Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 378 › Conversation 378-002
Nixon & Kissinger on Vietnam War and 1972 Election
Tuesday, October 31, 1972 · 9:28 AM–9:50 AM ET · Old Executive Office Building · 23 min
AI Summary
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the delicate status of Vietnam peace negotiations and the challenge of managing public and political perceptions of the potential agreement just days before the 1972 election. They analyzed North Vietnamese signaling, the complexities of drafting a durable settlement, and the need to reassure conservative critics who feared the deal might mirror failed previous agreements. The two focused on developing a public relations strategy for the administration, including potential media briefings by Kissinger, to clarify the U.S. commitment to achieving a high-quality, long-term peace rather than a premature settlement.
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Transcript (AI-generated)
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On the other hand, we have to realize that we have a very curious community here.
We're catching it in terms of this thing from both the right and the left.
On the ground, they were getting away from each other.
On the left, it's going in for reasons that are dishonest.
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I think that plus his father,
Because those guns are dying.
See, if they lay a box there, we'd blow out their faces.
We'd have proof of saying we could have had this for years with no cars.
And I do believe those are the differences.
Well, the more I think about that, if they were going to blow it in and send us a message, and I think they sent us only two explanations for sending the message.
One, to keep us from doing something.
Then, yeah, it would give them a chance to blow it in.
or to reassure us that something was coming.
And I'm now of the view they couldn't very well before the signing that they were going to vote.
So I suspect that tomorrow or the day after.
I'd like to leave right away, but I have offered them to meet them, but I offered to meet them on the first, and I told them I wasn't available to meet them on the 9th.
I thought it would be too cynical to say, try to meet on the 9th.
60 hours 60 hours to the 40 to the 40
But I think we have to accept that people, some of the youths out there, are, of course, from the north of Florida, some of them.
And to live around those youths, all of them are part of that.
See, particularly in the meeting in the press, because all the youths are staying, the handicap we have is a little more of a risk.
Thank you.
but i think
I'm for that one.
If you know I'm for bombing anyone.
The only thing these guys understand is that after the election, they still hang tough.
I think they love it.
They take on all that value.
That's the sort of thing that everybody's going to watch.
I know you can't think of any more.
Well, there'll be a lot more that you can't fool around with a mile over reaction now.
So, take it out of that age.
That's it.
We have got to get in a position for Henry, and maybe you've got to do another briefing.
I'm just wondering later.
To a position where we are covered.
You just got to tell him about my own public stance.
And he's thinking he's nice.
I'll cover it with my own money.
But it's more difficult for me to do it than you do.
I think there's the real
that we are not signing this agreement this time because there are some ambiguities that we need to deal with, which may get a poor agreement like the Laos agreement to hit that content agreement.
And I said that we want the right kind of agreement.
We already developed reasons over the weekend.
And in other words, we're hanging up on that treaty that is not going to be a coalition government agreement.
And he says, Eric Spielberg.
I agree that
Thank you.
What I hadn't figured out, and shouldn't have, is these goddamn people, intellectually, they ought to be wiped out.
It's so complicated.
It's all right.
It's a better day back at home.
All right.
I think you have to go through these maneuvers.
I must say, in retrospect, I'll be honest, I think we made a mistake in going to such an incinerating stage.
We had nuts.
We shouldn't have made a quarter radio, quarter TV speech on the 27th.
I think we should have been held in the 49th.
Sure.
I think you didn't press, but you would have had it.
so we should have gone back to bed.
We had said we were back, but we were not going to die.
But that was a mistake.
That was a mistake.
Okay.
Well, we'll try to think.
Maybe when can you go out at the moment?
See, what I mean is, you've got to leave the other.
You don't want to leave the other.
Listen to the other.
He's alive.
The other is dead.
Well, of course, I don't think they're lying.
Okay.
Maybe that's the best thing.
Now, I've got to do my follow-up, and I'm not going to put in a bunch of paragraphs, but I have to make it much more simple.
I've got to talk to 23, and that would take too long.
I think we should be very simple and direct.
Here's a declaratory statement.
You might have your...
I'm sorry.
... ... ... ...
Thank you.
I think you'd do the same.
I think you'd do the same.
No, I agree.
But you could still get in, and you did the portals.
You could get in the wire services.
You could get in one field.
You could get in the free network people in another field.
You could get in the network background.
And then, in addition, you could get about half of the major commentators, the columnists, in another field.
How would that be?
You'd have to be in the media and background.
Fair enough.
In the meantime, just wait about it.
Thank you.
Very obtuse, dull man, I must say.
So he had nothing on the ball.
But there he is, Andrew Wynn, part of it.
Well, he's dead, isn't it?
It may be, but I think he's alive.
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so that he can say it and see it one time.
Okay, and I thank you.
NARA Description
On October 31, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:28 am to 9:50 am. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 378-002 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 378-2
Date: October 31, 1972
Time: 9:28 am - 9:50 am
Location: Executive Office Building
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.
Greetings
Vietnam negotiations
-The President’s letter to Nguyen Van Thieu
-Ellsworth F. Bunker
-Terms of agreement
-South Vietnam’s seven points
-News summary
-Criticism
-Left compared to right
-Concessions
-William F. Buckley, Jr., Robert B. Semple, Jr., Colm [sp?] [First
name unknown]
-Settlement text
-Publication
-US foreign policy
-Press coverage
-Clayton Fritchey, Joseph W. Alsop, Rowland Evans,
Thomas W. Braden
-Time
-Jerrold L. Schecter
-Hugh S. Sidey
-US posture
-North Vietnamese position
-October 30, 1972 message
-Possible meaning
-Break-off of talks
-Resumption of talks
-Future message
-Forthcoming North Vietnamese – US meeting
-Expectations
-US position
-Kissinger’s schedule
-Timing of meeting
-1972 election
-Terms of agreement
-North Vietnamese troop removal from South Vietnam
-Analogy to Soviet Union troops in Poland
-US strategy
-Post-1972 election
-Bombing
-Hardline approach
-Bombing
-Demilatarized zone [DMZ]
-B-52’s
-19th parallel
-20th parallel
-Hanoi reaction
-Post-1972 election
-Radio
-Thieu position
-Effect of actions on 1972 election
-Victory claim
-US public relations stance
-Kissinger’s possible briefing
-Tone
-Timing
-Usefulness
-The President compared with Kissinger’s briefing
-Difficulties
-Kissinger briefing, October 26, 1972
-Points
-Coalition government
-Reason for the US not signing
-Quality of agreement
-Compared to Laos, 1962
-Reaction in US
-Moral issue
-Right
-Tone
-Stress on negatives rather than positives
-News summary
-Charles W. Colson’s conversation with Louis P. Harris
-Harris
-Political preference
-Liberals
-Support
-Conservatives, hard hats
-George S. McGovern
-The President’s agreement with Harris’ analysis
-Kissinger’s forthcoming meeting with Jay Lovestone
-Thieu
-Terms of agreement
-Thieu
-Coalition government
-Aid to South Vietnam
-Thailand
-North Vietnam
-Laos
-Cambodia
-Joseph C. Kraft’s, October 31, 1972 column
-Liberals
-Kissinger’s view
-The President’s view
-Lovestone
-Alsop
-Buckley
-Reassurance to conservatives
-Media
-North Vietnamese options
-Breakoff of talks
-Timing
-Bombing
-Results
-1972 election
-Administration’s stance
-Settlement
-Settlement
-Press statement
-Nelson A. Rockefeller’s forthcoming appearance at National Press Club
-“Peace with honor”
-Details of agreement
-Thieu position
-Bunker
-Kissinger’s view
-Strategy
-Schedule
-October 26, 1972 television [TV] speech
-1972 election
-The President’s letter to Thieu
-Negotiation strategy
-US posture
-Tone
-Congress
-US public relations stance
-William P. Rogers statement
-Melvin R. Laird statement
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew statement
-Kissinger’s and the President’s role
-Rogers
-Strategy
-1972 election
-New York
-Far left and far right
-Kissinger’s recent statement
-Agnew’s recent statement
-Kissinger’s possible statement
-The President’s address to the nation, “Look to the
future”, November 2, 1972
-Raymond K. Price, Jr.
-Length
-Progress
-Settlement
-Coalition government
-“semi-backgrounder”
-Timing of statements
-Wires services
-Network people
-Major commentators
Pierre E. Trudeau
-Recent Parliamentary election
-Seat margins
-Liberals
-Conservatives
-[New Democrats]
-Reason for results
-Robert L. Stanfield
-Possible election
-Stanfield
-The President’s view
The President’s schedule
-Rockefeller
Kissinger left at 9:50 am.Also recorded on October 31, 1972
- 378-001 8:34 AM · 13 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 8:34 am and 9:28 am.
- 378-003 9:50 AM · 9 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 9:50 am and 9:55 am.
- 378-004 9:55 AM · 25 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, unknown person(s), Alexander P. Butterfield, and Stephen B. Bull met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 9:55 am to 11:00 am.
- 378-005 11:00 AM · 7 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 11:00 am and 11:04 am.
- 810-001 11:04 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:04 am to 11:10 am.
- 810-002 11:10 AM · 23 min — President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and White House photographer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:10 am to 11:36 am.
- 810-003 11:36 AM · 31 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:36 am and 11:43 am.
- 810-004 11:36 AM · 15 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and unknown person(s) met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 11:36 am and 11:43 am.
Cite this conversation
Conversation 378-002, October 31, 1972. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/378-002 (accessed October 5, 2026).