On January 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:32 pm and 6:32 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 316-016 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Christian, please.
Good evening.
I've asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace which will end the war at this time.
The author of the action I'll present, on behalf of the government of the United States and the government of South Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of the President of the United States,
It is both generous and far-reaching.
It is the plan to end the war now.
It includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within six months of an agreement.
It in concept would mean the speedy return of all prisoners of war to their homes.
Three years ago, a country of Augusta revived with 50,000 Americans by 1999.
It never killed an active American, running as high as 300.
There were no plans to bring any Americans home.
The only thing that could settle in Paris was the shape of the country's fate.
I immediately moved the full-fledged fighting I had made with the American people to bring about a peace that could last not only for the United States, but for all the long-suffering people of Indochina.
They were too honorable putting paths on the joints.
The path of negotiation was and is the path we prefer, but it takes two to negotiate.
There had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.
That path was called de-ethnicization.
That meant training equipping the South Vietnamese to defend themselves and withdrawing American forces as they developed and completed the military.
The faculty utilization has been successful.
Two weeks ago, I announced that by May 1st, American forces in Vietnam would be down to 69,000.
That means about one-half million Americans will have been withdrawn to Vietnam over the last three years.
In terms of American lives, the losses of 304 have weakened and been cut by 95% to less than 10%.
The path of the opposition has been the long way of straining the patience, testing the perseverance of the American people, but of a shortcut, the path of negotiation.
Progress there has been disappointing.
The American people deserve an accounting of why it has been disappointing.
Tonight, I intend to give you that accounting, and in so doing, to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations.
We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict.
With early in this administration, after 10 months of no progress from the public and Paris talks, I became convinced it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels to see whether it would be possible to end the public deadline.
After consultation with Secretary of State Rodgers, our ambassador in Saigon, and our chief negotiator in Paris, under the full knowledge and approval of President Pugh, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, to begin,
these secret peace negotiations.
Since that time, he has traveled to Paris about 12 times on these secret negotiations.
He has met seven times to lead October, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, Minister Zhuang Cui, head of the American North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris conference.
He has met with Minister Zhuang Cui alone five times.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank President Pompeo of France for his personal assistance in helping to make the arrangements for these talks.
Now, this is why I initiated these private negotiations.
Privately, both sides could be more flexible in offering new approaches.
Also, private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions free from the pressure of the public debate.
Seeking peace in Vietnam and so many lives of state, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by private or public to negotiate a settlement.
As I have stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared and remain prepared to explore any avenue, public or private, to speed negotiations to end the war.
For thirty months, whenever Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, or I were asked about secret negotiations, we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace.
There wasn't a leap because we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations.
Though recently this course showed signs of the illness of progress.
Now, however, it is my judgment.
The purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the pro-polis via the name of the project.
Nothing is served by silence from the other side that exploits our good faith to divide America into a void of conversation.
And nothing to serve by silence would have mislead some of our ends into accusing their government of being to do what it has already done.
Nothing to serve by silence would have enabled the other side to apply possible solutions publicly that it has already rejected privately.
Time has come to lay the record of our secret negotiations on the table.
Just as secret negotiations can sometimes break a public deadline, public disclosure may help to break a secret deadline.
Some Americans, who believe in what the North Vietnamese need, let them believe, have charged that the United States has not pursued negotiations intensely, as the record will show just the opposite.
Questions have been raised as to why we have not opposed the deadline for the withdrawal order and the portions in exchange for a ceasefire and return of our prison to war, why we have not discussed the seven-point proposal made by the Viet Cong last July in Paris, why we have not submitted a new plan of our own to move the negotiations off dead center.
As the private record will show, we have taken all these steps and more, and have flatly rejected or ignored them the other time.
On May 31, 1971, eight months ago, at one of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered specifically to agree to a deadline for the withdrawal of all American forces in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and ceasefire.
At the next private meeting, on July, June 26, the North Vietnamese rejected our proposal.
They privately proposed instead their own nine-point plan, which insisted that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam.
Five days later, July 1st, the Army publicly presented a different package of proposals, a separate one, the Viet Cong plan, and that closed the door.
Which package should we respond to, the public plan or the private plan?
On July 12, at another private meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question to this North Vietnamese director.
They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan, because it covered all of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, while the Vietcong seven-point total, the public total, was limited to Vietnam.
That's what we did.
We even went beyond that, dealing with some of the points in the public plan that were not covered in the secret plan.
On August 16, at another private meeting, we went further and offered a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces within nine months after agreement on an overall settlement.
On September 13, when our Vietnamese rejected this proposal, they continued to insist that we overthrow the South Vietnamese government.
What has been the result of this strike?
For months, the North Vietnamese have derailed us from public sessions for not responding to their side's positive agenda, the seven-point plan.
The truth is, we did respond to the end of the plan in the manner they wanted us to respond secretly.
Full possession of our complete response, the North Vietnamese public deep denouncements were not having responded at all.
They had missed many Americans in the press and the Congress end up echoing their propaganda.
Americans who could not know it were being used falsely by the enemy to stir up the business in this country.
I decided in October that we should make a mental attempt to break the deadline.
I consulted with President Pugh who concurred fully in a new plan.
On October 11th, I sent a private communication to the Department of Defense that contained new elements that could move negotiations forward, and urged a meeting on November 1st between Dr. Kissinger's special advisory, Dr. Toad, or some other appropriate official in the House.
On October 25th, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20th.
On November 17th, just three days before the scheduled meeting, they said that Dr. Ho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he got well, with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who would come to the panel.
Two months had passed since they called on that meeting.
The only reply to our plan has been an increase in troop military attrition north of Vietnam.
The Communist military have had suits and vows in that way.
Our proposal for peace was answered by a step up in the war.
That is where matters stand today.
We are being asked publicly to respond to the proposal, and we answered it in some respects, except months ago at night.
We are being asked publicly to set a terminal date for our withdrawals, and we ought to be on the front line.
And the most comprehensive peace plan of this conflict lies ignored in a secret channel while the enemy tries again for military victory.
That is why I have instructed Ambassador Forkin, whom I will meet after the broadcast, to present our plan publicly at this Thursday's session of the Paris peace talks, along with alternatives to make it even more flexible.
We are publishing the full details of our plan tonight.
It will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make these negotiations with the team.
It will show unmistakably the hand-eye and the heart of your side of mind to make the world go on.
Here is the essence of our pre-plan, public disclosure, and give it the attention it deserves to have.
Within six months of an agreement, we will withdraw all U.S. and L.A. forces from South Vietnam.
We shall exchange all prisoners of war.
We shall exchange all prisoners of war.
There shall be a ceasefire throughout every channel.
There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.
President Pugh will announce the office of this election.
These include international supervision, an independent body to organize and run the election, representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communist National Liberation Front.
Fr.
Mark President Chu has informed me that within the framework of the agreement outlined above, he makes the following offer.
He and Vice President Hoa would be ready to resign one month before the election.
The Chairman of the Senate, as a character head of the government, would assume administrative responsibilities in South Vietnam, but the election would be the sole responsibility of the independent election body.
there's a lot of folks on our youtube channel for example as we offered privately on july 26 of last year we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout indochina including north vietnam to help all those people recover from the rapid regeneration we will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations
We're ready to negotiate the plan I've outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues.
Or, as we proposed last May, we remain relevant, settle all three of the military issues, and leave the political issues to the other teams alone.
Under this approach, we will withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within six months in exchange for an end to China's ceasefire and the release of all prisoners.
The choice is up to the enemy.
This is a settlement offered which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam.
It deserves a lot of public scrutiny by those nations and by other nations as well.
It deserves the united support of the American people.
We made the substance of this generous proposal privately over three months ago.
It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored.
I reiterate this peace offer tonight.
It can no longer be ignored.
The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, something the United States of America will never do.
If the enemy wants peace, we have to recognize the important errors.
We can settle and surrender.
It's been a long and agonizing struggle, but it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position in the war, can now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair to everyone concerned.
By the steadiness of our withdrawal forces, America has proved its resolution to end its involvement in the war.
By our readiness to act with a spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout every country.
We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.
If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces to South Vietnam to develop the capabilities that I have sought.
If the enemy in answer to our peace offer is to step up their military attacks, I shall wholly meet my responsibility as commander-in-chief of our armed forces to protect our remaining forces.
We do not prefer this profession.
I want to end the war, not only for America, but for all the people in the country.
The plan I propose tonight can accomplish that goal.
Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our government says must be false, whatever our enemies say must be true.
The record I review tonight proves the contrary.
We can now demonstrate publicly what we have long been demonstrating privately.
America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself.
Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all, nine years ago.
President Kennedy said in the first 15,000 years.
There has been disagreement on the conduct.
The proposal I have made tonight is one on which we can all agree.
Let us unite now in our search for peace.
A peace that is fair to both sides.
A peace that can last.