Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 335 › Conversation 335-003

Nixon, Kissinger & Sanchez on Vietnam War and SALT

Monday, May 1, 1972 · 2:40 PM–2:55 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Sanchez, ManoloConversation335-003 on Tape 335 (tape position 00:07:42–00:27:21)StartMonday, May 1, 1972 at 2:40 PMEndMonday, May 1, 1972 at 2:55 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 335-003 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss managing public and media perceptions regarding ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations and the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Nixon expressed frustration with leaks originating from the State Department, which he believed were inaccurately portraying the administration's stance on cease-fire offers. Kissinger briefed the President on the necessity of controlling the narrative surrounding SALT negotiations to avoid appearing to accept strategic inferiority, specifically regarding submarine limitations. The two agreed on a strategy to maintain a unified public position while downplaying recent press speculation about breakthrough agreements.

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This conversation has not yet been cut into its own clip, so the player above contains the full tape segment shared with neighbouring conversations. It begins about 00:07:42 into the tape and ends around 00:27:21.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
8:18Well, all I can say is, anybody who thinks they don't read my briefings, they have been coming out for the last four days, and we keep screaming about briefings, and they must be on a budget speech.
8:22The state has been pumping out stories about what allegedly I offered in Moscow.
8:27What allegedly I offered in the secret door.
8:31It's been all gearing into a ceasefire.
8:36And they've been gearing into my head.
8:38We've been screaming at them every day.
8:40I...
8:41These stories don't come from me.
8:44There's been somebody at State who's been very bothered, pushing cease-fire, pushing, and hanging it allegedly on things that happened in Moscow, who thinks that allegedly.
8:53And when you're briefing, there was no problem on cease-fire.
8:56I have been, every day, we heard about the briefing.
9:00I mean, we're pretty... Is that what you meant?
9:04Is that what you meant?
9:05I'm sorry.
9:12Me?
9:12I haven't seen it.
9:13You might have seen it.
9:14I haven't seen it.
9:15No, I haven't seen it.
9:16What is their line?
9:17What are they trying to say?
9:18We're offering the seats.
9:19Why are they not offering it?
9:21It does everything.
9:22What is they be putting up?
9:23Stuart Sherman, Murray Marner, Keithley, Dunman, none of whom I've ever talked to, had stories this weekend saying that I offered more conservatory business than you did.
9:38Total nonsense.
9:43If there's one thing I have never done here is to be here and watch them while they're- Do you mean that's how, in the briefing?
9:49Or in Moscow?
9:50No, well, in the briefing.
9:53Allegedly.
9:54Oh, sure.
9:56But they don't say that.
9:58But most of this comes from state, which has been putting on, there has been, every day there has been some ceasefire story in some newspapers.
10:07And I made the mistake of letting Bill Sullivan work on a ceasefire in May.
10:12But he was okay.
10:15He wasn't bad.
10:18Remember, I told him I was very comfortable with him on the ceasefire when I talked to the control.
10:24And I said that they had to go back to the other line and all that sort of stuff.
10:30I talked to Mortar about giving Hanoi a high fire on top today and tomorrow.
10:34He can't do it.
10:35But he can do it with 40 planes tonight and with maybe
10:44and we'll take as much.
10:45If they don't worry about it, we can take, we don't take any heat for anything.
10:51Well, we can do it today, like tomorrow night or tonight, like today.
10:58But I think it will not be as effective as this weekend.
11:03We can hear the last little bit of power.
11:08I heard so.
11:10You know, you didn't want there to be for a... You know, you didn't want there to be for a...
11:37My instinct, from the point of view of what is going to make the biggest blow to America and the people we're trying to lead,
12:11If you're talking directly about the American public reaction, don't think so.
12:19I'm thinking of the Soviet reaction.
12:22The American public reaction, we need it now.
12:30My judgment on the American public reaction is that it needs to be done.
12:40And then all of a sudden, it's, that has nothing, that may be with a few intellectuals, but in terms of supporting the strikes in the North, they are supportive, not because we have been negotiating and offering peace, but because of the invasion of the North Vietnam.
13:00That's where we stand.
13:03We've made that point, and we've gone through that and took a claim
13:10I told you that in that memorandum, the support for doing anything in the North is received every day.
13:28I told the president today that there's one more of them.
13:47None of this means a goddamn thing.
13:54It's about, don't be concerned about destroying the market and all that.
14:13I haven't even seen the story.
14:14I have no existence here.
14:16I haven't even seen the Federalist who, as a matter of fact, I don't, I think, you know, Bob Holt and so on.
14:23Do you think that, do you think that, what do you mean the state, what the hell is the state putting out that story?
14:34If they want us to seek peace fire, you know?
14:37Or are they trying to embarrass you with horrible things?
14:40They're trying to show that there is some hope for a negotiated settlement.
14:48And now, rather than tackle me as the villain, they're trying to make me the good guy.
15:06Well, I told you Roger traced that with me, and remember, and I called you, and I had taken a strong eye on it.
15:11The May 31st proposal was acceptable then, but it's not acceptable now.
15:14That's all there is to that.
15:16God damn it, they're starting an offensive.
15:19Let me get you a word about the state of the play.
15:20All right.
15:21Nobody's claiming that this is new, but what they are claiming is that Smith is acting.
15:32Is it he saving the country from giving away the country?
15:36Against the White House giving away the country, and the other particular position of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, deputy secretary of the staff, director of the central intelligence station, we all support it.
15:53Will they say so today?
15:55Trump?
16:08Now, that isn't so... Well, I didn't want a position of some sort.
16:12The basic strategy of Smith, and this meeting today is going to be, so is throughout the issue, that he had the free hand in Helsinki.
16:24Now, my view was that he was stepping out of his way.
16:28I guarantee you, if you don't step out by Monday, today, and by Thursday, we'll be speaking to you.
16:33These stories are a double-sing of the great breakthrough on SLV and NAV.
16:38Now, as soon as that plenary session is over, that's what's going to happen.
16:42Now, if you have content with my language, I think it's ridiculous.
16:47You mean it?
16:48I think the only issue we can raise, whether or not the
16:59All right.
17:01All right.
17:31Then I think I can explain that you're going out and saying, it's the only time I'm concerned about your, what this is, but just the story of the, your offering, ceasefire, and so forth.
17:48I'm not concerned as far as the...
17:55What the hell is after?
17:57I mean, it's trying to make me look bad today.
18:03That's trying to do anything, isn't it?
18:06Mr. President, never have I deviated.
18:10What I mean is, I'm just trying to get at what they're getting at.
18:13I just heard our negotiating position.
18:17That's the other one.
18:19Well, it's important to me.
18:20I don't even give a thought.
18:21I don't even give a thought.
18:21I know you're against the goddamn ceasefire.
18:27I know that what's going to happen here is that we're going to probably take one.
18:31For example, Yu Tsai has a very favorite line about my mission this week.
18:34I haven't seen Yu Tsai.
18:37I haven't talked to him.
18:40I talked to Jerry Schechter, as you asked me to.
18:44But apparently, Schechter and he and the other worked together.
19:06And God damn it, any smart person knows that you're not going to, that you couldn't be doing anything unless I were up for it.
19:14And it's just as well that I feel a little comfortable.
19:24on the salt and the only problem i'm concerned about is uh i'm worried if i could say that we are on the threshold of an agreement i just say i would i would prefer to say that i would say on the basis of these exchanges and i'm not going to mention it
19:51breakthrough.
19:52I want to use the word, I've made a breakthrough.
19:59that I am sure the Soviet negotiators received, which can produce a agreement, which I believe can produce an agreement in the near future.
20:07The breakthrough is better than the threshold.
20:11Is that right?
20:12No.
20:12No.
20:12I mean, I'm talking about the merits.
20:14What about the merits of a Smith proposal that's going to look terrible if we agree to give them 62 and we get four of them?
20:20Well, I bet that this is what I want to do.
20:22Mr. Smith, he's a son of a bitch.
20:25He's so dishonest.
20:27We are not going to build a submarine until 1979.
20:30Therefore, we are not giving up anything.
20:32They can build nine submarines a year.
20:35If they build nine submarines a year between now and 1978, they will be up to 86 submarines.
20:43Therefore, by disagreement, they are limiting themselves to well below their capacity.
20:51In return for which we give them nothing.
20:54How do we get, how do we get the numbers?
20:56I'm thinking of the public, not the public relations today, but the public relations later.
21:00How do we get the numbers?
21:03But if you don't have a summary, then the gap is going to increase with every passing year.
21:10How do we present this?
21:11Other than a, other than a, the United States has agreed to inferiority in assaulting Moscow.
21:17How do we present this?
21:21But we can present that there are ways of writing the agreement so that it doesn't appear as if the numbers don't, you could say, each side is committed to do the part.
21:34the number of submarines it has as of this coming up day, plus trading a certain number of missiles in the submarine.
21:42In other words, that'll be definitely including one of those.
21:47See, for example, now our resident, our division proposition is that the Soviets trade 205
21:56I think I've got the message on this, and I'll handle it right.
22:08And I think what we've said is that at the end of the .
22:18Yeah.
22:18I will summarize it.
22:19I will say, if you have approved this, I'm sure, I'm sure I will sum it up for you.
22:25Yeah.
22:26And then we'll give it, right?
22:28Then you give it to me.
22:31Just one moment, please, sir.
27:09Yeah.
27:11Do you have that draft of the eulogy?

On May 1, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 2:40 pm to 2:55 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 335-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 335-3

Date: May 1, 1972
Time: 2:40-2:55 pm.
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     Greetings

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]

     -White House news summary report
          -Alleged differences between Kissinger and the President
               -Kissinger’s view
          -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman

Vietnam
     -Cease-fire
          -Kissinger’s talks in Moscow
                 -State department reports
                 -News stories
                       -Murrey Marder
                       -Inaccuracies
          -Kissinger’s briefing
          -Story
                 -News summary
                 -Source
          -US offers
          -News reports
                 -George Herman
                 -Marder
                 -Henley W. Donovan
                 -Content
                       -Kissinger’s offers
                             -Kissinger’s view
                 -Accuracy
                 -Kissinger’s briefing
                 -Source
                       -State department
                             -William H. Sullivan
                       -A paper
                             -William P. Rogers
          -President’s talk with Rogers
                 -The President’s view
     -Bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi
          -Kissinger’s talk with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
          -Time
          -Number of bombers
          -Response
          -Effectiveness
          -Timing
                 -News stories
          -Impact

                -Moorer
                -Thursday’s meeting
                -US public response
                -Soviet Union response
                -US public response
                      -Need for support
                      -Doves
                      -Hawks
                      -General public
                           -Support
                                 -Reasons
     -Negotiations
          -Public reaction
          -A memorandum
          -Kissinger’s talk with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -Conditions
                -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                -North Vietnam government
                -Meaning
     -News stories
          -State Department
                -Marder
                -Rogers
                -Haldeman
                -Purposes
                      -Kissinger’s view
                -Forthcoming proposal
                -New York Times story
                -Rogers talk with the President
                -Acceptability
     -North Vietnam invasion

SALT
    -Gerard C. Smith
         -Negotiating position
    -Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Central
         Intelligence Agency [CIA] director
         -Position on SALT
         -Briefing
               -Melvin R. Laird
               -[David] Kenneth Rush
    -Smith

          -Negotiating position in Helsinki
     -Possible news stories
          -Time
          -Content
          -President’s actions
     -Acceptance
          -News stories
                -Purposes
     -Negotiators
          -Meeting with the president
          -Kissinger’s briefing

Vietnam
     -Cease-fire
           -News stories
                 -President’s position
                 -Kissinger’s position
                 -Significance
                 -Hugh S. Sidey
                       -Recent article
                 -Jerrold L. Schecter
                       -Kissinger’s interview
                             -President’s suggestion
                       -Work with Sidey
     -Kissinger’s work
           -Consistency with President's policies
     -President’s position

SALT
    -President’s public position
          -Wording
    -Status of talks
          -President’s statement
                -Wording
                -Soviet negotiators
    -Merits
          -Smith’s proposal
                -Kissinger’s view
    -Substance
          -Soviet submarines
                -Numbers
                -Limits

                 -US position
           -Weapons
                 -Numbers
                 -US compared with the Soviet Union
           -Presentation of agreement
                 -Wording
                      -Submarines
                      -Missiles
           -Trades
           -President’s statement
                 -Kissinger’s summary
                      -Presentation to Smith

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 2:40 pm.

     An object

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 2:55 pm.

     SALT
         -Reduction

The President and Kissinger left at 2:55 pm.
  • 335-001 2:32 PM · 28 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:32 pm and 2:40 pm.
  • 335-002 2:32 PM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:32 pm and 2:40 pm.
  • 716-001 2:55 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Stephen B. Bull, and Rose Mary Woods met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 2:55 pm and 3:02 pm.
  • 099-010 3:07 PM — President Richard M. Nixon, Gerard C. Smith, William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Richard M. Helms, Gen. Royal B. Allison, Henry A. Kissinger, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Cabinet Room of the White House at an unknown time between 3:07 pm and 11:59 pm.
  • 716-007 3:08 PM · 1 min — United States Secret Service agents met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 3:08 pm and 4:08 pm.
  • 716-002 4:11 PM · 1 hr 22 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, Ronald L. Ziegler, Stephen B. Bull, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 4:11 pm and 5:29 pm.
  • 716-003 5:31 PM · 24 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:31 pm to 5:53 pm.
  • 716-004 5:57 PM · 51 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander P. Butterfield, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:57 pm to 6:47 pm.

Conversation 335-003, May 1, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/335-003 (accessed October 10, 2026).