Conversation 329-042

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I don't care about it.

No, the following has happened, Mr. President.

The North Vietnamese had called the public, had said they'd passed us a private message asking for a meeting on the 27th.

Why?

Asking for public meeting on the 27th.

They didn't say anything.

So you haven't told Bill about the private meeting?

I don't want him to know about the private meeting thing, that it's on and off, because he'll say, well, the reason we did it is because of what Porter said, or what I said, or something.

Now, screw that.

That isn't the reason.

So, the court has said, if we go to a public meeting without having nailed down the private meetings, they're going to tell us because then they will have to plan the recessions.

Then they'll say, unless we stop the violence, then they'll cancel the private session again.

His suggestion, of which I agree, is that we promise them to come to the private meeting if they come on the 24th, and then we will come to the public meeting.

If they want to have a private meeting on the 24th, we'll come to them.

and they'll come back home.

Then I should call the ransom in this afternoon.

You go back home.

My Vietnamese expert who works on these things says their problem about the private for deductible travel

without having the excuse of having had a public meeting is an enormous humiliation.

Now, that is a part of the truth, but we are not interested in this now.

So that's the, I've just had a briefing on the military situation.

And, and Locke is still voting.

Are we sure?

I don't know how much we've been lying to the military.

The military's been lying to all the administrations for years.

I agree.

And I can't, I don't want to, I don't want to, I don't want to lie either way.

I can't tell you, Mr. President, other than that I question the police.

They have the party.

No, they have the party.

I don't want to talk, Mortar gets it from somebody else, so I talk to the guy that uses the Mortar.

He says that the head of the plants division, he saw it too.

He says they're still holding that lock.

They're still holding that lock and that they now have business who say that they always are if they don't make it in the next 36 hours.

That is almost plausible.

Are we not bombing in the area?

That's what I want to know.

They make the numbers absurd, but what are they hitting?

Oh, I know.

They said they had 300 bodies.

You told me that 300-body story four different times.

I know.

Just saying, 300 bodies.

I don't know, but they claim that...

I'm sick of the Air Force.

Oh, the Air Force.

The disaster is that these...

When we get a new chief of the Air Force, which we're going to have to get next year anyway, because Ryan's doing something...

We have to get these planes to design, Mr. President, these high-performance planes can't fit a car that size.

If it weren't for the people at the cruise, that's the one thing.

Well, he wants to know what the hell he's doing.

He's preparing another massive move that makes it look like it's true.

Oh, good.

Well, I mean, before we leave that,

And I'm going to ask, is the move tonight going on to get Laird more?

I agree.

Did Laird, did Laird, now you understand, Abrams here is simply making a record.

In case he doesn't win in the South, he'll say that.

Well, does Laird know that he's making a record?

Mr. President, I thought about this weekend group.

The average number of soldiers he flew every day during the battle when there was nothing going on.

And, uh, so that just isn't a good idea.

It's the beginning now to wind up the old, wind the bombings, uh, starting, uh, they're gonna have, uh, demonstrations in France over the weekend.

And we're gonna get the same stuff, yeah, the same stuff that Johnson got.

And...

I know it's impressive, but it's tough not to believe.

Who did that?

That is tough.

President, I'd like to send a message, except to say we will come on the 27th.

Um, certainly if there is a private meeting, we'll have a private meeting on the 24th, correct?

Correct.

That will also, I think that can be done, and I assume you'll send something to us to do that immediately.

I'm sure that would be good for what is happening.

All right.

There's a, one of those contacts I've made out of time, this would actually, I just, you know,

I can show you how I don't.

But they fired 3,000 rounds in this area that we ordered yesterday, and that's a pretty massive load.

And, of course, they're going to get 10 more destroyed than on Monday, all of which I don't know.

I think, and they ran the same last night.

I don't know.

No, and you were the fact that we're both on a particular note.

You see, the purpose of that is I was considering it as a faintness.

It was a faint before, but it is.

It's basically a ball.

It said, look, goddammit, if you don't screw, or if you keep screwing around here, we're going to lock you in.

And then we would.

It was a thing.

It was well done.

My worry was that they made a separate expedition of it.

What they did was they shelled the town wall, which is 50 miles out and 60 miles out.

Moved north and on the way back, shelled it again.

So it looked as if this was the same operation.

Right.

And...

Are we using our massive air there rather than farting around all over now?

We're counting if you look at the flood.

In fact,

The whole area of Adelaide, they show me every box now.

It's just one big block of red.

And they had, I think, 32 boxes.

I think, Mr. President, any correct answers is the way it was in your office that day.

It isn't any designable objection to anything.

The one thing is,

Since this thing started, until Friday, I have not had a single phone call from him, right?

And it's just not right, basically, that the Secretary of State has never suggested he said that.

And particularly because we're, because we are consulting with his other people.

He knows damn well it's up to him.

And he should be out front briefing.

And he hasn't briefed anybody, has he?

No, but...

He hasn't said a word.

But we've got to stay out front because McCloskey's going to take the briefing.

We write it to him, but he's doing it.

So they can't say it, it says.

Well, Rogers doesn't care about the State, he cares about himself.

That's right.

That's exactly right.

Coming back to the composition care, it's really what our cards are.

We will do this if we have a private meeting.

That's Porter's advice.

Porter does not believe you should have a public meeting.

Porter will now talk.

So basically, he just feels that we'd be in a bad position to have a private meeting.

I can get this message .

is that if we have a private, a public meeting, they could immediately attack our parliament.

That's what they used the government meeting for.

They were then threatened.

They were threatened to call off the planetary sessions if we don't stop the bombing.

And secondly, they were threatened that they will cancel the private meeting on the ground

Now, my view is also, Mr. President, that if we just give them a four, we'll get them on the line.

They have a two.

It also means two.

If we agree to a private meeting on May 7th, or May 6th, or 7th, or 8th, in that time, it will be two weeks.

It will be two weeks before.

They say that on May 6th or after.

But the trouble is, it will put us

two weeks before the summit.

It was a plausible threat then.

So it's rather cleverly chosen.

They will probably give us something at that meeting that at least keeps us going to another meeting.

By that time, we're in June, because then we have to go to Russia, and you've got the Democratic Convention.

And then you've got the Democratic Convention coming.

And then you haven't got the Russians as eager to help us.

The situation is basically this.

Now, you mentioned about the demonstrations and so forth and so on.

What the hell difference does that make?

The bombing demonstrations and so forth.

Isn't that anything new?

You know, they never affected us before.

It's not unpleasant, but it's not what I meant.

It's demonstrations in Canada.

or France, England, Stockholm, Germany, overseas, and all the rest.

So they're going to have it, right?

So what, do you think we should do?

Stop bombing because of that?

Absolutely.

That's what we cannot do.

It's left them to actually keep us pissed.

But we think that Johnson never did well.

That what killed Johnson is

that he seemed to be, well, how can you tell Rogers I know he seemed to be fixed in that position?

He seemed to be reluctant to negotiate.

We've been in the great position that we've always seemed tactically flexible.

So right now you're concerned that Rogers is, and maybe that's a good point, that we're being boxed in on that point a little bit, right?

Well, that's probably true.

Yeah, but I am against going to a blended session on these things.

When they are, if I have any understanding.

When they have a lot of understanding of this, a blended session is better.

Right.

Oh, yeah.

He'll play along.

How is Larry going?

You're telling him what to talk.

He's going to talk.

Oh, I know what they're going to need, because I'm doing this present.

I have no doubt that they're going to have a bloody session.

supporting each other.

We probably have to do president against each other, against us, against each other.

Laird?

Goddamn him.

None of them.

I mean, Laird now says we panic when we get people to Memphis reports, and we should have just ignored them.

That's what he says.

In other words, Laird's now in a position of saying it's for him.

Oh, yeah.

All right.

That lead is also, the citizen is saying it isn't necessary.

Some people say that's a right.

That's a right to raise a water problem.

And the way Jeff Bowles said it, it would like to be 52 days before we raise a water problem.

That's what we want to do.

Because it's further on.

Right.

Yeah.

I know I can find a problem.

Now let's talk about the blockade.

Let me tell you about the blockade.

In my view, if we're going to do it, we've got to do it very soon or we will not have the support for it.

And that support runs out as time goes on.

In fact, we probably should have done it this week.

You know, I'm just saying, I'm just saying, I'm thinking in terms of having public support in the United States.

The support can run out.

If the blockade comes at a time that a disaster is impending in the South and people know it, or when riots are going on here, then it looks like an act of desperation.

If we can move before either of those things happen,

then we might have a great deal of public support for it, for a while.

You see, that's my reasoning for doing it sooner rather than later.

The second point is that that could be an argument for Europe going to the Soviet Union, even though they know of a meeting on the 24th.

The idea being that you are on it with the condition that the primary subject for discussion is Vietnam unless there is something possibly tangible to offer, the president is going to take action.

And at that time, you would tell him, I would tell him what action he's going to take.

It's going to be strong action.

It will not be directly against you.

The way to do that, if I played out that scenario, I thought of it.

It was one of the things I had in mind, yeah.

But I would say that the Vietnam case must be worse than that.

If there is no complete progress on it, I would refuse to go on to summit the agenda item.

If there is complete progress on it, I would be entitled and empowered to discuss some of the agenda items.

But the progress cannot be an agreement at all.

It must be a precise description of how the world will come to an end, how the world will come to an end.

That's not good.

Second point.

That's what I'm thinking.

Second point is, it also has the advantage, vis-a-vis our domestic opinion, that we have got an absolutely extra lot of young people.

Well, that brings me to the second point, the reason for your comment.

And on that basis, then we go.

After they hear that, they look at the hard ones, which would be that if we don't get it in on Vietnam, except, you know, a discussion or something like that, sorry, on the South, you know, whether we really can still go to the South.

they're going to have to make, we're going to have to make an evaluation.

It may be, it may be that we may still go, in other words, I'm going to put it this way.

As I heard it, going to the summit, we cannot go, we cannot go to the South Vietnam major on the run.

It's impossible.

We could go, we could go, and I'll make this concession, if the situation is still in flux, with the understanding that we

and something is going to come out of it on the summit.

But there's our problem there.

Now, the point that I make is if you're going, they want the summit, they want it back.

And you're going to, of course, hold over their heads the, not only the , but the German thing has done.

I'll sit down around the question.

We'll just tell Marshall and the rest of them how we're going to answer it.

Do you agree?

No, but that means we have to get it done as soon as possible.

So, as you're thinking this morning, you have to find the next problem.

to them should be.

And if you would just, like the president is now, change his opinion.

The directions are directed in the following way.

I should say this.

They haven't been missed out on that for the past little time.

the, uh, would you tell them about this rigmarole and what it is?

That is a point, that is a point.

I understand, but I don't know what it means.

I don't think they can deliver their people.

The transistency of these questions about utility of my trip to Moscow.

I should be very done.

Secondly, the President had turned down originally a meeting in Moscow simply to prepare the summit for reasons that he has his plan to listen to.

Now, we have offered the South Wigan, the North Wigan meeting again.

We were going on with it for the 24th, with the promise of coming on the 27th.

And, you know, we made that announcement before the 24th.

Secondly, we have to have a clear understanding of what I'm talking about.

In some country, Russia's will be made towards a rapid act of the Vietnam War.

And before the President can give his final approval, I'm sure he would like to hear the Soviet, uh, with his, uh, with his service.

So...

I don't mean all over.

Oh yeah.

But look, except in the battle area, you see, you know what I mean?

Meaning, those meetings were supported in the battle area, and I thought, that's what I had to do.

You would stop only arms, not food and medical supplies, right?

You say that, medical supplies, you're president.

I told them, hey, why don't you do something just to do it, though?

I wouldn't mind if bloody helpers would say, are you willing to make arrangements to get medical supplies?

Now, what I mean is these things, you have to have some trusted person start working on that away.

Now, it seems to me that the basis to draw out something is the blockade will be lifted when the POWs are returned.

And within six months after the P.O.W.

did the return, all of our interviews were drawn on that subject.

But, in other words, it's prisoners for P.O.W.

to do that project.

And that was Q5 on fish.

Now, you see, that's the kind of a game I think we should play on the blockade.

I think we're put in that way.

I'm not the pro of the research fund.

Maybe it should be three months.

Maybe it should be eight months.

I'm not worried about the months.

I'm worried about the fact that we've gotten ourselves into this box that we seem to be doing it only for the business.

The fact of the matter is we're doing it for our bottom line.

It's here for the trust in us about the country.

And I know that if anybody wants to have the effect, they will have the effect.

I guess you're right.

The war will return for all horses.

I'm looking at all horses.

I think if we are playing it disproved a little bit, I guess I'm going to put it.

Put yourself in a position where everybody can stand.

until they can stand the blockade for six years or the last six months.

Well, no, they can't.

They've been standing for about nine months.

They need supplies.

Not that they have.

The second point is...

Second point is that we wouldn't be hit by railroads unless the other countries would come to China.

No, very little P.O.L.

would come to China.

So a great P.O.L.

would come to China.

Any questions?

I'm sure.

And another problem, Mr. President, is that the Russians have two reasons why they don't want this.

One is it would drive, it would force them into a confrontation with us.

Second is, if it was Hanoi, it was Peking.

Because the only way that Hanoi would possibly survive is through Peking, this flood.

Yeah, yeah.

And of course, well, that brings me to the point as to the effect.

The effect would be with Peking, they'd have to get more deeply involved in the war to get the hell out of the blockade.

The effect also is sort of a break on China.

The effect, huh?

Yeah.

What would it do to the Russians?

The Russians would call up and say, we want you.

We're here.

You would have, what we're doing is we're making ourselves, possibly putting in quite a brilliant Soviet Vietnam.

On the other hand, the alternative is a Soviet initiative and a Chinese initiative.

All that hangs on them.

isn't going to be worth a hell of a lot if Vietnam goes down for two.

If it doesn't, then we have no choice.

then this policy that Trudeau described as throwing our way to one side or the other doesn't work because we won't have any way to struggle.

The Russians don't come up with anything.

We have no choice but to walk away.

And we've got to do it.

I already mentioned this to President.

The rest of us, the battle with South Vietnam, we're going to go on our own.

And that'll be what it is.

It could be.

But we're too long.

You see what I mean?

Your forces of opposition in this country and around the world will begin to build next week.

If they build too great, the blockade then comes at the wrong time.

The blockade could come right now.

We could do it tomorrow.

And if we, you know, if we see real action, we always say stop the doubt and debate for a while.

That's why I was just wondering whether or not maybe our option is to blockade now.

No, Mr. President, but that is not just enough.

First of all, we haven't played the Russian string on yet.

They are bloody minded sons of bitches.

But I know they haven't fought for 35 years in order to be pushed around by the Russian side.

So, we have...

the problem that we must lend so deep pressure on our own people to honor it.

And we must bring home to so many people that we are really bloody serious about this.

And then we've got to get them some time.

But not a hell of a lot of time.

Well, I'm just saying blockade options are going to run out here.

I'm afraid.

We have to do it.

Because I'm afraid, basically, our domestic support for blockade, which is, I don't give a shit about the foreign support, but our domestic support for blockade might be ruined in two weeks.

I'm strongly in favor.

I didn't want to leave any crew that Colston had chopped up.

I'd be strongly in favor.

No, we're not.

See, when I go to Moscow, it's a hell of a... That's why all the distant music moves again.

Lots of times it's good to start streaming while I'm in Moscow.

I know the parents would notice that.

I don't know what the kind of stuff that I do in the future, but it's good to start streaming.

We may have to reveal the Moscow crypto if you go.

And it, and it, and it, and it.

This is off.

I just reveal it to you.

I'm the director of Moscow.

There's a suggestion to do a damn thing.

I'm calling off the Russians on the time blockade.

I wouldn't let that call off the summit.

That's my point.

Do you agree or not with that?

All of a sudden, right, they're crashing arms.

They're doing this.

They didn't tell them.

We're not going to have a hell of a lot of people to support them.

We're ready to talk about it.

I don't think they're going to get to that point.

You know, I was facing your conversation just last week.

I don't know.

He may say things that aren't true, but they're never said either.

He's lying.

I don't think he ought to take the trip to Moscow.

I would say that in a way.

So, wait.

I'm changing this.

to Moscow, then I have to come to the message to someone that's aggressive because then I don't want to put ourselves in the position.

I still have to say, say that you're coming to Moscow, often the president is with a clear understanding.

But I will say with a clear understanding that Vietnam will be the first man, the first island to be attempted.

And the first problem is that you're not prepared.

It's just the other island.

I think you can say that.

I have to say it's a great understanding that if it's one class that... That's right.

Do you see what I mean?

I'm sure you can go to Moscow and ask them.

They know they've got an issue, but they don't know you're not going to discuss it somehow.

They're going to want you to come.

Oh, yeah, then I can do it.

The question is, do I tell them, you must come back with an answer by Monday that tells us how we're going to make progress?

Or is it enough to say they won't be ready?

That's my concern.

They won't be ready.

I wouldn't come upon it.

I mean, I would say, do you agree with this understanding?

There must be an understanding.

And that there's not just to be discussion.

And the failure to have a proposal at that time, which we saw a proposal to discuss.

That is our understanding, and that's the basis that, lacking such a proposal, you will return to Washington immediately and not have a further discussion as far as some of it is concerned.

In other words, you're giving them the fact that they don't have to tell you that there's something on Monday.

They present it to you on Thursday, and you're there.

And if you don't get it, you get the hell out of there.

Let me write something out.

That sounds like a good deal to you.

Right.

It sounds fine.

And I think I would write it out because this is an important message, Mr. Besson.

We must feel correct.

But I myself, my first instinct was that playing it cold-bloodedly, what we get out of the trip...

It's more than they've done.

I agree.

I mean, the worst is they are suckering me along.

That's right.

And tell me nothing that they have done.

We have then gone the extra mile.

Then we've gone to Moscow.

We've gone the extra mile.

The little shitheads here who say the man doesn't want to negotiate.

Hell, you had me in Moscow.

That resurfaced my talk with Gromyko last September.

All the overtures we made through Moscow because then we don't give a damn.

And then have the basis for a very strong case, a blockade.

And if we don't want a blockade, it has to use the mass country for the purposes of crushing the summit.

Well, for the purpose of, I mean, supposing you then, supposing.

Is there any way that we can, which we just got a look at our water cards here.

Let me say, we have to realize that there's a lot more on the line here than simply a trip to Moscow and then toward Vietnam and so forth.

Because then I've got to do a lot of heavy thinking as to how we can do something about trying to get a candidate in this presidential race.

Who can be a candidate?

House somebody else.

Why?

Because you have to realize, you have to realize the position that we have.

We fail here, which we could well fail all of us.

You know, some of us cancel.

And if the blockade does not succeed, you understand that we're putting everything on the line.

That's my point.

But there's one other possibility.

This is another reason for going to Moscow.

If I don't go to Moscow, then your time is foreshortened.

If I do go to Moscow, we have the excuse that I'm going to Moscow, and that's why we're not doing more, rather, what?

I don't know.

But, like, in bombing, like, blockade.

If we don't stop blockading by the end of the week, without my going to Moscow, the question is, why the hell not?

Yeah.

Otherwise, I'm looking at all of the outcome standpoint of the Russians.

Not to say any were not ferocious.

When we were in Moscow, by this time, I agree, I understand that there's a couple of other domestic problems.

I'm back then.

But we've talked about the possibility of canceling the trip and going to a blockade.

There are other variations.

There's the variations that haven't been in Moscow.

If this Al-Qaeda is over, we might still decide to bomb the shed out of there, in the north, and go to Moscow.

Because if we can break a dialogue like this and not block it, I am reiteration of it.

We must not trip all the way on and couch the message in a way that you will not.

And they'll figure that they can sucker us through one way or another.

But we're going to be awful hard to sucker.

Also, by the accident that Larry Moore decided to go ahead with his damn strike, I don't know why he hit Moore.

Talk Larry into it.

What the hell do you think?

I think it's the best thing.

Why the hell did it happen?

It's so unbelievable.

I think this, I think Larry...

just playing in both ways.

He knows that I want to do it.

He doesn't want to be...

He's a patriot.

He isn't.

Rouse is like Rouse.

Rouse is really, at least less so than Rouse is.

But, you know, it's really something, you know, you take Bill, it's even...

I don't even know what it is.

Sucks around the Canadian, you know.

This is true though.

Well, the news summary gives you high marks for... We didn't need it at all, but the news... Well, it was nice to tell us some minor positive news, but they reported...

I've never quoted it as a podcast, but they described you actually in a very positive way.

Your speech definitely wasn't all that good.

So we've got to use your account on this.

If there's a way, Reed Henry, to not allow Vietnam to sink the Soviet Union, that's what I'm thinking about.

If we can, we ought not to do it.

Having in mind the fact that the Soviet Union

Let us face it, and here we look at the other side.

If we can find a graceful way to let you down, then maybe we just have to die and live to fight another way, if we fight like hell before it happens.

My point is, you see my point, but on the other hand, if there is no graceful way, then the summit goes out the window.

That is the problem everywhere the summit is.

It's a whole new imposition.

That's what I understand.

I'm only putting it on what to me is a totally rhetorical matter.

And mind you, there is no graceful way you can let it go.

Remember, you always say, let it go.

How in Christ can you do it?

It would never have worked.

It was never right.

But now I think what we have to do is this.

I think what I have to do is to say, in fact, that we're going to, everything's on the line, cancel the summit.

We haven't realized that the Russians canceled the summit.

In fact, if we cancel the summit because of the blockade, we are virtually assuring the certainty of

the Democrat winning, unless I don't find a way to.

And I'm thinking of this, too, of trying to move one of the other Republicans in the money.

The moment you come down to it, you've got Rockefeller, who probably couldn't have dominated.

You've got Reagan, who could, and he couldn't do.

And the other possibility, which never would have occurred to you, is Bernie,

But it has been suggested.

And the other one, and this is really the only long shot, just might blow the plug on the whole bunch, because you did the whole sound.

Did I ever talk with Colin before all this began?

I said, well, look here.

You've got to change your heart.

And then I...

to bow out and endorse Connolly and then Connolly with what I am, and Connolly without the scars to go on and win it.

See, there is a problem.

But the point is, we have to realize that if we lose Vietnam and the summit, there's no way that the election can be successful.

That's the problem.

There's no way it's going to be.

To be, that means to vote for the president.

So it can't be permitted.

I don't know how you can avoid it.

Maybe, you see, the blockade is not working.

Secondly, there's no realistic opportunity.

No.

Well, not really.

You see, it's something that you could be around with any of these people.

The only one you couldn't handle is D-Ray.

I think he's too much of a lifeline.

Mr. Besson, you could handle Bird.

Mr. Besson, you could handle D-Ray.

If I had worked as closely, as invested as I have with you, to work in a similar position, with the success of that, I would have had a much closer relationship.

And after three years... Well, then you realize what we look at.

We're looking at Muskie, Huckabee, or Kay.

This is cold as hell.

I pray.

Now that, you see, that's why so much rags on the stand today.

Now you come around to this problem.

Maybe it was the Soviets.

My point is, if we can,

We've got to handle this way to save the Soviet Union and mitigate Vietnam.

What I'm getting at is that I don't mean to sink you, but if you get used to it, I'm getting at it.

See, I don't think there's a way anymore of mitigating Vietnam, Mr. President, because we'll either win or lose.

I think the first one I'm choosing is right.

If we lose.

It doesn't matter how solid it is.

If we lose, then we're out.

Then you'll be under some kind of militaristic opposition.

And you'll be under murderous pressure.

If you win, now, if I think a blockade ought to be... You think a blockade was going to help?

No.

I think, Mr. President, we, as far as anybody else is concerned, you must give the impression...

being on the verge of going to prison.

I know everybody should be scared now.

Why not?

If we do invade, I think a blockade should be very, very carefully considered.

But I would like in Russia to act as if you just did not kill them.

That's true.

I would like to leave the impression

You're going to go to the summit, you're going to be blessed by the Wallace vote, you're going to go to the summit south, you're going to go on an anti-communist kick, and by God, you better not do it.

That's what I've been telling the people.

Now, I had all of this treatment, I've always backed off when it got wild enough.

Yeah, but I know the Russians should back off because I'm in the current field of peace right now.

That is true.

But if we can get the Russians to back out, then the question is, can we find the Bolsheviks?

And even for my own selfish reasons, I'm not eager.

We've both been covered in an unbelievable way.

And all the reputation has been achieved for great ones.

I'm sure it would be the other ones.

We know that.

So I have not as much of a stake, but also a stake in not having to go to Russia.

I know that.

But we've got to play the Russian card out.

I think that's why you have to go.

to write your message then.

But I think that what I want, what I'm really trying to tell you is that I am prepared to go all the way and that I'm prepared to take all the consequences.

But, and, that means that you have the blockade card over there.

You may not play it there, but I mean, you see, if you know that's going to come, you could be a hell of a lot tougher than if you know it isn't going to come.

If they think we've turned the last screw, there ain't much more to be done.

See, we may not want to do a blockade, we may trust Tom.

How Tom made this decision.

In that case, why would we do a blockade, really, for what?

Just start bumping every port so they don't use it.

Why is the third one?

Because then the other ships will come in.

Or they'll just pile them outside.

And we're not challenging the Russians to exit.

You mean the bomb on the ships wasn't harder as a chain?

No, they bombed the British.

They had it pretty well cut off from the rest of the country for a while.

All right.

Well, it takes longer to do that.

Well, I will.

Let me put it this way.

I'm talking about a blockade, though.

The American people, I think, would stand a blockade

longer than they would vomit.

That's the reason.

The blockade appeals.

The blockade is, you're not killing people.

You see, it's easy to have a public demonstration against the bombing.

That's right.

The bombing people, they could kill them.

But if we blockade and say, stop the killing in the South, return our prisoners of war, get out of that, we'll let the blockade.

That's a hell of a hard thing to do.

So I had to go out to eat at a bar last night, by the way.

But I didn't go out there, and I didn't put the name on it.

So, uh, all the things considered, I would tend to go with what was okay, but my judgment is also that if we decided on cosplay and flexes, they'll help us.

Maybe not enough.

I can't think of the bottom line.

I think you've got your, uh, messenger on the right.

What?

Oh, I haven't picked one of mine if you want to do something else.

I didn't.

You've got, uh...

If you want to bring it back, all right.

But if I need my sentence.

We all understand.

In fact, if you want to say who was up to repeat the announcement.

I would say the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh,

It's very difficult for us to see whether the two great powers, the South Korean and the United States, have devoted Vietnam, and also whether, on the basis of this, to speed up the reparations of the South, of the South, and of the rest of the United States.

It now appears that by some assurances by the Soviet ambassador,

The President wants to be prepared to send Dr. Kissinger

on the assumptions made here.

I would like to hear an expression from the Soviet government, how it did it.

And if the Soviet government shares this view, then I would like to hear it.

You know, you've got to say that the first item on the agenda will be

prepared for discussion.

And unless one is, that we will not go, you are not authorized to go to the other items of the agenda.

Or do you want it to be that hard?

I think I said it.

I'll do it.

Now let me just say one thing.

to say that we won't come in the 27th.

Well, Mr. President, I must tell you honestly, before they had no business knocking out that planet, it's a terrible liability to us.

We didn't ask you to do this.

He did it on his own.

You didn't instruct him without my knowing it.

Hell no, he did it himself.

I know that.

So it was a goddamn mistake.

He hadn't done that.

But I backed him up when he did it.

Oh, you were very lucky.

Yeah, I had to.

But he had not done that.

And if we hadn't had, I didn't know if God had anything about it, but if he hadn't done that.

I was surprised you were, but let's don't second guess it now.

We've got to back him up.

I just want to tell you that I basically agree with what you're thinking.

Yeah, yeah.

But my point is now...

All we want is a private meeting.

You see what I'm getting at?

Well, a private meeting on May 7th is doing us a hell of a lot of good.

In other words, my point is, let me put it this way, is their desire to have a...

I don't know if the Russians get what they want for.

Well, that's what I want.

Rather than trying to use the device of Porter stripping her out of a public meeting...

I think they have a real thought about getting people out of Paris without a session going on.

This looks too much as if he's going there to sit around and play on for something to happen.

So if we propose to them that we come on, that we don't need on the 24th, if they, that if we will have a public session on the 27th, no matter what happens on the 24th,

then we can have a private session on the 24th.

Maybe.

On the other hand, if we go to a plenary session, now under the present circumstances, we may do it.

I think we should hold up on the plenary session after I've been involved.

That puts us in a position.

And just put them on the basis of the order it says.

As long as there are promises, you know, it's stated, it's activated, and then we have the notice.

And now we're in command.

Don't be too sure, Porter.

Five.

Get the best of intentions.

Make them the right thing.

You know what I mean?

For God's sake, stop that.

I don't like it.

That's just the business.

That's the business of it.

If these guys want to negotiate, they'll negotiate.

You can't drive them off the station.

If they're going for the plan of accession, providing a prefect, they'll find another prefect in the army.

If they want to meet with the prefect, they'll meet.

And if they don't want to, they'll find another prefect.

They lose the private accession primarily.

This brings the subject under law.

All right.

That's, uh, and you're going to have to order, do this, I won't have to order, I will, through other channels, say that, say that we will not, that we will agree to a public session on the 5th session, 27th, only if they come to a private meeting on the 4th or you want, that, uh, and I wouldn't say that, that we would be committed to, um, the public session on the 27th, because of the meeting.

Do you think that's better than,

maybe four or five days later, how would that feel?

In other words, you'd have to go back again.

And also, then we can say we've been in touch with them about this.

They won't be able to drive me.

That's another thing.

We've responded to it.

to respond to their office response.

I think that the president has a position to take the ability to go .

That I don't need to see a bench.