Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 377-007 Date: Sunday, October 29, 1972 at 9:20 AM Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Recording device: Old Executive Office Building Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/377-007 This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative. [0:00] I'd like to get through three of the fights myself, you know, at the outset. [0:21] Roger's real angry with me and so forth. [0:21] And the main thing I really think people are trying to get across is sort of a sense of conflict, toughness, and hurry, and, you know, I think it's quite personal to say that you serve Vietnam and you know what people, you know, and I think you sort of chew up what I say. [0:34] In other words, the remarks in that case, it seems to me that there are two or three points that ought to be made. [0:58] What's going on there? [0:59] The most important point is the presence of the United States. [1:00] The representation of the United States does make the right kind of decisions. [1:02] This nation has ended wars before. [1:03] They're ending the war in a way, in the wrong way, [1:06] We're going to end this war in the right way so as to discourage another war. [1:24] That is the President's main goal. [1:25] Not ending the war, but ending it the right way. [1:26] We could have ended it the wrong way when we first came into office. [1:27] And it would have been fun. [1:28] Now, in comparing our climate with the government's climate, that's what's important. [1:30] We have a guarantee to return to part two without getting any money from the government. [1:33] strong and then left it to the mercies of the North Vietnamese. [1:47] The ending of the war, it would have ended it for America. [1:53] We would have withdrawn, but it would not have ended the fighting and the killings of those between the North Vietnamese and the Cambodian Malawians inspired by our own. [1:58] True. [1:58] Thank you very much. [1:59] Terrifying. [1:59] With regard to what was the fourth war, [2:01] the right of the South to prevent a conflict between the two countries. [2:12] His plan would have, our plan is one that provides for a right of the South Vietnam that may determine their own future by supervising elections. [2:25] It is not a coalition government. [2:25] We rejected it. [2:26] The President rejected it. [2:30] It also not only provides the right, but it gives them the means to guarantee that by providing for continued economic assistance, military replacements. [2:48] So we're leaving air in South Vietnam through Vietnamization. [2:52] And the strongest army in Southeast Asia, the best equipped army in Southeast Asia, the best trained army in Southeast Asia, they're able to do it. [2:58] His plan would have simply withdrawn America [3:01] could draw also the equipment to the means, the arms, to take away the arms of the South Korean army. [3:17] That would have led to a communist takeover and a bloodbath, worse than anything we've seen in this century. [3:22] Those are the differences shown in the plan. [3:23] Now, whether or not it's going to work, we cannot predict. [3:27] We're not going to predict time or anything like that. [3:29] But it's right in front of us all, and it is going to be made. [3:34] at the wrong time the wrong and making the wrong [4:03] We haven't put all these years to make the wrong kind of a settlement in a matter of a few days. [4:17] It's not the right settlement. [4:18] We will make it. [4:18] I don't want to tell you to go on one day longer than necessary, but it must be the right kind of settlement. [4:24] And that's what it's got. [4:25] You can also say, now, ladies and gentlemen, I think you better realize how this came about. [4:31] It was the president's determination. [4:33] could not have happened without November 3rd. [4:39] It could not have happened without the courage of going to the temple. [4:45] It could not have happened without Laos. [4:47] And above all, it could not have happened unless we had moved, made the blockade mine, all these things, made it possible. [4:51] That's what I want to say. [4:52] So thank you, everyone, for watching today. [4:59] And basically, when you come right down to it, ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to say this to you. [5:18] It's really a clear joke. [5:21] Peace with honor, or peace with surrender. [5:22] Peace with a free South Vietnam, or peace with a private South Vietnam. [5:25] Peace with the return of our people that we care for, or peace with faith for the return of our people that we care for. [5:27] Those are the questions. [5:29] Now what can you say of anything about the cube and all the rest? [5:55] There's still feelings that it works out. [5:58] You're still going to hear some grumbling here and there, but that is expected of this government because these people, North and South, are making a decision that's going to affect their future. [6:12] And it's going to be, but the general principles have been agreed upon. [6:16] There will be a decision. [6:19] I would say that would be very confident. [6:20] What is your private evaluation? [6:21] Do you think the North will come back to negotiate or not? [6:24] I think, I think professionally, I believe on a dime. [6:34] I've had it with them the best I've ever had. [6:39] They, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, they, [6:47] certainly before the election and not afterwards unless he's agreed to a deal. [7:07] But I have a feeling that that is about all that's going to do it. [7:08] His feeling about it is very, very, very, very totally suspicious. [7:11] On the other hand, he can't say anything against the end, does he? [7:15] I've never heard him say these things. [7:17] I want you on board. [7:25] I want you on board in order to save South Vietnam, not to make this goddamn sudden. [7:39] You think that my problem is my health and my courage is my health? [7:40] I don't know. [7:41] I don't know. [7:41] See, one of the problems that I always worked with, several after the election, was that, thank God, before the election, [7:48] That's right. [7:51] We had to juggle that psychological problem. [8:02] Now, we've got to work our way past that. [8:04] And when the schedule adjusts, that will start to drop off in consideration. [8:09] It's exactly what it takes to be a trusted citizen. [8:11] I don't think you should take a woman to your damn church and go succeed. [8:14] It's the worst thing you can do. [8:14] That's right. [8:15] I love it. [8:15] We've got to do that in a very strong way. [8:35] They're getting the confidence that they're not the chief. [8:56] Did you ever get the meaning of it, Steve? [8:59] I've talked to them twice. [9:00] I'm scared this is more of an act of the fact that we are trying to heal than the fact that we're going to do this. [9:02] It's the president's request, I mean, and that I want to have information that we cannot put out publicly. [9:05] How about Johnson? [9:07] You know, when I talked to Walt Muskell, I said, you know, I talked to Orton yesterday, and I said, he said, you know, I've been following this thing since 1967, and this is what we're calling, you know, the noise pollution. [9:32] What about a goddamn candidate? [9:33] Why is a candidate going out and saying he won't even support the president? [9:39] It is. [9:42] It's a public thing. [10:02] He said, this is a collapse for them. [10:17] This is a surrender. [10:29] or insulation, but on the other hand, if they build up again, they'll come back to you. [10:55] Right? [10:55] I don't know if anybody else has a good problem. [10:56] You can't send Henry again. [10:57] They're not going to leave him. [10:57] I don't think you can send him again. [11:05] But the little act I'll do it. [11:26] You know, that perspective and that spirit of color. [11:27] It's about living. [11:27] I brought it in, but I know it's really important. [11:28] It's very important. [11:29] Thompson. [11:29] Thompson? [11:29] Yeah, it's Thompson. [11:31] Right. [11:56] Yeah. [12:12] Right. [12:13] Okay.