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Conversation 333-026

TapeTape 333StartWednesday, April 26, 1972 at 5:01 PMEndWednesday, April 26, 1972 at 5:10 PMTape start time03:24:12Tape end time03:32:09ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate the handling of Secretary of State William P. Rogers regarding sensitive Vietnam policy and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The two men expressed frustration with Rogers's attempts to claim credit for diplomatic breakthroughs and his potential to leak or interfere with upcoming presidential announcements. To mitigate these concerns, they decided to withhold full drafts of the President’s speech and technical SALT proposals from Rogers until the last possible moment to prevent unwanted revisions or unauthorized disclosure.

Vietnam WarSALTWilliam P. RogersHenry KissingerWhite House leaksForeign policy
AudioNARA Description

On April 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 5:01 pm to 5:10 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 333-026 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 333-26

Date: April 26, 1972
Time: 5:01 pm - 5:10 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

Vietnam
     -The President's call to Kissinger
     -Kissinger's trip to Paris
           -Private talks
                 -Kissinger's call to Melvin R. Laird
                         -William P. Rogers
                         -Timing
                         -Leaks
           -Message to Laird
     -The President's speech
           -Rogers's copy

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
      -Kissinger’s talk with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
      -Kissinger's meeting with Gerard C. Smith
      -Rogers's role
      -Credit
      -Leaks
      -Proposals
            -Rogers's Vvew
      -Issues
            -Submarines
                  -Proposal
                        -Smith
                        -Rogers's knowledge
                        -Kissinger's call to Smith
      -Rogers's presence at meeting
      -State Department

Vietnam
     -The President's speech
          -Copy to Rogers
                -Corrections
                -Haldeman
                -Rogers's call to Kissinger
                -Meeting
          -Copy to Rose Mary Woods
          -Joseph C. Kraft
          -Copy to Rogers
                -Problems
                -Changes
                       -State Department proposals

       SALT talks
           -Leaks
           -Chalmers M. Roberts
                  -Washington Post
           -State department involvement
           -Rogers
                  -Involvement
                  -Knowledge
                         -Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs]
                  -Interest
                  -Call to the President
                  -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                         -The President's call
           -Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense
                  -SLBMs
           -US proposals
                  -Rogers
                         -National Security Council [NSC] meeting
                               -SLBMs
                         -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                               -Converstaion with Kissinger
                               -Conversation with Rogers
                  -SLBMs

       The President's speech
            -Copy to Rogers
                  -Key section
                         -Delivery
                               -Time
                         -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s report
                  -Other sections

Kissinger left at 5:10 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I was just going to, I only called to give you a thought to be a reminder that I think we've got to let Flaherty in on the private talk today.
I mean, it's not fair to tell Rogers that it's not Flaherty.
And I think in this case, the way I was telling today, I was saying, Mel, the president, I mean, well, you know, we've got to tell Bill about this.
He thinks it's a great decision to lawyer and all that.
You ought to know this for your own information.
And if you've got to be prepared afterwards to do something, start letting know or something.
But I shouldn't tell him to go out tonight because when he agrees on this drawdown, he'll then certainly be tonight.
Probably you could tell him tomorrow.
Friday, sure.
On the other day, Friday, I can dance to a tune.
You could tell him now.
Say, now the president has a special announcement.
I'll give Rogers a copy of that 16.
Oh, sure.
Now, we, uh, don't want to bother you with that.
Talk to Alderman.
We're having some Rogers fun again.
Which, as you predicted.
Well, now, he wants to grab credit for this tall thing.
Oh, really?
And he says he insists on being present when I talk to Sven.
Yesterday, when I told him to make a report to us, he said, ah, whatever you
And I agreed with all of them.
Have you a friend?
Oh yes, I will have a friend, but I'll be brutal.
I'll say, look, I have all the papers, how it was done.
I will not ask for any credit.
My name will never be mentioned.
There will only be one issue now.
This is the president's affair.
And you, Charlie, are going to get it done.
And this group, if anyone starts speaking, we'll stop you.
Take my word for this, one subject... You know, I almost predicted that.
But what's the other one?
You know, he wouldn't have called that Saturday, except for that.
Mr. President, he doesn't even know about the goddamn summary proposal.
That proposal doesn't even exist here.
Could you do this?
Could you get the jury in advance so that he can
letting him say that he didn't know about it, so that Rogers could hear your presence.
Yes, I'll have one of my staff members present.
Now, what I mean is, is he Rogers?
There's no possible way, Mr. President, around this thing.
What's the trouble?
Why isn't one of you present?
Because I know what the game is.
He's fast as a stick.
When you write a speech, when you're bombing, I don't hear anyone.
They haven't even asked you.
I don't, I wouldn't give him the Huffington Sound.
But then he'll want to call for corrections.
But there's not going to be any corrections in this case, do you understand?
He understands, correct?
Correct.
Did he call all of them?
Yeah, he called all of them.
But if I see some other people...
We were starting at the end of that meeting.
Did you tell a lot?
What about you?
You know, the...
Wait, wait.
Did you give this to Roach yet?
Did you give it to him?
I didn't.
I didn't.
It's so bad.
You know, you can't take that on your way.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Press forward.
Or maybe not, you know, Kraft.
Kraft has got to admire the diplomatic skill here.
What do you think?
You see, the problem with giving the goddamn speech to Rogers is he's likely to call five minutes or ten minutes before I go on and say, Well, you shouldn't see him or talk to him.
You'll just make him nervous.
Well, I mean, I don't mind him, but
If he's got something to say, give him the speech.
I won't give him the speech.
The mention brought to me is when I give him this, whether they'll start thinking it out.
What, they'll assault him?
Yeah.
Well, if they do, I'll do it myself.
If they do, I'll call them charlatans and give them their own story.
Have them opposed it?
Yeah.
You know, I'd have to direct what they're interested in.
I'd have to direct what... Why?
What do you think Rogers would want to do?
Put it out that the state did this?
Yes, sir.
I don't think that's what he's trying to say.
It's a goddamn thing to do with Solomon.
President Rogers has never attended one meeting.
He couldn't tell you what an SLPM is.
He couldn't tell you what conversion is or any of this.
He's never taken interest in it.
But when he called you on Saturday, you hit stick with him.
Well, I know it.
I know it.
I talked to him yesterday.
Well, Haig knew it.
See, Haig.
And that's why I called Haig.
And Haig, uh, you know, that's what Haig and I wired him, because we knew it was up.
And since they, the fact is, they don't have the SLVN proposal.
And we have it.
Now, it would be nice if I could hold it, but we need to try and see.
But the defense department, of course, we've got to get it in while you draw our arguments.
You can't get the chief in the defense department.
Gordon, I know what you'll probably say.
This isn't a good proposal.
Oh, not bad.
I think he was the one that insisted in the NSC that we include SLPN.
And also that he read the agreement.
The agreement was made that he was astonished.
Raj has talked to him for 30 seconds and said SLPN ought to be included.
And he said, how, Mr. Secretary?
He said, oh, I don't bother about these details.
He said, it's done by the committee.
Well, isn't that something?
Well, on the speech, as I said, has he asked for a copy of it?
Yeah.
Tell you what you do.
Give him the key.
Oh, that I'll send over.
I mean, the key part.
And just say the balance of it is the rhetoric is that the president is working on that.
And send that over to him about 8 to 8.30.
How's that?
But you've given him the points of where Abrams reported that thing.
Well, what the hell?
He asked for more of it.
What?
There's not much more.
Well, I just have to say the rest of it I'm still working on.
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