Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 316 › Conversation 316-016
Nixon alone in his EOB office on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks
Tuesday, January 25, 1972 · 5:32 PM–6:32 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 16 min
AI Summary
President Richard M. Nixon used this meeting to rehearse his televised 'Address to the Nation,' in which he aimed to break the deadlock in Vietnam War negotiations. He reviewed the history of secret diplomatic channels and clarified his administration's extensive, previously private peace proposals, including a plan for total American force withdrawal. By going public with these terms, Nixon sought to counter domestic criticism regarding the pace of negotiations and pressure North Vietnam to engage in meaningful diplomatic dialogue.
Audio
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Position in tape: 02:38:43 – 02:54:37
part B, 36:21
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NARA Description
On January 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 316-016 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 316-16 Date: January 25, 1972 Time: Unknown between 5:32 pm and 6:31 pm Location: Executive Office Building The President rehearsed his "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam". [A transcript of the speech, in its final form, appears in Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1972, pp. 100-105]
Transcript (AI-generated)
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Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all 90 years ago, and there has been disagreement on the content of the war.
The proposal I have made tonight is one on which we can all agree.
Let us unite now in our search for peace, a peace that is fair to both sides, a peace that can last.
Christian, please.
— 1 min 20 s with no transcribed speech —
Good evening.
I have asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace which will end the war in Vietnam.
The author of the action I'll present, on behalf of the government of the United States and the government itself, Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of the President of the United States.
There's both generous and far-reaching.
It's the plan to end the war now.
It includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within six months of an agreement.
It is in acceptance with me to speed the return of all the prisoners of war to their homes.
Three years ago, I took off as the revivor of 50,000 Americans fighting in Vietnam.
I never killed an active American as high as 300 feet.
There were no plans to bring any Americans home.
The only thing that could settle in Paris was the shape and the confidence they had.
I immediately moved full-fledged by China-made American people to bring about a peace that could last not only for the United States, but for all the long-suffering people of Indochina.
They were too honorable, putting paths on their choice.
The path of negotiation was and is the path we prefer, but it takes two to negotiate.
There had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.
That path was called Vietnamization.
That meant training and equipping the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, and withdrawing American forces as they developed and completed their abilities.
The path to Vietnamization has been successful.
Two weeks ago, I announced that by May 1st, American forces in Vietnam would be down to 69,000.
That means about one-half million Americans will have been withdrawn from Vietnam over the past three years.
In terms of American lives, the losses of 304,000 a week have been cut by 95% in less than 10 hours.
The path of the opposition has been the long way of straining the patience, testing the perseverance of the American people.
But it was a shortcut, the path of negotiation.
Progress there has been disappointing.
The American people deserve an accounting of why it has been disappointing.
Tonight, I intend to give you that accounting, and in so doing, to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations.
We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict.
But early in this administration, after 10 months of no progress from the public Paris talks, I became convinced it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels to see whether it would be possible to get a public deadline.
After consultation with Secretary of State Rodgers, our ambassador in Saigon, and our chief negotiator in Paris, under the full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, to begin,
these secret peace negotiations.
Since that time, he has traveled to Paris about 12 times on these secret negotiations.
He has met seven times, believe I'm told, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, Minister Juan Pui, head of the American North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris conference.
He has met with Minister Juan Pui alone five times.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank President Pompeo of France for his personal assistance in helping to make the arrangements for these talks.
Now this is why I initiated these private negotiations.
Privately, both sides could be more flexible in offering new approaches.
Also, private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions free from the pressure of public debate.
Seeking peace in Vietnam and so many lives of state, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by private or publicly negotiate separately.
As I have stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared and remain prepared to explore any avenue, public or private, to speed negotiations to counter war.
For thirty months, whenever Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, or I were asked about secret negotiations, we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace.
It wasn't a leap, because we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations.
I know recently this course showed signs of the illness of progress.
Now, however, it is my judgment.
The purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the pro-polis view in the name of progress.
Nothing is served by silence from the other side that exploits our good faith to divide America into the right and common states.
And nothing is served by silence but it misleads some of our ends into accusing their government of being through what is already done.
Nothing is served by silence but it enables the other side to apply possible solutions publicly that it has already rejected privately.
The time has come to lay the record of our secret negotiations on the table.
Just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadline, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadline.
Some Americans who believe in what the North Vietnamese need, let them believe, have charged that the United States has not pursued negotiations intensely, as the record will show just the opposite.
Questions have been raised as to why we have not opposed the deadline for the withdrawal order and the portions in exchange for a ceasefire and return of our prison to war, why we have not discussed the seven-point proposal made by the U.S. Congress last July in Paris, why we have not submitted a new plan of our own to move the negotiations off dead center.
As the private record will show, we have taken all these steps and more, and have flatly rejected or ignored them the other time.
On May 31, 1971, eight months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a deadline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and ceasefire.
At the next private meeting, on July, June 26, the North Vietnamese rejected our proposal.
They privately proposed instead their own nine-point plan, which insisted that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
Five days later, July 1st, the Army publicly presented a different package of proposals, the seven-point Viet Cong plan, and that closed the door.
Which package should we respond to, the public plan or the private plan?
On July 12, at another private meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question to this Lord of the Vietnamese director.
They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan, because it covered all of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, while the Viet Cong seven-point bill, the public proposal, was limited to Vietnam.
That's what we did.
We even went beyond that, dealing with some of the points in the public plan that were not covered in the secret plan.
On August 16th, at another private meeting, we went further and offered a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within nine months after agreement on an overall settlement.
On September 13th, when our DMV rejected this proposal, they continued to insist that we overthrow the South Vietnamese government.
Now, what has been the result of these crackdowns?
For months, the North Vietnamese have derailed us from public sessions for not responding to their side's positive agenda, the seven-point plan.
The truth is, we did respond to the end of the plan in the manner they wanted us to respond, secretly.
Full possession of our complete response, the North Vietnamese publicly denounced us for not having responded at all.
They had amused many Americans, the press and the Congress, into echoing their propaganda.
Americans who could not know they were being used falsely by the enemy to stir up the business in this country.
I decided in October that we should make a mental attempt to break the deadline.
I consulted with President Pugh, who concurred fully in a new plan.
On October 11th, I sent a private communication to the North Vietnamese that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward.
I urged a meeting on November 1st between Dr. Kissinger's special advisory doctor or some other appropriate official in the town.
On October 25th, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20th.
On November 17, just three days before we scheduled the meeting, they said he got told he was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he got well, with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who would come to him.
Two months had passed since they called off that meeting.
The only reply to our plan has been an increase in troop militarization in North Vietnam, and the Communist military have had suits and vows in that way.
Our proposal for peace was answered by a step up in the war.
That is where matters stand today.
We are being asked publicly to respond to the proposal, and we answered it in some respects, except months ago at night.
We are being asked publicly to set a terminal date for our withdrawals, and we ought to be on the front line.
And the most comprehensive peace plan of this conflict lies ignored in a secret channel while the enemy tries to get the military in.
That is why I have instructed Ambassador Corbin, whom I will meet after the program, to present our plan publicly at this Thursday's session of the Paris peace talks, along with alternatives to make it even more flexible.
We are publishing the full details of our plan tonight.
It will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make these negotiations with the people.
It will show unmistakably that Hanoi, our heart and soul side of mind, made the world go on.
Here is the essence of our peace plan, public disclosure, and give it the attention it deserves now.
Within six months of an agreement, we will withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.
We shall exchange all prisoners of war on the road to Robinson.
We shall exchange all prisoners of war.
There shall be a ceasefire throughout every channel.
There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.
President Chu will announce the elements of this election.
These include international supervision, an independent body to organize and run the election, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Liberation Front.
Furthermore, President Chu has informed me that within the framework of the agreement outlined above, he makes the following offer.
He and Vice President Quang would be ready to resign one month before the election.
The chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the government, would assume administrative responsibilities in South Vietnam, but the election would be the sole responsibility of the independent election body.
There are several other folks on our YouTube channel.
For example, as we offered privately on July 26th of last year, we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout the new China, including North Vietnam, to help all those people recover from the ravaging regeneration war.
We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.
We're ready to negotiate the plan I've outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues.
Or, as we proposed last May, we remain relevant, settle all three of the military issues, and leave the political issues to the other means alone.
Under this approach, we would withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within six months in exchange for an end-of-China ceasefire and the release of all prisoners.
The choice is up to the end.
This is a settlement offered which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam.
It deserves the light of public scrutiny by those nations and by other nations as well.
It deserves the united support of the American people.
We made the substance of this generous proposal privately over three months ago.
It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored.
I reiterate this peace offer tonight.
It can no longer be ignored.
The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our allies under the United States of America and America.
If the enemy wants peace, we have to recognize the important errors, and we can settle and surrender.
It's been a long and agonizing struggle, but it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position in the war, can now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair to everyone concerned.
By the steadiness of our withdrawal forces, America has proved its resolution to end its involvement in the war.
By our readiness to act in the spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout every country.
We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.
If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces to South Vietnam to develop the capabilities that I have sought.
If the enemy's answer to our peace offer is to step up their military attacks, I shall wholly meet my responsibility as commander-in-chief of our armed forces to protect our remaining forces.
We do not prefer this frustration.
I want to end the war, not only for America, but for all the people in the country.
The plan I propose tonight can accomplish that goal.
Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our government says must be false, whatever our enemies say must be true.
Record I reveal that I am proves to conquer.
We can now demonstrate publicly what we have long been demonstrating privately.
America has taken the initiative, not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself.
Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all nine years ago.
President Kennedy said in the first 15,000 years.
There has been disagreement on the conduct.
Also recorded on January 25, 1972
- 019-059 4:36 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-011 4:36 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-012 4:36 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-013 4:36 PM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 019-060 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-015 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-017 5:32 PM · 27 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm.
- 316-018 5:32 PM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, Marjorie P. Acker, White House operator, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm.
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Cite this conversation
Conversation 316-016, January 25, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/316-016 (accessed November 11, 2026).