Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 331 › Conversation 331-033
Nixon, Kissinger & Colson on Vietnam War and Soviet Summit
Wednesday, April 19, 1972 · 5:05 PM–5:35 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 14 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the diplomatic risks and strategic conditions surrounding Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Moscow ahead of the Soviet summit. They reached a consensus that any public announcement regarding a return to plenary peace talks on Vietnam must be backed by ironclad Soviet guarantees to prevent the U.S. from being forced to halt bombing and blockade operations prematurely. Following this, Nixon consulted with Charles Colson regarding political pushback from university administrators over the administration’s Vietnam policies, emphasizing a need for a firm, adversarial response to critics.
- Vietnam War
- Soviet Summit
- Henry Kissinger
- Military bombing
- Public relations
- Higher education criticism
Audio
Transcript (AI-generated)
This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 6 minutes of this recording (about 44% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.
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Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
.
.
.
.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
As soon as he gets here, I need to come in a minute before he starts and I have one.
Ow!
Ow!
I think we
Better to go Monday than Tuesday if we can work it out.
I just have a feeling that there's chances of the Russians leaving.
Well, you see, the thing is, if you get back, you can start out in the morning and let it all go.
We can.
Of course, there's so many possibilities that could emerge, huh?
Maybe they don't want to.
No, that they cannot avoid.
That they'll agree to.
But it could range from just an announcement that we've got to avoid a situation where it appears that we just went there and it's not run some.
That we cannot announce.
Oh, no.
I will be clear, because if they get, if you went to Moscow for the purpose of preparing for the summit, that poses enormous problems, which we can handle in terms of the project, but it also doesn't do any good for us.
No, no, we have to keep a clear expectation.
If we cannot announce, if Leonard is there, we have to be very careful about what Leonard will say, because if we then, because that means we can't bomb Hanoi and Haifang anyway.
and no after it's announced, I agree.
But therefore, Mr. President, that is really giving away.
Once you announce publicly that we're going back to the plenary session, you are locked into not blocking or anything like that.
So we must have something very concrete.
Oh, I agree.
I agree.
So if, for example, we announce that I've been there to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia and the summit, that would be enough for just that announcement.
The second possibility is...
that we add another 70% both sides agree the urgent desire ability to de-escalate the fighting in the Southeast Asia.
That is no crime.
That doesn't hurt us because that affects both sides.
The third would be we can agree to the plan of recession if the Soviets give us an ironclad guarantee that the deal is set on de-escalation.
But don't you agree?
You're absolutely right.
If you agree, a plenary session, we'd give up bombing.
We'd give up blockade, Hanoi, and high bomb.
Although we, of course, would not give up all the evidence below the 20th.
That still is giving up a hell of a crowd.
Also not completely gives it up for that week, but we could go to a plenary session.
We could have a plenary meeting.
And then say, well, we tried everything we could.
That isn't the regard that that's right.
There the private meeting a bit drops.
that you just break it all off again and go again.
I'm glad to realize you're getting closer than the Moscow summit.
I would be glad to know that the dean of graduate school and I would get the message in my office that he's appalled at my influence to resume bombing, and that maybe some of his brothers and me would be more concerned since I'm a three-and-a-half-year undergraduate advisor.
See, in action before, who is stirring him up?
It's a crisis of matter of jackasses.
You know, he's just going to laugh at the...
He's just going to laugh at the... What do you think?
The size of his speed of his school of education.
The speed of his school of education.
If we don't go to the plenary session, then we just announce that I was here because we've done everything.
And if we do not go, if we go to the plenary session, we can phrase why I was there more loosely and just announce the plenary session.
You know, you're not getting there as many stuff as you did before, though.
What is it?
What makes these sons of bitches tick?
Do you think it's because they're terrified of the students again?
Oh, yeah.
He's going to tell the graduates.
He's going to tell the students now that he protects them.
He probably got frightened because 500 students charged the building, isn't that it?
What in the name of Christ?
Let me tell you one thing.
They'd never let me get back in.
I'm through with them.
I was through with them long ago.
And I told you in China, I said, forget it.
Remember, you said there's a new atmosphere in the rest.
Remember, I told you, Henry, don't ever believe it.
I know.
These sons of bitches are against us.
This is real life.
This one's a beauty.
In Cambodia, we had to say it was so up in India.
But this one,
He's got them locked out now.
It's a beautiful old fellow.
They've got to be treated with total intent.
Total intent.
I don't think it's okay.
I don't think it's okay.
Maybe that's not fair to him.
No, no, he is anyway.
I think, Mr. President, don't you feel the drive on Monday?
You can't go Thursday, I understand.
Either one, I just want to tell you the argument.
What do you call it?
Tell you the argument.
We can go Tuesday.
Tuesday's fine.
I must admit, it's just a bit false.
If you feel it, it's better.
The major thing is we must remain ferocious this weekend, no matter what trend we play over the weekend.
Okay, good luck.
Hello?
Yeah, what is the latest report on Haiti?
How long do they need all the evening?
Yeah, you have to go out in the morning or something.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But then they'll have it done in the morning.
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
And how many of them I call when I remember the sentence and say how much?
That's where you can get it.
That's where you can get it.
That's where you can get it.
That's where you can get it.
That's where you can get it.
That's where you can get it.
As a matter of fact, be sure to get the word right up there to Rustin now that Eastman wrote the rules that they can ask about this.
Then, it's important to find out what they hold.
And you can open it up to the people who want to contribute to it.
Then it is also relevant whether they contribute to the members of the committee.
Any other senators?
I'm sure.
If it is, put it out.
But get out tonight.
I'll call you back at 7 o'clock, 7 o'clock, 7 o'clock.
Okay, fine.
That's definitely important.
Okay.
Did he?
Oh, what did he?
He always does a good job.
Yeah, yeah.
More.
Oh, good.
Yeah.
Good, good.
It'll make news.
The point is, if he takes them on,
We can make news and say, if you'd like to see a university president once, who, instead of condemning the United States and what's our enemies, not damn it, let's just all be simple and let it be.
Are we?
I don't know.
Should not our level, but I can tell.
No.
No, that's right.
But you can tell Friday.
You can tell Friday.
Okay.
All right.
NARA Description
On April 19, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Dr. W. Kenneth Riland, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, and Charles W. Colson met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:05 pm to 5:35 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 331-033 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 331-33
Date: April 19, 1972
Time: 5:05 pm - 5:35 pm
Location: Executive Office Building
The President met with W. Kenneth Riland.
*****************************************************************
[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 10/16/2019.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[331-033-w001]
[Duration: 1m 30s]
General conversation
W. Kenneth Riland
*****************************************************************
Office furnishings
The President's schedule
-Meeting with Henry A. Kissinger
-Kissinger's arrival
Kissinger entered at 5:20 pm.
Soviet summit
-Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-US allies
-Leaks
-Soviet Union
-People's Republic of China [PRC]
-US allies
-Europe
-Announcement
-Problems
-Announcement
-William P. Rogers
-Plenary meeting date
-US bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
-Announcement
-Southeast Asia
-Plenary session
-Conditions
-Relationship to Vietnam
-Blockade
-Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
-Tonkin Delta
-Possible second trip
Vietnam
-The President's policies
-Resumption of bombing
-Unknown Harvard University graduate school dean's statement
Kissinger's trip to Moscow
-Vietnam
-Plenary session
-Announcement
Vietnam
-The President's policies
-Criticism of college presidents
-Fear of students
-Opposition to the President
-PRC trip
-Cambodia invasion
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew’s countercriticism
The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 5:20 and 5:28
pm.
[Conversation No. 331-33A]
[See Conversation No. 23-43]
[End of telephone conversation]
Vietnam
-The President's policies
-An announcement
-Intensity of bombing
Riland and Kissinger left at 5:28 pm.
The President talked with Charles W. Colson between 5:28 and 5:35 pm.
[Conversation No. 331-33B]
[See Conversation No. 23-44]
[End of telephone conversation]Also recorded on April 19, 1972
- 023-040 4:41 PM · 4 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:41 pm and 4:58 pm.
- 023-041 4:58 PM · 11 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 4:58 pm and 5:01 pm.
- 023-042 5:01 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox talked on the telephone from 5:01 pm to 5:02 pm.
- 713-002 5:01 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Tricia Nixon Cox met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:01 pm to 5:02 pm.
- 713-003 5:02 PM · 59 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:02 pm to 5:03 pm.
- 713-004 5:05 PM · 1 min — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 5:05 pm and 11:59 pm.
- 023-043 5:20 PM · 5 sec — President Richard M. Nixon, White House operator, and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 5:20 pm and 5:28 pm.
- 023-044 5:28 PM · 7 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Charles W. Colson talked on the telephone from 5:28 pm to 5:35 pm.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 331-033, April 19, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/331-033 (accessed October 1, 2026).