Conversation 041-043

TapeTape 41StartFriday, June 22, 1973 at 1:51 PMEndFriday, June 22, 1973 at 1:58 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceWhite House Telephone

On June 22, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger talked on the telephone from 1:51 pm to 1:58 pm. The White House Telephone taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 041-043 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 41-43

Date: June 22, 1973
Time: 1:51 pm - 1:58 pm
Location: White House Telephone

The President talked with Henry A. Kissinger.

[See also Conversation No.448-5]

     Kissinger’s schedule
           -Sans Souci restaurant

     President’s conversation with Leonid I. Brezhnev
           -Kissinger
                 -Champagne toast
                 -Conversation with William J. Fulbright

     President’s agreement with Brezhnev on prevention of nuclear war
           -Reaction
                 -Enthusiasm
                      -Hawks [?]
                      -Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Paul H. Nitze
                      -James R. Schlesinger
                                 -25-

       NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                        (rev. November-2012)

                                                  Conversation No. 41-43 (cont’d)

-Treaty compared to agreement
      -William Rogers’s suggestion
      -Congress
      -Melvin R. Laird’s view
-Congress
      -Approval
      -Edward F. Hebert
      -Spiro T. Agnew
-Support
-President’s assessment
-Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield’s comment to president
      -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
            -Chou En-Lai
-North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
      -Brussels, Belgium
      -Support
-Japan
      -Support
-Great Britain
-France
-Germany
-Kissinger’s briefing on airplane
      -President’s conversation with Ronald L. Ziegler
      -Message from President
      -Will of the parties
            -President and Brezhnev relationship
                   -Politburo
-Kissinger’s conversation with Marvin L. Kalb
      -Kalb’s assessment
-Possible reaction
      -New York Times, Washington Post
-Provisions
      -Use of threat of force
            -Third parties, allies
            -USSR restraint
                   -Jordan
                   -Cien Fuegos
-PRC
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
                                             -26-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    (rev. November-2012)

                                                           Conversation No. 41-43 (cont’d)

           -Mansfield
                 -President
           -Achievements of the administration
           -Attendees at signing ceremony
                 -Fulbright
                       -President’s assessment
           -President’s remarks
                 -Pragmatism
           -Roles of President and Kissinger
           -Rogers’s suggestion
                 -Congress
                       -laird’s view
                       -Debates
                       -Approval

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello?
Dr Kissinger, sir.
Are you at lunch?
Yes, I'm at lunch.
I wanted to tell you that you probably know what Bershnev and I were mumbling about.
We were trying to get you the hell up on that platform with the champagne drinking.
You were over on the side, but you couldn't get our signal, apparently.
Oh, no, I didn't notice it.
Well, we tried.
He spoke to me, and he says, where's Dr. Kisner?
And I said, he's over here.
But, you know, these stupid aides never know what the hell to do.
But you should have been up there.
Hell, you did this thing.
I want you to know that he mentioned it to me, and I, you know, and I, of course, and then I saw you over in the left, and I signaled, and you were talking to Fulbright or some son of a bitch.
I don't know.
Yeah, I didn't notice it.
Well, I think it was a great occasion, Mr. President.
you know it's going to come off all right henry oh not that they're enthusiastic what do you think oh everybody's enthusiastic tell me about it tell me your reaction came up to me and said you know uh uh you know the ones who have a vested interest in defense and said how did you bring it off it's unbelievable
From our standpoint, Henry, the treaty is a masterpiece.
I mean, the agreement.
We've got to be sure we say agreement.
Thank God we didn't go with Roger's suggestion of sending it to Congress.
Mel Laird was absolutely right on that.
We'd be producing a congressional storm.
Congressmen are delighted with it.
Sure they are.
And if they raise the point, we'll say it doesn't require congressional approval.
They don't raise it.
Your individual support, we appreciate it.
Well, a bear was delighted with it.
Agnew is thrilled with it.
He says it's a masterpiece.
Did he?
Yeah.
Told you?
Isn't that something?
You know, he was mumbling around a little bit.
Oh, God, he doesn't know anything.
But, you know, basically, Henry, this is a masterpiece, you know.
You know, when you were talking and you were, no, Rogers was talking to me, and I leaned over and Mansfield called me and says, my, the Chinese were really like this moment.
I said, well, Mike, they may object, but let me tell you that I sent a letter to you in law.
Well, the NATO ambassadors we briefed them this morning are enthusiastic.
Roger said they were, huh?
Well, and also in Brussels, the Japanese are enthusiastic.
Are they?
Yeah.
They're going to make a very strong statement of support.
What about the British and the French and the Germans?
The British will certainly be for it because they helped draft it.
Right.
It's in your background to give us some part.
Let me tell you one thing that I would like for you to do.
I just spoke to Ron about it when I couldn't get you.
I'd like for you to drop to the back of the plane and make a very important comment.
You've just talked to the president and so forth, and that the president has said for years that a treaty is only, or a contract, any agreement,
is only as good as the will of the parties to keep it.
Every war is started by breaking a treaty.
Now, at this point, the important thing here is not just this agreement, which is important in itself.
The personal relationship between...
and Nixon, and the whole Politburo, which means that the will of the parties to keep it has been established.
That, gentlemen, is really what is involved here.
There is a new relationship between the leaders of the two most powerful nations.
the words then take on substance because it's the will of the parties to keep it if you go back and give that and you can quote me directly that you have talked to me why don't you try to that'll make a hell of a story certainly i said part of it at the press briefing this morning but not as strongly as that don't you think it's a good point i think it's an excellent point it's an essential point
But I spoke, for example, to Marvin Kalb on the way out.
Did he?
Oh, did you?
What did he say?
You know, he was standing there doing his broadcast.
He said, oh, it's a masterpiece.
He's smart enough to know.
Yeah.
He did say it was a masterpiece.
he said that yeah oh yeah now don't you worry if some people say it isn't you understand oh no no they won't say that some have a vested interest no some will they have a vested interest in saying it isn't the times and the postal piss on it but we don't care they'll run against the stream of american opinion my god an agreement to prevent nuclear war in which both sides agree
not just on nuclear things, but to avoid the use of force, threats of force against each other, or third parties and allies, groups abroad.
That's something that...
Protect their allied obligations at the same time.
Yeah, I believe it.
But even without that, the fact that the Soviet Union now restrained with regard to Jordan, with regard to Xi Jinping, with regard to... Jesus Christ, Henry, this is a hell of a thing.
Yeah.
I think the reaction has been more universally approving than I thought.
Jackson saw, as many people see in it, as a protection for the Chinese, which is fine.
That's what Mansfield saw.
That's fine.
I scared him a little on it, but...
I wouldn't talk against it.
I didn't talk against it, but I just said, well, Mike, we've assured the Chinese it's no threat to them.
Yeah, yeah.
Oh no, this is going to be, this is going to put, it's a sort of a capstone of everything.
so oh yeah if we had said three years ago we were going to do this four years ago five years ago yes two years ago but you know basically let's look at those clowns around that table today fullbright that sniveling bastard and the rest that have done the things that they've done to us for god's sake henry you realize that the
we have come so far from where we were that doesn't mean that's why i put in the pragmatic things i did in these within my remarks that i have no illusions about all this but basically we have come so far that nobody would have predicted it right oh nobody could have conceived it no i think this is a great achievement and your fortitude got us here
did or not.
The main thing is your expertise carried it off because this language is superb.
Thank God, though, we didn't try to press that stupid point Rogers made last night.
Why, hell, we'd... First of all, Laird is totally right.
We don't want it to go to the Congress.
Good God, we'd have a damn debate.
We'd be spending all our time... No, and the minute it comes up that it should be approved by the Congress, we'd say, no, it is not required, period.
Any other questions, gentlemen?
Exactly.
Okay.
Right, Mr. President.