Conversation 349-001

TapeTape 349StartThursday, July 20, 1972 at 12:04 PMEndThursday, July 20, 1972 at 12:20 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Sanchez, Manolo;  [Unknown person(s)]Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On July 20, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Manolo Sanchez, and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 12:04 pm to 12:20 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 349-001 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 349-1

Date: July 20, 1972
Time: 12:04 pm - 12:20 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger. This recording began at an unknown time while the
conversation was in progress.

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 12:04 pm.

     Refreshments

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12:20 pm.

     Kissinger’s schedule
          -Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]

     George S. McGovern
         -Briefing by Henry Kissinger
               -Location
                    -McGovern’s office
                         -Compared to White House
                              -Press corps
                              -Picture

Kissinger talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 12:04 pm and 12:20 pm.

[Conversation No. 349-1A]

     Briefing
          -Fred Dutton
          -Location
                -McGovern’s office
                -White House
                     -Press corps

[End of telephone conversation]

     Briefing
          -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman

     Kissinger's trip

                                    (rev. Mar-02)

The President's previous meeting with Armand Hammer
     -Hammer's recent trip to the Soviet Union
          -Hammer’s previous trip to the Soviet Union

Peter M. Flanigan
     -Relations with Kissinger
     -Desire to put negotiations in writing
           -Memorandum
                 -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
                     -View of Hammer deal
                 -Hammer deal
                     -Value
           -Peter G. Peterson
           -Bureaucracy
                 -Haldeman
                 -Leaks
           -Kissinger's handling of negotiations
                 -Berlin
                 -[David] Kenneth Rush
           -Memorandum to President about Hammer
                 -The President's desire for secrecy
                     -Staff
                 -Kissinger's handling of National Security Council [NSC] files
                     -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                     -Helmut (“Hal”) Sonnenfeldt
                            -Middle East affairs

President's meeting with Hammer
     -Sonnnenfeldt
            -Kissinger

Joseph C. Kraft's call to Kissinger

Vietnam
     -Negotiations
           -Deadline
                 -September 1972
                      -The President’s recent talk with Kissinger
     -Military situation
           -Military Region [MR] 1
                 -Training division
     -Negotiations

                                        (rev. Mar-02)

                 -North Vietnamese possible strategy
                      -McGovern
           -Nguyen Van Thieu
                 -Continuance in office
                      -Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, People's Republic of China [PRC], Soviet
                           Union
           -Government of Vietnam [GVN]
           -Negotiations
                 -Possible deal
                      -Thieu
           -Thieu
                 -1972 election
                 -GVN
           -Negotiations
                 -Possible deal
                      -1972 election
                           -House and Senate
                                 -Defense budget
                 -Leonid I. Brezhnev proposal
                 -July 1971 proposals
           -Thieu
                 -Possible candidacy
           -Pace

      Middle East
          -Anwar el-Sadat
          -State Department

      McGovern
         -Briefings by Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
               -Compared with Barry M. Goldwater in 1964

      Vietnam
           -Negotiations
                -North Vietnamese strategy

      McGovern
         -Briefing
               -Timing

Kissinger left at 12:20 pm.

                                       (rev. Mar-02)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hey, sir.
Bring us two cups, some of these, please.
Hey, Mr. Marnie, how can I help you?
Oh, yes.
I think there is something that you said.
It's a very subtle difference.
I'm free.
I'm free.
I'm free.
He's denying the White House press report.
It's much better to do that.
He comes down here, he's lying out.
There will be a picture of him in the White House.
What did he say, Steve?
He said he can't do that.
He won't say that.
He'll say he doesn't want to come to your office.
That's not going to be hard for me.
I'm happy to come.
Well, just see if you can work it out then.
From a PR standpoint, it's better that you go there.
Because he's expecting me to come.
Now, should we take the initiative in sending him to that place?
No.
But if he insists that we do it there, if he...
He'd just do it here.
Would you, uh, tell, uh, a Dutchman, of course, that he would be, uh,
Small thing.
Oliver felt that was a smart, quick crime.
Well, how'd you get along today?
I suppose it was a very interesting little trip.
Now, you seemed happy today when I first saw you.
Well, nothing really happened to me.
He's never had such a warm reception as he was there 40 years ago with nothing, 30 times.
He was there 40 years ago.
He says the Russians were there for us.
The Russians were there for us.
The same as the Pyroids, punching each other in the face.
So, I'm having a lot of trouble with planning, and he keeps wanting to put everything in charge.
I don't want to put it in charge.
You don't have to do anything.
Well, as a matter of fact, planning, even on this one, you wrote a memorandum, and I first thought it was a good idea.
But that planning, well, this isn't one of the biggest problems.
It's only two and a half million dollars.
It's the tenth biggest.
But the point is, you know, but the point is, Henry, that Pete has just gone, and like you just did, some of the, he had very, very prejudices that he doesn't get the goddamn prejudice.
You ought to stop that.
If he comes to you with a plan, you don't have to settle it.
I can handle Pete.
But...
He feels he wants to put everything in writing in form of instructions to Peter.
I've managed every one of these negotiations without ever putting anything in writing.
So if you put it in writing, Peterson, or somebody who's in the bureaucracy about Peterson, there's nothing to doubt.
That's my worry.
Pete doesn't always ask for a space about dealing with people.
See, my worry is... Have you mentioned it at all?
No, but if we put it in writing, the bureaucracy will take it.
If we put it in writing, they'll take credit for it.
The way we've managed all these deals is that no one ever knew what it was until you announced it.
That's why there's no question.
I think he's just the greatest guy, the greatest man in the world.
I don't think so.
He's got a fetish for wanting to be a memorandum and put a directive on it, direct people to do this, direct people to do that.
I wasn't a part of this prize and so forth.
He wants to do the same thing to me and I'm going to do it in a very political way.
You just can't do it.
You can't separate it.
Nor have I ever given an order that way.
I've conducted all of these negotiations.
I did the ones on Kirtland that were really complex.
was never putting instructions in writing.
Rush and I would go back and forth on some key data.
But only as they arose, we agreed on the strategies.
It's too dangerous to find, to have that many pieces of paper floating around.
I agree.
We don't need to worry about this.
I just wanted to... Because when I read this memorandum about Hanover this morning, that age shouldn't even have been in writing.
But it did make me nervous.
It was to me.
But you would... You know, I don't believe in language.
I don't even know if my son deserves to know that.
You know that?
I already don't.
As much as I trust him.
I don't want to...
I've seen your staff people.
I don't let any paper about the freedom out of my office.
There is no class anywhere.
Even Sonnenfeld, when I'm with Soviet affairs, I don't let him see Middle East things because he's too into it and I don't want to tempt him.
I don't say he's...
He'd be all right.
He'd be all right, but I don't want to run into any trouble.
I'll tell you what I did with Hammer, so they can keep him off your back.
I'm not working with him anymore, but I'll tell you.
He had seen Sonic, you know, in Morocco.
He stopped there.
So I said, I'll do it.
Whenever you've got any problems, you don't have to just call Sonic.
He has my total confidence.
He has Christopher's confidence.
That's a good idea.
That's a very good, good memory.
Memories are a good memory.
It does take time.
You know, it's, but, uh, Joe Kraft called us and he said, he came back to the United States, and he said, he said, he said, he said, he said, he said, he said,
Well, answer that one, you're not lying, right?
I think you, I was doing thinking about it when we talked last night.
What you say with regard to the month of September is quite true.
They have come, they have come to a hard place.
They, yourself, in September, are there facing a hell of a choice in that matter.
And they are starting, they're going to have to take offensive in the next two or three weeks.
And that's fine, because we'll never have more power there.
And they are doing it because they put in even a training division.
Division that never fights, that is only used for training.
And if we stop that,
that they have used up every goddamn division they've got.
So I think the point, point two is they've got to look at their whole car.
The best time for them to settle, unless they want to take the long chance of endeavoring, is now.
And time, as I said, is not on their side.
It's running out.
It's running out.
That's the way we've got to position ourselves.
I have also brought up what you said about the cute things.
And you think that we, basically, we have to question them.
Putting two out is not going to have the effect of frightening the Japanese again.
ties and a hell of a lot of other things.
You understand?
Because the June thing irritates our relations with both the Russians and the Chinese.
They're much bigger games.
That's what it really does to us.
And that's what we mean by June.
By June.
No, no, no.
That's right.
But on the other hand, if the government of Vietnam stays, that's all we need.
You know what I mean?
But as you say, we go pretty far in making the deal.
Pretty far in making the deal.
One thing we could do is, if we could make the deal where he makes the deal, and then he goes after your election, after your election, you have four years to deal with each other again.
And if we can construct it in such a way that the GBS says,
That kind of thing.
I'm not going to do anything.
Well, I don't think it's going to happen.
I mean, let's put it this way.
You could make a deal.
Any kind of a deal.
It looks all right.
Maybe it's a screw-up.
It's worth a selection.
I'm sure of the election, I'm sure of the landslide that we have both the House and Senate, and that we would be able to govern this damn country, and be able to get our defense partners to be able to do all the other things, and we're having a hell of a time right now, and that's very much worth it now.
My present thought and recommendation to you is that next time you serve as a slightly talented Bush,
of what you discussed with them and that goes through two sessions and if they turn that around and let's see what happens with those then we
The fact that the July 5th decision to us, of July 7th to the 1st, saying you've missed your chance then, you wanted us to make good, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event, you wouldn't have done it in the event,
And I'd make that proposal right after the budget was presented.
But you're not sure you have cleared out the queue, are you?
No.
He's already put it in.
But he hasn't corrected it.
Mr. President, we've got to decode one of them.
Let's face it, I mean, we can't have a blowout of two in a month before it's corrected.
Oh, I know, I know, I know.
Let him sign the goddamn deal first.
I'm not telling you this is a secret deal.
He's already told us that we can say he won't drive.
We have to... That's the line.
That's what they want.
in that position, just the way we want it.
Well, I ran a little more slowly.
I could have gotten a little closer yesterday.
You have to leave some for the next meeting.
But I didn't want to run the risk of getting, of seeming to either get it too much turned down.
Also, they want to have their offensive before going.
Let's see what happened with that.
Do you have the direction, I think, to pull the muscle down?
Yeah.
We all agree.
I don't think states have just been saying the right things, but others have.
We've got to say, if you wanted to make it under these terms, that is just that.
We haven't heard from him.
Sorry.
I don't think we should call him, sir.
He's got a...
I just think we should...
I mean, he calls.
He knows you're taking a trip.
And he has offered a briefing.
And he doesn't follow you.
He doesn't.
I mean, I want to see... Goldwater never took the briefing.
He took it before.
He did what?
He couldn't hear you.
And, uh, getting everybody confused before I put that on.
And, uh, just make any kind of statement.
As we make practice.
With these guys, we ask ourselves, what is it that they gain by being so forthcoming in their behavior and in playing?
Up to now, they have said the two coins are largely reasonable and the only possible solution.
This time, they said they are just negotiating coins.
This is already a whole thing.
My view is this.
If they have already made a decision to settle, they could not have done more than the exit.
If they've taken a decision to waste time, they also would have done, well, a little less than yesterday, but about the same.
I mean, it was a difference.
I think so.
I think so.
I think so.
But I think he was going to the governor.
Yeah.
Oh, it was this one.
And incidentally, he decides to come here to be sure that it's tomorrow afternoon rather than tomorrow morning.
But I'll be the hell out of town or Saturday morning if possible.