Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 316 › Conversation 316-016
Nixon alone in his EOB office on Vietnam War and Paris Peace Talks
Tuesday, January 25, 1972 · 5:32 PM–6:32 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building
AI Summary
President Richard M. Nixon used this meeting to rehearse his televised 'Address to the Nation,' in which he aimed to break the deadlock in Vietnam War negotiations. He reviewed the history of secret diplomatic channels and clarified his administration's extensive, previously private peace proposals, including a plan for total American force withdrawal. By going public with these terms, Nixon sought to counter domestic criticism regarding the pace of negotiations and pressure North Vietnam to engage in meaningful diplomatic dialogue.
Audio
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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 02:38:43 into the tape and ends around 02:54:37.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
2:39:33Christian, please.
2:40:53Good evening.
2:40:54I've asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace which will end the war at this time.
2:40:59The author of the action I'll present, on behalf of the government of the United States and the government of South Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of the President of the United States,
2:41:17It is both generous and far-reaching.
2:41:20It is the plan to end the war now.
2:41:22It includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within six months of an agreement.
2:41:24It in concept would mean the speedy return of all prisoners of war to their homes.
2:41:28Three years ago, a country of Augusta revived with 50,000 Americans by 1999.
2:41:31It never killed an active American, running as high as 300.
2:41:36There were no plans to bring any Americans home.
2:41:40The only thing that could settle in Paris was the shape of the country's fate.
2:41:45I immediately moved the full-fledged fighting I had made with the American people to bring about a peace that could last not only for the United States, but for all the long-suffering people of Indochina.
2:42:00They were too honorable putting paths on the joints.
2:42:01The path of negotiation was and is the path we prefer, but it takes two to negotiate.
2:42:05There had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.
2:42:09That path was called de-ethnicization.
2:42:12That meant training equipping the South Vietnamese to defend themselves and withdrawing American forces as they developed and completed the military.
2:42:21The faculty utilization has been successful.
2:42:24Two weeks ago, I announced that by May 1st, American forces in Vietnam would be down to 69,000.
2:42:29That means about one-half million Americans will have been withdrawn to Vietnam over the last three years.
2:42:36In terms of American lives, the losses of 304 have weakened and been cut by 95% to less than 10%.
2:42:42The path of the opposition has been the long way of straining the patience, testing the perseverance of the American people, but of a shortcut, the path of negotiation.
2:42:53Progress there has been disappointing.
2:42:56The American people deserve an accounting of why it has been disappointing.
2:43:00Tonight, I intend to give you that accounting, and in so doing, to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations.
2:43:06We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict.
2:43:10With early in this administration, after 10 months of no progress from the public and Paris talks, I became convinced it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels to see whether it would be possible to end the public deadline.
2:43:22After consultation with Secretary of State Rodgers, our ambassador in Saigon, and our chief negotiator in Paris, under the full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, to begin,
2:43:38these secret peace negotiations.
2:43:39Since that time, he has traveled to Paris about 12 times on these secret negotiations.
2:43:47He has met seven times to lead October, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, Minister Zhuang Cui, head of the American North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris conference.
2:43:55He has met with Minister Zhuang Cui alone five times.
2:43:58I would like to take this opportunity to thank President Pompeo of France for his personal assistance in helping to make the arrangements for these talks.
2:44:08Now, this is why I initiated these private negotiations.
2:44:12Privately, both sides could be more flexible in offering new approaches.
2:44:16Also, private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions free from the pressure of the public debate.
2:44:24Seeking peace in Vietnam and so many lives of state, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by private or public to negotiate a settlement.
2:44:33As I have stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared and remain prepared to explore any avenue, public or private, to speed negotiations to end the war.
2:44:41For thirty months, whenever Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, or I were asked about secret negotiations, we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace.
2:44:49There wasn't a leap because we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations.
2:44:56Though recently this course showed signs of the illness of progress.
2:45:00Now, however, it is my judgment.
2:45:02The purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the pro-polis via the name of the project.
2:45:09Nothing is served by silence from the other side that exploits our good faith to divide America into a void of conversation.
2:45:15And nothing to serve by silence would have mislead some of our ends into accusing their government of being to do what it has already done.
2:45:22Nothing to serve by silence would have enabled the other side to apply possible solutions publicly that it has already rejected privately.
2:45:31Time has come to lay the record of our secret negotiations on the table.
2:45:36Just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadline, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadline.
2:45:44Some Americans, who believe in what the North Vietnamese need, let them believe, have charged that the United States has not pursued negotiations intensely, as the record will show just the opposite.
2:46:05Questions have been raised as to why we have not opposed the deadline for the withdrawal order and the portions in exchange for a ceasefire and return of our prison to war, why we have not discussed the seven-point proposal made by the Viet Cong last July in Paris, why we have not submitted a new plan of our own to move the negotiations off dead center.
2:46:24As the private record will show, we have taken all these steps and more, and have flatly rejected or ignored them the other time.
2:46:31On May 31, 1971, eight months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a deadline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and ceasefire.
2:46:45At the next private meeting, on July, June 26, the North Vietnamese rejected our proposal.
2:46:52They privately proposed instead their own nine-point plan, which insisted that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
2:46:58Five days later, July 1st, the Army publicly presented a different package of proposals, a separate one, the Viet Cong plan, and that closed the door.
2:47:07Which package should we respond to, the public plan or the private plan?
2:47:11On July 12, at another private meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question to this North Vietnamese director.
2:47:18They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan, because it covered all of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, while the Vietcong seven-point total, the public total, was limited to Vietnam.
2:47:30That's what we did.
2:47:32We even went beyond that, dealing with some of the points in the public plan that were not covered in the secret plan.
2:47:38On August 16, at another private meeting, we went further and offered a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within nine months after agreement on an overall settlement.
2:47:49On September 13, when our Vietnamese rejected this proposal, they continued to insist that we overthrow the South Vietnamese government.
2:47:56What has been the result of this strike?
2:47:59For months, the North Vietnamese have derailed us from public sessions for not responding to their side's positive agenda, the seven-point plan.
2:48:05The truth is, we did respond to the end of the plan in the manner they wanted us to respond secretly.
2:48:13Full possession of our complete response, the North Vietnamese public deep denouncements were not having responded at all.
2:48:19They had missed many Americans in the press and the Congress end up echoing their propaganda.
2:48:23Americans who could not know it were being used falsely by the enemy to stir up the business in this country.
2:48:30I decided in October that we should make a mental attempt to break the deadline.
2:48:36I consulted with President Pugh who concurred fully in a new plan.
2:48:40On October 11th, I sent a private communication to the Department of Defense that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward, and urged a meeting on November 1st between Dr. Kissinger's special advisory, Dr. Toad, or some other appropriate official in the House.
2:48:55On October 25th, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20th.
2:49:00On November 17th, just three days before the scheduled meeting, they said that Dr. Ho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he got well, with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who would come to the panel.
2:49:09Two months had passed since they called on that meeting.
2:49:15The only reply to our plan has been an increase in troop military attrition north of Vietnam.
2:49:20The Communist military have had suits and vows in that way.
2:49:24Our proposal for peace was answered by a step up in the war.
2:49:27That is where matters stand today.
2:49:29We are being asked publicly to respond to the proposal, and we answered it in some respects, except months ago at night.
2:49:36We are being asked publicly to set a terminal date for our withdrawals, and we ought to be on the front line.
2:49:43And the most comprehensive peace plan of this conflict lies ignored in a secret channel while the enemy tries again for military victory.
2:49:50That is why I have instructed Ambassador Forkin, whom I will meet after the broadcast, to present our plan publicly at this Thursday's session of the Paris peace talks, along with alternatives to make it even more flexible.
2:50:04We are publishing the full details of our plan tonight.
2:50:05It will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make these negotiations with the team.
2:50:12It will show unmistakably the hand-eye and the heart of your side of mind to make the world go on.
2:50:17Here is the essence of our pre-plan, public disclosure, and give it the attention it deserves to have.
2:50:23Within six months of an agreement, we will withdraw all U.S. and L.A. forces from South Vietnam.
2:50:29We shall exchange all prisoners of war.
2:50:30We shall exchange all prisoners of war.
2:50:33There shall be a ceasefire throughout every channel.
2:50:36There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.
2:50:39President Pugh will announce the office of this election.
2:50:44These include international supervision, an independent body to organize and run the election, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Liberation Front.
2:50:56Fr.
2:50:56Mark President Chu has informed me that within the framework of the agreement outlined above, he makes the following offer.
2:51:02He and Vice President Hoa would be ready to resign one month before the election.
2:51:07The Chairman of the Senate, as a character head of the government, would assume administrative responsibilities in South Vietnam, but the election would be the sole responsibility of the independent election body.
2:51:20there's a lot of folks on our youtube channel for example as we offered privately on july 26 of last year we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout indochina including north vietnam to help all those people recover from the rapid regeneration we will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations
2:51:43We're ready to negotiate the plan I've outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues.
2:51:51Or, as we proposed last May, we remain relevant, settle all three of the military issues, and leave the political issues to the other teams alone.
2:51:59Under this approach, we will withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within six months in exchange for an end to China's ceasefire and the release of all prisoners.
2:52:08The choice is up to the enemy.
2:52:10This is a settlement offered which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam.
2:52:14It deserves a lot of public scrutiny by those nations and by other nations as well.
2:52:19It deserves the united support of the American people.
2:52:22We made the substance of this generous proposal privately over three months ago.
2:52:25It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored.
2:52:29I reiterate this peace offer tonight.
2:52:31It can no longer be ignored.
2:52:35The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, something the United States of America will never do.
2:52:43If the enemy wants peace, we have to recognize the important errors.
2:52:46We can settle and surrender.
2:52:48It's been a long and agonizing struggle, but it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position in the war, can now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair to everyone concerned.
2:53:01By the steadiness of our withdrawal forces, America has proved its resolution to end its involvement in the war.
2:53:10By our readiness to act with a spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout every country.
2:53:18We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.
2:53:21If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces to South Vietnam to develop the capabilities that I have sought.
2:53:35If the enemy in answer to our peace offer is to step up their military attacks, I shall wholly meet my responsibility as commander-in-chief of our armed forces to protect our remaining forces.
2:53:46We do not prefer this profession.
2:53:48I want to end the war, not only for America, but for all the people in the country.
2:53:53The plan I propose tonight can accomplish that goal.
2:53:58Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our government says must be false, whatever our enemies say must be true.
2:54:06The record I review tonight proves the contrary.
2:54:07We can now demonstrate publicly what we have long been demonstrating privately.
2:54:12America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself.
2:54:25Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all, nine years ago.
2:54:31President Kennedy said in the first 15,000 years.
2:54:35There has been disagreement on the conduct.
2:54:39The proposal I have made tonight is one on which we can all agree.
2:54:43Let us unite now in our search for peace.
2:54:47A peace that is fair to both sides.
2:54:48A peace that can last.
NARA Description
On January 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 316-016 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 316-16 Date: January 25, 1972 Time: Unknown between 5:32 pm and 6:31 pm Location: Executive Office Building The President rehearsed his "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam". [A transcript of the speech, in its final form, appears in Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1972, pp. 100-105]
Also recorded on January 25, 1972
- 019-059 4:36 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-011 4:36 PM · 53 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-012 4:36 PM · 16 min — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 316-013 4:36 PM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 4:36 pm and 5:30 pm.
- 019-060 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-015 5:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:30 pm to 5:32 pm.
- 316-017 5:32 PM · 27 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm.
- 316-018 5:32 PM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Rose Mary Woods, Marjorie P. Acker, White House operator, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 316-016, January 25, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/316-016 (accessed September 26, 2026).