Conversation 336-037

TapeTape 336StartMonday, May 8, 1972 at 5:23 PMEndMonday, May 8, 1972 at 5:27 PMTape start time02:08:11Tape end time02:11:10ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On May 8, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:23 pm and 5:27 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 336-037 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 336-37

Date: May 8, 1972
Time: Between 5:23 and 5:27 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

[See Conversation No. 24-16]

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

We now have a clear-hearted choice of our three forces of action.
We need to withdraw all of our forces to commence a negotiation or precise a military action to end the war.
I know that many Americans think of the first force of action.
They believe that the way to end the war is for the United States to get out and remove the threat of war, meaning through a present-day withdrawal.
From a political standpoint, this would be a means of choice that we need to send.
I did not send a reply to that.
I did not send a reply to that.
But abandoning our commitment to Vietnam, here in Vietnam, to remain in Germany's 17th League, is not the only thing we will accomplish there in Germany.
It would risk the lives of 60,000 Americans who are still living in Vietnam.
It would mean leaving hundreds of American prisoners in communist camps with no bargaining power to keep them from leaving.
The American League Vietnam will encourage this kind of aggression all over the world.
Aggression from small nations, armed with energy and arms, will be attempted.
The attack will take place as well.
World peace will be a great challenge.
The second course of action is to keep on trying to push itself.
This is the course that we prefer to begin.
We should continue to pursue it.
We have every reason to go on, try every possible path, to pretend it's war, but we're not the same.
The problem is that it leads to a coercion.
And now, in the past four years, we've partly and inherently refused to negotiate, negotiate any, but an imposition by the United States of a communist regime with 17 million people in South Vietnam who do not want to compromise.
It is plain that what appears to be a choice among three forces of action in the United States is really not a choice at all.