Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 330 › Conversation 330-007

Nixon, Kissinger & Moorer on Vietnam War and Military command

Wednesday, April 5, 1972 · 9:16 AM–9:55 AM ET · Old Executive Office Building

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; White House operator; Kissinger, Henry A.; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.)Conversation330-007 on Tape 330 (tape position 00:14:32–00:50:56)StartWednesday, April 5, 1972 at 9:16 AMEndWednesday, April 5, 1972 at 9:55 AMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 330-007 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive and their frustration with the lack of aggressive military responses from U.S. air commanders. The participants evaluated the effectiveness of current air strikes and naval gunfire while debating the potential need for a leadership shake-up, including the possible replacement of commanding officers to ensure more imaginative and vigorous tactics. Additionally, Nixon emphasized the psychological importance of massive B-52 strikes and analyzed the geopolitical risks for the Soviet Union regarding the conflict ahead of their upcoming summit.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 00:14:32 into the tape and ends around 00:50:56.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
14:40Well, that's a warning report.
14:45Weather is still bad.
14:47We've been most tracking about it.
14:51It's being destroyed.
14:58It's not going to clean again.
15:01Destroyed machines.
15:07No, no, no.
15:08Of course, lead was lying.
15:11I think it's more a case, Henry, that I think you're right.
15:18Laird is being led by a smart man in his office.
15:30Personally, that's his comment.
15:32Personally, it probably tells you that.
15:38Personally, it's
16:08I didn't think it was you, though.
16:11No, no, well, they meant it.
16:12I know what happened.
16:13I told you that we knocked out some tax-protected gunmen, and then you ordered more citizens in.
16:19And then you spoke back and had our letter and said, I mean it, I don't want more citizens.
16:28Now that's their thing.
16:30Hold it.
16:31Hold it.
16:33And that's...
16:34It's all something to the effect of
16:38We haven't lost any.
16:42We lost several, the first two dead.
16:45We have not lost one in the last three days.
16:53We lost two and then we sacrificed them.
17:08What about the report of crossing the river?
17:10They crossed the river.
17:12They crossed it with these little tanks that they had in Laos last year.
17:20And they have the bridgeheader, and they find it back.
17:24We have any further reports?
17:26That is not the river that we talked about.
17:28That's not the area.
17:29Maybe because that's close to the coast.
17:31And I think we have to do something to fix it up to that.
17:38When Boris made his statement, it seemed to me that we were developing an institution.
17:44They're not attacking the country from the north, from the river.
17:49They're going around, they're hitting it from the south.
17:52We notified April something yesterday, and he's on an inspection trip.
17:57He's gone out on an inspection trip.
18:01What I wanted was to go to the distance.
18:05They have a new Air Force command on there with a gun.
18:07Charlie Hogan put me in, put me aside after the briefing this morning, and said he has to tell me as a friend that he believes that it is not run-and-run.
18:25And they've just replaced one Air Force command at normal rotation.
18:29The guy they sent out is an R&D guy.
18:32I don't give him a star, and I don't give him a star.
18:35But I think we ought to order them to put either folk down there for a general play, who was just out there, who knows how it was.
18:45And unless we do something drastic, I'm afraid now, yesterday they drew only 12 pieces.
18:52Why?
18:53Because it would give me a big mismatch in the story that the cloud cover is so high that the electronic counter at this place
19:04Don't have enough maneuvering tools.
19:07Every day they have a different excuse.
19:16There's a bomb.
19:16We're going to have to be knowing.
19:19I believe we have to get a copy of the airplane.
19:22Then I'm going to talk to the weather person.
19:24They're probably going to get commanded.
19:26But god damn, isn't something here a little bit...
19:30Mr. President, when Patton had moved, according to their principles, to battle at the foe, some people wanted to, he'd still be, if he would have come there four days later, too late to check the battle.
19:47They're not doing anything down here, they're all, they have yet to do an imaginative thing.
19:52Mort, Admiral Mort, please.
20:30Oh, ja.
20:30And muskies.
20:32And muskies, ja.
20:34That means let it fall.
20:36That means let it fall.
20:37You see, that's why we have to do it until it's goddamn fast on the screen.
20:40That's right, that's right.
20:41I understand.
20:47Well, to fly on the APBs, which they have a great technical story, but a daring commander would have had them out then.
21:02143 tactical airstrikes.
21:03They had, there's another attack developing in a third corps.
21:08And, you know, they had to do this.
21:13So, they had to do this.
21:17They had to do this.
21:19They had to do this.
21:21They had to do this.
21:23Oh, yes, that's good.
21:25I mean, that's not good.
21:29He called back.
21:30He gave the call.
21:33I'm here with the president.
21:36He hasn't called back.
21:38I'm here with the president.
21:42Regretfully, he wants the best air commander with experience out there.
21:50He's replacing the air commander.
21:54Don't screw up.
21:57That's what you do.
22:00Who is it?
22:00You mean Clay?
22:01Yeah, I don't know what he meant.
22:02Clay just was out there.
22:03He says he doesn't want to be experienced.
22:04Clay says he doesn't want to be experienced.
22:11Oh, I can tell you that.
22:13Yeah.
22:14Just say, I think we need an experienced air commander out there as fast as we can get him.
22:18And I can support that.
22:20I haven't got that authority, but I'm going to call him.
22:28I'm back.
22:29He, uh...
22:29Listen, I told Moore with his face that Abrams had screwed up Blouse, and he knows he screwed up Blouse.
22:36Rush told me yesterday that Moore repented, and said that he recommends against Abrams to be made chief of staff at the office, that the only man for him is his leg.
22:52So he's all right.
22:58We're done.
23:03I'm sitting here with the president as we were going over the briefing that both gave us this morning.
23:22Well, it was very well done.
23:31But the concern that the president has is whether we don't really need it.
23:36The president raised the point that he wants an experience there.
23:41We understand you've got a new guy out there now.
23:45Yeah, but he's got no experience with this.
23:49We've got all our shit driving on this.
23:51That's right.
23:52Thank you very much.
24:07We would like a recommendation, the president would like a recommendation by noon, of who the best man would be who could take this battle over now, during this offensive.
24:20We are determined to get bigger into this campaign and get the most experienced men and ladies that we could get played back out there.
24:33We were delighted with what the destroyers are doing very quickly.
25:02And if we can't, I'll step out and be 52 strikes, as the little words of the day come flying through the wind.
25:11He explained the Iron Man.
25:13Yeah, he explained that, Tom.
25:19Hello, Tom.
25:20Say, Tom, the thing I want you to do.
25:22Now, on the B-52 mission, there had, for psychological reasons,
25:29Now, let's forget the cloud cover and all the rest and so forth and all that.
25:33Have them fly at 95,000 or 110,000 feet.
25:34Drop their goddamn bombs and boom, drop them.
25:38Let's get them from, yeah, I want a hell of a lot of sergeants blown by B-52s today.
25:42Is that clear?
25:44Get those B-52s flying.
25:45Now, at least let them do it around the main tree area.
25:48That's open, isn't it?
25:50Yes, yes, I know they have it.
25:52All right.
25:53I don't want to see another report with 16 sorties of a diva to do.
25:57I want the enemy to know that we're really letting them have it.
26:01So get them in there.
26:03We've got to have it for psychological reasons.
26:06We can't have this, what appears to be a pusillanimous effort.
26:10I know that there are brave men out there at risk in their lives, they're fighting and all that sort of thing.
26:14But up to this point, you know, and I know, I know the reason it's weather, and there are technical reasons, and this and that and the other, but we have to have some sort of massive strike in the next 12 hours, 24 hours.
26:29You see what I mean?
26:31We've just got to have one.
26:32And it doesn't have to be in that area of the valley.
26:35Put the damn thing down on the V-tree, or put the 52s in there, and just knock to the future sun.
26:41You'll hit something.
26:44You just got to do it.
26:51Maybe out there is the next month, or two months from now.
27:02How long does it take to fly?
27:04Yeah, okay.
27:06Wow.
27:08Okay, now, I'm commander, I've got to get the most experienced of commanders, not as an observer, but in charge.
27:14Now, let me say, let me say, I've studied warfare enough to know this is the hardest thing to do.
27:21But more wars have been lost by not changing commanders than changing them.
27:25And you've got to have the most experienced, and also a fellow with imagination and vertigo, who takes the orders of getting the hell out there as fast as he can.
27:35And ours has been outplayed.
27:37Okay?
27:38All right, you give us the name by doing it, will you?
27:43All right.
27:43You see, they...
27:45I don't know.
27:46I looked at the goddamn plots.
27:48They blew the B-52s.
27:49They just had...
27:51They dropped some in the Chicago area.
27:53That was last year's time.
27:57They had four stories in the B-3 area.
27:59It was just about city.
28:00But they sent out a boat for flag hunting, and then they...
28:33They are hanging on the gunfire now 24 hours a day, so they can put on good pictures.
28:40They have the rule 1 on the 24-hour gunfire now.
28:44Even if they don't hit a great deal, it forces them to slow up.
28:49It's bad for their morale.
28:50I can only tell you that that's what they started to reason with this morning.
28:55And once the weather clears and it starts getting more accurate,
29:04Oh, that naval gunfire.
29:05That naval gunfire.
29:06It's the most precise thing I've ever heard of.
29:11It's a naval missile.
29:14And what was really interesting after the speaking, you guys were there yesterday, I asked them to come into the job, they can cover all the route lines, all the way down to the neck.
29:26There's no thought of movement other than to carve them around.
29:31I heard Saul's story, which I liked, both about the Jekyll and also something about his family, and Saul and Stanley, and a lot of things, in fact, that I consider thanks.
29:45That may be... Are they in a heart of panic?
29:47Are they not?
29:47Well, Mr. President... Now, some people always panic, you know, and I hear that a lot.
29:52But, yes, I would need to know the truth.
29:54Listen, for me, you'll have a better record of the content of the event than the kids back from the battle, I guess.
30:01The news stories are mixed.
30:07The news stories aren't so bad.
30:12Why is it?
30:13I don't know.
30:20Because at this time they can't say it's a guerrilla war.
30:23They can't say it's an emergency.
30:25And I noticed some news stories.
30:26I read a news summary or something that I was saying.
30:28This is what the operation laws prevented last year.
30:30I don't know if you saw that.
30:32But I know it's true.
30:33It's true, but the news stories are now saying that these are massive invasions.
30:42And that's what we've predicted.
30:47I think it is.
30:49Any more that they can claim, either we will make this case, or if they can't claim this is a good level, or they can't claim this is a civil war.
30:56The bags we have turned on, just like we expected, and the force on them will eventually be off in China in days to come.
31:07It's just that they can't do this.
31:09No, I'd rather have them off there.
31:11It's alright, they're going to do it, and we're going to have them here.
31:19I still think that this can be the conclusion of the work that we can ever do to them, what we're capable of doing.
31:42They all say that the weather figured it was live.
31:45Oh, yeah.
31:47The tragedy is that here we are.
31:48They're already open.
31:50It would be like shooting guns.
31:53But they've got to stay open, you know, so they can't go away.
31:57We've just had to open it ourselves in an eastern home.
32:00I don't know where they're going.
32:03It's pretty sad weather tonight.
32:08This is what you need to do when the weather is going to break something.
32:45I'm not going to do an entire little letter to open your mouth.
32:50We'll find out after that.
32:51We'll work out the, let me work out the tape situation and something else, and then let the chief serve the army in front of us, and we've got to get the army shaken up.
33:02I think we need to get the airport shaken up.
33:03I have no idea who should be the commander of the airport.
33:07I think if you like, somebody should go up and shoot him.
33:09Oh, God, no, no, you guys are not right.
33:11He doesn't have to be, well...
33:14He's got brains, but he doesn't have the strategic concept.
33:18Correct.
33:18He's a decent guy, but I don't think he can do that.
33:22For the Omni, my recommendation would be Davidson.
33:25And, hey, just provide a pen.
33:27He doesn't mortar always through the blouse, or does he?
33:35No.
33:36He sat there and braved us all the way through.
33:38It was the same thing.
33:40It was the same day in and day out.
34:15They've got the extra 70 crew, uh, Air Force out there.
34:19You, uh, you've got the destroyers out there.
34:22You've ordered the B-52s out there.
34:25You've ordered the extra carrier out there.
34:31And, uh, it's just not an aggressive command.
34:32I've spoken more of Cordei, but I've asked him yesterday when they received it.
34:36You know, he said the staff, uh, he said three days ago.
34:42But...
34:44Any series of the matter of this, which you've been boosting and pulling and busting and ordering, ordering, can we do that?
34:53I need a report from that.
34:55What the church today was doing, saying, oh, it's their job, you know.
34:58I don't mind that.
35:03Let me tell you, I'm not discouraged, though.
35:06I'm not discouraged.
35:07Watch.
35:13Watch.
35:13I hope.
35:14You've got to remember, once action begins, then all doubts must leave.
35:22You must just go, and by God, if we've decided what we're going to do, if it doesn't work, then we'll have to take on hand.
35:29I'm just...
35:31And I left those streams and they got them, and so we're not going to lose this war.
35:37I'm not discouraged.
35:38I've been horribly frustrated.
35:40I think we can break it open.
35:41I think that they make a mistake.
35:42Everything we want to go, we've done it, and it's a sign.
35:48In a way, it's a sign of prosperity.
35:50Secondly, I've come to the conclusion that Moscow must be the center of this war.
36:01This is a power plant for the muskite.
36:05Because here on the muskite, I know the muskite is over the muskite, but here, this in a way is the oil, this is between the oil and the air for the muskite.
36:25Because here, Moscow has to risk everything.
36:28All its relations with us.
36:30For what?
36:33I mean, what can Moscow ask us to get out of it?
36:40If we get run out of it, it starts being... Well, this will tell us a lot about Moscow.
36:51Because Moscow is willing to risk everything.
37:22Having just been defeated, it would be a time you can't come back from Moscow, having made another deal.
37:35So, if whatever they wanted to get out of this, something they cannot have, if Hanoi does, so in a way this is a power... What power in the world is more or less right?
37:54I guess.
38:18I think there's too some in Campo here than there's too some in...
38:23I kept it, but they did fly about 40 areas altogether, but only 16 in the battle area.
38:27Now the excuse they give you in the battle area is that there's nothing planned.
38:36Keep the ceiling of 5,000 feet, 6,000 feet, on top of the highest clouds.
38:40The clouds are 30,000 feet up, and these other planes can't get more than...
38:47I haven't got a seat that can fix this stuff.
38:50But that's all for now.
38:53If Russia, they can't cut it, that's fine.
38:57And just because they don't want to take action, I think that's not a problem.
39:02We're not going to do it, right?
39:10We should do it.
39:11If we get booked for a flight, and they have flights or not,
40:47Well, they're writing it to a certain extent that it doesn't really work.
40:53I think we've actually learned an error.
40:55It's more or less whatever we said we could.
40:58We didn't say no all along.
41:00On the other hand, we've got to get back to one that's one of the reasons why negotiations are very close to this.
41:08Certainly, I don't think we've been appropriating a lot of this as we've been hoping since this time.
42:10I should go for it.
42:14He has done it.
42:16Well, I think he's done everything to take the instinct.
42:19And in fact, the way that he has done it, the way that he has done it, I don't know why he did it.
42:26I don't know why he didn't walk out.
42:30It makes it very clear to see it.
42:32The enemy was pretty much here.
42:35He was sitting there talking and attacking.
42:38Vi hadt skuldersikret rettogående.
42:41Vi gudt trækt og sett at det sikkert hevde nevnt det.
42:44Men hest nevnt den gud?
42:46Tremendus effekt.
42:47Mr. President, after the election, vi gjorda bedre stånd.
42:53Vi gudt tre gudt i stedet.
42:57Vi nevnt vi gudt.
42:58Vi nevnt vi gudt.
42:59Vi nevnt vi gudt.
43:01Vi nevnt vi gudt.
43:03Vi nevnt vi gudt.
43:05I think if you have a good strong, and a man who will be totally loyal to you, you need a secretary who's oriented towards you.
43:23The secretary, yes.
43:25The secretary has to be your man.
43:30The department has to know that
43:36He is there as your man.
43:38Not their man, he's of the you.
43:41But he's your man, he's of the you.
43:43That's what I'm trying to say.
43:45That's what I'm trying to say.
43:50That's what I'm trying to say.
43:51That's what I'm trying to say.
43:55That's what I'm trying to say.
43:58That's what I'm trying to say.
44:00That's what I'm trying to say.
44:04And of course, you may not have known what we wanted them to do, but now you know how to have these types of facilities.
44:10You might see the letters go to me, to the heads of government, to the states, to the government, to the government, to the government, to the government.
47:03Thank you, sir.
47:31I don't think I'm going to know if this thing is going to work.
47:38I don't see that I can sit on it for a minute.
47:43Look, there couldn't be a better scenario for the game.
47:52I would let them know right now, sort of.
48:31Hey, I hope I should have my headache, and I've seen everything, so that I won't have to be involved at all, and I'm not going to do it.
48:41I'm not going to do it, because I don't want to be in the back of your house this time.
48:46It is a sad reason, because I don't want to do it, and I'm not going to do it.
48:52I'm not going to do it, because I don't want to be in the back of your house this time.
48:59Well, maybe tomorrow.
49:00Maybe tomorrow or today.
49:03I'm afraid something's not happening.
49:07I can't believe it.
49:10People are that strong.
49:12They can't be.
49:12They can't be.
49:13They have Mr. President.
49:17They have no idea who.
49:19And they can't believe the way we are.
49:22Now, you have both ignored my head.
49:25What about the
49:55My instinct, Mr. President, is to forget the two or three weeks of the other, and then wind it up with my thoughts.
50:01Do you consider this to agree with this kind of stuff we're doing now?
50:06No, it will be me, Mr. President.
50:09No, that's what I'm saying.
50:11Do you consider we're doing that now?
50:14No, we're not doing that now.
50:15Do I understand that there wasn't always a need to turn all of that?
50:20No, I didn't.
50:21Yes, always.
50:22All the way along with my thoughts.
50:28We're still gonna win it, you know.
50:41Oh yeah, don't we?

On April 5, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, Henry A. Kissinger, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:16 am to 9:55 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 330-007 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 330-7

Date: April 5, 1972
Time: 9:16 am - 9:55 am
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam
            -Morning report
                  -Weather conditions
            -Destroyers
            -Melvin R. Laird
                  -Report on air attacks
                         -Veracity
                         -Dong Hoi and Hue
                  -Reports
                         -Robert E. Pursley
                               -Reports to Laird
                                     -Positioning of destroyers
            -Destroyers
                  -Use
                         -Origin of instructions
                         -The President's orders
                  -Losses
            -Air attacks
                  -Plane losses
                         -Number
            -North Vietnamese offensive
                  -Crossing of river
                         -Tanks
                  -Latest reports
                  -Quang Tri
                         -Counterattack
                  -US response
                         -Unknown Air Force commander
                               -Replacement
                                     -Promotion
            -Air strikes
                  -General Lucius Dub. Clay Jr.'s report
                  -Cloud cover
                         -Effect on instruments

                  -Air Force reluctance
                  -Weather
                  -Compared with the Battle of the Bulge
                        -George S. Patton
                  -Lack of imagination

The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:16 and 9:27
am.

[Conversation No. 330-7A]

[See Conversation No. 22-79]

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -Administration’s opponents
                  -Michael J. Mansfield
                  -Barry M. Goldwater
                  -Hubert H. Humphrey
                  -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
                  -Mansfield
                  -Edmund S. Muskie
            -Air strikes
                  -Necessity
                  -B-52s
                  -Tactical aircraft
                         -Number
                         -III Corps
                         -Benefit
            -Thomas H. Moorer's return call
                  -Kissinger
            -Air commander
                  -Replacement
                  -Clay
                         -Experience
            -Air strikes
                  -Moorer’s reluctance
            -Creighton W. Abrams
                  -Handling of Laos operation
                         -The President's comments to Moorer
                  -Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] Chairman

                        -Moorer’s comments to D. Kenneth Rush
                             -Moorer’s recommendation
                        -Abrams’s capabilities

Henry A. Kissinger talked with Moorer between 9:27 and 9:32 am.

[Conversation No. 330-7B]

[See Conversation No. 22-80]

The President conferred with Kissinger during the conversation.

The President joined the conversation at an unknown time.

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -B-52 strikes
                  -Targets
                  -B-3 area
                        -Number of sorties
            -Air commander
                  -Compared with a doctor operating
            -Destroyers
                  -Route one
                        -Effectiveness
                        -Briefing given by Kissinger on April 5
                  -Weather
                        -Clearing
            -Naval gunfire
                  -Range
                        -Route One to Da Nang
            -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] morale
                  -Reports
                        -Verification
                  -Effectiveness of fighting
                        -News stories
                              -Laos
                              -Civil war
            -Mansfield
                  -Trip to People's Republic of China [PRC]
                  -Possible conversation with the President

            -The President's response
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -US response
            -Air strikes
                  -Weather
                         -Break
                  -Aircrafts’ vulnerability
                  -Weather
                         -Predictions
-Air Force command
      -Shake-up
            -Abrams
            -Laird
            -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
      -Commander
            -Unknown person's suggestion
                  -Ability
-Army Commander
      -Kissinger’s recommendation
            -[Forename unknown] Davidson
-US offensive
      -Moorer’s role
      -Destroyers
      -New ideas
            -The President's and Kissinger’s role
                  -F-4s
                  -Destroyers
                  -B-52s
                  -Carriers
      -Moorer’s call to Abrams
            -Abrams’s role
-North Vietnamese offensive
      -Countermeasures
            -Haiphong
            -Determination
-Soviet Union's role
      -Hanoi
      -PRC
      -Risk for Soviets
            -Gains
      -Impact of a US defeat
            -US-Soviet Union summit

     -Air strikes
           -B-52s
                  -Moorer’s report
                  -Number
                  -Cambodia
                  -Laos
                  -Flying ceiling
     -US air command
           -John W. Vogt
           -Clay
           -Abrams
                  -Replacement
                        -Effect
                  -JCS appointment
           -Moorer
     -North Vietnamese offensive
           -Hue
           -Moorer
           -Gain of territory
     -Negotiations
           -Laos
           -North Vietnamese request
                  -US refusal
           -William J. Porter
                  -Abilities
                  -Decision regarding a walk-out
                  -U. Alexis Johnson
     -US command
           -Loyalty to the President
           -Secretary of Defense
                  -Loyalty to the President
                  -Control of military
                  -Undersecretary
                  -Porter
                        -Kissinger’s recommendation

Soviet summit
     -William P. Rogers
           -Letter from the President
                 -Approach to summit
                 -Report on PRC
                 -Request for Rogers’s views

                         -Recommendations
                               -Subjects to be discussed
                   -Possible call from Haig

       Blackmail of unknown person
            -Private army [?]

       Vietnam
            -Guerillas
            -Air commander
                  -Loyalty

       Soviet summit
            -Timing
            -The president's schedule
            -National Security Council [NSC]

       Vietnam
            -Air strikes
                  -Break in weather
                  -Cambodia
                  -Bombing
                         -Haiphong area
                  -Alternatives
                         -Weather
                  -Bombing
                         -Haiphong
                              -Weather
                                    -Cloud cover
            -Optimism on outcome

Kissinger left at 9:55 am.
  • 022-078 8:45 AM · 10 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 8:45 am.
  • 330-003 8:45 AM · 51 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at 8:45 am.
  • 330-004 9:00 AM · 9 min — President Richard M. Nixon and John K. Andrews, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:00 am to 9:10 am.
  • 330-005 9:10 AM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 9:10 am and 9:16 am.
  • 330-006 9:10 AM · 50 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 9:10 am and 9:16 am.
  • 022-079 9:16 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 9:16 am and 9:27 am.
  • 022-080 9:27 AM · 5 min — Henry A. Kissinger, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone from 9:27 am to 9:32 am.
  • 330-008 9:55 AM · 16 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 9:55 am and 9:57 am.

Conversation 330-007, April 5, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/330-007 (accessed October 1, 2026).