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Conversation 377-007

TapeTape 377StartSunday, October 29, 1972 at 9:20 AMEndSunday, October 29, 1972 at 9:30 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.Recording deviceOld Executive Office Building
AudioNARA Description

On October 29, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:20 am to 9:30 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 377-007 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 377-7

Date: October 29, 1972
Time: 9:20 am - 9:30 am
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

        The President’s forthcoming briefing on surrogates
            -William P. Rogers
            -Vietnam
                -Instructions for Haig
                     -Service in Vietnam by Haig
                          -Sacrifices
                          -Interest by administration
                     -Ending of wars
                          -Kind of settlement necessary to prevent new war
                          -Consequences of other type of settlement
                     -Comparison of administration and George S. McGovern plan
                          -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                               -Return
                          -End of war compared with end of US involvement
                               -North Vietnamese
                               -Cambodia
                               -Laos
                          -Prevention of communist takeover
                               -Self-determination
                               -Election
                               -Coalition government

                          (rev. Aug-03)

                 -Means to defend South Vietnam
                     -Economic assistance and military replacements
                     -Vietnamization
                     -Quality of South Vietnamese equipment
            -The President’s view of the McGovern Plan
                 -Withdrawal of Americans
                 -Withdrawal of arms
                 -Communist takeover
                 -Blood bath
        -Prospects for success of cease-fire
            -Timing
            -Settlement
                 -Type
            -Strength of Vietnam
        -US position
            -Settlement
                 -Type
            -End of killing
            -The President's role in settlement
                 -The President’s November 3, 1969 speech
                 -Action in Cambodia, Laos
                 -Blockade and mining of Haiphong harbor, May, 1972
            -“Peace with honor “compared to “peace with surrender”
            -Communist South Vietnam compared to noncommunist South
             Vietnam
            -Return of POW's
            -Amnesty
                 -The President’s recent remarks

Negotiations
   -Nguyen Van Thieu
   -North and South Vietnam

Vietnam
    -Negotiations
        -North Vietnam
        -South Vietnam
            -The President’s possible conversation with Thieu
                 -Letter
                 -Timing
                     -1972 election
                 -Acceptance of terms

                                     (rev. Aug-03)

                            -Thieu’s view of Henry A. Kissinger

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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National security]
[Duration: 3s ]

INTELLIGENCE

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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                        -Thieu’s role
                             -South Vietnam
                             -1972 election
                   -Letter to Thieu from the President
                        -Tone
                             -Haig’s view
                   -Thieu’s position
               -Haig’s briefings
                   -George Meany
                        -Timing
                             -New York
                   -Lyndon B. Johnson
                   -Walt W. Rostow
                   -Paul C. Warnke, October 28, 1972
                        -Haig’s experience
                             -1967
                        -Support for the President
                             -[McGovern]
                                 -The President’s previous support for
                                  John F. Kennedy, Edward G. (“Pat”)
                                  Brown
                             -Foreign policy
                                 -Comparisons
               -Souvanna Phouma
                   -The President’s view
                   -Memorandum

                                          (rev. Aug-03)

                      -Possible US aid to North Vietnam
                           -Consequences
                               -Analogy to Japan
                           -Credibility
                  -Thieu
                      -Possible visit from US representative
                           -Kissinger
                           -Haig
                      -Adm. John J. McCain, Jr.; William F. Buckley, Jr.,
                       Sir Robert Thompson
                  -Conclusion of war
                      -Timing
                           -The President’s view
                      -Haig’s view
                           -Thieu

Haig left at 9:30 am.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

I'd like to get through three of the fights myself, you know, at the outset.
Roger's real angry with me and so forth.
And the main thing I really think people are trying to get across is sort of a sense of conflict, toughness, and hurry, and, you know, I think it's quite personal to say that you serve Vietnam and you know what people, you know, and I think you sort of chew up what I say.
In other words, the remarks in that case, it seems to me that there are two or three points that ought to be made.
What's going on there?
The most important point is the presence of the United States.
The representation of the United States does make the right kind of decisions.
This nation has ended wars before.
They're ending the war in a way, in the wrong way,
We're going to end this war in the right way so as to discourage another war.
That is the President's main goal.
Not ending the war, but ending it the right way.
We could have ended it the wrong way when we first came into office.
And it would have been fun.
Now, in comparing our climate with the government's climate, that's what's important.
We have a guarantee to return to part two without getting any money from the government.
strong and then left it to the mercies of the North Vietnamese.
The ending of the war, it would have ended it for America.
We would have withdrawn, but it would not have ended the fighting and the killings of those between the North Vietnamese and the Cambodian Malawians inspired by our own.
True.
Thank you very much.
Terrifying.
With regard to what was the fourth war,
the right of the South to prevent a conflict between the two countries.
His plan would have, our plan is one that provides for a right of the South Vietnam that may determine their own future by supervising elections.
It is not a coalition government.
We rejected it.
The President rejected it.
It also not only provides the right, but it gives them the means to guarantee that by providing for continued economic assistance, military replacements.
So we're leaving air in South Vietnam through Vietnamization.
And the strongest army in Southeast Asia, the best equipped army in Southeast Asia, the best trained army in Southeast Asia, they're able to do it.
His plan would have simply withdrawn America
could draw also the equipment to the means, the arms, to take away the arms of the South Korean army.
That would have led to a communist takeover and a bloodbath, worse than anything we've seen in this century.
Those are the differences shown in the plan.
Now, whether or not it's going to work, we cannot predict.
We're not going to predict time or anything like that.
But it's right in front of us all, and it is going to be made.
at the wrong time the wrong and making the wrong
We haven't put all these years to make the wrong kind of a settlement in a matter of a few days.
It's not the right settlement.
We will make it.
I don't want to tell you to go on one day longer than necessary, but it must be the right kind of settlement.
And that's what it's got.
You can also say, now, ladies and gentlemen, I think you better realize how this came about.
It was the president's determination.
could not have happened without November 3rd.
It could not have happened without the courage of going to the temple.
It could not have happened without Laos.
And above all, it could not have happened unless we had moved, made the blockade mine, all these things, made it possible.
That's what I want to say.
So thank you, everyone, for watching today.
And basically, when you come right down to it, ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to say this to you.
It's really a clear joke.
Peace with honor, or peace with surrender.
Peace with a free South Vietnam, or peace with a private South Vietnam.
Peace with the return of our people that we care for, or peace with faith for the return of our people that we care for.
Those are the questions.
Now what can you say of anything about the cube and all the rest?
There's still feelings that it works out.
You're still going to hear some grumbling here and there, but that is expected of this government because these people, North and South, are making a decision that's going to affect their future.
And it's going to be, but the general principles have been agreed upon.
There will be a decision.
I would say that would be very confident.
What is your private evaluation?
Do you think the North will come back to negotiate or not?
I think, I think professionally, I believe on a dime.
I've had it with them the best I've ever had.
They, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they,
certainly before the election and not afterwards unless he's agreed to a deal.
But I have a feeling that that is about all that's going to do it.
His feeling about it is very, very, very, very totally suspicious.
On the other hand, he can't say anything against the end, does he?
I've never heard him say these things.
I want you on board.
I want you on board in order to save South Vietnam, not to make this goddamn sudden.
You think that my problem is my health and my courage is my health?
I don't know.
I don't know.
See, one of the problems that I always worked with, several after the election, was that, thank God, before the election,
That's right.
We had to juggle that psychological problem.
Now, we've got to work our way past that.
And when the schedule adjusts, that will start to drop off in consideration.
It's exactly what it takes to be a trusted citizen.
I don't think you should take a woman to your damn church and go succeed.
It's the worst thing you can do.
That's right.
I love it.
We've got to do that in a very strong way.
They're getting the confidence that they're not the chief.
Did you ever get the meaning of it, Steve?
I've talked to them twice.
I'm scared this is more of an act of the fact that we are trying to heal than the fact that we're going to do this.
It's the president's request, I mean, and that I want to have information that we cannot put out publicly.
How about Johnson?
You know, when I talked to Walt Muskell, I said, you know, I talked to Orton yesterday, and I said, he said, you know, I've been following this thing since 1967, and this is what we're calling, you know, the noise pollution.
What about a goddamn candidate?
Why is a candidate going out and saying he won't even support the president?
It is.
It's a public thing.
He said, this is a collapse for them.
This is a surrender.
or insulation, but on the other hand, if they build up again, they'll come back to you.
Right?
I don't know if anybody else has a good problem.
You can't send Henry again.
They're not going to leave him.
I don't think you can send him again.
But the little act I'll do it.
You know, that perspective and that spirit of color.
It's about living.
I brought it in, but I know it's really important.
It's very important.
Thompson.
Thompson?
Yeah, it's Thompson.
Right.
Yeah.
Right.
Okay.
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