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Conversation 371-013

TapeTape 371StartFriday, October 20, 1972 at 10:56 AMEndFriday, October 20, 1972 at 11:10 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building
AI Summary

President Nixon and Alexander Haig met to discuss the status of ongoing Vietnam peace negotiations and the delicate diplomatic pressure being exerted on South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. They debated the potential political risks of finalizing an agreement before the 1972 presidential election, specifically regarding whether a premature deal might be perceived as politically motivated or disadvantageous to South Vietnam's long-term security. Nixon instructed Haig to emphasize to Henry Kissinger that any settlement must ensure the prevention of a Communist takeover and be accepted by Thieu as a willing partner rather than as a coerced participant.

Vietnam WarPeace Negotiations1972 Presidential ElectionNguyen Van ThieuHenry KissingerForeign Policy
AudioNARA Description

On October 20, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 10:56 am to 11:10 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 371-013 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 371-13

Date: October 20, 1972
Time: 10:56 am - 11:10 am
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

                              (rev. Oct-06)

Vietnam
    -Peace settlement negotiations
        -Henry A. Kissinger's talk with Thieu
        -Gen. William C. Westmoreland's Views
             -The President's previous conversation with Westmoreland
             -Private understanding
             -South Vietnamese sovereignty
             -North Vietnamese intentions
             -Settlement predictions
             -Westmoreland's Views
        -The President's letter
        -South Vietnamese Security Council
        -Thieu's possible reaction
             -Westmoreland's views
             -Haig’s view
                  -Kissinger’s pressure on Thieu
                      -Timing compared with 1972 election
                           -Risks
                  -Haig's conversation with Kissinger
                      -1972 election
                      -Thieu
        -The President’s forthcoming message to Kissinger
             -1972 Election
                  -Timing of settlement
                      -Kissinger
                           -The President’s view
        -Possible settlement
             -Thieu’s possible acceptance
                  -Gen. Creighton W. Abrams's view
                  -Haig’s view
        -The President’s forthcoming message to Kissinger
             -Prevention of Communist takeover of South Vietnam’s territory
             -Thieu’s role
             -Risk of North Vietnamese public release
                  -US Response
                      -Thieu
        -Kissinger's previous message
             -Haig's reaction
        -The President's schedule
             -Haig’s updates for the President

                                         (rev. Oct-06)

                           -The President’s instructions

Haig left at 11:10 am.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Well, what about this fall, West Palm?
First, I think the concern about the private stand.
What do you think about this?
Reflect a bit on West Palm.
What do you think about that?
I don't know if Leah's position is right in the context of this other issue.
But we have these assurances.
And we're going to get that case to deal with.
I think the question is that.
Yeah.
What about the government?
You know, the actual virtual issue.
They had a fact check with the federal court.
They talked about the current issue of government enforcement.
That's what we're doing.
That's what we're doing.
That's what we're doing.
That's what we're doing.
That's what we're doing.
That's what we're doing.
They're all on, you know, half the place they are.
Oh.
What if they're going to leave us out?
They're what?
They'll leave us out.
They'll be constantly fighting.
Did we have any responses?
And if we're not certain, you can give us something on that.
Well, if you did with your life, you should take the most positive step.
I feel myself
Well, you've always said more about what you're here to, uh, about what Westfalen said, but you still want the deal, despite what Westfalen said.
I, when Henry left, I said I agree to the deal, and we should put the answer to the story.
You said that.
Yes.
And that's the way I feel.
All right.
All right.
And that's why I told you.
I told you.
I told you.
I told you.
I told you.
I told you.
I told you.
I told you.
In other words, is it fundamentally a bad deal for you, or not a bad deal for you?
It's a solid plus for us.
It's a high risk for him.
If he gets it enthusiastically, then it's definitely going to work.
If Henry pushes on, and he accepts it before the election, I think it's going to be safe.
Because if that went away, it's going to hurt you.
It's going to hurt this country.
That's my concern.
And I know that there is odds and odds to the point where he's going to have the office.
And that was the question.
That was the argument.
So it looks like an election cycle.
I think it's going to be a long-term second election.
So there's a risk of a break with the four-year election.
Now, we decided to open up right after the election.
If you listen to this guy, if you look at our iPhone, that's what we're talking about.
over and over again.
There's no consideration.
Mr. Henry, I want to emphasize again my concern that we, in our discussions, under no circumstances have been informed by the election deadline.
That is my conclusion on further reflection.
after a settlement before the election?
Will it best be a wash?
And as a high risk?
We made a bad settlement now.
We made a settlement now, which could have been better later.
He made a poorer settlement now than he could have made had he simply waited for that to happen.
And as you hear this again, I think that's a common straight answer.
Because Henry is passionately concerned about this.
Partly because he doesn't even know Bob.
But Al, what do you think about that?
Can we realize that he doesn't employ the election to help improve for him?
You know, in his journey.
If it's done after the election, you know, then most everybody's going to say, well, Al, if you want an election, the president's on a bad date.
Obviously, if you adopt that case, it's going to be that much of an achievement.
Am I being too unkind?
I don't know.
I don't know what you're saying about that.
check papers so you see if you look at that original video of that two on-bounds up to the second one on the left one on the left of the second full hearted yeah it's a good decision it's not good I don't consider it's not a good decision now later that's the pathetic pathetic I emphasize again it's two
the essential requirement is that you must choose acceptance
of the agreement must be over without so that the charge cannot be made.
And we have portioned that through a settlement.
which was not in the interest of what it may have prevented a common, uh, takeover.
And it's a substantial part of itself right now.
I put that in as I mentioned it and I do not use the charge that he must go as a partner in the fight against Mr. the uh... uh... uh... Mr. the uh... we want him as a partner uh... we want him... we want him as a willing partner in the fight against Mr. Raymond this must not be a shotgun fight against Mr. Raymond
I am aware of the risk of developing an argument.
But from an election standpoint, we can handle that.
eventualities, much more easily than they can.
I told Henry all of this, but you've got to have it restated.
You bring up, oh, my God.
Oh, my God.
But you changed that, didn't you?
Yeah.
Yeah.
I mean, this will be very helpful to me if we'll get more ejection tests.
Call me, I'll help.
You just call me, and I'm not going to call you.
If anything comes up, I'll be there night over day.
Understand, I don't mind doing the adjustment.
I'm about this.
I have to do my adjustment on this thing and this one.
So it's 2 o'clock in the morning.
Be sure you see the message you're calling.
I'm awake 2 o'clock in the morning.
Well, last night I was with the bathroom, but then it became a mess.
So, yeah, I doubt it.
What time is it?
It's 11 o'clock.
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