Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 330 › Conversation 330-036

Nixon, Kissinger & Huebner on Vietnam War and Soviet Union

Wednesday, April 12, 1972 · 2:47 PM–3:09 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 21 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Butterfield, Alexander P.; Huebner, Lee W.Conversation330-036 on Tape 330 (tape position 04:01:59–04:21:55)StartWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 2:47 PMEndWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 3:09 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 330-036 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the potential for a secret trip to the Soviet Union to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War, weighing the implications of such a visit on U.S. relations with Hanoi and the People's Republic of China. Kissinger emphasized his belief that Soviet leadership was feeling increased pressure and might be willing to act as a intermediary. Following the strategic discussion, Alexander Butterfield and Lee Huebner joined the meeting to finalize and refine the tone of an upcoming presidential speech intended for delivery in Canada.

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Position in tape: 04:01:59 – 04:21:55

part C, 2:01

330a.mp3
330b.mp3
330c.mp3

On April 12, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Lee W. Huebner met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:47 pm to 3:09 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 330-036 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 330-36

Date: April 12, 1972
Time: 2:47 pm - 3:09 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam
            -Kissinger’s meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -Consultations
            -Soviet Union
                  -Relations with North Vietnam
                        -Military equipment
                        -Propositions
                        -Negotiations
                        -Hanoi’s interest in summit
                  -Message to the President from Dobrynin
                        -Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin
                        -Kissinger’s meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                              -Secrecy
                              -Message to Hanoi

       Kissinger's schedule
             -Postponed meeting

       Vietnam

-Soviet Union
      -People's Republic of China [PRC]
             -Reactions to US-Soviet relations
      -Kissinger’s message to Soviets
             -Appearances
             -Kissinger’s trip
                   -Secrecy
                          -Guarantees
                                -Kissinger’s trip to Soviet Union
                          -Brezhnev
                          -William P. Rogers
                          -Soviet Summit
      -Influence with Hanoi
      -Reaction to US attacks
             -Kissinger’s message to Brezhnev
                   -US military effort
                   -Secrecy
Show the rest of the log (75 more lines)
                   -Effect on Hanoi
      -Irini N. Dobrynin's visit with Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
             -Letter from Mrs. Dobrynin to Viktoriya Brezhnev
      -Soviet attitudes
             -Desire to discontinue summit
             -Brezhnev's statements to Kissinger
                   -Comments concerning the President
                   -India
      -Kissinger’s trip
             -Negotiations with Hanoi
                   -Aid
                   -US election
                   -Dobrynin
                   -Advisability
             -Negotiations with Soviets
                   -The President's forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
                   -US limitations
                   -Soviet summit
      -Soviet requests
             -The President's Canadian speech
             -Message to the President
                   -The President's response to Dobrynin
                          -Camp David
                          -The President's forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
-The President's Canadian trip

             -Domestic problems
             -PRC
             -Democrats
                  -Edward M. Kennedy
             -Cessation of war
                  -Chances

Alexander P. Butterfield and Lee W. Huebner entered at an unknown time after 2:47 pm.

       The President's Canadian speech
            -Changes
                  -Kissinger's approval
                        -Wording of a sentence

Kissinger left at 3:01 pm.

             -Wording of a sentence
             -Tone
                   -Change
             -Wording
                   -Changes
                         -Further work
                         -National Security Council [NSC] considerations
             -A copy
                   -Retyping
                   -Further work
             -Changes
                   -Consistency
                         -Compared with a speech at a conference
             -Copies
                   -Retyping
                         -Rose Mary Woods
                   -Sentences
                         -Shortening
                         -Tone
                   -Distribution
                   -Work at Camp David
                         -Huebner's schedule
                               -Completion of speech

       Butterfield's schedule
             -Camp David

                  -Haldeman
             -Arrangements for Huebner
                  -Secretary
                  -Typewriters

Butterfield and Huebner left at 3:09 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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Now he's bluffing.
He says, one, what can a true man do?
It's good for you to know he can't survive for much time.
This way he can have communication.
Second, what can a true man do?
It's the most urgent question.
He said they have a terrible problem.
For one time, religion was good.
He said, he doesn't give me the tools to get about peace.
When he doesn't play, he's pulled upon.
He said, let's not assess blame.
Let's not do anything.
Let's just ask ourselves what can be done.
He says, we can't turn them off.
From Monday to the next evening, he'll activate our laboratory specimens, which is very interesting.
It will take three months to take effect.
He said, we'll get them there on the 24th, even though you can't do this, that's what he said.
He said, that he's not sure.
Well, he said he's not sure.
He said, however, they have one problem.
He said, right now, all the indicators are normal.
There's, uh,
that, uh, he hurts the stomach of a Hanoid and a Tibetan from the summer.
Therefore, can I make some proposition, any proposition, that they can translate to Hanoi?
I said, I don't know.
The president has said, we hate Hanoi.
We can't go beyond.
He said, can we at least tell them that you're willing to negotiate?
He said to me for the first time, I'm prepared to tell you.
Good.
I'm serious.
It's important.
I said, I don't know.
Frankly, I could have given him some confidence.
I know.
I said, I've got to talk to the president.
He's very determined on this.
The boy has got to act.
Good.
He said, I said, he said, are you sure you can see me tomorrow?
I said, I'll talk to the president.
He said, may I tell them you'll give me something tomorrow?
I said, I'll come to you tomorrow.
What did the president say?
What he will decide, I can't promise you.
That's what he made his decision.
He's very much on the go.
But I can tell, we haven't closed the dry system yet.
I can tell when he comes here.
Then he said something.
I must tell you the whole thing.
He said,
He believes that if I could go to Gresham, if I could know their secrets, it would break everything.
And could I go for some days prior to the attack?
They would guarantee total secrecy.
They would let me fly in on military rules.
You know, I'm covered by the U.S. military.
No problem.
And why don't we tell them?
I believe... That doesn't give them anything to tell.
Yeah.
Why don't they tell?
Why don't they tell him?
I don't know.
But you see, I believe, Mr. President, you see my point?
If it turns out, rather than our giving anything to Hanoi now, why don't we say to give it up to the President?
We can do two things, Mr. President.
And the other thing I was thinking, I would be very thrilled to tell you.
We were going to have to catch the plane on board, but now I'm going to sign on the side.
I put off the meeting with the Chinese.
But he was really serious and said, how about the Chinese?
What if the Chinese turn against us if we do that?
I said, I don't know if you want to leave and pull over Vietnam.
We don't need the Chinese.
I can easily give him a general formula tomorrow that doesn't give him anything.
Plus, if I said I'll go there secretly before the 24th, provided there's a meeting on the 24th.
How about this?
Well, let me see.
I'm trying to think of gimmicks now for a minute.
You know, I'm all for atmospheres, and I'm not much for substance.
That is, giving them atmospheres is not...
If they can guarantee secrecy to Russia, I think you should go to Russia.
See, I could also set up the thing for you that in such a way that the way we have to chose they can set up.
He'll guarantee secrecy if you tell him how low.
You've got to know what a president does.
You've got to help him out.
You've got to show him every person.
Thank you.
Thank you.
See, this will put more heat on the Russians.
We have to make two conditions.
One is, I can go home late and pay the delivery.
That is just delivering them.
They'll be there in 24 hours.
They've been delivered 12 times.
That's never been delivered.
All right, okay.
This time, as I've told them, they may deliver.
Well, I understand.
They will talk to me this time.
We have a gust of wind.
If they see me, this will be it.
President seized me after what we are doing to Hanoi.
I said to him, for example, look, we are trying to take increasingly strong military methods before the 24th.
I don't want you to know this.
So that you people don't feel we are fooling you.
He said, are you going to attack our ships?
I said, I can't tell you anything.
But until the 24th, we will try to exercise as much restraint as the situation permits.
But these guys see me.
Either way, if they keep it secret, they have more of an incentive to keep it secret than we.
Yeah.
The Russians.
Yes.
Because if they...
But I'm getting down.
I still get back to the fundamental thing.
I don't know what's... What effect does it have on Hanover?
On the way to an end of the death.
Is that true?
On the Russians?
Did I go to Russia before I see that?
No.
Again, it puts us into, if it ever does come out.
But it won't come out.
We don't care.
But I think, Mr. President, I have a lot of experience with these guys now.
And I can assure, I can tell you, they are cracking.
He said Mrs. was moved to tears by Mrs. and has written a personal letter to Mrs. Bresnik.
I told him, look at this.
I think the Russians want funds for you.
The Russians want funds.
The whole position of Bresnik depends on this government.
I can't go to the Navy while they're moving out.
What you should have told him, too, was how comfortable he was.
They want to break off the sun, fight.
But he said that you are the greatest man, the greatest psychologist.
He said he is.
Or he'd be caught.
Well, I said to him, he said, he asked me what I thought of how this was handled, and I said that I know the second line.
That you always take up all the loose change that's lying around, and you lose all your good will that way.
He said, I said, but how can I survive without saying this about you guys?
He never thinks up new strength, but then he pulls you for all the volume.
Remember that, don't you see how he pulls at night?
I said, do you think that...
He said, how about an hour?
An hour is just two of us.
I said, on a note, do you think they're going to keep us being sitting out there?
We proved something to me.
He's not debating with all the men, nothing with any of them.
President, where do you think we have been talking?
I believe, really, that it seems to trip on me.
I accrue it as the advantage.
They're so panting after us that any slight chance they might feel they're attacking us, no matter what they're going to do, will disappear.
A secret trip could be taken.
Let's figure out what to give now.
Nothing.
Not this before.
What do you do?
What do you want to say to them?
What do you want to say to them?
I'll just give them a couple of the two.
The three states might, the three states.
We'll be glad to discuss the eight points and the modalities of the elections.
Mr. President, it would be a mistake to give them anything.
These are a great week.
God damn, he's shaking now.
Correct.
But the point is, what Govrina is saying,
Can't you give us anything?
I'll say we'll go there.
I think going to Russia is giving them something.
I say tell them we will go there.
There's an open line.
Then our eight boys, of course, we are willing to negotiate about that.
But we're not going to negotiate a surrender.
And of course, we won't ask you to surrender.
I'll just get the general company, which commits us to nothing.
but also that has to be done now.
But we must now bring him to court.
And I tell you, Mr. President, every instinct I have, I have never said to you that we have a chance in any particular time.
But we've never had enough begging us for specifics.
Right.
Let's keep in our Canadian speech.
Let me think.
Let's wait until tomorrow to mail the message.
He said he's coming for the message.
Well, the message would just be a little crap.
Hold on.
Hold on, Mr. President.
But on the other hand, what harm does it do to leave it in?
I would leave it in.
My President's thing is to leave it in, but... What harm does it do to leave it in?
I mean, but what I think I would like to do now is to tell him that you're considering his trip idea, because when you're hit with a T-62, there'll be a defense that will protest.
Tell him that, right?
I won't tell him that you approved it, but I'll tell him you are accurately considering it.
Tell him he can tell his government.
And there's a friend, it's a friend of Tom's friend who's going to Camp David tonight.
He says that he will, one of the things that he will do is give him a chance.
He should take the trip.
We'd like to see what, but he wants to see their message first.
How's that?
They didn't say that.
Then tell him he...
I think we ought to still make the Canadian thing.
I've got a domestic problem here, too, you know.
Can you make mine?
I'll make it.
Can you make it?
It's fine.
It was decent language.
I'll make it.
I'll make it.
Because it has to be set for the Chinese, too.
If you pull this one off...
I will guarantee you one thing, Mr. President.
Not guaranteed.
I think there is a two chance out of three that we can stop the war for the rest of this year.
That's the minimum I think we can get.
Whether we can stop it altogether, I don't know.
But that I think we can get.
Yeah.
They just made very good changes, aren't they?
And they just approved some word changes.
Do you want to look at those word changes?
Yeah, you go for it.
This is all right as far as you're concerned, huh?
Yes.
That's one sentence that was questioned, and everything should stay in it.
I'm hearing this, that deer.
In disrespect of special responsibility falls upon great powers.
You cannot avoid responsibility.
Hey, James, that paragraph, that's the new paragraph.
What I'd like to do is just go try and turn that into the same tone as the rest of it.
Oh, I don't know.
The tone's got to be tougher.
It's got to be.
I don't want it to double.
It usually comes down to the staff.
It's got to be this tone.
Right?
You want to soften it down.
No, that's not what I just said.
The tone is much longer.
And, uh, it's only a third of that.
I don't know if you want to come up top or not.
Much time, that's our problem.
Well, the rest of it's all right.
It changed last year.
This year, it cannot be changed in terms of the Sonoma and the Republicans.
It's got to be.
Yeah, it's quite good.
It's got to be set here for support all through the year.
I have no objection to you working on it and submitting the letter in paragraph.
I realize that this NFC stuff is a little more technical than the rest.
But you've got to change the true responsibility of that.
You see what I mean?
You can't go down for the same sentence.
But that's very carefully worded, and it can't be changed a hell of a lot.
What do you want to do to take this paragraph?
Take this copy and, uh... Have she... Oh.
Well, that's fine.
Tell her to retype it.
Reading copy with those two changes.
And then you can work on this so that tomorrow.
Yeah.
No hurry.
Don't take a half hour.
We'll take it if you can do it.
But I try to say you've got to keep up to date.
Well, it has to be in the same, it has to say the same thing.
I'll be right here for that.
I thought I had been paragraphed twice before I really... Well, what we really were going to do was put it exactly the way I said it over there at the conference.
Let me get that language.
But we can't do that because it's got to be slightly different.
I changed some of it already.
I don't mind.
I'll tell you all you want on that one.
I won't bother with it.
I don't care if it's another thing.
Have a copy.
Have Rosalie just send up the, if you can retype the... Oh, sure, sure.
They're fine.
But have her take that one.
We can work on what you want to do to try to get those sentences short.
Cut them in half.
That's one way we can do it, is to cut the sentences in half.
You may find a little more rhythm in me, but it's the toughness that you want.
Yeah, yeah.
What are you talking about?
I mean, subtle.
I don't want it to be subtle.
And yet I don't want the direct challenge taken out either.
So, okay.
Fine.
Okay, fine.
Good job.
Fine.
And I just say, you don't have to, as soon as you get it done, send it up on the telecast or whatever it is.
Okay, I'll be playing along on the trip, so... Where?
Oh, that.
Oh, no, no, no.
I said, well, why don't you do this?
Why don't you just go along and come up to Camp David in case I want to finish it up there.
I'm going up to spend the night.
You free?
Yeah.
Tonight?
Or are you?
Or were you going out tonight?
Tell me.
I'm free.
Sure.
Why don't you do that?
And, uh...
and bring with you at 4.30 whatever you have, and we'll try to finish the darn thing there.
And then if I've got any thoughts, I'll fire a few.
You can spend the night up there tonight.
You're going to Camp David Ellis?
Who's going there?
I'm sure one of us will.
Well, if you are, all of us.
You go up and get him.
Put him up at one of the cabins.
Somebody's got to go up there.
Thank you.
retitle that speech typewriter if anybody wants to go with that.
Well, take one girl, would you?
Fair enough.
But do they have two speech typewriters?
They don't, do they?
Well, that doesn't make any difference.
We'll redo the page here when we come back, and he can send it down on the page we've done.
But you go on up and spend the night.
That'll be good for you anyway.
All right.
Thank you very much.
One thing I was going to say.
With the Chinese, I think you probably ought to...
I don't think it's any need to play it too hard against them on the rhetoric side now.
What do you think?
I think with them, I'd say we understand.
But please, as the president said, we want to join lines.
And if we do it here, it's not directly against you.
You see, they could get a little bit, wouldn't want them to say, decide that Mansfield and Scotch would come or something.
You might like it.
I'll give them something that will make them realize we're still playing that one against the Russians.
  • 330-037 3:09 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:20 pm.
  • 330-038 3:09 PM · 48 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:20 pm.
  • 022-118 3:20 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 3:20 pm.
  • 330-039 3:20 PM · 16 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at 3:20 pm.
  • 330-040 3:20 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:20 pm and 3:26 pm.
  • 022-119 3:23 PM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Stephen B. Bull, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 3:23 pm to 3:26 pm.
  • 330-041 3:26 PM · 14 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:26 pm and 3:27 pm.
  • 330-042 3:26 PM · 12 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:26 pm and 3:27 pm.

Conversation 330-036, April 12, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/330-036 (accessed November 15, 2026).