Nixon & Haldeman on Watergate scandal and David Eisenhower

It's a different story now.
Now.
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He says that the man that he's really concerned about on the House of Representatives is very unscrupulous.
And he's very different.
And George doesn't really explain what's next.
If George doesn't really explain the simplicity of it, David, who does not want to live in the White House, and runs for mayor, he can't.
And he shouldn't live in the White House.
He better go now.
And secondly,
It's going to work in Washington.
Therefore, it must live in Washington.
And this is the best day that you've got to do it.
And under the circumstances, you can't go to the legislature.
You need to go to work.
You can't leave a Gettysburg fountain that's going to work then, right?
What the hell does it look like?
So he moved the Gettysburg.
In the meantime, the David's are there.
And therefore, the David should move into his house.
And then the other man makes a decision.
And David decides what he's going to do.
Now, what he ought to do then is, you know, he got the money, he gets the store for the Gettysburg.
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Or he might work for the House of Policy Committee, which is a fire department.
Sam's going to check it out.
David's a big one.
He's going to get up on the hill and work on general research.
But that would get him the house.
He says he's got a rhythm.
He's been pretty interesting down there.
And he wants to be a real student.
And I'm going to do this issue.
He says, well, they asked me to get David.
I said, well, I want to be able to do this.
Good.
And so Sam's working on that.
He's the only lead security.
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that you ought to start getting up to the districts.
Would it be better if that would be a possibility at all?
Should work with the National Committee.
One of the House committees, Peter Peter, the House Committee, was on the conference today, which was very interesting.
Pardon me, there actually was no, normally no press charge.
Called Amanda's help with this distortion that leaked out of the Lenski Group.
Well, they put out a big story, which is a big story writing.
And I admitted to the Winston group that I organized and directed the intelligence operation for the campaign.
But claimed that I had done nothing illegal.
But any such thing, you know, it was done.
They put Lasky here, and some others apparently put that out, but I blew it a second.
Howard Rose is the chairman.
I would apologize for that.
He didn't call me.
He called Max Friedrich.
But as he called me, it's not bad as hell.
I've been a member of the Wednesday group for seven years, and I'm probably going to resign.
But first, I want to characterize that I'm going to go make a statement on the floor tomorrow, correcting the record of what you said.
The apology is not necessary.
The fact that there was a leak is of no concern to me, because I expect that.
And I have nothing ever that I would say that I'm concerned about.
On the other hand, I am very much concerned that what I said was distorted and was reported erroneously.
And if you felt that you wanted to correct the record on that and straighten out what I said, that would be a very useful service, and I would deeply appreciate it.
He said, .
Well, he says McCloskey put the data at the start and the story first.
And they said five times from all of you, basically the same story.
And two others ..
So you never said this to me.
No.
I used my thing about tape recordings of the candidates.
I had urged that either the National Committee or the campaign committee get busy and make a complete record of what all these people were saying because it was very useful.
I said, I'm sure every one of you in your campaign for Congress, the most useful thing you had in your general election was what your opponents...
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They assumed that this meant that Harleman admitted that he'd set up the machinery that had led to the Watergate operation.
It's the same kind of thing as the Watergate one.
And this will have the same effect on the Watergate.
I was worried about it at first, but it's become now sort of a conventional thing.
They've now, they've lobbed that into every story.
Since Harleman did direct the political intelligence, then it must be assumed that there's some
he's a decent man
He said, most of all, I'm concerned about the fact that your accounts are in direct contrast with the way you love me when it's on the water treatment.
He said, it's clear as hell.
Everyone on that team, you should know the follow-up on it was that all of us have miscommunications about how the water treatment was handled.
But in terms of your relationship, I don't know that you would come away with a hell yes.
We do have something that's very profitable.
We have opposition research in terms of public utterances.
And that was the point you made.
You made it very well.
And then I said, but I didn't say I directed it.
And you said, that's right.
You didn't let the others know about that.
But that is directly patented surveillance.
And I first drafted a statement for the record.
You taught me how to do it.
Thank you.
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Thank you.
He said, that's not what the public's going to see.
They're going to see each of yours as a part of an overall.
So you can say, yes, you cut off here, but if you cut off here and the thing went on to there, then the public sees you over there.
You've got to look at this.
I know the problem.
I see it that way.
What do you do to knock that off?
There's no way.
He's not sure.
He doesn't know enough yet.
Mark, I'd like to repeat what they're going to do.
You believe what they want to believe.
That's what it is.
They can't believe what they want to believe.
What they did is proceed to extend what I said to make it sound like I said something else.
I don't want them to tell me anything that's untrue.
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Somebody, you don't need to give me that.
Somebody came off the bushes and had to go this way.
Yeah, well, you've got to be there, I guess.
That's what I'm talking about.
Maybe we're wrong.
Maybe there's water.
You're not taking it, so I'm not going to be specific.
It's just, it's early.
You can't expect to get out of there right now.
Thank you.
They can damn the hell out of everybody.
That is a big one.
What John is thinking about is that it improves his Senate committee, censures, actual blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah,
Yeah.
Maybe it doesn't sound like it.
There are incidents of violence that are worse than segregation.
That's my point.
You want to get a whole list of threats.
You can probably do that work next to supporters.
You've got to get a whole list of threats, particularly high antibody implications for us.
I like these questions, but
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That's right.
I think they'll go to the time, whether there's a time.
I don't think they're going to expose it.
I don't think they're going to take care of it.
All right.
I'm not really
I don't really want to get into too much of that.
I think calling staffers for doing their work, though, I think that's up to the person.
Rick Timmons recommended them to call Carlos, and I should call him today, and Max Friedrich, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today, and I should call him today,
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At that time, there were a lot of dope stories about decisions being made.
They told the contracting congressmen and different things, you know, they were .
I said that he had nothing to do with it, and that I was running it.
Well, with Rockefeller and Reagan, believe it or not, or any of the state chairmen they were setting up, the regional chairman, Frank Dale, well, I never talked to Frank Dale.
He was chairman of the committee.
There were hundreds of people that know
Thank you.
Thank you.
Well, the problem is, though, whether it can answer anything on your side, whether you're then not setting yourself up to answer everything.
And he's very concerned.
He says, I don't see it.
They ask you, did John Deacon say to you that?
How can you refuse to answer?
You have to know whether what he told you is true or not.
You have to know whether he told you to answer that or not.
There's a lot of things that I can do.
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No, I mean...
Yes.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
There was a letter.
There is one that doesn't look good.
It doesn't tie it in any way.
And I don't think it was a response to the question.
You wouldn't thank me for it.
I'd like to meet the idea of going on and putting a card on the first and then put a hard drive on it.
It's not something you can't do.
Getting it out first.
We're going to come back the week after Easter.
I think they're going to call us.
That's what Irving's trying to get.
Baker's pushing for that.
Irving's going to try to deal with that tomorrow.
Do that, Fred.
We'll get it here.
I think the urban strategy would be very much the other way around.
I think he would say, you know, we have to make the case first.
But your point is that we have to be very urban.
They have been dragged in.
They have to be at the right place.
That's what he's got to say.
And if we go working, we're going to get back to it.
We can't sit around for months waiting for the Senate to come in.
And the staff of 75 investigators will be out taking care of resentments and trying to find something that blows it or creates doubt on it.
And the staff of 75 get all screwed up and want to pull it all together.
And that's a goddamn lot of stuff.
And they have trouble getting it sorted out with their staff.
Thank you.
Well, I think it's all right to do this.
I think it's bad.
I don't think we ought to do another one again, though.
And that really would be brilliant.
Bill is one of them.
He said, you know, the more you do it, the more you want it.
You just can't do it.
And also, you need this business of calling every time there's a vote.
Yes, sir.
Bill, you see, we did that so much.
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I didn't want to be good.

Nixon & Haldeman on Watergate scandal and David Eisenhower

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on April 10, 1973

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