Conversation 383-001

TapeTape 383StartThursday, December 14, 1972 at 2:30 PMEndThursday, December 14, 1972 at 3:24 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  Bull, Stephen B.;  Getty, Jean PaulRecording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On December 14, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Stephen B. Bull, and Jean Paul Getty met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building at an unknown time between 2:30 pm and 3:24 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 383-001 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 383-1

Date: December 14, 1972
Time: Unknown between 2:30 pm - 3:24 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger and Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

[This recording began while the meeting was in progress.]

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Kissinger’s press conference
                  -Kissinger’s “peace is at hand” statement, October 26,1 972
                        -Justifications
                               -The President’s May 8, 1972 proposals
                               -The President’s January 25, 1972 speech
                               -Nguyen Van Thieu
                               -Good faith efforts
                                     -Cessation of US bombing north of 20th Parallel
                                           -Timing
                  -North Vietnam’s actions
                        -Continuation of war
                               -Cease-fire
                  -Possible question
                        -Prognosis

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 2:30 pm.

       The President’s call to J[ean] Paul Getty

Bull left at 3:04 pm.

The President talked with Getty between 3:04 pm and 3:05 pm.

[Conversation No. 383-1A]

[See Conversation No. 34-80]
                                             -2-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. June-08)

                                                             Conversation No. 383-1 (cont’d)

[End of telephone conversation]

       Vietnam negotiations
            -Kissinger’s press conference
                  -Resumption of talks
                        -Conditions
                              -October 26, 1972 agreement
                              -National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord
                                [NCRC]
                              -Cease-fire
                                     -Enforcement
                              -North Vietnam’s military intervention in South Vietnam
                              -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                              -Settlement agreement
                                     -Protocols
                  -Details
            -Thieu
                  -Letter from the President
                        -Length
                        -Thieu’s speech before National Assembly
                              -US aid to South Vietnam [Enhance, Enhance Plus]
                        -US-South Vietnam relations
                              -1972 election
                              -The President’s advisers
                              -US aid to South Vietnam
                        -Tone
            -South Vietnam’s survival
                  -US bombing north of 20th Parallel
                        -Effect on North Vietnam
            -US bombing north of 20th Parallel
                  -B-52s
                        -Fighters
                              -Weather
                        -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
                        -Hanoi
                        -Haiphong
                              -April 15-16, 1972 mission
                                     -Duration
                                  -3-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                            (rev. June-08)

                                                    Conversation No. 383-1 (cont’d)

                        -Effect
             -Targets
                   -Power plants
                         -Hanoi
                   -Marshaling yards
-North Vietnam
       -Statement to population
       -[Le Duc Tho]
       -Thieu
-Settlement agreement
       -December 8, 1972 clause
             -US to respect the rights of people of Vietnam
                   -Effect
       -Signing
             -Melvin R. Laird’s view
       -US bombing north of 20th Parallel
             -William P. Rogers’s view
                   -The President
                   -US foreign policy
                   -Kissinger
                   -The President’s possible meeting with Rogers
                   -Patience
-North Vietnam
-Thieu
       -Meeting with Haig
-North Vietnam concessions
       -Timing
             -November 1972
-US bombing north of 20th Parallel
       -Effect
             -North Vietnam
       -Notification
             -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                   -Note
             -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                   -Conversation with Kissinger
                         -Tone
                               -Haig
                         -The President’s appreciation for the Soviet Union’s efforts
                                 -4-

      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                           (rev. June-08)

                                                  Conversation No. 383-1 (cont’d)

                       -Le Duc Tho’s trip to Moscow
                       -US interests
                       -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                             -Visit to US
                             -Relationship with the President
                             -Visit to US
                                   -Timing
                                         -May 1973
       -Duration
             -May 1973
-Settlement agreement
       -North Vietnam’s actions
             -Cease-fire
                    -Timing
                          -Laos
                                -Preamble concession
                                -Withdrawal of civilians from South Vietnam
       -US-North Vietnam relations
             -Tone
       -Timing
             -February 1973
       -Thieu
       -US resolve
-Possible statement
       -Patrick J. Buchanan
-North Vietnam’s delays
-Theme
       -Ronald L. Ziegler’s view
             -“Peace is at hand”
             -Necessity of avoiding wrong kind of peace
-Kissinger’s press conference
-Settlement agreement
       -North Vietnam’s actions
             -Cease-fire
                    -Laos
                    -October 1972
                    -Lon Nol
-POWs
       -Possible statement
                                              -5-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. June-08)

                                                             Conversation No. 383-1 (cont’d)

                          -Ziegler
                   -Settlement agreement
                          -Protocols
                                -Text
                                      -William H. Sullivan
             -Forthcoming report
             -Kissinger’s press conference
                   -Tone
                   -Press relations
                          -News magazines
                          -[Arnold] Eric Sevareid
                          -David Brinkley
                          -Walter L. Cronkite, Jr.

Kissinger and Haig left at 3:24 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Because the formal proposal to come to the May Blast was accepted on May 8th.
They had accepted our proposal.
They had accepted the proposal, which you had adjourned, so we had no reason to suppose that we could not bring him along.
Second, the things we wanted to fix were, if they were in good faith, easily fixed.
And we assumed that they had to be in good faith having gone this far.
The President said repeatedly he would sign the treaty.
Stopping the bomb in the north of the 20th parallel on the 23rd.
Why don't you put that in?
So wait, so...
The demonstration is a good thing.
Just to show how far you can stop the bomb.
It was an easy matter if they were willing to honor the spirit of what we had at least before.
It became insoluble if they wanted to use it as a substitute for doing what, for who he is the president introduced it to.
Now, since then, what have they done?
are trying to interpret every provision in such a way not that it would present peace.
I just called to wish you a happy heathen birthday.
And I... Well, we remember our visit there, and we came to see you, and I...
have a great life to look back on and a great life to look forward to.
We've still got a few problems, but we'll work them out.
... ... ... ... ...
I've made it very clear, Mr. President, this past Thursday, the point you made this morning, here it takes a speech because the National Defense Committee sent it, and it's basically a dollar to the bottom.
It's nothing to me.
Now, imagine the dollar.
You risk your whole political future in that.
In retrospect, it all looks easy, but if the Senate doesn't know enough, as there was a 50-50 chance that it might, Michael, obviously, you might have lost the election.
So, uh, you went right on the line.
You could have flushed him a hundred times.
All you had to do was follow the advice of your advisor.
All you had to do was not increase your voice.
You'd be dead.
I think it should be a very cold, wetter, or eukaryotic.
Better cold.
Or do you want it?
Good.
Circulation.
Now, will you prepare better now or work on it a little?
I think it should be cold and just safe.
I really think that the only
You don't think it will really fly.
And then, you said they have to fly those fighters, the fighters that have to fly it.
They get to the point where they're not going to be able to record it.
I think it's good enough so it's actually not going to fly out.
I think it's a little bit more than they can fly.
Okay.
Now that, have we ever put 60-150 meters over an hour before?
No.
We had that at 30.
That's one mission.
What mission?
IPHON.
In the middle of the airfield.
We had one mission of T-55 in IPHON in 10 minutes.
It shook them up more than any other mission we undertook.
And the targets?
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Can I do that to George?
Huh?
And George.
And the bucket.
Now, just the fact that you're going magically with people is good.
They have told their population that they're going to eat you.
They're playing chicken with us.
That guy is on his last legs because they think they can do less of all this.
and they can grab together to take it back to very close to October 26th.
Then when we do this, they're going to scream from the roof, and they'll tear us down, and they'll bring you down to death.
So I think now is the time, Mr. President.
There's one flaw in that, which we gave last week.
We said the U.S. will respect the integrity and so forth.
We should now
It's a minor point.
It doesn't make any operational difference.
But you cannot let them...
The letter backed off this proposition that we should forget the language and just go ahead and sign it.
No, but you're not going to let me do that.
But Rodgers will be more complex.
Rodgers will not fight you.
Rodgers will not defend you.
You've got to say it's important policy in the United States.
And Rodgers will usually try to get away, but that's not how he's tried for four years.
What do you think he should do with Rodgers?
I don't want to get in with Rodgers.
Do you agree with that, Al?
Why do I, if I get anything?
He won't fight.
He'll be on the board.
Why'd he do it?
Why didn't he just board his car?
We should have done this.
We should have done it.
All right.
All right.
He's done it.
He just did it.
He agrees with himself.
I think Hanoi, as it was, end of November, they were ready to case against a lot of concessions.
They have nothing they can do to improve their situation.
And if they think you're going to pay them for six months, and if their mind stays in court, they're going to be finished as a functioning society.
All right.
What's your name?
My name's .
I don't know about you, but you've done anything good.
You've spent a better experience than I've ever done.
What are you going to tell me, Frank?
I'll be very, very honest, though.
I won't force you to know that, but I want to tell you something.
I know you're going to be forced to.
But, hey, I know when you're going to be fast on the highway, it makes it impossible to put you in the middle of people's faces.
Simply, as you quoted for us, we have something that we should do and judge what we're going to do.
Let's say, why don't you say it?
I'll tell you the truth.
I'm very grateful for your actions.
You realize how it really is.
He has to take the matter into his own hands, and he wants you to take no one to each another.
I don't think we should do that, Mr. President, because he's our coach, and he must have the model.
We don't want him to throw us a concession.
It's not us who's doing it.
We should just say, we'll have to do it.
Mr. President, I'll just say, the president doesn't plan to do it.
We're just going to have to do it.
Just remember that.
I just want you both to just leave this one, that whatever happens, the Brezhnev relationship, the president considers it most important to do nothing.
He wants to retain that relationship.
When the big event put up next year, it's going to be the Brezhnev-Lewis relationship.
We have this problem, Henry.
The Brezhnev visit.
So it's scheduled for May.
So at that time, it was still bombing, but if you just thought it might be enough.
My God.
Mr. President, if you do it thoroughly, it will be enough.
It cannot last.
It will not last.
That's what you're talking about, eh?
It's going to get closer than that.
Now, what do you think?
It's going to be perfect.
President Bush had gone as far as they did.
And they are heading towards a settlement.
They're getting their little ocean friends in to change for a settlement.
And now that that's sustained, they can pull a poultry ploy up.
And, I mean, some of the things they did last week, they told us they chose to be fired in ours if we gave them a concession on the treaty.
We gave them the concession, so they chose to not hand that in.
I say, well, I'm not sure of the name, but I understand that if they pay for that, you have to pull out the civilian employees.
And some people, you know, just tell me, and they will be fired and out.
This company has got that thing to us.
Uh-huh.
So they are saying, they are saying, they are saying, I'm serious right now, I can use it as a system, right, eventually.
I mean, you've never done it.
You're never going to do it if you turn back.
Realize it.
Realize it.
I think Mr. President would be a stronger president.
But I'm not convinced he's going to still run for office.
I want the right kind of people.
You see, Sager has seen this very clearly.
He says that much better than the
On the other hand, I want you to be sure to couch this in terms.
All is not lost.
We're hopeful.
We're ready.
But, uh, please, I will say this, but the fact is, we could have been in a week.
But it would not last.
No, but we could have been at the wrong time of season week.
Right.
We could have been at the easy time of season week, but it is their will to carry out these assumptions on which our agreement was made.
They don't care about it.
It's just an example.
Exactly, yeah.
I think the idea is very good.
They now put out a condition which does not give back our prisoners of war.
Therefore, today, when the POW thing goes, I want Ron, I want something that bears it.
Ron puts tremendous weight on the fact that we are doing this because we are trying to
Here is what Sullivan said about the DOW protocol.
He gave it only to be in text.
We expect to receive an English language text of this order when we meet a ship tomorrow.
We will transmit it to you through this channel.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Good morning.