Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 338 › Conversation 338-001

Nixon, Haldeman & Connally on Vietnam War and Military blockade

Thursday, May 4, 1972 · 5:25 PM–5:55 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Connally, John B.; Haig, Alexander M., Jr.; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.); Woods, Rose MaryConversation338-001 on Tape 338 (tape position 00:00:24–00:22:56)StartThursday, May 4, 1972 at 5:25 PMEndThursday, May 4, 1972 at 5:55 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 338-001 ↗

President Nixon met with his senior advisors and military officials to coordinate an aggressive military response to the North Vietnamese offensive. The discussion centered on implementing a naval blockade of North Vietnam and intensifying air strikes, with Nixon emphasizing the necessity of a decisive victory to protect American prestige and prevent a communist takeover in Southeast Asia. The President also consulted with his staff on the strategic messaging for a forthcoming public announcement, weighing the psychological impact of a blockade against traditional bombing campaigns.

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· Timestamps are positions within the full tape recording.
0:04It would take a little time.
0:05They should have a rehearsal, in other words, so they know what bull they get into and so on.
0:09But something of that kind, I think, would be...
0:14I think there's got to be something that's, as I said, an offensive measure.
0:19They just can't sit there and let these people amass their artillery and then throw it in in great quantities and then back off and then let them fall down to the next point.
0:34and go through that again.
0:36That's, in essence, what's happened is that the artillery, I don't think there's been a single instance when the North Vietnamese ground forces have overrun the South Vietnamese.
0:45What's happened is that the South Vietnamese have collected any strong points, then these people have disposed their artillery around it, left by about a thousand rounds, and these South Vietnamese take so long, and then they quit and back up again.
0:57So the Vietnamese don't have active artillery in response to that?
1:03Well, sir, I think that they have artillery, but here again, they've lost the large quantities of artillery because they haven't served their guns during the time that they were getting shelled, in many cases.
1:14And I just think that to continue on the defenses of the loser.
1:20Well, let me tell you, the blockade will be a very important one.
1:23Oh, I guess so.
1:33My hat channel will be there at some point.
1:35There will be one or two posts where we're going to go put time and money in there in such a way as to drive the ship in half, give them the rest, and drive the ship in half.
1:45And then we'll go home right on time.
1:47It takes a lot of time.
1:50That's the plan.
1:51Well, if you don't want to talk to me first, with our team in the shell, we should have tips.
1:55Yes, if you want to talk to me, we will.
1:56Right.
1:56I was with the ships that are in the port.
2:01I'm 72 hours in, but I'm so long .
2:05Well, I'll ask the plan.
2:08I just said yes to you.
2:13In terms of the South Vietnamese landing thing, I'm not going to discuss it with you.
2:24Well, I've had the two of them together some.
2:29When you take this to the second one, that's set up.
2:59Maybe 2,000.
2:59I don't know.
3:01I don't know what it is.
3:04I don't know.
3:07I don't know.
3:12I don't know.
3:16I don't know.
3:17I don't know.
3:25Two weeks, two months.
3:26Well, no, sir, no, sir.
3:27I think we can do it in two weeks.
3:28At least we're good.
3:33You know, like what I'm saying is right.
3:34We need it now.
3:35It's a bottleneck for the control to be based on this speed with which they can make the troops available to go through the earth.
3:44Well, let's get that off right away.
3:47Let's wait an hour.
3:49Now, when we're in the process of working up this base,
3:55It's a blockade.
4:05We could do it.
4:06I think it depends on when, which I'll have to wait to get down.
4:09But we could do it within the next three or four days, if you like.
4:12Because that would kind of set the stage for the next thing.
4:15We don't want to have the ships involved up there, although they don't have a few hours away, when we want to be involved with these others.
4:25But I will do that if we want them to be involved.
4:26In that case, I don't know if I want them to be involved with us.
4:37Yes, sir.
4:37I think that would be, in that sense, be helpful.
4:39Well, the information, Mr. President, I would go ahead with it unless you feel that we have to delay it.
4:45But think aggressively.
4:47Yes, sir.
4:48Very aggressively.
4:49Because now the whole thing has changed.
4:53We're not going to lose.
4:57We're going to win.
5:00Yes, sir.
5:01All the time.
5:02All the time.
5:04It's been a week now.
5:07The air, the air, the air, the air.
5:21It's been a week now.
5:22The air, the air, the air.
5:23It's been a week now.
5:26The air, the air, the air.
5:38Well, of course, the further south we get, the more difficult it becomes.
5:55Oh, yes, sir.
5:58I think some of the reports, for instance, have indicated, for instance, that there was heavy traffic on Highway 1 that's coming down from here to the M.C.
6:14Huffman General Boatman, I have to report, he has been working that overnight today.
6:18He says that he has taken severe damage on him.
6:23The convoys, they had them, they had locked them and put them down Highway 1 as it was reported otherwise.
6:32And he said the same thing to Highway 137, which comes through the back of the right pass, and to Highway 1032, which is that new road that comes across the end of the road towards the west end.
6:43And so there's no question about it that they have suffered a stack of losses.
6:49The problem with that, really,
6:52As I say, the fact is that we haven't been able to get the Southeast Indies to stand long enough to generate the right kinds of targets.
7:01That's been one of the problems.
7:04But I assure you that the other side has had various to do with that.
7:09For your information, I'm sending a takeout on Monday, Tuesday.
7:15We're going to go out there for a definite period and see what we can do to follow up.
7:18Good.
7:19It's got to be done.
7:20That's about what we're doing.
7:22We're going to have direct communication.
7:23We're going to go in the night.
7:25We've got to go all out.
7:26We've got to have some chance for military air.
7:30We've got to do a safe design.
7:32More importantly, it's a chance we all have to save this country.
7:35Okay.
7:35Very close.
7:43When we start, first of all, this is a good time of year in the sense that bombing and the weather's going to be good.
8:08And I would recommend that when we commence bombing, I know I bombed.
8:12that we do not do it on a two-day basis, but we keep it up.
8:15The order is that you are to bomb, unmercifully, not 50 times a day, but whatever you have got that you can spare and knock out everything you can.
8:25Don't aim at civilian targets.
8:27But if you're trying to hit a military target, you will not be held responsible if you haven't hit a civilian target.
8:38And it's going to be all out.
8:40No more two-day strikes.
8:42Thank you very much.
8:55Well,
9:12As I always say, that's what they pay you this big salary for.
9:15Look, the fight is not a rough call if you look at the situation and recognize the same fact that the United States cannot lose this war.
9:34If you cannot lose this war, then you determine
9:37With all of our power, how do you win it?
9:38Or at least keep the other side from winning it.
9:41That's what we're really all about.
9:43It's a draw.
9:43We're fighting for it.
9:44Fight it out.
9:44If we can't get a draw with these bastards, the United States is finished.
9:48But at least have the devastating idea now.
9:51the point where they're going to have to look to the restoration of their own soil and their own resources so that they can't move in and just take over South Vietnam.
10:01And Laos.
10:01And Laos.
10:01And Laos.
10:02You know, even if you couldn't tell.
10:03Look at Romania.
10:04Of course I'd tell.
10:06That's what you have to do.
10:07At least you have to give them a few years of homework.
10:10We can do it.
10:11And if you can't do it, you shouldn't do it.
10:15I like that.
10:18Or, uh, I don't want too big a stretch.
10:23I don't want too big a stretch.
10:25But I don't want to do it in a half-assed way here.
10:28I don't want to take away the wham, wham, wham.
10:34Just bomb them.
10:35I don't want to heat them up.
10:38Now we will take, realize, take a hell of a lot of heat.
10:41Particularly on the, uh, well, the blockade that is the bombing.
10:43The bombing.
10:44Today, the person says, stop the bombing.
10:46Stop the bombing.
10:51I think you have to be very cold about it and explain it to the American people and let others do it.
11:02Let others do it.
11:04Let them say it before it's gone on for 10 years.
11:06They know it's the anomalous behavior of the operations.
11:11They're a big sanctuary.
11:12They're basically a land sanctuary.
11:13There's no damage that's been done to them.
11:15There's nothing wrong with the water outage.
11:18There's certainly nothing wrong with the ocean.
11:20And if you have ever reasoned that all those pieces would have gone further than we should have gone, we've got to bring about a ceasefire to at least bring the restoration of the tranquility in that area.
11:34And that's what we did.
11:35So it's an hour of military invasion.
11:40And now the time has come.
11:41And we can't, we can't commit this anymore.
11:47If they persist, and if they give, then they have to pay the price in the paper.
11:52And I think the American people understand that.
11:57I think the world understands that.
12:05I think the problem that we have is that all of us are constantly
12:08And as the time goes on,
12:33and so forth, it gets more and more of a cynical spiel.
12:37That's right.
12:38They've been talking about that for three years.
12:42They've been talking about that for a very long time.
12:44They show a picture in a hotel room.
12:47It keeps getting worse and worse.
12:49They can't, at least our cameras, they can't get it all the way down and take the picture.
12:54Something else he said, maybe at least he forgot he had it five weeks ago or about something he showed him.
13:03but i'm not sure i'm not sure how much good even that does for us because i'm a dead
13:33Very good at writing, man.
13:38Good old days.
13:59The one the other night was not too difficult.
14:07This is chromatic, sapphire, a little bit of a whore.
14:15I'm trying to figure out a thing for the canvas now.
14:24I guess you can't go, you can't write.
14:28Well, you really can't because you don't have the ability.
14:32The other fellow is my teacher to work with in Sapphire.
14:37He's a teacher.
14:40I don't have a lot of knowledge myself.
14:44I'm just going to put it first.
14:45And we hired him, as you see.
14:49In fact, he goes through his training and he wants to speak about the impact on North America.
14:55I don't agree with that.
14:56You don't agree with that?
14:58No.
14:59I don't need to go over and say, I've withdrawn $500,000.
15:04I've done this and that and that.
15:09I'm just going to say, stuff that an individual person can take is going to take.
15:28Everybody knows that.
15:29It's the other one.
15:36What's the advantage, is it an advantage, of blockade versus denial?
15:41Is the psycho-ideal?
15:46I don't think.
15:47The sophisticates here would be a little shocking, but to the folks, a blockade is an overt act of war.
15:55A blockade doesn't kill anybody.
15:59The purpose of a blockade is not to kill, but to prevent killing.
16:02The purpose of it is to prevent lethal weapons from coming into the hands of these murderous outlaws.
16:10Weapons of destruction must be denied to these murderous international outlaws.
16:30Normal people get excited about that.
16:34But then, for one day, a hell of a lot less excited about it than the person getting the bomb.
16:40The bomb has to go to the doctor.
16:43I'm not going to count that.
16:47I'll just...
16:50You've got to say something like that you're going to continue to take all necessary actions.
16:57You're going to continue to strike military targets with our air defense.
17:00This is definitely what you're doing.
17:04You've got to let it happen.
17:10You've got to let it happen.
17:14You've got to let it happen.
17:21I was just debating, and I don't mind, which way you go on.
17:32You could argue in both ways if you want to build it up and make it a big thing.
17:39Well, Bob, you don't need to build it up if you do something like that.
17:52It's supposed to take over.
17:55It is a big logistics .
18:22There's a lot of shapes and a lot of planes.
18:25This is very small.
18:29See that?
18:31It's a narrow channel.
18:59Well, you know, to me, it's okay.
19:19Cancel it, will you?
19:30War materials past this line.
20:03All right, Rose, you tied up tonight?
20:05Yeah.
20:08Why don't we go over and have a dinner with Pat, okay?
20:11You free?
20:12All right.
20:16Yeah, I thought we'd go over early.
20:18Are you going to do a huge tie-up now?
20:28Fine.
20:28I'll take her up.
20:29I can't see her.
20:38All right.
22:34I just carried my reading copy when I went down, went out of the room, and I don't know whether I gave it to somebody to file or not, but would you check with Alex and be sure that it's found, let me know whether you find it or not.
22:47Is it because it should be kept in one of the historical records?
22:54Yeah, my reading copy, I carried it out of the drug test room, headed my hand around and down to the other room.
23:01I think I gave it to him.
23:02I'll just find out how you called that.

On May 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, John B. Connally, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and Rose Mary Woods met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 5:25 pm and 5:55 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 338-001 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 338-1

Date: May 4, 1972
Time: Unknown after 5:25-5:55 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman, John B. Connally, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer. The recording began at an unknown time while the meeting was in
progress.

     Vietnam
          -A rehearsal
          -Possible South Vietnam offensive
                -North Vietnamese artillery
                      -Concentration
                -Ground forces
                -South Vietnam positions
                      -Artillery
                            -Availability
                            -Reasons
          -US blockade
                -Effectiveness
                -Mining
                -Ships
                      -Time
                -Nguyen Van Thieu
                -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                -Confidentiality
                -Blockade
                      -Ports
                -Speed
                      -Timing
                -Ships
                      -Positioning
          -Air strikes
                -Possible delays
                -Intensity
          -Supply convoys
                -Artillery
                -Reports
                      -Highway One
                      -Gen. John W. Vogt
                      -Highway 137

                            -Vankari Pass
                      -Highway 1052
                            -Dimilitarized zone [DMZ]
                -North Vietnam losses
                -South Vietnam counteraction
                -North Vietnam losses
          -Haig mission to South Vietnam
          -Air strikes
                -Dikes
          -Prestige of the US military
                -The President’s view
          -US plans
                -Officers
                -Amphibious landing
                -Bombing
                      -Weather
                -Hanoi and Haiphong bombing
                      -The President’s view
                            -Duration
                            -Intensity
                            -Civilian casualties
                                  -The President’s instructions
                            -Duration
                            -Intensity

Moorer and Haig left at 5:35 pm.

     Vietnam
          -Stakes of US
                -The President’s view
                -Power
                -Connally’s view
                      -Bombing
                -Communist takeover
                      -Cambodia
                      -Laos
          -President's goals
                -Attacks on North Vietnam
                      -Extent
                -Air strikes
                      -Duration
                      -Intensity

                       -Anticipated criticism
                             -President's response
                             -Public support
           -Public stance
                 -Communist sanctuaries
                       -North Vietnam
                       -Laos
                       -Cambodia
           -President's offers
                 -Peace offers
                       -Ceasefire
                       -Concessions
           -President's actions
                 -Consequences for North Vietnamese offensive
                 -Support
           -Lyndon B. Johnson's policies
                 -Deficiencies
           -North Vietnam offensive
                 -President's response
                       -Criticism
                             -Senate
                 -Publicity
                 -South Vietnam civilian casualties
                       -Media coverage
                       -Responsibility

Connally left at 5:40 pm.

     Speechwriters
          -John K. Andrews, Jr.
                -Speech announcing blockade
                      -Compared with the President's previous speech on Vietnam
          -William L. Safire
          -Patrick J. Buchanan
                -Writing ability
          -Safire
                -Compared with Andrews

     Vietnam
          -President's speech announcing blockade
                -Wording
                -Organization

                -Contents
          -Blockade compared bombing
                -Advantages
                      -Public opinion
                      -Psychological impact
                      -Purposes
          -North Vietnam
                -The President’s view
          -Blockade
                -Announcement
          -Air strikes
                -Announcement
                -Melvin R. Laird
          -Blockade
                -Preparation
                      -Number of ships involved
                            -Laird
                -Soviet Summit
                      -Cancellation
                            -Consequences
                -Advantages
                      -Pacifist option

The President talked with Rose Mary Woods at an unknown time between 5:40 and 5:55 pm.

[Conversation No. 338-1A]

     Woods's schedule
         -Dinner with the President and Thelma C. (“Pat”) Nixon

[End of telephone conversation]

          -Camp David
              -Time

Haldeman left at 5:55 pm.
  • 023-153 3:04 PM · 8 sec — Henry A. Kissinger and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:04 pm and 3:44 pm.
  • 023-154 3:04 PM · 31 sec — the White House operator, Henry A. Kissinger, and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:04 pm and 3:44 pm.
  • 023-155 3:04 PM · 2 min — the White House operator, Henry A. Kissinger, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, and John B. Connally talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:04 pm and 3:44 pm.
  • 023-158 3:55 PM · 51 sec — Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, President Richard M. Nixon, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:55 pm and 5:15 pm.
  • 023-159 3:55 PM · 11 sec — Alexander P. Butterfield, Henry A. Kissinger, President Richard M. Nixon, and John B. Connally talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:55 pm and 5:15 pm.
  • 023-160 3:55 PM · 11 sec — Henry A. Kissinger and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:55 pm and 5:15 pm.
  • 023-161 3:55 PM · 7 sec — Henry A. Kissinger and the White House operator talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:55 pm and 5:15 pm.
  • 023-162 3:55 PM · 41 sec — Alexander M. Haig, Jr., White House operator, and Muriel Hartley talked on the telephone at an unknown time between 3:55 pm and 5:25 pm.

Conversation 338-001, May 4, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/338-001 (accessed October 9, 2026).