President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the escalating military situation in Vietnam, specifically evaluating the impact of recent B-52 strikes and the performance of South Vietnamese forces against the North Vietnamese offensive. They strategized on managing domestic political fallout and media messaging, agreeing that Nixon should delay a formal speech to avoid appearing overly defensive or anxious. Additionally, they reviewed diplomatic maneuvers regarding the Soviet Union and China, emphasizing the need for firm resolve in maintaining foreign policy objectives despite potential criticism.
This clip was extracted from the full tape recording by Easy Nixon.
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Position in tape: 03:14:12 – 03:59:37
part B, 1:12:55
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330b.mp3
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NARA Description
On April 10, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), White House operator, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:10 pm to 3:55 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 330-031 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 330-31
Date: April 10, 1972
Time: 3:10 pm - 3:55 pm
Location: Executive Office Building
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Vietnam
-North Vietnam
-Private talks
-People’s Republic of China [PRC] talks
-South Vietnam’s survival
-Soviets
-Responsibilities in Vietnam
-US message to PRC
-US propaganda line
-Spokesmen
-Congressmen and Senators
-William F. Buckley, Jr.
-Fact sheet
-Clark M. Clifford’s statement
-Buckley
-B-52 strikes
-Targets
-Hanoi’s attitudes
-Impact of strikes
-Madam Nguyen Thi Binh
-Statements
-Hubert H. Humphrey
-Karl E. Mundt's statement
-William J. Porter's statement
-Publicity
-Scheduling and timing
-Porter’s statement
-B-52 strikes
-Negotiations
-Proposal
-US restraint
-Private channels
-Soviets
-Agreements
The President's schedule
Show the rest of the log (223 more lines)
-Options
-Camp David
Vietnam
-Political losses
-Appearance of ferocity
-Hanoi
-Soviet Union
-Encouragement to adversaries
-Deterioration of domestic support
-Impact
-The President's speech
-Soviet Union
-Demonstrations
-Letters from the President
-Perception of the President's strength
-Domestic support
-Confusion
-Washington Star report
-An Loc
-Caution of the President's opposition
-George S. McGovern
-Michael J. Mansfield
-Trip to PRC
-J. William Fulbright
-Fear of taking on the President
An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 3:10 pm.
Unknown article that Buckley should read
The unknown person left at an unknown time before 3:55 pm.
-The President's speech
-Timing
-Moderate tone
-Defense of policies
-Points to make
-Kissinger’s opinion
-Talking points for John A. Scali, Charles W. Colson
-Barry M. Goldwater
-Spiro T. Agnew
-Thrust of speech
-US role
-Support for South Vietnam
-Text of speech
-Aggressive tone
-Patriotic appeal
-Timing
-B-52 strikes
-Effectiveness
-North Vietnamese objectives
-Attacks on Saigon
-Real goals
-Vo Nguyen Giap
-US bombing
-Laos
-Cambodia
-Casualties
-Military Region One
-Weather
-Gunshots
-An Loc
-South Vietnamese army
-Creighton W. Abrams
-Performance
-US attacks
-Tanks
-Kissinger’s reports
-Weather
-Hoang Xuan Lam
-Number
-Casualties
-B-52s
-Binh
-Airfield
-Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL] dumps
-Intensity
-Photographs
-B-52s
-North Vietnamese expectations
-Unknown persons' performance
-Election year
-Dien Bien Phu
-1964
-1968 and 1972
-US bombing
-Naval gunfire
-Populated areas
-Number of ships
-Destroyers
-Cruisers
-Airplanes
-Numbers
-B-52 strikes
-Number
-Talking points
-Scali and Herbert G. Klein
-Clark MacGregor
-Domestic criticism
-Edward M. Kennedy
-Humphrey
-Proposals
-Gridiron meeting
-Constitutional amendment
-The President's conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
The President's Canadian trip
-Draft of speech
-Substance
-Disarmament statement
-William L. Safire
-US-Canadian relations
-Statements
-Speech
-Role of superpowers
-Peking and Moscow
-Long-range interests of superpowers
-Arms limitations
-Progress
-Goals
-Restraint on arms export
-Last drafts
-Kissinger’s input
-The President's phraseology
-Changes
-Impact
-Tone
-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin's reaction
-PRC
-State Department
-Analysis
US-Soviet relations
-Central Europe
-Détente
-Mutual dependence
-Democrats
Israel
Vietnam
-Troop withdrawals
-Problems
-Schedule
-Democratic convention
-Draftees in Vietnam
-Timing of announcements
-Haiphong
The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 3:10 and 3:55
pm.
[Conversation No. 330-31A]
Call to Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
The operator placed the call on hold at an unknown time; the President and Kissinger conferred.
Vietnam
-Change in policy
-South Vietnam
The President talked with Haig at an unknown time.
Vietnam
-Troop ceiling in 1969
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-Troop withdrawals
-Rate
-Total numbers
-Timing
-Goal by July 30
-Domestic issues
-PRC
-Soviets
-Dealings with US
-Dobrynin
-Kissinger’s message to Egon Bahr
-Prospect of relating message to Soviets
-Text
-Bahr
-[David] Kenneth Rush
-Dealings with Germans
-Letter to unknown person
-Receipt by Rolf Pauls
-Reporting through channels
-Summit
-Need for German settlement by Soviets
-Pressure by PRC
-Shanghai communiqué
-Scali
-Democratic convention
-Outcome of Vietnam war
-The President's reputation
-South Vietnam
-Fighting capacities
-Compared with Laos
-Control of offensive
-Abrams
-Tacair uses
-Performance
-Washington Special Action Group [WSAG] meeting
-Reaction to the President's policies
-North Vietnamese offensive
-US bombing
-Necessity
-Impact on Southeast Asia and US foreign policy
-Thailand and Indonesia
-Democrats
-Possible lines of criticism
The President's meeting with Kissinger's parents
-Time
-Location
Kissinger left at 3:55 pm.
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.
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Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I'd like to hold a couple of extra minutes.
I know you go over to Rose's office, and as soon as she finishes that, you bring it right back over to her.
She's probably half through it now.
You tell her that you want to bring it back to her.
They didn't say they would do anything.
They didn't even say they supported the Vietnamese.
They quit bombing.
That's all they said.
The Vietnamese people were prepared.
Because they had the chance to tell us what they knew.
The interesting thing is they didn't say,
My idea is that that's exactly what you told me when you were there, that our tables are veiled, that you're on the wrong side of it, and we say, no, we're not going to do anything about it.
But we're going to step further into it, don't we?
The Russians can't do anything.
The great powers that are responsible do not care for each other's lives.
Which is exactly the message that you sent in the last week to the Chinese.
I think I ought to say...
I think it's important that that line be done now.
I'm not referring to your getting down.
We'll have an opportunity on the station, but I'm referring to something that can be given.
All of our spokesmen have been hammered.
And we've done it very simple.
We've done it repeatedly.
And so forth.
I'm not referring to David.
I'm referring to the Congressmen, the Senators, the Bucklers, the, well, you know, absolutely now, that must be.
I don't know what was being done there so far.
I had a bunch of fact sheets ready.
And I had a bunch of statements ready from Clifford and Harrington about the fact that he was the person that I was telling him about what they had to do.
And I've already sent one batch to Buckley and I've sent it to some other person.
I've made a little bit of mistakes, but I think they're all correct.
That'll be a good flat on the verge, you know.
I'm totally unexpected.
Incidentally, I checked and there's never been a B-52 strike, I don't know.
Now, there was a B-52 strike two miles inside the north-eastern border, and it passed in order to get a mountain slide into the pass here.
But the beauty of it is that the public is annoyed against the message, that the public is confused.
There's probably things that we've done before.
I think it's great that they said it before.
I just wanted to know how important, how significant the message was to him.
It's great that we've had a fight before.
We say this is something new.
But Madame Bin has today made another statement, but it is very defensive.
She says all the American force is to change the color of the body.
That's the line.
Let me ask you this.
Could I...
that I step up, could we step up the day of the second peace treaty, sir?
At that stage, yes.
They would have the additional advantage that Porter's statement would follow it, rather than follow the final peace treaty, sir.
On the other hand, certainly the way that we are, if Porter makes his statement Thursday morning,
that you'll get a good ride that Thursday evening.
And if then we do a B-52 strike, it will sort of get your hand out again.
See, the B-52 strike is scheduled for Thursday.
Yes, we can schedule it any time you want it, Mr. President.
That Thursday was an arbitrary day, and I can see really two sides of the question.
One argument is too advanced,
and then if there's any other border statement, we'll give up.
The other is to get border statements out through it.
Because undoubtedly the guys are going to create a bit of a North Korean government.
We're going to give them a terrific wall anyway.
You are a better judge of PR than I am.
No, I don't want anybody to judge me.
But it's better to have the border statement first followed by the B-52.
Because the B-52 is followed by the border statement.
I'm trying to go over it to your home.
I don't know what you're saying.
I don't know.
I'm trying to go over it to your home.
I don't know what you're saying.
I don't know what you're saying.
We used restraint.
We used restraint.
Then, in order to underline the importance of serious negotiations, we interrupted.
After having interrupted one meeting, we had told them that we were ready to resume on April 13th.
Their response to this was a massive invasion.
It is fair for a total rubbish to say that we interrupted the negotiations and that we have not been prepared to go back.
And that in effect would be to say that we should end the negotiations.
And we will not negotiate it.
That's right.
You see, we're now making...
I think we've reached the button.
And I've thought about it during the day too long.
If I want to keep the option open of going on Wednesday night, I've got to go up to Camp David and I can start doing it.
The question is, I don't need it.
That's my conclusion.
You know,
What I'm going to do, what I'm really setting an effect on, in my own mind, is that we will take whatever political laws that we have to take here, and figuring that they will be temporary.
So we're going to take them, because I am convinced that on the foreign policy side, there is no way I can handle it without weakening our ferocious appearance
which I think needs to be the Russians.
That's basically what I'm going to conclude on.
Now, the second point here, the only countervailing argument is that to what extent will Hanoi and Russia, as our political position weakens here, as demonstrations and so forth may develop and may not, to what extent will they get encouragement from that, and therefore should we try to stop it?
Now, there is your...
In other words, let me put it this way.
I am making this decision solely on the basis of the foreign policy.
Screw the policy.
Now, looking at that, the only thing you've got to think about is, are Russia and Hanoi going to get some encouragement by the deterioration of our position here?
You're assuming that it won't deteriorate.
You've got to assume that it will.
You've got to assume there will be more opposition, more demonstration, more editorial, et cetera.
And that may happen.
On the other hand,
The other side of the coin.
There ain't no way that I can make this damn speech without being protested too much that there's a peace.
And that's what I don't want to do.
That's exactly right.
So what are your views on the second point?
My assessment is, Mr. President, that at least Moscow, now that Moscow has at least been decayed for a good time, that they're going to move something that they haven't already done.
At least Moscow understands the demonstrations won't begin.
You've written through them three times.
You not only may understand them, but I'm going to ask you to tell the demonstrators to come and get me, but I'm going to ask you to do something.
I'm not so sure you can judge this.
Much better than I've heard the speech from my haste to protest, rather than today.
Yeah, by laying down the government.
By laying down the government.
Right now, people are still confused because, for example, the headline today in the Star is, uh, enemy offensive, but both sides are slow.
I don't think it's true.
You know, I think it's probably, it's largely true.
Well, they've got the back.
We've got the people fighting in that lot.
Now, the point is, I think that most politicians are going to be very near of taking you on if they think the enemy might lose.
And they are going to make the same.
Your political opponents, in my sentiment, they have any grace, except McGovern.
Well, I don't care what they do.
But, you know, Maxfield isn't going to say anything before he goes to China.
That's for him very much.
Fulbright yesterday, with all his, filled with all his pride, said he was not yet ready to say there should be a clear day of terminating the war.
They're watching the war, I suppose, too, but at one point, they're going to figure what we are doing.
They'll figure if you win, they, you destroy them, and they're going to run.
If you lose, they can get you after you lose.
So what then, why should they tackle you prematurely?
And
I think, and I think this is exactly what we have now, but now, from the moral policy standpoint, there's any question that what we really want to agree, unpredictable, unpredictable is that the speech would certainly tend to mute and mitigate
And, Mr. President, from what I know of the way you prepare for this meeting, it takes really an enormous emotional concentration.
I know that we may need a next meeting, or the week after.
It's too early.
You're truly too early.
And above all, it will take away from Mr. Roshan's deductive.
You've got to remember, I can pay out a little emotional debt.
I have to.
I just want you to know.
The president will pay it out.
He's meant to pay it out to Rodney, too.
The question is, is it wise to do it this week?
And I think it is not wise to do it this week.
And I say this is not what we started out as a strong advocate of.
What can I say?
I wasn't there for that, but maybe she said it was an exclusive initiative to defend against the victims, but we may say that people that are active about our existence, they wouldn't take it on.
That's the better thing to do.
At least they don't see it as aggression.
It's seriously jeopardizing.
Anyway, and that's the reason for the elevation.
I've put out points that you want to remind you about.
These are good ones.
I think all these ones are good, except the last one.
Now, will you please?
But what I have to guess, and I suggest you take this, and you get this and don't go any much further than this.
and give this as far as we can provide as a funding point to the Scallies, the Colson, you know, the whole group.
And believe me, Henry, they've got to be led.
These guys have got to be led.
There's a lot to say right now, but they don't know what the hell to say right now.
Let's turn over, let's unreach for a good one.
Let's try to get him around.
Sorry to bring him to take him around.
Not bad, not bad.
Do you agree?
I'd give him, I'd not let him go, because he's become too much of a symbol and a good force of people.
I love cold water.
But you are not yet that much in love, Mr. President.
The beauty of the way we plan it is it still features the reason it doesn't yet, it isn't yet you against the world.
You've got to hear all the points I want to make.
A massive invasion from Puerto Rico is enforcing a communist government.
South Vietnam will join the ground forces.
U.S. Royal Air and Sea Command will provide, and they'll provide what the men deserve.
No U.S. ground forces are prepared to protect America from the U.N. and provide chance to stop the independence of North Vietnam from the United States.
U.S. officers will be dispatched from North Vietnam to come to South America.
If Soviets support the indirect questions we've heard, we've tried all sorts of U.S. trade orders, and more than that seems to be normal.
It's not that, I think.
It's the tactic of the people.
The tactic of the people.
Those who advocate surrender.
They won't say no, because those who got us in are the ones who got us out.
Okay.
Then this will be decided now, no speech.
I think, Mr. President, it is the wise and patriotic thing to do.
You can make this speech next week.
Perhaps it may be necessary.
I never thought we could get away with it.
People have been trying to sort it out.
They tell them to have a pretty good Saturday.
They don't think we could get away with it.
We've got these guys really divided.
I must say, you know, that weather is about to be as good as it used to be.
Everything up to now has to be done.
We want to have things improve better.
Yeah, but you see, as I understand it, you're right and you're wrong.
The enemy's nature is every time he's not in one, I know that he's down.
Imagine if it was in one.
What is it?
Good.
Good.
That's what we want.
That's where they have to go, just because that's where they went away.
Right, that's right.
Military Region 3, of course, it takes our gun, but the...
I have never been to Military Region 3.
It's basically a diversion.
What I wondered was whether Military Region 1 was a diversion for the purpose of cracking through the creek.
See, that could be a job of smart as hell.
He does the things that our boys always do.
In other words, he banks and then he gets someplace else.
Let's make it that easy.
Well, Mr. President, I would just be astonished because they had enough supplies down there.
Yeah, I don't know how that happened.
What the hell?
I thought we were supposed to block a lot of time in Laos.
But we're bombing all year.
We're bombing.
It has built up in the central province.
They, uh, yeah, uh, more than any soldier that's killed in Cambodia on that front is irresistible.
In the MR-1 region, they can feed it to people, but not Vietnam.
In the MR-3 region, it takes six weeks for a guy to walk down.
I just don't think they have the structure to provide more than what we need.
Well, listen, if one is the place, we'll take the chip on them, because the weather will clear.
And then we've got gunships.
Gunships can fly an egg.
Oh, yeah.
And we're going to have to shoot a mine to shoot.
And MR-0, moreover, Mr. President, MR-3, has good weather now.
I don't think it's due to death, but it's due to disaster.
Well, it's obviously, but it hasn't cracked yet, as I mentioned.
There has not been a massive attack on that plot.
And I had to do a report without the others.
That was, that was nothing to us.
And I'm coming today.
Coming.
And it's midnight.
It's one o'clock in the afternoon.
But they fight at night.
Well, they, they turned into two birds, wasn't it?
And, uh, the end of the summer period, I mean, because I had someone on the phone.
Abrams can't be all that wrong.
What you say, I'm just wondering if it's true, if we had any American servers who saw a South Vietnamese
Guns knocked on the tank.
I just want to know.
That's true.
Any word, Mr. Mayor?
We do know that there was a tank attack.
We do know the weather was too bad for our Air Force to fly.
We do know that the North Vietnamese tank column was repulsed.
We do know that.
That's right.
Now, my noon report says that General Lam is elated that he's
that he says he has scored a tremendous victory.
Now, maybe the guy is smoking a lot, but he's a calm guy.
So, maybe they knocked out only 40 tanks, but I must say... Well, they knocked out 20.
So, all three of them each handled 300 tanks altogether, according to our estimates.
Now, you have to add to it that even if they double the casualties,
even if they triple it, there must be at least as many casualties as we can see that are caused by S-maps that just happened in New York.
It isn't statistically possible that in a sprung, which is only 10 miles from the border that they've even introduced, never hit anything.
What do you think the one has been accomplished in subpsychology?
We took out the air.
We didn't take the gorge.
We didn't have the muscle.
We didn't have the muscle.
And we went after the P.O.F.
He had no photographs.
All we know is that there were a number of explosions and fires that were so powerful that they illuminated the clouds at night over which they were flying.
So that the clouds were at an altitude of about 3,000 feet, so they must have been pretty strong.
All right, now...
Secondly, it must have given them a remunerative stance.
This was the first time the B-52s were used over North Vietnam.
B-52s are, in fact, their most aggressive party.
They shouldn't have.
Above all, they indicated that the restraints are coming up.
They didn't expect that they were going to fight.
They expected maybe, crucially, there is a mass ground.
And they've been getting, in fact, unlimited mass ground.
They expected...
of a much more massive protest than this one.
They must have expected it.
And I think they must have expected above all this, our people need to survive.
They expected it.
They certainly expected you to act like John.
Why would they expect that after a loud, senseless lie?
Because... His election came, I think.
Because they read all the facts.
He is brilliant, but he also has a stereo flashlight.
His theory is I've had Mr. Schultz debut once when he thinks the other guy is most vulnerable.
That's what he did in 54, the scratch, the DMF 2 young men.
Not just the DMF 2, but we know that he's bruised up.
His memoir, however, on Saturday, playing at the North Beach, and he's there on the edge of the sea.
He lied after the DMF 2.
They shot the Roots back.
He did it in 68.
They're doing it in 72 now.
He's taking his daggers for victory.
It pays off, and they've done it now over twice, so maybe they figured it was to do it now.
But when the veteran Manette 33 destroyed it on the coast, that was a country in which so much of the population was within 20 miles of the coast.
Manette 33 destroyed four troops there.
Uh, and six acres, that'll be everything.
That 18-10-0, that, uh, 10-4-5-8-6-3, how many were there before?
Four.
Oh, yeah.
That's right.
That's why it's the same thing.
Oh, four.
I can tell the name will be, um, if you don't see any, I mean, 50 straight.
I don't know if you can put it on the other monitor.
Airplanes, where the company now has to find enough ramps for them to park.
And once we start flying, we keep it to sort it to 40 a day, a week ago.
Yeah, 60 a day, a day, 80 a day, before the week is up, before the day.
But let's see now, how would you have this person get out?
Should you get someone around her?
Well, you already got me down.
I think it's the best thing.
Why don't we get together a few of our professionals and post-trending ones that we've talked to?
And then, of course, then it's Scali.
If people get something prepared, Scali's fine.
That kind of people, you know, they're good.
Right.
I was amazed at his nuts, that because of few criticisms, we haven't got any sustained attacks.
His life wasn't that immodern invented by his family.
I have to kind of build it up, but, well, Kennedy, the Kennedy, the Kennedy was to the Kennedy, Humphrey, Humphrey backed him up.
But on the other hand, Humphrey also said, Humphrey was on both sides, Humphrey issued a count.
The first reaction to this count was now the 3-2, 2-3-8 count.
And over the, the ultimate challenge in particular was said about Humphrey yesterday.
He said then Senator Humphrey made a speech,
made a proposal characteristically, because the movie was not bigger than the project.
You know, none of this, Dick Wilson made a whole thing that I'm concerned with yesterday.
And he was explaining how he made a proposal that women should be constituted in the event that they're going to be released.
And so Dick Wilson said, characteristically,
I wonder,
I haven't been through it yet, you know, but I was wondering why I wanted longer.
But I wondered, you know, if you could give it a little substance in one of your dolls, or maybe even make it that far.
Could it take where I sit at that bend as an arm thing, and take that part that has to do with arms control, etc.,
and restate the proposition again.
That major problem is included right in there.
In other words, let me put it this way.
The Canadian draft at the present time talks about the brotherhood of Canada and the United States, the neighborhood of the United States and Canada and the American, in other words, the alliance.
And then the alliance, et cetera,
And then some of the world brotherhood of man.
Well, of course, that's all pure popcorn, but it's all right to say.
Now, let's come to another point.
Then it talks about Beijing and Moscow.
It does not say enough, in my opinion, indicating that we, that I don't want to be belligerent on it, but I think we've got to indicate that, well, it was that sentence about the interest that I struck out in the literature.
Our long-range interests are not compatible, and never will be, as long as they're conscious and we're not conscious.
You know that, don't you?
Correct.
Now, let's come to the point.
I think what we've got to say is that we have made significant progress in our implementation.
See that?
Deep, deep, deep.
Let us recognize that the goal is not implementation.
There will still be enough arms to have a hell of a war.
The goal will be to restrain
particularly the restraint of all powers in the use of aggressive force to invade against the neighbors, and the restraint of great powers in encouraging other nations to use them.
And on this, the United States committed an all-nighter, and that means a little bit more.
I think it's a nice movement.
It's growing again.
What do you mean?
I put it up there before those students.
I think it's essential.
Would you put Phoenix Valley and work into that?
Absolutely.
Well, I'll have you settle for a copy in the last draft.
Good.
And maybe you want to do it yourself or no?
No, I'll work on that.
This is important to get right.
Yeah, I'll grab it.
And you've got my language there.
Your language is just one of the things for which you don't get enough credit.
It's really so good that I frankly don't think we should change it too much.
It's very subtle.
It makes every point.
I mean, after all, here you have to do that.
There's nothing said about it.
It leads all the newsletters, and yet it's not provided.
No, because it simply says, it doesn't, I didn't challenge the soldiers at all.
I simply said, our goal is peace.
That means that great powers must be served and strengthened.
Now, will it help to be against that?
The Russians are going to say that we are confused.
We've got to lay the comfort down for them.
And you've talked to Green and Afton, you're fair.
It's not dumb enough to not have seen this.
To me, the fascinating thing is that the Russians have not yet made a public statement.
Now, I agree with you.
They have to say something, and it's not either a trick or a...
But it's been a fantastic job.
We can stop today.
This is the worst month for the immigrants right now.
It wasn't just a thing we've got.
I don't think the state people understand.
The state people don't need to stop it.
They don't link things together.
We don't even have to stop it.
If the Soviet Union and we are hostile to each other, then there's no reform in Central Europe.
There's no reform in Central Europe.
There's no basis for grand policies.
They need a summit for their German policies.
That's what they learned in the 70s.
They need our summary.
If they're ever going to send one to the East, what if you decide you're going to be a son of a bitch?
Or a non-citizen.
And secondly, you're disrespecting Democrats under the feet of the Western youth.
I'm going to say this from a Soviet point of view, because the Democrats, who are currently in Europe, have not pressed them.
I mean, that's what you and I know, and they know, that we are at least prepared
to consider the proposition that Israel will be subjected to maximum pressure.
Question.
What should we do?
And this was the subject of the question.
Very good.
What should we do about that?
I think we ought to make it the last three that they wrote.
Oh, yes, I agree.
It's one person, eh?
I think something like 9,000 came down to 60,000.
Well, you see, the trouble we're running into, Mr. President, is that we've maybe taken too much out of that well.
Well, I don't want to take out any, but I don't know.
The problem is we've made this problem every month now.
Well, I know.
But if we get down to 50, 40, then that's all.
Well, another thing we can do is make it two months or less.
and then we can make it up before the Democratic Convention because you know we have to remember our scheme there before the Democratic Convention.
No more draftees, strikes, we have to be ready for that.
And uh...
By that time something would have broken because of the early situation that you either lost or won.
That's, that's where they made their terrible mistakes.
Why are there two ones announced now?
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Let's get out of there, too.
Yeah.
I don't know.
I don't care what it is.
It's just going to go on and on.
It's always changed.
The trouble is, it was taken in 2003, and now it's going on.
Yeah.
Now, what was the crew stealing when we came in?
Well, it's going to be the bomb.
See what I'm getting at?
I have faith.
All we've been doing is two months from now.
Now that's, I want to get the radio to go.
We're done.
And then that's the original course.
So we will have taken out a half a minute, a round figure, and then we're going to make those things.
So that's the point.
It gives us the running room.
And then we will take it.
You see, you've got the... Now, understand, I'm not... We're not deciding it now.
But I want to do the true thing in a way that will even follow all of those needs.
But I think that's a modest number to take out, isn't it?
We only did about $20,000.
$32,000.
We can get half a million off pretty good.
We're going to just sweat it through.
We're not going to be knocked out totally by losing the pound.
We're not going to be knocked off by the men's soldiers.
We're not going to be knocked off by Chinese soldiers.
If they're going to play this game, take care of the soldiers.
You're right.
We've got them with a hair of sugar.
And we're going to play it tough.
We'll just do it.
We're going to have to tell it to rain well during the game as well.
Agreed.
I've come through.
That message to Bob, that kind of message would be that.
Thank you, Will.
What did you say, sir?
I said the President was serious in considering the request for a memorandum of the possibilities of the economy, which we couldn't put our eyes into until last week.
Gratification.
We are now confronted by the second military agreement in six months.
You will first hold me down.
And we are engaged in a... You should bar those who pass it.
I've got to be.
to engage in an intent and review of the situation, that that review is completed and we communicate with the person.
Then he said, oh, we might still do it.
Then I had Rush, who had been asked by the Germans to write a personal letter to Barsol, communicate with Barsol that he cannot now write such a letter.
And I told him to give this to Powells, the ambassador,
If I were to answer this one, that would be sad.
There are so many people in this world, but I'm not going to read it.
It is too long now.
I have every heart.
I'm sweating.
I can't help it.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
I'm sweating.
Well, particularly what the summit is, something is another thing.
You see, the summit, they may think, is something for us.
No.
Well, let's think for a moment if they do.
Something for me, for me, for him, for all of us.
On the other hand, the German thing is something they apparently need.
Mr. President, the summit, as long as it was something for you, they were screwing you all over the place.
The summit became something for them when we developed the Chinese summit.
It became something for them, but they needed to have their dreams.
I suppose the press will play up the Chinese criticism.
Well, it's not such a lot.
There is, you know, if they support the Vietnamese position, but it's in effect their version of the organization.
They are in effect saying, what you're doing is just American imperialism, has no right to do this, and the Vietnamese people will succeed in this, just like they did the Chinese people.
But I think, Mr. President, we really
Uh, you know, the way this is around, sir, because supposing they had, supposing we had gone on saying the war is winding down, and supposing this had hit us in September, we now know for sure that by the Democratic Convention, this thing is going to be one law after another.
If it's lost, you know, let's get it over with now.
Live out the balance of our time here without worry.
You did morally do it, I think, Mr. President.
The country will thank you.
You're going to be history books ahead of us longer than you are.
Poor enough that you can lose.
But I have the instinct that it's about to be the meeting.
Don't track.
Not this week.
I'm not so sure they're going to grasp.
They're fighting better than in Laos, for example.
In Laos, yes, in Laos the thing was never...
I told you in Laos from the beginning it didn't look good.
I know you did.
Every day, every day.
And I've never felt that we were in command of the situation in Laos.
Never.
I sense that we're getting in charge of that situation.
Now, I could be surprised.
He tells me that one of the things Labors is very good at is the use of air to support the troops.
So maybe there's something to that.
Well, now, it's very much independent of what you have to say.
What's meek is he was told to bug out.
Even in the Laos operation, he wasn't really given the sense that we wanted him to be there at all costs.
We didn't drive, sir.
We said that, though.
You said last week was a nightmare, actually.
You were right.
Because it took us six days to drill into the bureaucracy, they said, by God, we were putting the chips into the top.
What was the reaction here?
What's it this morning?
Mr. President, they are drilling beautifully.
You don't get anything to say now about how horrified they are.
Ah, we've shaken it about.
We've got to tell them we're working with you.
Now, I'm sure that if it blows up, they'll blame it all on us.
But if it blows up, if all you had to do last week, Mr. President, is to play it with their drum,
It would have blown up by now.
And that group was really...
If we had said last week that we're continuing with the immigration plan, that there are problems on everything, and we're going to provide the same air support that we had, no ships, no group lines, I think by now they would have lost weight.
And the whole thing would have started in many ways.
Every day, I don't know if you can call it...
And that is why I believe that the Democrats are not going to attack India.
Why should they attack you?
If you lose, they don't play a game anyway.
If you win, they are through if they have to attack you.
We'll see you with your parents about 4.30.
Yes, over there.
Oh, yeah.
Also recorded on April 10, 1972
022-098 1:59 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 1:59 pm and 2:59 pm.
022-099 2:59 PM · 20 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield talked on the telephone from 2:59 pm to 3:00 pm.
330-027 2:59 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:59 pm to 3:00 pm.
022-100 3:05 PM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield talked on the telephone from 3:05 pm to 3:06 pm.
330-028 3:05 PM · 34 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:05 pm to 3:06 pm.
330-029 3:06 PM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:06 pm and 3:10 pm.
330-030 3:06 PM · 39 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:06 pm and 3:10 pm.
705-015 4:00 PM · 36 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield, Stephen B. Bull, and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:00 pm and 4:41 pm.
Conversation 330-031, April 10, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/330-031 (accessed November 15, 2026).