Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 346 › Conversation 346-014

Nixon, Kissinger & Haig on Vietnam War and Press Conference

Wednesday, June 28, 1972 · 3:15 PM–3:30 PM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 14 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; Acker, Marjorie P.; White House operator; Haig, Alexander M., Jr.; [Unknown person(s)]Conversation346-014 on Tape 346 (tape position 03:17:25–03:31:07)StartWednesday, June 28, 1972 at 3:15 PMEndWednesday, June 28, 1972 at 3:30 PMRecording deviceOld Executive Office BuildingSourceNixon Library record for 346-014 ↗

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to refine strategy and talking points for an upcoming presidential press conference, focusing heavily on the Vietnam War and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). They discussed how to address sensitive inquiries regarding the bombing of dikes, potential cloud seeding operations, the use of mercenaries, and the current status of North Vietnamese troop deployments. Kissinger provided counsel on managing public perception of these issues while emphasizing the administration's defensive stance on military parity and peace negotiations. The discussion served to prepare the President for likely media scrutiny while coordinating ongoing diplomatic efforts.

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Position in tape: 03:17:25 – 03:31:07

part B, 1:16:56

346a.mp3
346b.mp3

On June 28, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Marjorie P. Acker, White House operator, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 3:15 pm to 3:30 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 346-014 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 346-14

Date: June 28, 1972
Time: 3:15-3:30 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     President's forthcoming press conference
          -Anticipated questions and proposed answers
                 -Defense Department budget
                       -Melvin R. Laird
                 -Vietnam negotiations
                       -Briefing book
                       -Location of memorandum

Marjorie P. Acker entered at 3:15 pm.

     Alexander P. Butterfield
          -Meeting

Kissinger talked with the White House operator.

[Conversation No 346-14A]

     Requested for a call to Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Kissinger talked with Haig at an unknown time between 3:15 and 3:30 pm.

     The President’s forthcoming press conferene
          -Vietnam briefing book
               -Questions and responses

[End of telephone conversation]

          -Butterfield

     President's forthcoming press conference
          -Anticipated questions and proposed answers
                 -Vietnam
                       -Bombing of dikes

The President talked with an unknown person.

[Conversation No. 346-14B]
Show the rest of the log (45 more lines)
     Unknown item

[End of telephone conversation]

     President's forthcoming press conference
          -Anticipated questions and proposed answers
                 -Vietnam
                       -Cloud seeding
                             -The President’s possible responses
                             -Laos
                       -Laos
                             -Mercenary commando raids
                                  -Meo tribesmen
                       -Peace negotiations
                             -Withdrawal of US forces
                                  -Laos, Cambodia
                                  -Thailand
                             -Coalition Government
                                  -Nguyen Van Thieu
                 -North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam
                       -Number of troops
                       -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and Department of State
                       -Possible attack on Hue
                 -Leonid I. Brezhnev's statement
                       -Fidel Castro
          -Strategic Arms and Limitation Treaty [SALT]
                 -Relative military strength of US and Soviet Union
                       -Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle [MIRV]
                             -The President’s possible comments

     Washington Post story
         -Time's coverage

     Vietnam peace negotiations
          -Questions at forthcoming press conference
               -SALT
               -Defense budget

     Kissinger's schedule

           -President's schedule
           -Meeting with People’s Republic of China [PRC] officials in New York

Kissinger left at 3:30 pm.

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Yeah, okay, fine.
I've had a few of these things.
I'm a little bit uncertain.
With regard to their budget, the answer is by way of a matter of question.
I don't think it has to be on demand, but I understand the quality of that.
It's lost really well.
I'm taking it in.
It hasn't actually been formally requested yet, so I don't think we've got a question.
The question might be that there has been a $5,000,000 loan to Vietnam.
Right, right, right.
That was some weeks ago.
Okay.
If they do, I think we should...
I can't say.
Well, that works.
That's an objection.
spending at the present level for the balance of the year.
That's what we're here for.
I think that Secretary Kennedy has a good stat.
I think that the FOMO estimate, which is FOA, we have in the next week, will be estimating the FOMO index, which is what it's going to be.
It's going to make sense to support when it's aware.
I'm just going to say that we're good.
That's okay.
We're fine.
We're all good.
We're all good.
I was going to ask you, too, with regard to what you think ought to be said about the...
I don't think it's in the book.
Well, I have put it into a separate...
Wait, not a second.
I don't need it now.
I'd rather it be here now.
But also, it should have come to you.
I took it out of the book because I didn't want it to go through the chain.
Of course not.
But it has been ready for you since yesterday, and it's undoubtedly stuck somewhere.
It would have made me laugh about it now, but I don't know.
It is not in the book, but it was supposed to have come to you.
I'll get it back to you as soon as I...
You don't worry about getting half of everything, sir.
All right.
We've got a letter for you.
Yeah.
A letter for you.
Thank you.
All right.
Let me talk to him, hey?
I've been to the classified questions that we were supposed to send over here.
They were ready yesterday, you know.
What do you mean, is it?
He has, he said, he said he went to the classified questions.
I have some quick ones.
First, on the dikes, you want to, of course, say we have not bombed.
Second, we want to say we will not.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Wow.
Okay, thank you.
Seating in the clouds of no comment.
I'd rather say, I don't like the no comments.
I think it's just like saying yes.
I don't say a damn harm.
Why don't I just say yes, you know?
Goddamn hell, this is racist.
Well, this is going to help to end the war, isn't it?
Well, what's the reason that we use it, Mr. President, to get through this quagmire that's on the road?
It's ours.
That's what we need to do this for.
I understand no comment, Mr. President.
I wouldn't say no comment.
I mean, that's what I'm saying.
I will say that we don't have that policy.
I don't have any information on that.
Fine.
Uh...
U.S. is using mercenaries for commando raids.
It says no comment.
I say that, that means yes.
But what mercenaries would come?
Well, we have okay positions to be addressed.
I cannot imagine that that's true.
If it does, if it does, I'll just say no.
Why the hell are there not mercenaries?
Why don't they work for people?
Huh?
Point that I didn't point.
Well, it's in the book, and I just want to see it.
Another point that you have here, that they have here, it says that regarding negotiation, it says that we'll remove our forces, but as far as other forces in China are concerned, that is not for negotiation with Hanoi.
Some will be withdrawn.
Well, now, we want to admit that we have forces in Laos
in Cambodia.
No, no, no.
The hell are they referring to?
No, Thailand.
What?
Thailand, not Indochina.
No, that's a bad answer.
South East Asia.
South East Asia.
Oh, okay.
I understand.
But I wonder, because Indochina said, and I thought, what the hell, I'm not going to bet we got a report.
Absolutely.
Because our ceasefire proposal, because it all, of course, is for all Americans in Indochina.
Absolutely.
Okay.
Incidentally, we're getting a lot of information about it.
It may be true that they are moving towards keeping Jewel in the government, but they are going to ask for a coalition government between those two.
If that were the case, we'd be over the hump.
I mean, we can't quite accept that either, but at least that would be the biggest hurdle after that.
If they ever get to that point, because then they would say, settle it with Jewel, we've got nothing against it.
I just take a second to just be sure to read it.
You know damn well where it's coming from.
Well, he says... Oh, that they're going to fight till...
I believe 120,000 North Vietnamese bullied when capable of making sustained attacks are in and near South Vietnam.
Yeah, I've heard that.
Now, what in the hell is he putting that up?
Death comes from state and CIA.
I don't know.
Do they believe it?
They have 120,000 people, Mr. President.
I don't think they're going to do it.
Ready to attack Kuwait?
They have to attack Kuwait.
Oh, not to attack Kuwait.
That's what's happening.
It all serves me.
But what is the name of Christ's state CIA?
I think they're going to launch one big attack on Kuwait, which is impossible to do.
It's supposed to have been launched by now.
But if they do that, well, today we launched a big attack.
For the five reasons they go on here.
Freshness was cracked a little bit.
Well, he did that at a welcoming banquet for Castro.
Yeah.
And it's a new picture that is not particularly significant.
She was our master mother.
We expected to support her a lot.
We were willing to expect her to support our own body.
He didn't say we support the seven points and the two points.
Another last point.
On the whole salt thing, you know, who's ahead and all that kind of thing,
That's sort of a quite minor issue we can get into.
I don't think that's the big debate now.
I think we are ahead in warhead.
We are ahead in bombers, and we are ahead in forward bases.
But I don't know that we want to push that down the throats of the other side.
What I would say, Mr. President, is look, you have to look at... You see, the way they're putting it is, now suppose they purge, let's not put them in there.
Well, the argument against that is, there's nothing you could have done to prevent that.
We wouldn't be better off this...
I agree.
Secondly, over the period of decrees on any foreseeable move, you can still stay ahead in warheads because they have even tested their move yet.
I don't want to read a phrase.
Fine, that's fine.
But I would do it and say, I would say, if you can't look at this thing properly, you have to look at the overall situation.
And in the overall situation, the overall situation is advantageous to us.
This is a hell of a list of how it should have been on both issues.
And the goddamn Washington Post managed to put it on the second page and piss on it.
Well, I mean, the time was great, but it ran into this story, which, you know, that wasn't a hell of a moment.
Well, both the goose and the napkin.
Can you imagine?
Can you imagine what it would have been if the napkin would have been turned around?
It would have been a column and so forth.
Those are the outcomes I have here.
I believe on this, I will get the...
I think, Mr. President, the North Vietnamese have asked us to come in tomorrow morning.
Almost certainly it means that you're settling your nine feet.
So you'll be in great shape announcing it tomorrow evening.
You should do it and reply to a question until they can't say you screwed them.
But I think this will sort of set the tone of the news conference because almost certainly, just judging from the questions I get, the early questions will either have to do with the solved defense budget thing, but very early you'll be asked, have you anything to say?
prospects for negotiations.
That's what you're getting to do.
That's a good indication.
And if you do, if it is any, if you try to set up the right framework, do you think we can now reach a certain point and then stay essentially pretty close to what I just said?
Oh, I'm going to take what you said and say that I okayed that.
Incidentally, there is now a chance, which we will know more about, we can't just tell on Thursday,
But there's a fair chance that we may, that I may get out on Saturday afternoon.
If so, you're better off to take the big plane and go with us rather than go Friday.
Okay.
Would you rather go?
I'd rather go Friday.
I would do, I would go Friday.
Get out early with your children Friday morning and get that Friday night on the whole deal.
I'm not going to say that we are, we are, we will definitely not be able to go Friday.
But there's a very good chance, a pretty good chance we can push that.
But if I were you, I'd get you kissing the hell out of me.
Unless you'd prefer to ride the big plane all day.
Well, let me see.
Why wait?
Do either one.
I may go out and get out there with my children.
Well, you don't have many hours.
Well, you get Friday night, too.
I'd go out, and I'd be there for dinner, and you have the whole thing.
So where are you going?
You're going to New York tonight, huh?
I'm going to see the Chinese, just to see how much that exists.
Oh, I see.
So, I think that's a good idea.
I think that's a good idea.
I think that's a good idea.
I'll send it over.
Good.
And I'll just send it over in an opening.
I guess I can say I'm on it, President.
All right, Henry.
  • 346-011 3:09 PM · 19 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:15 pm.
  • 346-012 3:09 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon, unknown person(s), and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:15 pm.
  • 346-013 3:09 PM · 57 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:09 pm and 3:15 pm.
  • 026-048 3:15 PM · 8 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and the White House operator talked on the telephone at 3:15 pm.
  • 346-015 3:30 PM · 1 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:30 pm and 3:34 pm.
  • 346-016 3:30 PM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:30 pm and 3:34 pm.
  • 346-017 3:30 PM · 38 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:30 pm and 3:34 pm.
  • 346-018 3:30 PM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Manolo Sanchez met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 3:30 pm and 3:34 pm.

Conversation 346-014, June 28, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/346-014 (accessed November 14, 2026).