Conversation 416-043

TapeTape 416StartSaturday, March 17, 1973 at 11:25 AMEndSaturday, March 17, 1973 at 12:33 PMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haig, Alexander M., Jr.;  Sanchez, Manolo;  Woods, Rose MaryRecording deviceOld Executive Office Building

On March 17, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Manolo Sanchez, and Rose Mary Woods met in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building from 11:25 am to 12:33 pm. The Old Executive Office Building taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 416-043 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 416-43

Date: March 17, 1973
Time: 11:25 am-12:23 pm
Location: Executive Office Building

The President met with Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

       Uniform

       Vietnam settlement
            -Absent without leave [AWOL]
                  -Charges
                  -Elliot L. Richardson [?]
                  -Policy
            -Prisoners of war [POWs]
                  -Performance
                  -Handling by networks, press corps

       Gridiron Club
             -Patriotism

       Vietnam settlement
            -Infiltration
                   -Henry A. Kissinger
            -Laos
            -Strikes against Ho Chi Minh trail
                   -Purpose
                          -Risks
                          -US withdrawal
            -US purposes
                   -Withdrawal
                   -Duration of peace
            -US strikes
                   -Prospects for damage
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                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                          Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

                -Symbolism
                -Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -Kissinger
                -President’s message
                -Soviet Union’s position
          -PRC
                -Position
          -North Vietnam
                -Economic aid
          -US options
          -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] assessment
                -Infiltration
                       -Decline
          -Bureaucratic attitudes
                -CIA
                       -James R. Schlesinger
                              -Toughness
                       -Military intelligence services
                       -Military control
                       -Schlesinger
                              -Ruthlessness
                              -Richard M. Helms
                                    -Softness
          -North Vietnam’s motives
                -Purpose of infiltration
                       -CIA
                       -Resumption of war
                              -Failure of past negotiations
                                    -Pham Van Dong
                                    -Economic aid
                                    -Improved US-North Vietnam relations
                       -Lam Son
                       -Kissinger’s evaluation
                              -Dobrynin
                              -Brezhnev

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                    NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                            Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-019. Segment declassified on 05/08/2019. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[416-043-w001]
[Duration: 9s]

       Vietnam settlement
            -North Vietnam’s motives
                  -Purpose of infiltration
                       -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] intelligence

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       Vietnam settlement
            -North Vietnam’s motives
                   -Resumption of war
                          -US-Soviet Union summit
                                -May 8, 1972 decision
                                -Brezhnev
                   -Assistance of Soviet Union
            -Infiltration
                   -Decline
                   -US strikes
                          -Cease-fire violations
                          -Pretexts
            -Kissinger
                   -Tactics
                          -December 1972 bombing
                                -Risks

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 11:25 am.

       Haig’s duties at Pentagon

       Cuba
              -Fidel Castro
                    -CIA

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12;28 pm.
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           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                              (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                    Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

Vietnam settlement
     -Reports
           -Accuracy
     -Kissinger
           -Attitude towards settlement
     -Longevity
     -Vietnamization
           -Gen. Creighton W. Abram, Jr.’s and Melvin R. Laird’s optimism
                 -An Loc, Quang Tri
     -South Vietnamese chances of survival
           -North Vietnam
                 -Effects of bombing
                 -Capabilities
                       -Offensive
     -Soviet Union, PRC
           -Relations with North Vietnam
     -Kissinger
           -Attitude toward settlement
           -Preference for tough policies
                 -December 1972 bombing
                       -Recommendation
     -Bombing
           -Results
                 -POW release
                 -Domestic reaction
           -Ho Chi Minh trail
           -Hanoi
                 -POW release
                       -POW reaction to bombing
                       -Public reaction
                              -Nguyen Van Thieu
     -POWs
           -Risks
     -Past risks
           -Correct decisions
                 -William P. Rogers
                       -Paris
                 -Kissinger
                 -Halt of mine removal
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      NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                          (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                 Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

             -Halt of withdrawals
             -Tough note
             -Impact on North Vietnam
             -Necessity
-Possible bombing
      -Preparations
             -Targets
                   -North Vietnam
             -Military posture
                   -Aircraft carriers
      -POW release
      -Impact on US public
      -Impact on press critics
-North Vietnam provocations
      -Public reactions
             -Belief in “peace with honor”
             -Press
             -South Vietnam’s fate
                   -Fall to communists
                          -Timing
                   -Compared to China in 1940s
             -Support for President
-Press
      -Criticism of President
             -Visits with Brezhnev and Chou En-lai
      -Anticommunism
             -Public attitudes
             -POWs
-US public attitudes
      -Political future of Vietnam
-North Vietnam
      -Possible actions
-Kissinger
      -Reaction to controversy
      -Reaction to violations
-Bombing
      -Tactics
             -POW release
      -Compromise
      -Reaction to delay of POW release
                                              -52-

                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                       (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                                Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

                         -Soviet Union, PRC
            -Assessment of violations
                   -Haig’s discussion with Abrams
                         -Intelligence estimates
                         -Judgments on North Vietnam
            -North Vietnam’s possible actions
                   -US options
                   -Public attitudes
                         -Violations
                         -Justification for retaliation
                                -Infiltration
                                       -Compared to offensive
                         -Concerns
                                -Thieu
                                -Kissinger
                                -Southeast Asia
                                -US goodwill, credibility
            -Cambodia [?]
            -New York Times article
            -Intelligence
                   -Quality
                         -May 8, 1972
                   -Assessment of North Vietnam

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-019. Segment declassified on 06/19/2019. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[416-043-w006]
[Duration: 3m 2s]

      Vietnam settlement
           -Intelligence
                  -Assessment of North Vietnam
                        -Pentagon
                        -Newspapers
                  -Prisoners of War [POWs]
                        -Change in North Vietnamese attitudes
                                           -53-

                 NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                     (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                           Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

                        -Henry A. Kissinger
                 -Settlement
                        -North Vietnam line
                              -“Great Victory”
                        -Anti-Americanism
                        -Hanoi press
                 -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
                        -Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] contributions

******************************************************************************

      Vietnam settlement
           -Kissinger
                 -Attitude towards settlement
                       -Personal attachment
           -Bureaucracy
                 -Soft-line position
                 -Vindication of hard-line policies
           -Veterans of Foreign Wars [VFW]
           -Congress members
                 -Support for President
                       -Patriotism
                 -POWs
                       -Credit for release
           -Possible US strike
                 -US public support
                       -Resumption of war
                 -North Vietnam’s reaction
                       -POWs
                 -Bombing of Hanoi
                 -Kissinger [?]
                 -Abrams
                       -Judgment on South Vietnamese capabilities
                              -Kissinger
           -South Vietnam
                 -Guns
                       -Tanks
                 -III Corps area
                       -Artillery positions
                                          -54-

                NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                    (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                          Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

                             -Purpose
          -Soviet Union, PRC
                -Influence on North Vietnam
                -Relations with US
          -US-Soviet Union relations
                -Brezhnev
                -Summit
                -PRC-Soviet Union relations
                -SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] treaties
                -Nuclear treaties
          -Congressional relations
                -Resolutions
                      -Unilateral force reduction
                             -Europe
                             -Arms
                             -Military base closure
                      -Impact on US foreign policy
                      -Impact on Vietnam settlement
                      -North Vietnam’s interpretation
          -US action
                -Cambodia, Laos
                      -US public attitudes
                      -North Vietnam’s reaction
          -Kissinger
                -New intelligence reports
          -Evaluation of situation

     Henry Brandon’s book
          -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
          -William L. Safire
          -Portrayal of President
          -Kissinger’s press relations
                -William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird
                      -Negative portrayal
                             -Sources
                             -Consequences

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                                           -55-

                  NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                           Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-
2014-019. Segment exempt per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 05/08/2019. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[416-043-w002]
[Duration: 21s]

       GREAT BRITAIN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

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       Brandon
            -Czech Jew
            -Laird, Rogers
                  -Reactions to book
                  -Jack N. Anderson
                        -Sources of leaks
                              -Congress members

       December 1972 bombing of North Vietnam
           -Kissinger’s accusations against Haig
                 -Disloyalty
           -Kissinger’s opposition
                 -James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
                 -Joseph C. Kraft
                       -Conversation with Haig

The President talked with Rose Mary Woods at an unknown time between 11:25 am and 12:23
pm.

[Conversation No. 416-43A]

       President’s meeting with William Warnock
             -Ambassador from Ireland
             -Timing
                                              -56-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                      (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                         Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

             -Ambassador from Great Britain

       White House social affairs
            -Haldeman
            -Music
            -Young people
            -White House staff
            -Other functions
            -Cabinet
                 -Rogers’s attendance at state dinners
                 -Kissinger
                 -George P. Shultz

[End of telephone conversation]

       December 1972 bombing of North Vietnam
           -Kissinger’s accusations against Haig
                  -Disloyalty
                        -Press relations
           -President’s role
                  -Restraint
           -Critical day

       John A. Scali
            -Press relations
                  -Skill

       Daniel Ellsberg
            -Testimony
            -Trial
            -Kissinger
            -[Unintelligible name]
                   -Bay of Pigs
                   -Testimony

       Vietnam settlement
            -Kissinger
                  -Handling
            -Decision on US action
                  -POWs
                                              -57-

                   NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

                                        (rev. Mar.-09)
                                                          Conversation No. 416-43 (cont’d)

             -North Vietnam
                  -Possible aggression
                  -Reaction to bombing
                  -Intelligence assessments
                         -Violations of cease-fire
                               -Thieu’s charges

       Meeting with Haig

       Weather

Haig left at 12:23 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Hello, how are you?
Good morning, how are you?
It's the day, it's the day, huh?
You know, this is the weekend before.
I had plans based on the case that I had to tamp down the whole place
And then this last past year, I just knew that they were in the south, that they were, some of them were coming here.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know if it's there, but they have done so well, and I'm surprised everybody's so much.
But I'll listen to you.
That's right.
That's literal.
I even think the networks are happening around the world.
Well, I think the networks have really been impressed.
I think the whole press corps has been cowed and intimidated by the basic instances of the experience.
I don't know if you can hear me.
Well, I guess I've been thinking that's why there's so much strong patriotic in it.
I mean, you're sure.
Yeah.
What I wanted to talk to you about, because I particularly, uh, you know, uh, we have, uh, we said we'd talk to you about this, uh, immigration, uh, you know, the revolution, the trail strikes next year, perhaps one year, uh,
I have no problem with regard to what I'm doing.
And the only problem I'd say is I'm confident.
Of course, except for the risk.
There's always a problem with that.
I'm serious.
Now what?
On the other hand, I think it's right for me to do it.
That's going to be a case that will work the long haul because our purpose here is not just to get out.
We want to start out with the purpose here is to get out if we can, if we can.
I don't know.
It's the last year or so.
Let's see what happens.
I wonder what your view is on that.
Well, I understand that if I would have, I have no hesitation on it.
If it would fall, I would be sure to do more damage.
But on the other hand, if it is a calling card down the line, and the Russians and the Chinese, as you know, I have very specific
We're also getting some of the Chinese in regard to that.
We're going to put them straight, put them right in there, in their body, and they have
I don't want you to have that.
I'm sorry to talk to you about these kinds of questions, but there's only one question we want to answer.
We've got other than the possibility of course they realize this, they think this, and they have to change their mind.
We don't want to talk about it, except for this.
It's a hard condition to live in, but all we've got is the fact to say, look, just forget the field program.
Forget it.
We're not going to be discussing it for so long.
Well, I think you're highly empowered.
That's right.
That's right.
That's right.
And I think, well, I think we had this session very, very carefully.
I read the latest CIA weekly assessment of infiltration, and they said, it looks like it's down about 30% from the people to possibly.
I think we had the business very, very carefully.
There are two things that are in the way, the attitudes and the bureaucracy.
I don't want to, I don't want to understand.
I'm a service man and all the rest of it.
I'd rather have a CIA agent do it.
We've just got that charge concept.
The point is,
But in any event, I think you have to be careful that some of these guys over at the CIA are such whores that they may be, that they're going to
In the past, they've always been soft.
In other words, they've been overestimated in the military.
Yes, and the dangers of it.
Yeah.
That's what you see.
I read the data reports.
I put it to him pretty strong.
He's gone to Mexico.
Basically,
Now, I said I didn't realize what's going on here.
If actually they are infiltrating, if CIA's worst fears are correct, it means that we're playing for seconds.
That the whole talk of your meeting has been bombed on and we're talking about the fact that they wanted economic assistance.
that they want a better relationship behind the stage with security.
They're the blipers.
They're setting us up.
And so as they get out, they're going to hit one side.
And I said, do you realize that's what's going on?
And I said, now, Henry, what is your evaluation?
Now, Henry, the evaluation came back.
It's an evaluation problem.
Well, and I was, I was more interested in what we were going to do.
And not the other.
They're thinking all the rest about this phrase and that phrase.
All those phrases I was going to share with you.
Doesn't mean anything.
It's a question of whether or not you agree.
Right?
I said, I said, what?
What about these guys?
What do they want?
He said, well, he said it was his judgment.
He can spell what he wanted.
At least for all of us.
Take it anymore.
But at least they want a relationship with us.
If that is true, the purpose of this infiltration, at whatever level it is, is simply to keep the option open of going another Wednesday in case the new one doesn't work.
But the point is, as you know, everything goes from here to here.
One day, as they're getting on, the next day, they said they're not starting, but that's even better than all right.
And there goes this.
shouldn't rattle these people.
I said, there aren't going to be any Russians on the border.
I said, well, sure.
I said, my God.
I said, we couldn't go to Russia without doing aid.
Russia, that's not going to come here at a time when the army has even started its war camp.
Imagine that.
We're not going to move forward with the Russian mission.
Do you agree with that?
I think that's going to have some effect on the Russians.
They have to know that's helpful.
But what I'm really saying is that I think
If it's down, you know, any division that's saying 30% down, we've got to watch it.
You know, it's a very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very,
He has this almost paranoia with regard to the fact that
We must brutalize, we must show our teeth, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
All right.
There's certainly nobody that's been in this office that has shown teeth more often in greater risk than I have.
December 5th.
Right.
But it was a hell of a list.
Now, the point is that,
Like he's been fed better now.
He's over at the Pentagon.
Or his bar.
Big shot.
He's worked it out.
He's got a visa to do it.
He needs to work it out.
Have you got Castro watching back?
No, I didn't.
No.
Never.
I'll be watching the CIA.
If you've got it so much pressure, you should catch.
I cannot just take it.
I cannot just take it.
Let me put it this way.
very, very honest to ourselves about is this.
That is that Henry is so personally involved in this settlement that he would risk everything, really everything, in order to buy some insurance for the government.
Now, I'm very interested to see the settlement survive.
In other words, you and I don't like to talk about peace with arms and then have a cave.
I don't think it will.
I cannot believe.
I personally think, well, I've never thought that, I've never believed Clare's paper was more optimistic than it was about how long the administration was.
After what they did at Avalon, after what they did at Monaco, I personally believe that the South African nation is going to be a hell of a lot harder not to crash.
I personally can't help but believe that the Kremlin has set that record so that they cannot launch a nuclear missile.
I think, not this time, but not as soon as November.
I personally believe, too, myself, that the Russians and the Chinese have got to have some influence.
The Russians and the Chinese at this time, at this time, will not want to do their interest to allow their whole relationship with us
Because, now that's the argument, the other one, now Henry on the other hand, I think he intends to make, well, let me put it this way, he intends to, to like a tough policy, but to provide us with money most of the time.
You know what I mean?
I don't remember, I mean, well, he set off a little bit of a bomb, and he didn't recommend it.
God damn, we have no idea.
No, I mean, he's very self conscious about the fact that he has been good for a river.
I don't speak for this country, but there's no question about that.
That's what we have to worry about.
And I don't have to worry about that.
And I didn't take the option to do it.
Let us suppose it did result.
now particularly if we have hit them if we have hit the trailer and then they hold the prisoners back and then we bomb and all that if they just hold the prisoners back period
You and I have to care for each other.
We've got to care for each other.
But the point is, I think the risking, that any significant risk on the U.S. is not worth thinking about.
The creed is not to go on the side of the block.
I think we've done it right.
At that time, you know, we gave tough private messages, and I look back on it as well.
We were calling in the students and parents, and we were having meetings.
We stopped.
We stopped withdrawing.
And they came.
That was necessary.
When we talk about this, sir, this will be .
So I just want to get you to judge them.
We're going to be cautious.
I'm going to say, was there a ceremony to do or a class?
Was there a ceremony to do it?
Yeah.
Then we've got to .
To the north, too?
Yes, sir.
If we decide that next week we should have a 48-hour crack, it's got to be under one set of premises only, or there's no sense in doing it at all.
And that is, A, we're going to take some other steps.
We're going to bring our carriers out and posture ourselves in a way that makes this just a free will.
It's a resumption of the law.
And we've got to be prepared for it.
And I would say that's a debatable issue.
It's to their advantage, in my humble view, not to hold the prisoners, and to make it even tougher for them, for the very reason you said.
Because then the American people say, why are you buying it?
That's right, why are you buying it?
Well, I tell you, sir, I really believe that you've turned the country, that you've convinced the mainstream of American thought, and you're now beginning to convince even the critics who think I'm a damn liberal threat, that your strength is what's done, and if it's necessary to do it, then stand back.
Despite all the goddamn things that you've done, I think we're going to get back.
But it would have to be as carefully postured and explained.
And I would never recommend it unless we've taken every, as you have to learn, every step of the way.
But I tell you this either.
I am pressing.
When you fired your shot on Wednesday, all the pussycats were calling me on the phone.
I think they like the idea of what you did.
That's right.
It wasn't him going in.
It wasn't him going in.
It wasn't him going in.
I really think the big thing is not that you're pretty sure that you're jumping in.
We must not, you see, I do think you're right, that if we have a provocation, I can explain that the country will back hard action.
But we have to realize the country now believes that we have peace.
We want the peace.
All right?
And I have to ask you, if they don't give a damn about this, believe the country doesn't give a shit.
The press does.
The press, many of them, want to see this thing fail.
But now the country doesn't give a damn.
The country would care if it was only Vietnam that came to Congress in a matter of six months.
They will not give a damn if it's two years.
You know what I mean?
It's really sort of that sort of an attitude here.
I care.
I care for you.
I'm not so sure.
I'm not so sure.
I don't think we're going to have a syndrome developed just like we did in the post-China period in the 40s.
What's that?
Well, I'm in office.
That, in that situation.
Also, we've got to realize this.
The press would never understand.
The people would not understand.
Would never understand.
All this crap that they do with Brecht and Joe and Lange and that and that and that.
They'd say, what the hell's the matter with these people?
Are we going to be dick and suckers?
They know the comments.
You see what I mean?
People still don't acknowledge that they are basically anti-communists.
And, you know, that means we're better or worse.
And we're really wrong to ask that.
You're going to start getting the cripple over here.
I think that's going to get out.
You can't tell them not to talk about it.
That's true.
They, I guess they're going to be, I had to know them too.
I voted.
I voted.
I voted.
I voted.
I voted.
I voted.
I voted.
I voted.
I don't think it was.
I don't, I don't think, I'm not as pessimistic about this as, I can't figure anything about, uh, you know, like what we know now.
It's like, you know, there's a whole story about, you know, where there was a camp, and there were maids, and so forth, and they were all in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door, and I got in the door
He was there to tell us what to see and all the rest.
He said, we've got to show you how to do it.
We've got to show you how to do it.
We've got to give him a shot.
That would be better now than a little later.
And he said it was ordered for him.
That's what I wanted to know.
You know, what I told him, I said I couldn't make sure the dialogue had been conducted in the last several weeks was done or they must get on tape.
And my assessment is that despite that violation, it really isn't so important what their intentions are in the context of the violation, but the fact that they're doing it.
Then I think it is better to do the bombing
That puts the killing in context.
And it's really going to, you know, I don't know.
We have to know.
It puts an upper pressure on the law.
If they let the prisoners out, then you know they're looking for a softer compromise or something like that.
If they hold the prisoner, you have to make the most strange message you can get out of there.
every one of them.
And, by God, they're all friends.
Now, that may not work.
Then you've got another set of calculations.
That is, whether you should, I believe you probably should, and you still, in fact, should.
Right now, before any of those, I think, is a very careful period of assessment.
The level of the violation, the character of it, whether your actions is being instated by the statements or the messages, it's all part of it.
And it isn't something that's going to be black and white.
It's going to be the toughest part of the whole thing is to assess the talent and the
I talked to Billy about this.
Yes.
And I'm not satisfied with the intelligence that he's getting.
I don't know what you're talking about.
My sense.
Because he knows that the law doesn't matter to anybody else.
And he, his instinct will be, I believe, to be very careful before we prejudge Illinois and be handled by a law firm.
We'll also be very
They're going to be able to do it.
God sent me through.
And I share that with you too.
You always have the option of whether you do it or not.
Then you can pray.
And the confession by itself is not the same as the confession in which case the case is very clear.
to everyone that they violated.
So you just have to take a very hard look at how blatantly the violations have been used.
And the point is to take a hard look at the reaction here.
Charm.
That's the problem that I have.
And on the other hand, it's all offensive.
That's such a blatant violation.
But we would have to cap that down.
We can't let that go on.
We want to have a charitable side.
I really think most Americans are more concerned about our communities than it is knowledge.
The thought about it.
That's one of the things that you can do.
But don't forget, for example, we do not have anything in here.
Then it's going to go.
And personally, we thought of getting a boat.
We took the soft version.
And then when the impact of it was going to say they are, that's what we thought.
And now we're making the best of it.
I think one of Henry's calculations was that a real American would try to recruit that kind of a black-and-white situation by addressing the problem itself and trying to get rid of the people in the room.
Man-Americans are more inclined to look at one of those safety stations out there now than others.
over the blue word of the United States and the way it's going to be kept over.
It's going to be debated in that context.
That may be a new context for us in the context of whether or not assembly stations work.
Another American war in the context of whether they will agree or not agree.
That's something that Americans are much more interested in.
The other gets into the other role of faith, which is what it should be, because often they don't have faith in God.
And in that sense, the missionary says things are right.
So I came to know all kinds of things.
And having a clear enough case, that's what I'm concerned about.
I read, for example, the Times this morning,
I'm just never sure that the intelligence would allow us to make up the behavior.
And frankly, maybe intelligence just allows us to get away now.
I don't know.
I just don't know.
The inner position is right there.
The inner position of the eye is listening.
The inner position of the eye is listening.
The inner position of the eye is listening.
The inner position of the eye is listening.
The inner position of the eye is listening.
The inner position of the eye is listening.
personal equation.
You have that much weight, and you get the fight.
It's not only true in a subjective way of hearing him, that's all.
But the other point I was trying to make is I think the bureaucracy is similar.
You know, here at his campaign, all the hardline views of death vindicate that.
Down here, I was against the listing.
Yeah, you have to get these soft lines along.
They used to be hard lines.
That is what they are now.
You know, these same bastards, they're out there clapping and they're just playing and they're supposed to go when they're going and they're already talking for the year.
Up where you, everyone's everywhere.
You know, we had a deputy the other night, probably was a great member of the city.
I saw a lot of people who were very good at talking to senators and congressmen and senators.
So we have to be careful not to get caught up in this.
That's our official creation plan.
Because they are attempting to sort of rise the bandwagon of patriotism that these people have just created.
Nothing's changed.
It's just the same as it always was.
It's very...
I don't know what to say there.
And of course they have the rest of it.
How the hell do they not work when they're out?
And what that does, and I personally think it's good.
If we didn't make it work, that would be a solid return.
Like what we did in December.
It was worth it.
I think that's what seems to be relevant.
What do we hit or not?
That's what they think.
That's what one of the packers thinks.
And one of them thinks something else.
So we'll brush it a little bit.
We'll come back to it later.
But I really believe that we have to decide this way.
We're going to look hard at it.
They all suggest .
But they also suggest .
Yeah.
And also not to live an assumption that
That's how he said, they have one arm support here, which it might not have.
Do you see what I mean?
You get the support now, you can be equipped with people, and then you roll, and you've got peace and all the rest of it.
I think you've got to have a big, less than 60, less than 60 days.
You don't like that.
You've got a real problem there.
The real problem that started this, they're not going to get it.
And the fight is,
You can't take that first step without being able to take the second.
You took the first and they get over to you.
And they might be .
That's right.
That's a tough one.
It's a tough one.
You can say, yes, the country would support anyone who says the country would rally, but he doesn't know.
I mean, everyone knows about that, but .
That's not his point.
Well told.
Incidentally, uh, I was, uh, Abrams, of course, his judgment would be very good on this.
After all, he was there.
He knows what the, uh, he does believe that they had a greater capability.
Yes, he's very sure.
I mean, it's not only that they had a greater capability.
He had a greater confidence in them, certainly.
And I guess we get all excited by these things.
Sorry, .
And it's out there.
We have confidence now that they can knock it around.
So in that sense, I'd love to pick it up.
730 .
Where we have to watch.
This time.
Well, they're there.
They're there to remember their changes, the pressure on something.
That's the nature of it.
But you're not sure that they're always the same thing.
That would leave you there to have the option of doing that at a later time.
Well, I wouldn't go anywhere if they didn't do it then.
I can't believe the Russians and the Chinese don't have a sign.
I can't believe the Russians and the Chinese are going to jeopardize their global relations with us.
That's the biggest part of me.
I'm not too sure about the Soviets.
Well, the Soviets, I suppose, like to make us trouble anyway.
On the other hand, they've got this, you've got to hold on to this, you've got to have some of that.
So they've got to have a mistake here.
They've got to have a fair attempt to get through.
They don't want that.
That's the danger of this whole thing as far as how we explain it.
If they were to decide, we'd get it off with a bigger, big game.
In the long run, the entities would decide that the best thing to halt that train would be to leave it covered inside the station.
That's correct.
At the present time, that's the reason we put in quite a bit on the plane.
The footage is for that.
Yeah, there's all three of them.
They don't know anything about it.
We do it.
We do it.
We do it.
Now it's a very, very dangerous thing.
And of course, we have a definitely difficult task with all of this goddamned, uh, Congress and all of this stuff that we've been hearing.
We're tasked with very, very, very, again, very unilateral reduction, according to the Bureau of Unilateral Reduction Demand, which blows all of our bases in the nation, all that terrible stuff.
If you wonder how the hell they did it, you know what, the Lord called them to do that, and I don't understand the fact.
I'm trying to support you.
And I don't understand, of course, the whole program.
I don't understand the whole thing, because you did not also realize that.
You didn't settle for that.
That's another thing.
The rest of the 60 days, after the summer, the rest of the 60 days, it seemed to be flat.
That is why I think that is why I think if we can, if we have to put a shot across the valley, put a cross there, after all, it is wild.
It's wild.
They won't care what
They don't care any of us about it.
It creates a reaction in the body, which is what it's going to do.
That's the problem that I see here.
It's different.
And there you go.
That's very funny.
We're watching the push, and we're watching the rest of the day, and we're making sure that everyone is aware of this.
You know, it's in that way, uh, uh, all the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh, the, uh,
Well, it'll probably cause problems here if the sapphires .
The book is not my favorite one.
.
.
.
.
And then I couldn't have come to breakfast.
Except for the night after.
And so, I'm over that.
Now, after we've been assured that everybody will rise to the floor, I suppose.
So, I expect them to say what they want.
But it is not a hard thing.
And I rest on that.
We want to deliver on that story.
We can't, we can't do it in a word.
He's a gentle, you know, with strong eyes and dreams.
So... Well, I think...
I don't know.
I don't know either.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Well, I hope he did.
You know, the presence of the ship.
There was not a lot of evidence of that.
But what I can say, basically, the reader of the book, when I see it, it's just in his eyes.
So obviously, I don't know.
It didn't have anything to do with it.
I just didn't know it.
.
.
.
.
.
Well, he was in film, so when he thought it wasn't going to work, he wanted to be against it.
And then, and he built that.
He was saying, December, White Rock went.
It was on Christmas.
Yes, sir.
After we started, after we started, he was covering his left flank.
And was telling people that the president said, that's right, that's how the rest of the craft is.
Exactly.
I know that as a matter of fact, Kraft came over to me when I went to the Pentagon, and I wanted an inside story.
I said, I have an inside story.
And I suggested, hey, everybody involved, you know what our recommendations were.
You know, you know the history and the way they work.
And he said, well, I can tell you that I was opposed.
And he was against it.
And what?
And he was opposed and opposed.
But you see, man, the bombing looked like a stroke of genius over time.
And Henry was very mad when he boxed himself in there.
Because he looked like the guy that was wrong.
And he then, when I got to work, he was mad at me and disloyalty and everything.
And I'm like, well, I'm going to come back to this as well.
Well, I'm very good at defending it.
I wrote, you know, there's a little Irish false comment today, and so forth, and I thought it would be a nice thing to do.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
Oh, oh.
Sure.
You know, the only thing I would say is that I would put young people in that kind of music.
We had it both, okay?
Yeah?
I do.
No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
I agree.
Couldn't agree more.
Couldn't agree more.
And there'll come a time
I have a party just for that, you know, which I have very much in mind.
You know, that's good for that.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
I think we are right now.
But you don't always have to read.
You don't always have to have shelter.
I've seen Christians with shelter very badly.
You know, and in fact, they get tired of the wires and all this.
Whether they do or not, whether they do or not, there are other Catholic officers who do.
But don't you include a certain person in Canada who does your own business there.
Okay.
Well, I see that he tried to, he thought, how could you, in this world, what respect?
in the sense that you would oppose the bombing, right?
No, no.
Or indicated that he had opposed it.
That I had.
I started to depress that he had opposed the bombing, which I had the notion.
He wasn't opposed to it.
As a matter of fact, really.
As far as being proposed, I was restrained and forced about that thing.
Strange, strange, strange.
And also it's about being a Republican.
Oh, good.
And prove, you know, that very act of being just so absolutely right.
And he said it was a pretty good day.
I don't know what you're going to call it.
He's got all the good stuff.
He's a good man.
We all know God.
We're out here.
And God's out here.
And let's come and get our glass of God back.
Which is good.
He's making moves.
He knows how.
And he knows now he's going to get it over with.
Don't let us get it over with.
I understand.
I'm going to take it off.
What's your opinion on all of this?
That's the one thing wrong with my church.
I don't care about it.
I don't care about it.
I think what I'm going to do is now, and this is something I'm not going to jump into, but I think I will have a very funding disability in my life.
It's very difficult.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
There has to be expected.
Well, I think everybody.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Oh, story.
On this thing, on this thing.
We have to realize it.
We have to realize it.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Right.
Right.
He's a perfectly qualified guy, but we don't know him very well.
He's a very tight-brained guy.
And actually, I'll tell you when I'm talking to him.
He said, I have no time to do it.
But I just can't let him.
He tells me how it's going to go.
You're all right.
You're all right.
You're all right.
That's why I'm listening to you.
I'm all for that.
Sure.
Yeah.
Give them a walk.
or the last few that I used.
That's why I think it's a good reason to volatilize his vocation.
His heart is just for the public, that's all.
It's volatilizing.
It's aggression.
It's clear and blatant aggression.
Aggression does not feel good at all when people talk to you like that.
But that doesn't mean you can say, well, you're an easily aborted man.
You can come to him anyway.
I remember that.
They gave the argument that a war is still going on.
Let's give it to them now.
And it breaks.
And it doesn't work.
That's the problem.
But it's not going to change their attitude and their strategy.
If they hadn't been violent and could do it, it would have been the right thing.
If they didn't identify them, then there wouldn't be any problem.
And I don't think they're going to lie to me.
No, not here.
But you might get a reaction from them.
That's what I'm trying to say.
That's what we do.
We say no.
We say no.
So what's it going to be?
How much do you do?
You're raising a question that we're not so sure that the intelligence is all that clear.
I think that the whole case of the violations of the federal system, and the Jews and the Muslims, that we can't really determine.
At least I haven't.
Both sides of the question.
We're missing really anything.
case that manifests .
I think that is the question as far as .
Good luck.
Sir, how do you like your job?
Let's do it.
Let's go.