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Conversation 035-035

TapeTape 35StartThursday, December 28, 1972 at 4:00 PMEndThursday, December 28, 1972 at 4:15 PMParticipantsKissinger, Henry A.;  Nixon, Richard M. (President)Recording deviceWhite House Telephone
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the resumption of Vietnam peace negotiations following North Vietnam's positive response to U.S. overtures. The two agreed on a schedule to announce a bombing halt of North Vietnam and the subsequent restart of technical talks. They also strategized on how to manage the South Vietnamese leadership and domestic U.S. political concerns, ultimately deciding to delay major diplomatic moves, including Vice President Agnew's trip to Saigon, until after the 1973 presidential inauguration to minimize the risk of a public confrontation.

Vietnam WarParis Peace AccordsBombing haltDiplomatic strategy1973 InaugurationSouth VietnamNorth Vietnam
AudioNARA Description

On December 28, 1972, Henry A. Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon talked on the telephone from 4:00 pm to 4:15 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 035-035 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 35-35

Date: December 28, 1972
Time: 4:00 pm - 4:15 pm
                                                -36-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Oct.-07)

                                                               Conversation No. 35-35 (cont’d)

Location: White House Telephone

Henry A. Kissinger talked with the President.

[See Conversation No. 380-39]

       Kissinger’s vacation
             -Weather
                   -Palm Springs
                         -Ted Cummings
                              -Home
                                  -Swimming pool

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Message from North Vietnamese
                 -Message from Col. Richard T. Kennedy
                 -Conditions
                 -Bombing halt
                        -Timing of announcement
                              -December 30, 1972
                        -Notification to North Vietnamese
                              -Announcement
                              -Timing
                                    -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                                    -December 29, 1972
                              -Announcement
                                    -December 30, 1972
                              -Bombing halt
                                    -US proposal
                                          -Thirty-six hours
                 -Kissinger’s view
                        -Effect of bombing
                 -Schedule for signings
                 -Press relations
                        -US bombing of North Vietnam
                              -Duration
                 -Tone
                 -Timing of meetings
                        -Technical meetings, January 2, 1973
            -Announcement
                               -37-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. Oct.-07)

                                                 Conversation No. 35-35 (cont’d)

     -Timing
           -December 30, 1972
     -Length
     -Content
           -Kissinger’s view
                  -Private, technical meetings
                        -Timing
                  -Bombing halt
                        -20th parallel
     -Ronald L. Ziegler
     -Gerald L. Warren
     -Meeting resumption
     -Bombing halt
-US bombing of North Vietnam
     -Kissinger’s view
     -Effect
     -Use of B-52s
     -Effect
           -Negotiations
     -Press coverage
           -Newspapers, news magazines
     -McGeorge Bundy
           -Recent telephone call to Kissinger
                  -Letter to the President
                  -Bundy’s son
     -New York establishment
-The President’s view
-Economic measures
     -Pressure of South Vietnam
-South Vietnam
     -US options
           -Bilateral deal
                  -North Vietnam
                        -The President’s recent conversation with Kennedy
     -Coordination in Negotiations
           -Signing
                  -Timing
                        -1973 Inauguration
           -Trip to Saigon
                  -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
                                  -38-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                           (rev. Oct.-07)

                                                 Conversation No. 35-35 (cont’d)

                       -Purpose
-Signing
      -Nguyen Van Thieu’s refusal
      -Effect on North Vietnam
      -Implementation
            -Understanding with North Vietnam
      -1973 Inauguration
      -Agnew’s trip to Saigon
            -Timing
                   -1973 Inauguration
      -Kissinger’s trip to Saigon
            -Timing
                   -1973 Inauguration
      -Possible trip by the President
            -Timing
                   -January 29 or 30, 1973
      -Announcement
            -1973 Inauguration
      -Agnew’s trip to Saigon
            -Timing
                   -1973 Inauguration
                         -Kissinger’s meeting with Le Duc Tho
                               -Paris
                         -Speech
                         -Compared to October 1972
      -Kissinger’s meetings with Le Duc Tho
            -January 8, 15, 1973
-Conclusion
      -Timing
            -Timing
                   -January 11, 1973
            -Leak
                   -Possible effect on South Vietnam
            -Agnew’s trip to Saigon
                   -Effect
                         -1973 Inauguration
      -Delay
            -1973 Inauguration
                   -Risk
                   -January 11, 1973
                                             -39-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Oct.-07)

                                                         Conversation No. 35-35 (cont’d)

                  -Ellsworth F. Bunker’s view
                  -Thieu
                        -Kennedy’s view
                        -Haig
                        -Acceptance of agreement
                        -Rejection of agreement
                              -Timing
                                    -1973 Inauguration
                  -Agnew’s trip to Saigon
                        -Timing
                              -North Vietnam
                                    -US bombing
                        -Kissinger’s trip to Paris
                        -Thieu
                        -1973 Inauguration
                              -US domestic conditions
                        -Delay
                        -January 11, 1973
                  -Progress
                        -Statements
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Mr. President.
Hi, Henry.
How are you?
How is the weather out there?
The weather is perfect.
Little breezy today, but sitting in the sun.
You in Palm Springs?
Yeah, still in Palm Springs.
Yeah, that's good.
You have a house there?
I have Ted Cummings' house.
Oh.
He has a little house here.
But it's nice, though.
He's got such fine taste.
Exactly.
It's small, but it's very exquisite.
Yeah, yeah.
And it's got a swimming pool.
Right.
It's a good set.
Right.
Uh, Kennedy told me, uh... Yeah, he said he just gave me a brief, uh, and said you'd be calling me.
That's progress.
It was proposed.
No conditions?
No, no, no.
It's all of ours.
Right.
I'll accept it.
Now the question is, how about time now?
How does it, how do we, what, how does that work?
Uh, we'll go Saturday.
the day is thursday yeah is that is that their understanding too just tell them i don't think we should hold around i just want i want to know what the understanding is but their understanding is that we'll notify them whenever we'll do it and we'll do that tomorrow morning tomorrow morning then you will notify them that what uh in effect uh
What I meant is I'm trying to think in terms of when it becomes public, etc.
Public 24 hours later.
Tomorrow morning we'll notify them about the...
Tomorrow morning is Friday, right.
And we've worked that out with Mortar and we'll stop it at 7.
7 when?
7 p.m. tomorrow night.
7 p.m. tomorrow night we stop.
Oh, I see.
Okay.
We announce it at 10 a.m. Saturday.
public announcements at 10 a.m. Saturday.
But that, frankly, Mr. President, we won't even ask them.
We'll just tell them.
Oh, sure.
I just want to... Two hours ahead of time that that's what we're going to do.
I understand.
What do you think?
At any rate, I think...
I see no reason to do it otherwise.
I mean, what are the arguments here?
What are they going to do about it?
Huh?
What are they going to do about it?
Well, I don't know.
I...
Can we exchange another set of messages?
No, no, no, I wouldn't exchange any messages.
I think we'll just tell them.
Because basically they have accepted our proposal, right?
Exactly.
Our proposal was that we would halt on the 31st?
No, our proposal was that we'd halt within 36 hours.
What's the answer?
I see.
So we will be keeping our word.
That's all I want to be sure of, up to a point.
No, no, we'll keep our word.
We'll be within two hours.
We're stopping within 34 hours.
Mm-hmm.
But, you know, we got an answer within 12 hours, which shows how anxious they are.
What significance do you attach to all this?
I think they are practically on their knees.
Mm-hmm.
Also in their answer, they said we will fix the schedule for the final signing at that next meeting.
They always want to talk about schedules, don't they?
Yeah, but this one, been considering what we've done to them.
Yep.
They are willing...
I must say, this should have some effect on our brethren in the press, shouldn't it?
As you know, if they could have taken it another week or two, we would have had unshirted hell in this country.
And it's a very conciliatory reply.
They said they'll come with a very serious attitude, and they hope we will, too.
And it can be rapidly settled.
Technical meetings are starting Tuesday.
OK. Well, that's good.
10 o'clock, then.
public announcement, 10 o'clock Saturday morning.
Right, and I think all we should do is just a very brief one.
Right.
Just saying private meetings will be resumed, technical meetings will be resumed, give the date.
Right.
And then in answer to a question which is sure to come, we should say, yes, while these talks are going on, we are not bombing the
But you're going to tell them?
They already know that, though.
They will have known that tomorrow morning.
They'll have known it for 36 hours when we announce it.
So basically you'd have Ziegler make the announcement, right?
Well, Warren will have to do it.
All right, it doesn't make any difference.
He can do it.
Warren will announce it at... At the resumption of meetings.
And then they'll say, what about the bombing?
But you prepare the answer.
Exactly.
That there will be no bombing until the meetings are concluded or something.
That's it.
While serious negotiations are going on.
Okay.
So this is another spectacular for you.
Well, hell, we don't know whether it's that.
Terrific courage to do it.
Well, at least it
Mr. President, anything else would have been worse in the long run.
And all the guys who are now saying, well, why do we do it with B-52s?
All the people who are saying if you did it with DC-3s, they'd be upset.
The point is that, as we know, we couldn't do it with anything for B-52s because, goddammit, there's nothing else that can fly at this time of year.
Mr. President, within 10 days, you've got these guys
...to the table, which no other method could have done.
Let's just keep right on.
And I think this way it makes the weekend papers, and the indictment is going to die.
Well, it'll make the news magazines, too.
Yeah.
They'll open up for this, don't worry.
Mike Bundy called me last night.
He said he's going to write a letter, a public letter to you.
Protesting?
We have, of course.
I said, why?
He said, because what am I going to tell my son?
I said, I'll tell you what you can tell your son.
Tell them I got us into this war, and now I'm preventing us from getting out and hung up on it.
The Staten, New York establishment hasn't...
They're done.
They're done.
Hasn't ever come...
The main thing now, Henry, is that we have to pull this off.
It's going to be tough pity.
I think now we're going to turn, we've already got a list of economic pressures.
Right.
And we're going to start implementing those next week.
Saigon.
Well, yes, right.
On Saigon, as I see, and I'm talking to Kennedy a little, which he'll fill you in this morning about some of the concerns as to the options that we have to be considering here.
Assuming we go forward with our plan, just talking to the North, my view is we talk and we settle, right?
Exactly.
Now then, at what point do we inform Saigon that we are going to proceed in that way or that we have proceeded in that way?
I think this thing is going to happen just before your inauguration.
I would still send Agnew and Haig out there to give them a safe, saving way off.
Well, I think it will wind up with Saigon at least implementing it, whether they sign it or not.
You've got to have that understood with Hanoi, then, that they aren't going to say, well...
You wouldn't want to have that happening just before the inauguration in Saigon.
That's what I think should happen, Mr. President.
If we send Hano to Saigon before the inauguration, that would get him back by the 16th.
Then I go on the final leg of this exercise right after the inauguration.
It stretches it out a little more, and then you could go on around the 29th or 30th.
In other words, we would have no announcement before the inauguration.
No announcement, but obvious activity.
Well, I don't think then I'd send, I don't think I would send out with the possibility of getting a rebuff before the inauguration.
I'm inclined to think I would have the activity.
You see, the problem we have here, which we've got to think about, the problem we have here is that
If we may as well play the inauguration as best we can, and I think you'd better, you may have to string your talk out to shove him past that point.
I mean, if we aren't going to get it, if we can't get it settled before the inauguration, I don't want him going out there and getting rebuffed before the inauguration.
The risk is worth it.
I don't think he will be rebuffed.
But the point is, if he isn't rebuffed, then we would settle it right then.
I mean, there's nothing to be gained by having him go out there and just show a lot of activity before the inauguration.
The activity, it's enough for you to go over to Paris, frankly.
I'm inclined to think that much up and down is the only activity that would be worth anything more than your going to Paris is basically something that I said, you see.
All right.
Because I won't be able to address the matter of...
It's really... See, a lot of this depends... A lot of this affects the flavor of the inaugural address, you understand.
That's the problem.
And I'm... Well, I'd hate to have this whole thing... That's why I don't want Agnew to blow it before the inauguration.
I don't plan to...
Under these circumstances, I can't say much about it.
I'm going to have to play it very close to the vest.
But if we have an agreement, well, it's dangerous to tie ourselves to a schedule that culminates just before the inauguration.
Because if anything goes wrong with that, we'll be in the same position as we were at the end of October.
Well, then let's push Agnew past the inauguration, too, then.
All right.
We can do that.
That's the best thing, just to...
You mean you'd take a whack on the 8th, then another on the 15th?
Something like that?
Well, I think we should conclude it by the 11th this time.
I just think it's too dangerous.
All right, but you concluded it's going to start getting out.
And then Saigon, I suppose.
You see, my problem, I think once it's concluded, well, we can talk about this later, but you can be thinking about this so that we get a plan.
This thing is concluded.
we agree the damn thing is going to get out and then saigon might blow on the other hand i don't want agnew going out there and and uh basically provoking it uh if so i realize there's a risk he doesn't go but i think there's even at least do not have the confrontation before the inauguration if agnew goes before the inauguration henry you could well have a confrontation and have the whole damn thing seem to be shattered
What we have to do is to work out some sort of a plan whereby you do your deal, and we sort of... Well, we could put it into cold storage for 10 days and just start it on inaugural day.
I'm afraid that's what we better do.
Although it's a high risk if one leaves these things lying around.
But, of course, we may not finish it by the 11th.
Yeah.
Well, the main thing, you'll have some activity, and we won't be bombing.
You can ask Bunker's judgment.
Yeah.
Well, I don't know.
Kennedy seemed to have some views that, too, might begin to be more reasonable, but I think that's sort of silly.
No, I think that's right.
We felt that before, haven't we?
Yeah, but we haven't really.
The last time when Haig was out there, we didn't have a specific proposition to put before him.
Well, this is going to be goddamn specific, and he isn't going to like it.
What are his options?
Yeah.
I know.
I'd rather have him blow Henry right after the inauguration than before.
You see my problem.
The problem being that I don't want to have the... And we'll just tell the North, look, with the inauguration coming on, we can't do it then, but you're going to send ag-do immediately after the inauguration.
That's right.
I think they'd well understand that if they're not being bombed.
Is that my point?
That's right.
The danger with these bastards always is when you let...
They might get off the hook.
When you let up the pressure on them, they again feel confident.
On the other hand, we ought to get...
But it can easily be done that way, and then we could perhaps compress it by having Agnew go to Saigon and have me go to the other places simultaneously.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
There was some advantage in having Agnew come back and then start again.
But Agnew coming back, I mean, that's...
problems with Pew and all that is just not the right story before the inauguration.
I mean, I don't know.
That's too high a risk from the standpoint of our domestic situation.
I know the risk on the other side, but I think we'd better take the risk on the other side and delay Agnew for five days.
We can do that.
I think we'd better do it.
That can be done.
That may stretch beyond the 11th anyway.
Well, we hope not.
If it does, it does.
We just take a little more time.
Right.
At least we'll get statements about progress out.
Okay, well, fine, Henry.
Enjoy the weekend.
Good problem to have.
For a change.
Okay, thank you.
All right, thank you.
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