Conversation 330-036

TapeTape 330StartWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 2:47 PMEndWednesday, April 12, 1972 at 3:09 PMTape start time04:01:59Tape end time04:21:55ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Butterfield, Alexander P.;  Huebner, Lee W.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On April 12, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Lee W. Huebner met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:47 pm to 3:09 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 330-036 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 330-36

Date: April 12, 1972
Time: 2:47 pm - 3:09 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam
            -Kissinger’s meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -Consultations
            -Soviet Union
                  -Relations with North Vietnam
                        -Military equipment
                        -Propositions
                        -Negotiations
                        -Hanoi’s interest in summit
                  -Message to the President from Dobrynin
                        -Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin
                        -Kissinger’s meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
                              -Secrecy
                              -Message to Hanoi

       Kissinger's schedule
             -Postponed meeting

       Vietnam

-Soviet Union
      -People's Republic of China [PRC]
             -Reactions to US-Soviet relations
      -Kissinger’s message to Soviets
             -Appearances
             -Kissinger’s trip
                   -Secrecy
                          -Guarantees
                                -Kissinger’s trip to Soviet Union
                          -Brezhnev
                          -William P. Rogers
                          -Soviet Summit
      -Influence with Hanoi
      -Reaction to US attacks
             -Kissinger’s message to Brezhnev
                   -US military effort
                   -Secrecy
                   -Effect on Hanoi
      -Irini N. Dobrynin's visit with Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon
             -Letter from Mrs. Dobrynin to Viktoriya Brezhnev
      -Soviet attitudes
             -Desire to discontinue summit
             -Brezhnev's statements to Kissinger
                   -Comments concerning the President
                   -India
      -Kissinger’s trip
             -Negotiations with Hanoi
                   -Aid
                   -US election
                   -Dobrynin
                   -Advisability
             -Negotiations with Soviets
                   -The President's forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
                   -US limitations
                   -Soviet summit
      -Soviet requests
             -The President's Canadian speech
             -Message to the President
                   -The President's response to Dobrynin
                          -Camp David
                          -The President's forthcoming trip to Soviet Union
-The President's Canadian trip

             -Domestic problems
             -PRC
             -Democrats
                  -Edward M. Kennedy
             -Cessation of war
                  -Chances

Alexander P. Butterfield and Lee W. Huebner entered at an unknown time after 2:47 pm.

       The President's Canadian speech
            -Changes
                  -Kissinger's approval
                        -Wording of a sentence

Kissinger left at 3:01 pm.

             -Wording of a sentence
             -Tone
                   -Change
             -Wording
                   -Changes
                         -Further work
                         -National Security Council [NSC] considerations
             -A copy
                   -Retyping
                   -Further work
             -Changes
                   -Consistency
                         -Compared with a speech at a conference
             -Copies
                   -Retyping
                         -Rose Mary Woods
                   -Sentences
                         -Shortening
                         -Tone
                   -Distribution
                   -Work at Camp David
                         -Huebner's schedule
                               -Completion of speech

       Butterfield's schedule
             -Camp David

                  -Haldeman
             -Arrangements for Huebner
                  -Secretary
                  -Typewriters

Butterfield and Huebner left at 3:09 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Are you ready to take off now for New York?
All right.
Come over now.
Bye.
We'll give him a call.
It'll probably be 3.15 or 3.30.
He's talking to the police.
Bye.
Have a nice day.
Bye.
Oh, fine, fine.
You can pick those things up and open them.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Ja.
Oh, fine, fine.
You can pick those things up and open them.
Thank you.
Now he's blubbered.
He says, one, what can I show you?
This way, before he gets back to Moscow.
This way.
This is communication.
Second, what can I show you?
It's the most urgent touch right now.
He said they have a terrible problem.
For one time religion is good.
He said, he doesn't give me the bullshit about peace, how tough, when he doesn't play, he's put upon, and he's serious.
He said, let's not assess blame, let's not, let's not do anything, let's just ask ourselves what can be done.
He says, we can't turn, we can't turn them off,
From one day to the next evening, he will activate the other veterinary specimens, which is very interesting.
It will take three months to take effect.
He said, we'll catch them, they are only 24.
Even though you can't do this, that's what he said.
He said, that he's not sure.
Or he thinks he's not sure.
He said, however, they have markups, and right now, all technicians are known.
There's, uh,
that he hurts the stomach of a northern Tibetan from somewhere.
Therefore, can I make some proposition, any proposition, that they can transmit to the north?
I said, I don't know.
President has said, we hate boys.
We can't do that.
He said, can we at least tell them that you're willing to negotiate it?
He said to me for the first time, I forget his name.
You are not serious.
I said, I don't know.
Frankly, I could have given him some cash.
I said, I've got to talk to the president.
He said, I said, are you sure you can see me tomorrow?
I said, I'll talk to the president.
I said, may I tell them to go get me something tomorrow?
I said, I don't have this small of a difference of consent.
What you will decide, I'll hand it over to you before you make these decisions.
I didn't want to talk about it.
But, I can tell, we haven't closed the dry system yet.
I can tell when these guys don't see it.
Then he said something.
I must tell you the whole thing.
He said,
He believes that if I could go to the treasurer, if I could know their secrets, they would break everything.
And could I go for some days prior to the tragedy, they would guarantee total secrecy.
They would let me fly in on military rules.
You know, I'd cover for you if you had no problem.
And why don't we tell them?
I believe... That doesn't give them anything to tell.
Yeah.
Why don't they tell him?
Why don't they tell him anything?
Yeah.
But you see, I believe, Mr. President, if it turns out, rather than our giving anything to Hanoi now, why don't we say to give our full trust to Hanoi now?
We can do two things, Mr. President.
And the other thing I was thinking, I would recommend to Bill Taylor.
We were going to have to catch the 24-4, but now I'm going to find him myself.
I put off the meeting with the Chinese, but he was really serious.
He said, how about the Chinese?
What if the Chinese turn against us?
I said, I don't know if you want to leave and pull over Vietnam.
We don't need the Chinese.
I can easily give him a general formula tomorrow that doesn't give him anything.
Plus, if I said I'll go there secretly before the 24th, provided there's a meeting on the 24th.
How about this?
How about telling the children?
Well, let me see.
I'm trying to think of games now for a minute.
You know, I'm all for atmosphere, and I'm not much for substance.
That is, giving them atmosphere is not...
I think so.
But I think they're going to Russia.
If they can guarantee secrecy to Russia, I think you should go to Russia.
But you see, I believe, Mr. President, also there's some advantage in your sort of finding out what's right and what's wrong.
You see, I could also set up this thing for you that in such a way that the way we have to chose that can set up.
You'll guarantee secrecy if you don't know what it is.
See, this will put more heat on the Russians.
We have to make two conditions.
One is, I can go home and they deliver this.
That is just delivering them.
They'll be there in 24 hours.
They've been delivered 12 times.
No, they've never been delivered.
All right, okay.
This time, as I've told them, they may deliver it.
Well, I understand.
They will talk to me each time.
And we haven't got to spend more time with them.
If they see me, this will be it.
President seized me after what we are doing to Hanoi.
I said to him, for example, look, we are trying to take increasingly strong military methods before the 24th.
I just want you to know that.
So those few people don't feel we are fooling them.
He said, are you going to attack our ships?
I said, I can't tell you anything, but until the 24th, we will try to exercise as much restraint as the situation permits.
But, if these guys see us,
As long as it's operating on the way.
Either way.
If they keep it secret, they have more of an incentive to keep it secret than we.
Yeah.
The Russians.
Yes.
Because...
But I'm getting down.
I still get back to the fundamental thing.
I don't know what's... What effect does it have on Hanoi?
On the way to an end of disaster.
Is that true?
On the Russians?
And I go to Russia before I see them.
And again, it puts us in trouble if it ever does come out.
But it won't come out.
We don't care.
But I think, Mr. President, I have a lot of experience with these guys now.
And I can assure, I can tell you, they are cracking.
He said Mrs. McCormick was moved to tears by Mrs. McCormick, and has written a personal letter to Mrs. President.
I told him, look at this position.
I think the Russians want to talk to you.
The opposition of President depends on this government, sir.
He said he is.
Or he be caught.
Well, I said to him, he said, he asked me what I thought of how this was handled, and I said that I know the technique, but you see to it that you always take out all the loose chains and slide them out, and you lose all your good will that way.
He said, I said, but how can I do that?
I said, there's nothing better.
You never fix up your strength, but let me prove it for all of you.
Remember that, let me see how you're doing.
I said, we do think that, we said, how is this going to work?
I said, I don't know.
Do you think you're going to keep us sitting out there?
President,
What do you think?
I believe it's really a secret trip on me.
I had cruel anti-advantages.
They're so panting after us that any slight chance they might feel they're attacking us over what they're going to do would disappear.
A secret trip could be taken.
Let's figure out what you could give them.
Nothing.
That's before what you would say to them.
Mr. President, it would be a mistake to give them anything to deserve.
I agree that we've got their needs taken care of.
Correct.
I think going to Russia is giving them something.
We won't ask you to surrender, or we won't.
I'll just give the general government the truth, which commits us to nothing.
But also that it has to be done now.
But we must now bring the truth towards us.
And I tell you, Mr. President, every instinct I have, I have never said to you that we have a chance in any particular time.
But we've never had enough begging answers for specific reasons.
I mean...
But what I think I would like to do now is to tell him that you're considering this trip idea, because when you're hit with a T-52, then we have the pressure to protest.
Tell him that way.
I won't tell him that you have to do the route, but I'll tell him you are accurate.
Tell him he can tell his government.
There's a friend, Tom, who's going to Camp David tonight.
He says that he will want to do things, that he will listen to the chances.
We should take a trip.
We'd like to see what, but he wants to see their message first.
How's that?
They didn't say that.
Then tell him he...
I think we ought to still make the Canadian thing.
I've got a domestic problem here, too, you know.
Can you make mine?
I'll make it.
It's time.
It was decent, mind you.
I'll make it.
I'll make it.
It has to be set for the Chinese, too.
If you pull this one off...
I will guarantee you one thing, Mr. President.
Not guaranteed.
I think there is a two chance out of three that we can stop the war for the rest of this year.
That's the minimum I think we can get.
Whether we can stop it altogether, I don't know.
But that I think we can get.
Yeah.
They just made very good changes, aren't they?
Henry has approved some more changes.
Yeah, you go for it.
This is all right as far as you're concerned, huh?
Yes.
That's one sentence that was questioned, and everything should stay in.
I'm hearing this sound here.
Disrespect and special responsibility falls upon great powers.
You cannot avoid responsibility.
Hey, James, that paragraph, that's the big paragraph.
What I'd like to do is just go try and turn that into the same tone as the rest of it.
Oh, I don't know.
The tone's got to be tougher.
It's got to be, I don't want it to double either.
It usually comes out of the staff.
It's got to be this tone.
Right?
You want to soften it down?
No, I'm not softening it.
I'm just going to...
The tone of the sentence is a much longer...
And it's only for today.
But talk about it.
Much time is our problem.
What the rest of us are.
Change last year.
This year, it cannot be changed in terms of some other problems.