Conversation 372-011

TapeTape 372StartWednesday, October 25, 1972 at 9:40 AMEndWednesday, October 25, 1972 at 10:08 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On October 25, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:40 am to 10:08 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 372-011 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 372-11

Date: October 25, 1972
Time: 9:40 am - 10:08 am
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

        The People's Republic of China [PRC]
            -Chou En-Lai

        Vietnam peace settlement negotiations
            -Leonid I. Brezhnev’s previous message
                -Kissinger’s response
                -Hanoi
                      -Kissinger’s possible trip
                          -Timing
                              -1972 election
            -Paris talks
                -Kissinger’s schedule
                      -Saigon

                           (rev. Nov-03)

-Possible leaks
-US proposal
    -Final Document
         -Saigon’s approval
    -Possible bombing halt
         -Rationale
              -Quality of offer
              -Concessions
         -Compared with 1968 bombing halt
         -Public announcement
              -The President’s suggestion
                   -20th parallel
              -Public opinion
                   -Forthcoming 1972 election
              -Possible press statement
                   -Breakthrough
                   -Further negotiations
              -Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
              -Fritz G. Kraemer’s view
              -Nguyen Van Thieu
                   -Public Position
                   -US Position
                        -The President’s view
                            -Thieu
                            -Coalition government
                            -Bombing halt
              -North Vietnamese military situation
                   -Possible cease-fire, October 31, 1972
    -Thieu‘s recent speech
    -Kissinger’s view
         -Strategy
              -Role in negotiations
              -Coalition government
              -Communist infrastructure in South Vietnam
    -Possible bombing halt
         -Political risks
         -Rationale
              -Timing compared with 1972 election
              -Compared with 1968 bombing halt
         -Public announcement
              -Extent of halt

                       (rev. Nov-03)

         -Reasons
         -Risks
         -Timing
         -Secrecy
-Thieu’s strategy
    -Possible North Vietnamese reply
-US public relations strategy
    -Possible North Vietnamese reply
         -Le Duc Tho
    -William P. Rogers
    -Issue of coalition government in Vietnam
         -Possible statement
              -Ronald L. Ziegler
              -US message
    -Possible attack on McGovern
    -Wording of press statement on coalition government
         -Ziegler
    -Washington Post article
         -Unknown reporter's name
              -Kissinger’s recent name
              -Coalition government
    -The President’s participation in negotiations
         -John B. Connally
              -Leaks
         -Thieu
         -Stewart J.O. Alsop
         -Murrey Marder
         -Television
              -Howard K. Smith
                  -Statement regarding efforts of the President and Kissinger
                       -Messages
-Content of Kissinger’s statement
    -McGovern’s proposal compared to the Administrations
         -Tone
         -Type of Peace
         -Surrender
         -Prisoners of war [POWs]
         -Coalition government
         -Assistance to South Vietnam
         -Thailand
         -Laos

                           (rev. Nov-03)

              -Cambodia
              -“Peace with honor”
          -1972 election
              -McGovern’s possible response
          -Bombing halt
              -Nature of announcement
              -Wording
                   -De facto compared to de jure status
          -Progress
              -Le Duc Tho
          -US position
              -Ziegler
-Soviet Union
     -US global commitments
-Kissinger’s possible trip to Hanoi
     -The President’s view
          -Le Duc Tho
-Thieu
     -Handling
          -US equipment shipments
              -Kissinger’s meeting with unknown person
              -Timing
                   -Settlement
     -Possible agreement to settlement
          -Timing
              -November 20, 1972
-Kissinger’s forthcoming telephone call to Nelson A. Rockefeller
-1968 peace initiative
     -McGovern’s statements
     -Compared with current US proposal
     -Compared with McGovern’s proposals
          -POWs
          -Laos, Cambodia
          -Communist government in South Vietnam
-The President’s schedule
-Priority of peace negotiations
     -The President's and Kissinger’s role
          -Joseph W. Alsop’s column
          -History's verdict
              -Abraham Lincoln
              -Opposition to the President's policies

                                        (rev. Nov-03)

                             -Compared to Lincoln
                                 -Bureaucracy, media
                      -Compared with Lyndon B. Johnson
                         -Administration problems
                             -Consensus

Kissinger left at 10:08 am.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Thank you for watching.
and our prestige should stand in the way of each other.
But if I went to Manali, it would threaten me.
I don't think I should do that.
I just want to tell you, go back as long as you can go.
Out of the question.
Out of the question.
But when they're talking modalities, and I've had another thought which we should also in my touch.
The message yesterday, we all said that, that they take us to Paris next week.
And if we don't do that, then people tend to consider that's fine.
We'll make ourselves responsible.
Yeah.
Because having to decide that, it could be a good accident.
It wasn't a good idea.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
They're taking zygote trenches to them.
That's what the meeting is about.
I don't care what we're talking about.
I expect that it will be different.
If they don't accept this document, it just incorporates a lot of this zygote trench.
We have a final document that we have stopped.
I know you would like to do it, but it is a hell of a thing to ask one to be bound for another two weeks.
A document be considered final.
Because Saigon is growing up on here.
The only thing we did is hold the bombing.
We've got nothing else.
This time it will be a two-billion, two-billion, two-billion, two-billion, two-billion, two-billion.
Just don't want to risk it.
I have no problem with that.
I think I have a problem with it at this point.
It's a few days before the election.
It's a question of American public opinion.
How are we going to talk to the public?
It would be a good idea to do that sort of.
I don't.
I don't.
I don't.
I don't.
I don't.
I don't.
He wants to kill him.
He wants to kill him.
But he doesn't have the skills.
But you see, we have this additional problem.
I'm very sober.
Stopping the bombing doesn't bother me at all.
We've seen a problem in our assistance, Mr. President.
The other side, I think the ground will be healed a lot.
We keep everything in place.
The other side has been, has been really screwed.
They put all their local forces out into very exposed positions when they feel that they can seize power.
It's really good.
Which we told the North Vietnamese,
What is your analysis?
Could we go back to that?
What is your analysis?
My theory is that he's got to be reassured.
I think it worries me the most.
It worries me the most.
I worry me the most.
You're dealing with a nut.
You're dealing with a box with a handle on it.
My theory is that he's posturing himself to do one, that he has a major role in the negotiation.
Two, he's setting up a stronghold of coalition government that he can then say he wants to take over.
He knows that the communist infrastructure is hanging out there, that he wants to get itself together as many of them as possible.
That's the part that bothers me most because the only reason the other side can accept it is because it preserves some assets.
If they don't preserve the assets, they're going to go another year and reestablish the assets.
And that's why, and that's because there's some really, you know, some military pressure.
See, as it is, people have stopped the bombing this week, but they can't run away.
Yeah, I know that.
While you were there.
Well, we wouldn't have moved you.
In a way, we wouldn't have gone unless you had signed.
Yeah.
We've got to get this done, too.
I don't know.
I think what it's getting at is partly the farming of the North, but it's also the mass of the drink that goes with it.
The purpose then was to say, well, we're going to have negotiations.
The purpose now is that we need to integrate.
You know, if these were to add in the stock trading, it would be terrible.
If they were to add, you know, it would say to the, to announce the box, it has the box, you know, the value.
Well, then what happens is they apply the status.
Thank you.
Then I could say, I'm coming back Friday to get your final approval.
Then Saturday night, we'll just hit the button.
I'll tell them it takes 48 hours to stop the button.
Then we'll just stop it Sunday night without it.
And I'll tell you, you've said it already.
You will not be able to stop it.
You will not be able to stop it.
You will not be able to stop it.
I'm now really getting worried about the fact that you, from this point of view, could actually affect such a brutal day.
This is how we clean up the infrastructure of these guys.
And I really like to do it without setting myself up.
I like to see how these good bodies come from.
I know it's good to be outside.
How's it at?
I think it's all right.
Ane ka loike, azele clare, tere hi texte, tere hirakto vizcate.
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Thank you for watching.
I know that, but you see, that time's a-wasting.
I think it's got to be, it's got to be iterated.
That's the problem, my problem.
I think you should sit in the president's office.
I think I should sit in the president's office.
I wonder what happens.
I could do it if that's the way that I can take something out of the way.
I just would like to have to see how that plays out.
So you'd like to play in the department?
Can anybody do anything today?
No.
I think that they're not there.
I don't know whether you have read Victor Shaw's Soja's article today.
I don't know who the hell the guy is.
I never see him.
There's a fellow called Soja who writes for the Washington Post.
Two weeks ago he wrote a brilliant article on the negotiation.
Today he wrote an absolutely brilliant article saying that my trip was an enormous success.
Benji, that's a fella I've never talked to.
They're my mates.
Here's what we are going to do.
You said that the air is going off.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
Thank you.
I'll do it because I don't want to
We've got to find out how our peace thing is.
We've got to find out how our peace thing is.
We've got to find out how our peace thing is.
I don't believe it.
I don't believe it.
I don't believe it.
Aspects emerged of which we agree that which we want to create and which need us to operate.
battle there at the present time.
And that's not hard, because the progress has been made.
And because the breakthrough has been made.
As soon as I know that we've got to go to this meeting, we know we're proper to a fair degree.
And I hope we can't use too much of what they've been saying.
I can't be sure.
Unless I want to give them a chance.
We've got a lot of things we have to work on here.
But you've got to be here for a while, all right?
Well, I can't go there.
You can't go there.
You just say, we can't do that.
At this time, you've got to have one more round.
We've got to go before you go.
It's the extra time that people settle, I think, by November 20th.
And so they brought up the, were you able to call Nelson?
There's no rush, but they do it today.
Just so, just, you won't take too long.
Just say, look, Nelson is very tight, very, very fed up.
All right.
All right.
I don't want to talk about the big strategy.
I don't want to talk about these emissions.
They don't really matter.
But I want to repeat on the basic strategy.
There's the, I don't know whether you saw a column show outside the other day.
But he wrote about the whole speculation about what's going to happen.
What people don't realize is to what extent all the fundamental decisions have been made.
I know one thing, I know what the history books are going to say, because no president that I know has had to do
I mean, the decision which you sort of take for granted, just by talking to one or two people, you then send them out.
Johnson could never have done this.
He would have tracked down to them.
He would have had 30 people and brought them down to a point where they didn't make a gun.
And good luck.
Keep at it.