Conversation 335-003

TapeTape 335StartMonday, May 1, 1972 at 2:40 PMEndMonday, May 1, 1972 at 2:55 PMTape start time00:07:42Tape end time00:27:21ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On May 1, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:40 pm to 2:55 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 335-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 335-3

Date: May 1, 1972
Time: 2:40-2:55 pm.
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Greetings

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]

                                  (rev. Nov-01)

     -White House news summary report
          -Alleged differences between Kissinger and the President
               -Kissinger’s view
          -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman

Vietnam
     -Cease-fire
          -Kissinger’s talks in Moscow
                 -State department reports
                 -News stories
                       -Murrey Marder
                       -Inaccuracies
          -Kissinger’s briefing
          -Story
                 -News summary
                 -Source
          -US offers
          -News reports
                 -George Herman
                 -Marder
                 -Henley W. Donovan
                 -Content
                       -Kissinger’s offers
                             -Kissinger’s view
                 -Accuracy
                 -Kissinger’s briefing
                 -Source
                       -State department
                             -William H. Sullivan
                       -A paper
                             -William P. Rogers
          -President’s talk with Rogers
                 -The President’s view
     -Bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi
          -Kissinger’s talk with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
          -Time
          -Number of bombers
          -Response
          -Effectiveness
          -Timing
                 -News stories
          -Impact

                                  (rev. Nov-01)

                -Moorer
                -Thursday’s meeting
                -US public response
                -Soviet Union response
                -US public response
                      -Need for support
                      -Doves
                      -Hawks
                      -General public
                           -Support
                                 -Reasons
     -Negotiations
          -Public reaction
          -A memorandum
          -Kissinger’s talk with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -Conditions
                -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                -North Vietnam government
                -Meaning
     -News stories
          -State Department
                -Marder
                -Rogers
                -Haldeman
                -Purposes
                      -Kissinger’s view
                -Forthcoming proposal
                -New York Times story
                -Rogers talk with the President
                -Acceptability
     -North Vietnam invasion

SALT
    -Gerard C. Smith
         -Negotiating position
    -Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Central
         Intelligence Agency [CIA] director
         -Position on SALT
         -Briefing
               -Melvin R. Laird
               -[David] Kenneth Rush
    -Smith

                                    (rev. Nov-01)

          -Negotiating position in Helsinki
     -Possible news stories
          -Time
          -Content
          -President’s actions
     -Acceptance
          -News stories
                -Purposes
     -Negotiators
          -Meeting with the president
          -Kissinger’s briefing

Vietnam
     -Cease-fire
           -News stories
                 -President’s position
                 -Kissinger’s position
                 -Significance
                 -Hugh S. Sidey
                       -Recent article
                 -Jerrold L. Schecter
                       -Kissinger’s interview
                             -President’s suggestion
                       -Work with Sidey
     -Kissinger’s work
           -Consistency with President's policies
     -President’s position

SALT
    -President’s public position
          -Wording
    -Status of talks
          -President’s statement
                -Wording
                -Soviet negotiators
    -Merits
          -Smith’s proposal
                -Kissinger’s view
    -Substance
          -Soviet submarines
                -Numbers
                -Limits

                                         (rev. Nov-01)

                 -US position
           -Weapons
                 -Numbers
                 -US compared with the Soviet Union
           -Presentation of agreement
                 -Wording
                      -Submarines
                      -Missiles
           -Trades
           -President’s statement
                 -Kissinger’s summary
                      -Presentation to Smith

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 2:40 pm.

     An object

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:55 pm.

     SALT
         -Reduction

The President and Kissinger left at 2:55 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, all I can say is, anybody who thinks they don't read my briefings, they have been coming out for the last four days, and we keep screaming about briefings, and they must be on a budget speech.
The state has been pumping out stories about what allegedly I offered in Moscow.
What allegedly I offered in the secret door.
It's been all gearing into a ceasefire.
And they've been gearing into my head.
We've been screaming at them every day.
I...
These stories don't come from me.
There's been somebody at State who's been very bothered, pushing cease-fire, pushing, and hanging it allegedly on things that happened in Moscow, who thinks that allegedly.
And when you're briefing, there was no problem on cease-fire.
I have been, every day, we heard about the briefing.
I mean, we're pretty... Is that what you meant?
Is that what you meant?
I'm sorry.
Me?
I haven't seen it.
You might have seen it.
I haven't seen it.
No, I haven't seen it.
What is their line?
What are they trying to say?
We're offering the seats.
Why are they not offering it?
It does everything.
What is they be putting up?
Stuart Sherman, Murray Marner, Keithley, Dunman, none of whom I've ever talked to, had stories this weekend saying that I offered more conservatory business than you did.
Total nonsense.
If there's one thing I have never done here is to be here and watch them while they're- Do you mean that's how, in the briefing?
Or in Moscow?
No, well, in the briefing.
Allegedly.
Oh, sure.
But they don't say that.
But most of this comes from state, which has been putting on, there has been, every day there has been some ceasefire story in some newspapers.
And I made the mistake of letting Bill Sullivan work on a ceasefire in May.
But he was okay.
He wasn't bad.
Remember, I told him I was very comfortable with him on the ceasefire when I talked to the control.
And I said that they had to go back to the other line and all that sort of stuff.
I talked to Mortar about giving Hanoi a high fire on top today and tomorrow.
He can't do it.
But he can do it with 40 planes tonight and with maybe
and we'll take as much.
If they don't worry about it, we can take, we don't take any heat for anything.
Well, we can do it today, like tomorrow night or tonight, like today.
But I think it will not be as effective as this weekend.
We can hear the last little bit of power.
I heard so.
You know, you didn't want there to be for a... You know, you didn't want there to be for a...
My instinct, from the point of view of what is going to make the biggest blow to America and the people we're trying to lead,
If you're talking directly about the American public reaction, don't think so.
I'm thinking of the Soviet reaction.
The American public reaction, we need it now.
My judgment on the American public reaction is that it needs to be done.
And then all of a sudden, it's, that has nothing, that may be with a few intellectuals, but in terms of supporting the strikes in the North, they are supportive, not because we have been negotiating and offering peace, but because of the invasion of the North Vietnam.
That's where we stand.
We've made that point, and we've gone through that and took a claim
I told you that in that memorandum, the support for doing anything in the North is received every day.
I told the president today that there's one more of them.
None of this means a goddamn thing.
It's about, don't be concerned about destroying the market and all that.
I haven't even seen the story.
I have no existence here.
I haven't even seen the Federalist who, as a matter of fact, I don't, I think, you know, Bob Holt and so on.
Do you think that, do you think that, what do you mean the state, what the hell is the state putting out that story?
If they want us to seek peace fire, you know?
Or are they trying to embarrass you with horrible things?
They're trying to show that there is some hope for a negotiated settlement.
And now, rather than tackle me as the villain, they're trying to make me the good guy.
Well, I told you Roger traced that with me, and remember, and I called you, and I had taken a strong eye on it.
The May 31st proposal was acceptable then, but it's not acceptable now.
That's all there is to that.
God damn it, they're starting an offensive.
Let me get you a word about the state of the play.
All right.
Nobody's claiming that this is new, but what they are claiming is that Smith is acting.
Is it he saving the country from giving away the country?
Against the White House giving away the country, and the other particular position of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, deputy secretary of the staff, director of the central intelligence station, we all support it.
Will they say so today?
Trump?
Now, that isn't so... Well, I didn't want a position of some sort.
The basic strategy of Smith, and this meeting today is going to be, so is throughout the issue, that he had the free hand in Helsinki.
Now, my view was that he was stepping out of his way.
I guarantee you, if you don't step out by Monday, today, and by Thursday, we'll be speaking to you.
These stories are a double-sing of the great breakthrough on SLV and NAV.
Now, as soon as that plenary session is over, that's what's going to happen.
Now, if you have content with my language, I think it's ridiculous.
You mean it?
I think the only issue we can raise, whether or not the
All right.
All right.
Then I think I can explain that you're going out and saying, it's the only time I'm concerned about your, what this is, but just the story of the, your offering, ceasefire, and so forth.
I'm not concerned as far as the...
What the hell is after?
I mean, it's trying to make me look bad today.
That's trying to do anything, isn't it?
Mr. President, never have I deviated.
What I mean is, I'm just trying to get at what they're getting at.
I just heard our negotiating position.
That's the other one.
Well, it's important to me.
I don't even give a thought.
I don't even give a thought.
I know you're against the goddamn ceasefire.
I know that what's going to happen here is that we're going to probably take one.
For example, Yu Tsai has a very favorite line about my mission this week.
I haven't seen Yu Tsai.
I haven't talked to him.
I talked to Jerry Schechter, as you asked me to.
But apparently, Schechter and he and the other worked together.
And God damn it, any smart person knows that you're not going to, that you couldn't be doing anything unless I were up for it.
And it's just as well that I feel a little comfortable.
on the salt and the only problem i'm concerned about is uh i'm worried if i could say that we are on the threshold of an agreement i just say i would i would prefer to say that i would say on the basis of these exchanges and i'm not going to mention it
breakthrough.
I want to use the word, I've made a breakthrough.
that I am sure the Soviet negotiators received, which can produce a agreement, which I believe can produce an agreement in the near future.
The breakthrough is better than the threshold.
Is that right?
No.
No.
I mean, I'm talking about the merits.
What about the merits of a Smith proposal that's going to look terrible if we agree to give them 62 and we get four of them?
Well, I bet that this is what I want to do.
Mr. Smith, he's a son of a bitch.
He's so dishonest.
We are not going to build a submarine until 1979.
Therefore, we are not giving up anything.
They can build nine submarines a year.
If they build nine submarines a year between now and 1978, they will be up to 86 submarines.
Therefore, by disagreement, they are limiting themselves to well below their capacity.
In return for which we give them nothing.
How do we get, how do we get the numbers?
I'm thinking of the public, not the public relations today, but the public relations later.
How do we get the numbers?
But if you don't have a summary, then the gap is going to increase with every passing year.
How do we present this?
Other than a, other than a, the United States has agreed to inferiority in assaulting Moscow.
How do we present this?
But we can present that there are ways of writing the agreement so that it doesn't appear as if the numbers don't, you could say, each side is committed to do the part.
the number of submarines it has as of this coming up day, plus trading a certain number of missiles in the submarine.
In other words, that'll be definitely including one of those.
See, for example, now our resident, our division proposition is that the Soviets trade 205
I think I've got the message on this, and I'll handle it right.
And I think what we've said is that at the end of the .
Yeah.
I will summarize it.
I will say, if you have approved this, I'm sure, I'm sure I will sum it up for you.
Yeah.
And then we'll give it, right?
Then you give it to me.
Just one moment, please, sir.
Yeah.
Do you have that draft of the eulogy?