, hello.
Hi, Jerry.
Our reactions are limited because, uh, we have many options, that's the problem.
Now, uh, it's very easy to say what we've done.
And the question of what do you do is a couple of steps forward.
Now, my view is that what our goal should be is to get some kind of agreement on a farm to pay for it.
And if we can't, then we won't do anything.
doesn't go so totally far as something that is universal and dense and cave-in to meaning.
Now that's really the guideline, and you can judge that probably better than most as to what will be so intrepid.
I would assume the management folks would have a pretty good idea of what they think is that.
My own view is that we, within that general framework, can go pretty far.
Mainly because we've been hot and puffed, like I heard from some of the others who did not understand, and then we put you through it like children, and said, well, we shouldn't have done that, or we shouldn't do that.
I said, well, what did you do?
They said, well, we ought to take on meaning.
But, as I say, how do we do it?
And I forgot to say this yesterday, what the heck do we do?
Well, it seems to me it's a pretty thin rule to say, well, we have a public board of public members, and the public members will put something out, and we proceed to take a selective part of the economy and try to enforce it and put people in criminal penalties and so on.
James, that's a, it's going to be, it's going to be universally distributed.
I mean, let me put it this way.
They settle them with the labor matters, even though that's up to the old bird.
And most people think it's wise.
It's better than I do, because of the hard choices.
that failing to get us something, and then having to go the other direction, where I don't think there's a, where I think there could be, I realize, popular at the moment, and popular in the sense that if we went the other direction, we would take labor and fail publicly, and say, no, we call upon everybody else to do it.
But then the question is, what sanctions do we have to back up that decision?
And they are damned few and far between as far as effective sanctions are concerned.
Would you not agree with that?
Now there's about, that's the way I'd say it's in my waiting list to try to make a deal if we can.
I must say that I would hope that at some point that they would not give them everything during the freeze period.
I know that the suggestions have been made that we let's forget 71 and look at 72.
That generally makes a lot of sense.
Yeah, right.
I think that makes a lot of sense, but I think in regards to something in the freeze-free, the kind of way that it can be worked out, it should be cool.
Maybe it just isn't in the cars to work anything out about the freeze-free.
The problem here is that now the other side of the coin has
What if, uh, what the hell is the attitude of the Malay people when they're there, when they're out to bust this thing, when they're out to co-operate on it?
Do you have any later reports on that?
Some parts to play with that in one sense is that while I say we have no options, the option from their standpoint isn't all that bright either because the public reaction will be enormously native to labor.
And I would proceed when I intend to make that move.
If they don't pledge, I mean, the hell of a political effect, I'm going to take them on and hard.
That's just got to be understood.
It's going to be a bloody battle.
They will have drawn a sword, frankly, on the American people, in my opinion.
I'm going to put a right to it.
And then we'll get a hell of a, we'll make them the bogeymen of this thing.
And that's our problem.
I realize that they say that's a public relations threat, which will hurt them for a while, but down the road, I don't think it's too damn difficult for what happens.
But on the other hand, they don't want that.
I don't think they want to be in the position of being considered to be the selfish people who broke this plan of the American people.
So that's the way I see it.
Okay.
Good luck.

Also recorded on November 2, 1971

  • 013-074 2:03 PM · 6 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 2:03 pm and 2:26 pm.
  • 300-006 2:03 PM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:03 pm and 2:26 pm.
  • 013-075 2:26 PM · 8 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz talked on the telephone from 2:26 pm to 2:34 pm.
  • 013-076 3:00 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:00 pm and 3:07 pm.
  • 613-001 3:00 PM · 4 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:00 pm and 3:07 pm.
  • 013-077 3:07 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz talked on the telephone from 3:07 pm to 3:11 pm.
  • 613-002 3:07 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and George P. Shultz met in the Oval Office of the White House from 3:07 pm to 3:11 pm.
  • 013-078 3:11 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:11 pm and 6:55 pm.

All 58 conversations from November 2, 1971 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 300-007, November 2, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives (NAID 417185045). Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/300-007 (accessed November 14, 2026).