Conversation 333-021

TapeTape 333StartWednesday, April 26, 1972 at 3:43 PMEndWednesday, April 26, 1972 at 4:31 PMTape start time02:34:51Tape end time03:16:30ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  [Unknown person(s)];  White House operator;  Byrd, Robert C.;  [Unknown person(s)];  Woods, Rose MaryRecording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On April 26, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), White House operator, Robert C. Byrd, unknown person(s), and Rose Mary Woods met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:43 pm to 4:31 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 333-021 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 333-21

Date: April 26, 1972
Time: 3:43 pm - 4:31 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

       Vietnam
            -Negotiations
                 -Current developments
                       -Le Duc Tho
                              -Trip to Paris
                 -Secret talks
                       -Xuan Thuy
                              -Statement to press
                                    -Nguyen Van Thieu
                 -Associated Press [AP] story
                 -Kissinger's press conference
                       -Questions
                 -Reports from Moscow
                       -Leonid I. Brezhnev's meeting with Kissinger
                              -Source
                              -The President’s forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union

                  -Brezhnev's offer
                  -Significance
                  -Willy Brandt
                  -Other issues
                        -Middle East
                  -Source
                  -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                  -The President's visit
                        -Schedule
                        -Brezhnev
                              -Andrei A. Gromyko
            -Significance of reports
-Soviets
      -US bombing
            -Hanoi
      -Dobrynin
      -The President's message
            -Summit
            -Yuli M. Vorontsov
-The President's speech
      -Kissinger's revisions
            -Additions
            -Paris talks
            -Use of channels
            -US objectives
                  -Prisoners of War [POW] return
-Soviets
      -Delegation in Hanoi
            -Significance
      -Report of Kissinger's trip
            -Purpose
      -Brezhnev
            -Press reports
-The President's speech
      -Revisions
      -Draft
            -North Vietnamese offensive
                  -Changes
                  -The President's orders for counterattacks
            -US role in Vietnam
                  -Limitations
                  -George S. McGovern's supporters

                 -Response in North Vietnam and Soviet Union
                       -Kissinger's conversation with Brezhnev
                 -Raymond K. Price, Jr.
                 -John K. Andrews, Jr.
                       -Abilities
                 -The President’s November 3, 1969 speech
            -Bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
                 -The President's decision
                       -Kissinger’s trip
                 -The President's Canadian trip
                 -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                 -Melvin R. Laird
            -Negotiations
                 -[David] Kenneth Rush
            -The President's speech
                 -William J. Porter
                 -Changes
                 -Kissinger's views
                 -Revisions
                       -Bombing halt
            -US public opinion
            -South Vietnam
                 -Changes in speech
                 -Defense
                 -Stakes in war
            -The President's speech
                 -Bloodbath of non-communists
                       -Number
                       -Wording of statement
                 -US goals
                       -Prevention of bloodbath
                 -Changes

H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman entered at 4:04 pm.

            -Cable from Ellsworth F. Bunker
                 -Release
                       -John A. Scali
                             -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                       -Network coverage
                       -Kissinger's office

Kissinger talked with an unknown person in his office at an unknown time between 4:04 and
4:10 pm.

       [Conversation No. 333-21A]

       Vietnam
            -Cable from Bunker and Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                 -Delivery to Oval Office
                 -Location

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -Senate Democratic caucus
                 -Robert C. Byrd
                 -Vote against administration policy
                 -Kissinger's call to Byrd
                       -Delays in meeting
                              -Sensitive developments
                                    -Jeopardy
                                    -Caucus action
                                           -Problems
            -The President's reception for Congressmen
                 -Report from Clark MacGregor
                 -Response
                       -Forthcoming speech
                              -Presidency
                              -Speechwriters
                              -Wording
                 -Positive tone of the President
            -The President's speech
                 -Text
                       -Distribution to press
                              -Ronald L. Ziegler, Scali and Charles W. Colson
                              -Time
                              -Briefing

Haldeman left at 4:10 pm.

       The President's speech
            -Deletions
            -Copies

                  -Distribution
             -US goals
                  -Stopping invasion

       Vietnam
            -Kissinger's call to Byrd

Kissinger talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 4:10 and 4:31 pm.

       [Conversation No. 333-21B]

       [See Conversation No. 23-84]

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -The President's speech
                 -Revisions
                       -Consequences of defeat
                              -Loss of respect

Kissinger talked with Byrd at an unknown time between 4:10 and 4:31 pm.

       [Conversation No. 333-21C]

       [See Conversation No. 23-85]

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -Byrd's support of the President
            -Democratic caucus
                 -Delay
                 -J. William Fulbright's request in writing
                        -Byrd's problem
                 -Byrd
                        -Meeting with Kissinger
                              -Confidentiality
                 -Scheduling
                        -Time and day
            -Negotiations
                 -Private meetings

             -Democratic caucus
                 -Time and day
                        -Errors
                              -Kissinger's call to Haldeman

Kissinger talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 4:10 and 4:31 pm.

       [Conversation No. 333-21D]

       Call to Haldeman
             -Return call

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -The President's speech
                 -Review
                 -Stakes in war
                       -US credibility with allies
                       -Future aggression
                 -Changes
                       -Kissinger's copy
                       -North Vietnamese invasion
                              -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] crossing
                              -Shelling of civilians
                              -Violation of 1968 bombing halt understanding
                 -Deletions
                 -Issues in war
                 -Negotiations
                       -Return of POWs
                 -Conclusion
                       -Press copy
                 -Kissinger's copies
                       -Rose Mary Woods
                 -Press copies

The President talked with Woods at an unknown time between 4:10 and 4:31 pm.

       [Conversation No. 333-21E]

       Vietnam
            -The President's speech

                   -Kissinger's copy
                         -Corrections
                         -Delivery
                   -Press copy

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -The President's speech
                 -Further changes
                 -Impact on country
                 -Kissinger's press briefing
                       -Time
                       -Format
                       -Negotiations
                              -Resumption

Haldeman talked with Kissinger at an unknown time between 4:10 and 4:31 pm.

       [Conversation No. 333-21F]

       [See Conversation No. 23-86]

The President conferred with Kissinger twice during the conversation.

       Confirmation of Senate Democratic caucus meeting time

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam
            -Democratic caucus
                  -Kissinger's conversation with Byrd
                        -Byrd's reliability
                  -Change of date
                        -Certainty
            -Kissinger's trip to Paris
                  -Secrecy
                        -Byrd
                  -Byrd's position
                        -Kissinger's conversation with Fulbright
                  -Kissinger's call to Byrd
                        -Byrd's response

                               -Fulbright
             -The President's speech
                  -Compared with the President's talk to Congressmen
                  -Simple language

       The President’s schedule

Kissinger left at 4:31 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

North Vietnamese have said, I have told you that already, that Redacto, that Redacto is... That public?
Yes, that public.
Oh, North Vietnamese chief, these negotiators said here today, it was highly possible that Manoa Public Bureau had Redacto carried in the next few days, opening the way for new secret talks, which I went towards.
No other speakers.
This negotiator, it's one tweet, was speaking to reporters.
Drew said, Drew said, and now that the United States had agreed to resume its evening of regional talks, it is very probable that we have broken down the Paris Agreement.
That's true.
That's one tweet.
One tweet.
Oh, yeah.
Then another AP story.
The United States will go back to the Vietnam Peace Corps.
These people first then.
Presumably because of the Communist Pledge on September 11th, the United States will change its briefing statement.
You'll be asked about that tonight, then, won't you?
With a smile.
Oh, see, that's the way.
With a smile.
Yes.
And then, here's an even more significant one from Moscow.
Highly-placed diplomatic sources from Moscow, highly-placed diplomatic sources said today that Congress' party chair, Leonid Brezhnev, initiated this week's talk with presidential advisor, Andrew K. Schultz, and that they led to the United States' decision to remove the Chinese visa from these stores on Thursday.
This highly-qualified diplomatic source also said that Brezhnev planned to do most of the talking
The diplomats at the Divide House in Christchurch, the kids who would be too busy with other things, said, and the people that hired the company in the past is Washington, Moscow, or Canberra, but the Divide House later decided to accept Russian authorities due to the gravity of the Vietnam situation.
That's all right.
It was also assumed that residents... That shows their worry about it.
It was also assumed that residents had been prevented from the Middle East crisis.
This is put out of a monster of a monster.
Oh, my God.
This is great.
I think what it does is like summer greening.
His highly qualified diplomat also said that when Nixon begins his state visit to Maine, Massachusetts, he will spend most of his working time with the president.
The rest of his only leadership is the CQM, who taught the environment to really good, who participated in the discussion, who told the president that the president would be the actual head of the GOP team.
And so on and so forth.
Well, that's it.
That's it.
Oh, this puts us totally behind this summit.
Do you think the lockups are not bombing Hanoi?
Yeah, okay, maybe not.
Absolutely not.
Absolutely not.
I knew it.
I mean, you see, the trouble was that no matter what the British reported, they didn't really, that was just an ambassador, no matter how highly trusted.
I know.
When I read your messages,
And when I tangled the summit prospects before him, when we were talking...
I want to know, did you get that little personal message you were offering?
Thank you.
I'm a machine scientist.
I'm a machine scientist.
Oh, good.
That's very good.
But it said exactly what you had told me.
You made that mistake, didn't you?
No, I didn't.
Oh, good.
Oh, that's much better.
I have added one sentence to your speech, Mr. President.
Yeah, right.
Well, let's see.
Go ahead.
Uh, will you talk about returning to the peace talk?
Yeah.
I have added two things.
I've added a sentence that says, we are returning to the firm expectation that productive talks leading to rapid progress will follow through all available channels.
Uh, excuse me, uh, what, where is it?
It's on page five.
Yeah.
Well, tell me what it is.
Uh, I'm just reading it.
Please, the second that was announced by Smada is directly a present for the U.S. and the U.N. to return to the negotiating table in Paris tomorrow morning for a very physical purpose.
We're not resuming the Paris talks if we know that the U.N. will end the propaganda on Paris from the North, the U.S. and the U.S. and the U.S. states.
And we're on with the constructive business of the U.S. and the U.S. We're returning with a firm expectation that productive talks leading to the active structures will follow through all the way with the change.
This plays into the news stories of today.
All available channels, public and private.
All available channels.
All available channels.
All right.
The only other thing I have added is one page.
Same thing.
But we are concerned that the worst course of action will be to get the enemy to all those events in South Vietnam and to return the American business to war.
That is a return to the American business to war.
And then go on and say, you know, I'm sorry to push you to peace.
Fine.
Actually, that sentence can now go.
Fine.
I don't think so.
It's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a,
with the Soviet in their usual way, as you know, would never be publicly voting on this unless they expected the play of hands to be correct.
It's like they did, like they did in Kashkent.
Hell, they said a hell of a lot more years about David Monroe than I did.
And they said that one of the purposes of my trip was the affirmation to be in that situation.
I didn't ever say that.
I certainly think that you should see that it's confirmed privately, though, that the invitation was made for a press conference.
It is.
I know, but can you be sure that that is... Don't let these sons of bitches in the press run it the other way.
They can't.
You don't think so?
They will, but...
Absolutely.
You've got a minute to wait, not a lot of minutes.
Oh, yeah, yeah.
I'll just be a second.
I didn't encourage you.
I'm just doing the last...
As the offensive progresses, the enemy discreminant, undiscriminate, indiscriminate shells of the populated place tend to be in clear violation of the state law.
I want to put it in the truck.
And where we talk about to support this defensive air defense, I mean, by order to attack an enemy or take an order to attack an air defense, could it be said, because it would relate to this crisis, but none will be appalled.
Our role is limited.
to attack some enemy and military forces.
I would not say what we don't do.
We've got this thing going so beautifully now.
There's nothing you can say requires you to govern people.
This is going to be very useful for Hanoi and Moscow.
This nation.
Oh, yeah.
This is tough, huh?
Oh, yeah.
Strangely enough, I mean, not so strangely, but since you've dictated 98% of the sum of defenses, and I would have stated what I told Breslin, not knowing how you reported that, it's the whole concept of the attack on the president.
Did you talk about this?
But you see, that's the reason that can't come out.
I mean, I have a feeling, too, that that is not so much Andrew's idea, but I think it's Ray Price's that's being reflected there.
Ray is so uptight about Andrew's books in good shape.
Well, Andrew's is first class.
I don't want to roll over a guy like that when he's smart.
gets the best ideas, because it may be right.
But you know, we all have to decide.
Who the hell would have decided November 3rd when we did it?
And who the hell would have decided about Illinois High Farm after we knew that I was going there?
It's not only your trip, and yet it was absolutely the right thing.
Do you remember that?
We were up in Canada, we were doing it when that park was up there.
We ordered four, of course.
We had to order it all the time.
I remember we were on the phone in the morning and all that.
And that damn thing came in on the plane.
It came in and raged.
I was raged.
We checked and we came back.
Thank God more.
And for a strange reason, Larry stood up.
Why did Christ did Larry stand up?
Well, I had stood up because at that time I had made a commitment to David.
I just wanted him okay.
so that he couldn't say that he didn't bring an answer.
Without Russia over there, we wouldn't be the same.
I'm not going to say it was an opportunity for us to fight.
Would it be better if we burst the border here?
Page 6 at the top of that page.
I was going to say to take the paragraph down to page 6 and put it in.
Before I say I consequently recorded it out here.
I'm going to put that first and then let's take the next line.
Because we have found a little bit of a... Yeah.
under this way that we really haven't gotten to the point that I really like with siding with the United States, which is what really, you see, the reason there will be, the reason it would have been a little American, they don't give a damn about siding with the South Vietnamese country.
They do say, well, they've got to do siding with America, and then the communists come in and chop you up, that would be a part of it.
Maybe we ought to just knock that out for a minute, and then around the end of the pandemic, people saw it, and then said, well,
who have chosen to side with freedom.
You can't make the case for freedom.
The only trouble is it shouldn't be.
With the idea of a bloodbath that would follow a period, what do you think?
Follow a form.
How's that?
For the non-communist Vietnamese.
For the millions of non-communist Vietnamese.
How's that?
Very, very good.
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who have dared to fight against the communists.
No, no, for the millions of non-communists.
Well, I think one of the hundreds of thousands of those, well, you see, there are going to be a few of them.
But the Mexicans would not be able to stand up to the communists who dare to oppose the communists.
Rather than stand up to the dare against
to come and solve the enemies, the millions to solve the enemies.
We have dared to oppose, oppose the Congress.
I don't mind saying who would rely on how good that debt is, but I'm sorry to interrupt you.
To prevent the imposition of the Communist regime on the people of South Vietnam against their will, we can have a vote.
The veterans would fall for the millions.
Wait a minute.
We've got South Vietnam and East Vietnam.
Let's see.
To prevent the imposition of the Communist regime on the people of South Vietnam against their will, we can have a vote.
We don't need to say 40.
But they never put up for hundreds of thousands.
I think it's better to say for hundreds of thousands.
For the hundreds of thousands of what?
Who have dared to oppose the Constitution?
The Constitution of the Left.
Is that right?
Who have dared to oppose the Constitution of the Left?
But we were there to fight against the Constitution.
I think we were there to oppose the Constitution.
All right, we got that one done.
We made the transition that we had brought to each of you, and I'll let you look at the facts.
Look at what the states are, not just for some of you, but not just for the United States, but across the piece of the world.
As you see in France, it's sort of a little rough before, but we can all do not love it, but we can live it.
I'd love that.
No problem.
Is that Bunker people available?
Yeah.
Can I get it to you in a minute?
Can we call over and have them take it at this count?
I don't want them to take that.
Okay.
Okay.
He promised he was going to get it off the network tonight, which would be very helpful.
Well, does some of your office know where it is?
Yeah.
That's it.
That's it.
Can't do it.
I don't know whether you know where it is.
Fact, I hope, from Bunker and Abrams, that a yellow piece of paper on my bed.
Gotcha.
Now, the other, another thing is a question for, probably, there's a Senate Democratic Congress tomorrow, which will vote two to one against this on Vietnam.
Sure.
That caucus, if Henry were to call Bob Byrd, if we wanted him to turn it off and say it would be an awfully good thing for the three of us, it would be an awfully good thing because of what's going on.
He just held off that caucus meeting for the next week.
I think you should.
They didn't probably.
Byrd would turn it off.
You could say, Senator, in all fairness, I have to tell you that there are very sensitive
but any action for the Democratic Caucus would seriously jeopardize those developments.
And, well, seriously jeopardize those developments which could lead to peace.
You said there's some developments that the President has authorized me to tell you.
I can't tell you what, but there's some very serious, very important developments that are going on right now.
that any action of the Democratic Caucus would surge to jeopardize those developments.
The President doesn't want to have our, you know, our Democratic friends be put on the spot.
Could you tell them that?
The other point, I don't know where you ended up on it, but Clark, Clark said that the Congressman, you know, your response to last night was just overwhelming as you've gone through it today and made the
have made the point strongly that they hope that we really, that you use the material, the approach, the posture that you took last night, again on television tonight, particularly the point of the presidency, and to push very hard, and this goes against your speech practice advice, push very hard that that was just extremely effective,
The other point that they made, however, was, and he said four or five of them in different colorations, and they were very strong, he said, please put them not to use the word humiliating.
In fact, because it's negative.
He apparently used it last night.
And they said the whole pitch he made is so positive, but the positive position, to say we won't be humiliated, puts us in a...
totally negative posse that paints exactly the opposite picture from what the rest of it paints.
And the only, the final point is where we end up and whether we give out a text or not.
The answer will help according to the ratings.
Why?
Do they want the text to haggle around with?
Well, they argue that... Who wants it?
Ziegler, Scali, Colson.
Not for them.
Not to give them a text.
To give to the press at 9 o'clock.
Well, he's going to.
We are going to give him a full text in the brief.
The press is going to get it, but I'm not going to distribute it to the Congress.
Oh, yeah.
Absolutely.
The staff will just take the substantive points and give them.
Let me just finish this for one minute.
Wait a minute.
Wait a minute.
You get this thing here.
Just bring it over to him.
That's it.
.
.
.
It's actually as good on the presidency as I did it last night, but I can't be quite as hard.
I can be as candid.
I'm on the word chameleon, which we've got on the left, on the top of the page.
And until I say it, I'll stick it out.
Actually, I'd like to... Let's stick it out.
Well, I don't know.
You never tell me to tell whether you're staying on the word chameleon or somebody else's.
The reason I do not distribute conference speeches to 18 people is because they all want to write without an answer.
Why don't we take it out and complete it?
We need two words, and we don't have one.
Why can't we say...
If Lee and Vietnam defeated?
Oh, my...
If the United States...
If the United States do, and if Lee is not over with the conference, then that is...
This is the real issue.
I'm afraid we've been bothered, isn't it?
Thanks.
I've been called to make this, Mr. Berg.
I don't know what you mean.
Why don't you call in from right here, and we can finish this copy right now.
I'd rather that Senator Berg of West Virginia just say that.
Could you get me Senator Byrd from West Virginia, please?
The United States betrays those who have relied on them in Vietnam.
The ground is the United States.
That's the real issue.
The United States betrays.
Hello.
Hello, Senator.
How are you?
What a pleasure to see you again, sir.
Who are you now?
Senator, I'm calling you because I've just been told that there's a democratic caucus tomorrow in which a resolution may be considered about the war in Vietnam.
Well, I was going to say this to you on a personal basis.
If you watch the news tickets today, for example, the fact that Li Dazhou is coming back to Paris,
and that in Moscow highly qualified diplomatic sources have said that they have played a role in the resumption of the talks and so forth.
I just wanted to say that we are now engaged in an extraordinary and sensitive diplomatic phase, and therefore poor public expressions at this moment of suggestive unity may really undermine what we're engaged in.
I don't know whether it is possible for you to delay this caucus for a week.
The later it happens, the better it is for us.
And I may say quite honestly, the better it will be for you, because you may be saying things in a moment which is...
could be embarrassing to those who make, uh, who make these resolutions and really might be difficult in some of the others of which we're not engaged.
There's nothing I can tell you about.
Worry about you.
Right, well, that's a tremendous help.
And let me discuss with the president, or see what I can come up with, or whether we can tell you something that will justify it further.
No, no, I mean, maybe ask Bulldryer or somebody.
I understand your problem, and I understand your feeling.
Well, I understand this, and I just want you to understand what the situation is, and we're not doing this for policy, because we're strictly policy.
We might just as well see the Democrats get out of this mess.
You can be absolutely sure that it will not be it.
You have my word that this conversation will not be repeated.
And I appreciate the fact that we could do both.
Thank you.
He said he's totally behind us on the series.
He's been down in confidentiality for a very demanding conference for two weeks.
Now both of us have been asked in writing and all the rules that we...
Why don't you just tell the program that you're coming to me?
Take some of it and you're coming to me.
I'm saying the president has authorized me, but the senator, he knows that you'll give us one week.
Got it.
Got it, great.
And then we'll report to you in a week, but you know that you're going to be in peace.
We can't tell this to any other person.
We haven't told it to our own people.
We're telling you now.
And you say that if this goes forward, it will delay this.
How does that sound to you?
Good.
Oh.
You want to get him down here to talk?
I'll go up to this one.
Good for you.
I'll do that.
Huh?
I'll do that.
Right.
Well, wait a minute.
I didn't talk with him until tomorrow.
It was next Wednesday.
It's after my driver's meeting.
Oh, no, no, no.
It's all over the set of smarts.
No, it's good.
Just tell me it's next Wednesday.
It's not good.
It's good.
It's a shame to say I can't believe it.
You're sure it's next Wednesday?
There's a week from today.
It doesn't make much difference.
Well, anyway, I think we should roll with the driver's meeting.
I mean, it's a little cold.
Yeah, probably.
Let's see what happens at the end of the meeting.
Yeah.
Well, it's not tomorrow.
Didn't Holland tell us it was tomorrow?
Would you mind just telling Holland that you're gone?
Maybe so that they'll know it.
Or maybe they don't know.
The United States betrays.
Yeah, but they did the United States.
The United States betrays.
Those who have to rely on the U.S. to survive.
Hard case to make.
States.
That's exactly the issue.
The issue is whether we get it.
The United States betrays.
But isn't it really cast our lot with us?
Those who have relied on us.
And it's our war to cast our lot with us.
But it really is, though.
Those who rely on us.
We pray those who rely on us.
The trade is 17 million people who are relying on us.
Isn't that better?
17 million.
That puts it in personal terms.
17 million people who are relying on us and we are not.
That doesn't answer the term.
That fits in because we're as good as a non-person.
We would amount to a renunciation of our morality.
The millions?
The millions of people.
Three people at a time.
They're not.
There are millions of people who rely on this period now.
That's fair enough.
That puts you in a position.
I think this is correct.
Now, you've got all the changes.
You've got all the changes.
You've got the ones you want.
Now, if you can go back on your copy, we'll be sure now that you pick up the ones I have here.
Page three.
Shortly after the invasion, across the DMZ in the north, another three North Vietnamese divisions invaded South Vietnam further south, rather than cross over.
As a defense for the enemy and its criminal shell civilian population, in clear violation of the 1968 understanding.
It's a clear violation of the 1968 bombing halt understanding.
You think that's right?
Yeah.
The bombing halt understanding.
You got that one?
Yeah.
All right.
Now, on page five, strike, second paragraph, as was announced last night.
Strike also, and need be a condelegate stand.
Strike the word there.
Yeah.
And it's a credit to the Senate.
The Senate of the United States is ready to negotiate peace with the United States.
And on the top of page six, you've got it because we have found over the last four years that they continue to fight.
Yeah, that's out.
And also on the top of page seven, you have a bullet that was bombed.
Hundreds of thousands who have been there.
They were close to the country.
They were bombed.
There were hundreds of them who were there to fight.
hundreds of days.
Right, that's good.
Why don't we say for hundreds of thousands, yeah, hundreds of thousands of days.
I think we've got it in, in those two sentences that you wanted to add and didn't add.
Those two sentences, I've got to read them to you.
One is a sentence and the other is a clause.
Yeah.
Yeah.
And we turn all of, we turn all of our, all of America into war.
Well.
That's good.
You always, I thank God you thought to put that in.
You have to make, you've got to make a few of those.
I was, I was thinking of the, of the wire, meeting the wire.
You, you knock off the thank you and goodnight as I thought.
Rose puts that in in my copy, but I never put that in the speech.
Not in the press copy, in other words.
Okay, you've got the whole thing then, right?
I will then give it to Rose and she will also get a present from me.
Let's see if we can get it forward.
Oh, yeah, fine.
Well, he's sending 100% over in these directions.
And this is one where you might pump it up.
And the press pump can be made also.
Okay, fine.
Yeah.
We're going to see if there's anything else that you have in mind.
I'm thinking on the thing tonight.
I'm thinking on the thing tonight.
I'm thinking on the thing tonight.
I'm thinking on the thing tonight.
What I will do, perhaps, if you agree with what the President is saying, is speak for himself.
Let me do a brief assessment of the situation as we see it.
Just for five minutes.
Because that has to work.
You do that with both the President and the PD.
What time is the meeting going to be?
Right.
This is the situation.
You know.
how dedicated we have always been to the process of negotiations.
Indeed, some of you used to make fun of our devotion to the process of negotiations.
You can be sure we would not have started it again just for an exercise.
Uh, and, you know, there's always some half-organic... Hello?
Yeah?
Now, I talked to Brewer, and he says the caucus is next Wednesday, not tomorrow.
That's what he said.
I'm starting to find out.
I mean, you can check it, but just don't check that.
Will was very boozy about that big call, just talking to us.
But he said it wasn't expressed.
He said the way he changed it is to make it put the requested writing in that the only routine today is to put it from expressed.
That's what he said.
It is changed now.
No, no, it had been changed before I talked to him.
Yes.
If you want to confirm it.
But we can rely on Ken Ken, will you?
Fine, I'll talk to him, John.
Fine, I'll talk to him.
If we plan to have it this week, I don't know.
Yeah.
Good.
That's it.
Huh?
He said we can rely on him.
Yeah, you're confident he told you it was not tomorrow?
I thought he didn't just tell you he was trying to chip it.
No, no, he said he could have.
Well, he did, and he's kind of clear.
Well, he could have made his statement after he put it down on the agenda, but I don't know.
Wait till Monday.
Watch your cards out there.
That's what I said.
And then I would call them in and say, I'd love to see you.
And I'd do it in a very, very secret way.
You know, I'd throw up the men on a hell of a secret deal and say, I'm on my way to Paris.
And they'd be like, you can delay this.
We're not getting through the week.
And frankly, if it fails, you can still take it on.
You don't have to ask me to do something.
You want me to.
Then he goes ahead anyway.
Then we'll, and then we've got him on a hell of a spot.
And then, and I would recommend, I'd just say that, let me tell you, if he does, after we've told, go right, we'll have him in one hell of a spot.
You realize?
Yeah.
We will pour our clothes on him, which is like the environment had poured on him.
Berg, at that point, you mentioned it to him, didn't you?
He's very clever.
What did he say?
That I'm not, that I'm not, that I'm not, that I'm not, that I'm not, that I'm not,
Well, since I said it.
It was really better last night, but I can't say it's that strong.
It's one thing to say it to a group of Congressmen, it's another to say it to the nation.
And many speeches, this, from the diplomatic point of view, this is the ideal speech.
I've talked about it.
It's strong.
It repeats to the rest exactly what I've spoken in more simple language.
I think we have been considering it.
We have no cause at all.
We have played this thing a good bit.
It's called My Lollipop.