Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 330 › Conversation 330-036

Nixon, Kissinger & Huebner on Vietnam War and Soviet Union

Wednesday, April 12, 1972 · 2:47 PM–3:09 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Butterfield, Alexander P.; Huebner, Lee W.Conversation330-036 on Tape 330 (tape position 04:01:59–04:21:55)StartWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 2:47 PMEndWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 3:09 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 330-036 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the potential for a secret trip to the Soviet Union to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, weighing the implications of such a visit on U.S. relations with Hanoi and the People's Republic of China. Kissinger emphasized his belief that Soviet leadership was feeling increased pressure and might be willing to act as a intermediary. Following the strategic discussion, Alexander Butterfield and Lee Huebner joined the meeting to finalize and refine the tone of an upcoming presidential speech intended for delivery in Canada.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 04:01:59 into the tape and ends around 04:21:55.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
4:02:17Are you ready to take off now for New York?
4:02:20All right.
4:02:24Come over now.
4:02:26Bye.
4:02:26We'll give him a call.
4:02:33It'll probably be 3.15 or 3.30.
4:02:36He's talking to the police.
4:02:39Bye.
4:02:39Have a nice day.
4:02:41Bye.
4:02:46Oh, fine, fine.
4:02:55You can pick those things up and open them.
4:04:41Ja.
4:04:41Ja.
4:04:42Ja.
4:04:42Ja.
4:04:42Ja.
4:04:43Ja.
4:04:43Ja.
4:04:43Ja.
4:04:44Ja.
4:04:44Ja.
4:05:09Oh, fine, fine.
4:05:21You can pick those things up and open them.
4:05:25Thank you.
4:07:07Now he's blubbered.
4:07:07He says, one, what can I show you?
4:07:12This way, before he gets back to Moscow.
4:07:16This way.
4:07:16This is communication.
4:07:17Second, what can I show you?
4:07:19It's the most urgent touch right now.
4:07:30He said they have a terrible problem.
4:07:35For one time religion is good.
4:07:38He said, he doesn't give me the bullshit about peace, how tough, when he doesn't play, he's put upon, and he's serious.
4:07:47He said, let's not assess blame, let's not, let's not do anything, let's just ask ourselves what can be done.
4:07:53He says, we can't turn, we can't turn them off,
4:08:01From one day to the next evening, he will activate the other veterinary specimens, which is very interesting.
4:08:11It will take three months to take effect.
4:08:12He said, we'll catch them, they are only 24.
4:08:19Even though you can't do this, that's what he said.
4:08:23He said, that he's not sure.
4:08:24Or he thinks he's not sure.
4:08:25He said, however, they have markups, and right now, all technicians are known.
4:08:28There's, uh,
4:08:30that he hurts the stomach of a northern Tibetan from somewhere.
4:08:36Therefore, can I make some proposition, any proposition, that they can transmit to the north?
4:08:45I said, I don't know.
4:08:46President has said, we hate boys.
4:08:49We can't do that.
4:08:51He said, can we at least tell them that you're willing to negotiate it?
4:08:59He said to me for the first time, I forget his name.
4:09:05You are not serious.
4:09:07I said, I don't know.
4:09:09Frankly, I could have given him some cash.
4:09:12I said, I've got to talk to the president.
4:09:13He said, I said, are you sure you can see me tomorrow?
4:09:20I said, I'll talk to the president.
4:09:27I said, may I tell them to go get me something tomorrow?
4:09:29I said, I don't have this small of a difference of consent.
4:09:34What you will decide, I'll hand it over to you before you make these decisions.
4:09:44I didn't want to talk about it.
4:09:45But, I can tell, we haven't closed the dry system yet.
4:09:47I can tell when these guys don't see it.
4:09:49Then he said something.
4:09:51I must tell you the whole thing.
4:09:57He said,
4:09:58He believes that if I could go to the treasurer, if I could know their secrets, they would break everything.
4:10:06And could I go for some days prior to the tragedy, they would guarantee total secrecy.
4:10:13They would let me fly in on military rules.
4:10:16You know, I'd cover for you if you had no problem.
4:10:21And why don't we tell them?
4:10:22I believe... That doesn't give them anything to tell.
4:10:23Yeah.
4:10:24Why don't they tell him?
4:10:25Why don't they tell him anything?
4:10:26Yeah.
4:10:27But you see, I believe, Mr. President, if it turns out, rather than our giving anything to Hanoi now, why don't we say to give our full trust to Hanoi now?
4:10:36We can do two things, Mr. President.
4:10:41And the other thing I was thinking, I would recommend to Bill Taylor.
4:10:46We were going to have to catch the 24-4, but now I'm going to find him myself.
4:10:51I put off the meeting with the Chinese, but he was really serious.
4:10:54He said, how about the Chinese?
4:10:57What if the Chinese turn against us?
4:10:59I said, I don't know if you want to leave and pull over Vietnam.
4:11:09We don't need the Chinese.
4:11:11I can easily give him a general formula tomorrow that doesn't give him anything.
4:11:17Plus, if I said I'll go there secretly before the 24th, provided there's a meeting on the 24th.
4:11:24How about this?
4:11:30How about telling the children?
4:11:38Well, let me see.
4:11:38I'm trying to think of games now for a minute.
4:11:41You know, I'm all for atmosphere, and I'm not much for substance.
4:11:44That is, giving them atmosphere is not...
4:11:51I think so.
4:11:52But I think they're going to Russia.
4:11:54If they can guarantee secrecy to Russia, I think you should go to Russia.
4:11:59But you see, I believe, Mr. President, also there's some advantage in your sort of finding out what's right and what's wrong.
4:12:08You see, I could also set up this thing for you that in such a way that the way we have to chose that can set up.
4:12:18You'll guarantee secrecy if you don't know what it is.
4:12:37See, this will put more heat on the Russians.
4:12:39We have to make two conditions.
4:12:41One is, I can go home and they deliver this.
4:12:44That is just delivering them.
4:12:46They'll be there in 24 hours.
4:12:47They've been delivered 12 times.
4:12:50No, they've never been delivered.
4:12:52All right, okay.
4:12:55This time, as I've told them, they may deliver it.
4:12:58Well, I understand.
4:12:58They will talk to me each time.
4:13:01And we haven't got to spend more time with them.
4:13:03If they see me, this will be it.
4:13:06President seized me after what we are doing to Hanoi.
4:13:09I said to him, for example, look, we are trying to take increasingly strong military methods before the 24th.
4:13:17I just want you to know that.
4:13:19So those few people don't feel we are fooling them.
4:13:22He said, are you going to attack our ships?
4:13:25I said, I can't tell you anything, but until the 24th, we will try to exercise as much restraint as the situation permits.
4:13:33But, if these guys see us,
4:13:36As long as it's operating on the way.
4:13:38Either way.
4:13:38If they keep it secret, they have more of an incentive to keep it secret than we.
4:13:49Yeah.
4:13:49The Russians.
4:13:50Yes.
4:13:50Because...
4:13:50But I'm getting down.
4:13:51I still get back to the fundamental thing.
4:13:54I don't know what's... What effect does it have on Hanoi?
4:13:58On the way to an end of disaster.
4:14:00Is that true?
4:14:03On the Russians?
4:14:04And I go to Russia before I see them.
4:14:11And again, it puts us in trouble if it ever does come out.
4:14:19But it won't come out.
4:14:20We don't care.
4:14:21But I think, Mr. President, I have a lot of experience with these guys now.
4:14:33And I can assure, I can tell you, they are cracking.
4:14:36He said Mrs. McCormick was moved to tears by Mrs. McCormick, and has written a personal letter to Mrs. President.
4:14:50I told him, look at this position.
4:14:52I think the Russians want to talk to you.
4:14:56The opposition of President depends on this government, sir.
4:15:02He said he is.
4:15:31Or he be caught.
4:15:34Well, I said to him, he said, he asked me what I thought of how this was handled, and I said that I know the technique, but you see to it that you always take out all the loose chains and slide them out, and you lose all your good will that way.
4:15:55He said, I said, but how can I do that?
4:15:56I said, there's nothing better.
4:15:59You never fix up your strength, but let me prove it for all of you.
4:16:06Remember that, let me see how you're doing.
4:16:12I said, we do think that, we said, how is this going to work?
4:16:16I said, I don't know.
4:16:17Do you think you're going to keep us sitting out there?
4:16:24President,
4:16:25What do you think?
4:16:27I believe it's really a secret trip on me.
4:16:30I had cruel anti-advantages.
4:16:32They're so panting after us that any slight chance they might feel they're attacking us over what they're going to do would disappear.
4:16:38A secret trip could be taken.
4:16:41Let's figure out what you could give them.
4:16:47Nothing.
4:16:51That's before what you would say to them.
4:16:54Mr. President, it would be a mistake to give them anything to deserve.
4:17:05I agree that we've got their needs taken care of.
4:17:13Correct.
4:17:15I think going to Russia is giving them something.
4:17:22We won't ask you to surrender, or we won't.
4:17:43I'll just give the general government the truth, which commits us to nothing.
4:17:48But also that it has to be done now.
4:17:50But we must now bring the truth towards us.
4:17:56And I tell you, Mr. President, every instinct I have, I have never said to you that we have a chance in any particular time.
4:18:05But we've never had enough begging answers for specific reasons.
4:18:16I mean...
4:18:41But what I think I would like to do now is to tell him that you're considering this trip idea, because when you're hit with a T-52, then we have the pressure to protest.
4:18:51Tell him that way.
4:18:52I won't tell him that you have to do the route, but I'll tell him you are accurate.
4:18:57Tell him he can tell his government.
4:18:58There's a friend, Tom, who's going to Camp David tonight.
4:19:00He says that he will want to do things, that he will listen to the chances.
4:19:08We should take a trip.
4:19:10We'd like to see what, but he wants to see their message first.
4:19:14How's that?
4:19:15They didn't say that.
4:19:16Then tell him he...
4:19:17I think we ought to still make the Canadian thing.
4:19:22I've got a domestic problem here, too, you know.
4:19:26Can you make mine?
4:19:28I'll make it.
4:19:28It's time.
4:19:28It was decent, mind you.
4:19:30I'll make it.
4:19:33I'll make it.
4:19:33It has to be set for the Chinese, too.
4:19:36If you pull this one off...
4:19:40I will guarantee you one thing, Mr. President.
4:19:44Not guaranteed.
4:19:50I think there is a two chance out of three that we can stop the war for the rest of this year.
4:20:08That's the minimum I think we can get.
4:20:11Whether we can stop it altogether, I don't know.
4:20:16But that I think we can get.
4:20:19Yeah.
4:20:20They just made very good changes, aren't they?
4:20:24Henry has approved some more changes.
4:20:26Yeah, you go for it.
4:20:27This is all right as far as you're concerned, huh?
4:20:31Yes.
4:20:31That's one sentence that was questioned, and everything should stay in.
4:20:42I'm hearing this sound here.
4:21:11Disrespect and special responsibility falls upon great powers.
4:21:13You cannot avoid responsibility.
4:21:14Hey, James, that paragraph, that's the big paragraph.
4:21:21What I'd like to do is just go try and turn that into the same tone as the rest of it.
4:21:26Oh, I don't know.
4:21:27The tone's got to be tougher.
4:21:28It's got to be, I don't want it to double either.
4:21:31It usually comes out of the staff.
4:21:33It's got to be this tone.
4:21:34Right?
4:21:34You want to soften it down?
4:21:34No, I'm not softening it.
4:21:35I'm just going to...
4:21:36The tone of the sentence is a much longer...
4:21:38And it's only for today.
4:21:40But talk about it.
4:21:43Much time is our problem.
4:21:45What the rest of us are.
4:21:51Change last year.
4:21:53This year, it cannot be changed in terms of some other problems.

On April 12, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Lee W. Huebner met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:47 pm to 3:09 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 330-036 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 330-36

Date: April 12, 1972
Time: 2:47 pm - 3:09 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam
            -Kissinger’s meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -Consultations
            -Soviet Union
                  -Relations with North Vietnam
                        -Military equipment
                        -Propositions
                        -Negotiations
                        -Hanoi’s interest in summit
                  -Message to the President from Dobrynin
                        -Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin
                        -Kissinger’s meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                              -Secrecy
                              -Message to Hanoi

       Kissinger's schedule
             -Postponed meeting

       Vietnam

-Soviet Union
      -People's Republic of China [PRC]
             -Reactions to US-Soviet relations
      -Kissinger’s message to Soviets
             -Appearances
             -Kissinger’s trip
                   -Secrecy
                          -Guarantees
                                -Kissinger’s trip to Soviet Union
                          -Brezhnev
                          -William P. Rogers
                          -Soviet Summit
      -Influence with Hanoi
      -Reaction to US attacks
             -Kissinger’s message to Brezhnev
                   -US military effort
                   -Secrecy
                   -Effect on Hanoi
      -Irini N. Dobrynin's visit with Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
             -Letter from Mrs. Dobrynin to Viktoriya Brezhnev
      -Soviet attitudes
             -Desire to discontinue summit
             -Brezhnev's statements to Kissinger
                   -Comments concerning the President
                   -India
      -Kissinger’s trip
             -Negotiations with Hanoi
                   -Aid
                   -US election
                   -Dobrynin
                   -Advisability
             -Negotiations with Soviets
                   -The President's forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
                   -US limitations
                   -Soviet summit
      -Soviet requests
             -The President's Canadian speech
             -Message to the President
                   -The President's response to Dobrynin
                          -Camp David
                          -The President's forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
-The President's Canadian trip

             -Domestic problems
             -PRC
             -Democrats
                  -Edward M. Kennedy
             -Cessation of war
                  -Chances

Alexander P. Butterfield and Lee W. Huebner entered at an unknown time after 2:47 pm.

       The President's Canadian speech
            -Changes
                  -Kissinger's approval
                        -Wording of a sentence

Kissinger left at 3:01 pm.

             -Wording of a sentence
             -Tone
                   -Change
             -Wording
                   -Changes
                         -Further work
                         -National Security Council [NSC] considerations
             -A copy
                   -Retyping
                   -Further work
             -Changes
                   -Consistency
                         -Compared with a speech at a conference
             -Copies
                   -Retyping
                         -Rose Mary Woods
                   -Sentences
                         -Shortening
                         -Tone
                   -Distribution
                   -Work at Camp David
                         -Huebner's schedule
                               -Completion of speech

       Butterfield's schedule
             -Camp David

                  -Haldeman
             -Arrangements for Huebner
                  -Secretary
                  -Typewriters

Butterfield and Huebner left at 3:09 pm.
  • 330-037 3:09 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:20 pm.
  • 330-038 3:09 PM · 45 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:20 pm.
  • 022-118 3:20 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 3:20 pm.
  • 330-039 3:20 PM · 16 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at 3:20 pm.
  • 330-040 3:20 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:20 pm and 3:26 pm.
  • 022-119 3:23 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 3:23 pm to 3:26 pm.
  • 330-041 3:26 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:26 pm and 3:27 pm.
  • 330-042 3:26 PM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:26 pm and 3:27 pm.

Conversation 330-036, April 12, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/330-036 (accessed October 1, 2026).