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Conversation 449-020

TapeTape 449StartTuesday, September 21, 1971 at 5:02 PMEndTuesday, September 21, 1971 at 5:15 PMTape start time03:45:23Tape end time03:56:10ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed the ongoing diplomatic efforts regarding the People's Republic of China, specifically focusing on the uncertainty surrounding Mao Zedong's health and internal political instability. Kissinger updated the President on recent communications with Chinese officials and the logistical challenges of finalizing dates for a presidential visit. The pair concluded that regardless of internal Chinese turmoil, the administration's strategic position remained advantageous for upcoming diplomatic negotiations, including potential summits with the Soviet Union.

People's Republic of ChinaHenry KissingerDiplomacyMao ZedongSoviet-American relationsPresidential scheduling
AudioNARA Description

On September 21, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 5:02 pm to 5:15 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 449-020 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 449-20

Date: September 21, 1971
Time: 5:02 pm - 5:15 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

     The President's schedule
          -Exhibition of race cars
          -Reception for race drivers
               -Compared to horse racing
               -Invitation to Kissinger

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 1m 47s ]

          PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [PRC]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

**********************************************************************

          -Mao Tse-tung
              -Status
              -Political changes
                    -Comeback
                          -"Great Leap Forward"
              -Status
                    -Kissinger’s forthcoming visit
                    -Effect on the President's visit to the PRC
                          -Veterans of Foreign Wars [VFW]
                          -Chou En-lai
                          -Timing

          -Kissinger's meeting with the PRC Ambassador
                -Timing
          -Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters's meeting
                -Report on meeting
                     -The PRC’s response
                     -Meeting
                     -The PRC’s response
                           -The President's communique
                                -Announcement of Kissinger’s forthcoming visit
                                      -Dates
                                      -Crew lists
                                      -Dates

    Negotiations
        -Nikolai Podgorny
               -Trip to North Vietnam
               -Dates of the President's trip to the PRC
        -Announcement of Kissinger's trip
               -Effect of the PRC’s domestic situation
               -Date of announcement
                     -Agreement

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[National Security]
[Duration: 9s ]

    PRC

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

**********************************************************************

          -US position
               -Middle East

           -PRC trip
               -USSR
                     -Soviet Summit
                     -The President's trip to the PRC
                          -Kissinger's memorandum to the President
                          -Soviet response

**********************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 30s ]

     PRC

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

**********************************************************************

                -The President's visit to the PRC
                -Chou En-lai
                -Kissinger's meeting with PRC officials

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 5:02 pm.

     The President's schedule
          -Exhibition of race cars
               -The President's remarks
               -Photo opportunity
                      -Oliver F. ("Ollie") Atkins
               -Racing magazines
                      -Press
          -Time
          -Racing cars
               -State Dining Room

Bull left at an unknown time before 5:15 pm.

     PRC
           -Domestic situation
                -National holiday
                      -Parade
                      -Cancellation of events
           -PRC's response to the President's communique
           -Kissinger's proposals
                -Dates

The President and Kissinger left at 5:15 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

You've not seen a racing car yet, have you?
You know, that's the second biggest car.
Yes, I've been invited to that reception, I might.
No, if you don't have no particular interest in it.
They might see it, I mean...
It could be that Mao has died.
It could be that Mao has really been pushed to the periphery, has been pushed to the periphery and has come back the way he came back after he had been put out in the cold after the Great Leap Forward.
The basic reality of Chinese politics won't change.
I would guess that if Mao died,
It would be hard.
Well, my visit is certainly off then, and I don't know whether they could put a visit for you together.
That's right.
Well, I mean, I still think our visit would come off, because whoever comes in would have to have a...
if the same things that motivated Joe and Meyer motivated the success?
Mr. President, over a two-year period, it will make them want an American president more.
So there's no question about that in my mind, whether in a six-month period, which is what we're talking about now, they would want an American.
They could handle an American president if Mao died, unless there's one unchallenged
survivor of this project.
The other thing, if you want to remember, you had your meeting with the Chinese ambassador since a lot of this occurred.
It was very cultural.
My meeting with the Chinese ambassador was September 13th, when all of it happened.
The 10th was when some of this started.
Well, and... And there... And Walters had a meeting with them today.
I sent him in to say that...
He's already reported on that.
Yeah.
They had no answers at all, but they were extremely cultural.
There are no answers.
No, and that is one thing that I find very odd, Mr. President, because they are usually meticulous enough to give you a nothing answer for them simply not to answer a communication, a communication which the President would appreciate, which is what we did.
His communication today was two things.
One, to tell them we could no longer accept the September date, which was just a way of
The second was to say, if necessary, we would accept the October 14th date and, thirdly, to hand over the list of the crew for the airplane that would show up.
Pointing out, too, that the October dates were not as good.
Did you do that, or did you not do that?
The 6th and 7th.
Yeah, on the ground with the visits to Hanoi.
Well, the more I thought about it, Mr. President... How did you do that?
The...
Uh, you can argue it both ways.
There's something to be said for having Putgoni in Hanoi.
Uh, and so you didn't put that in?
I didn't, I didn't want to tie up that slowly.
Would be all right.
Would be all right, because then if they wanted, they can still pick it, but if they had already decided for the 5th, 6th, and 7th, for us it's close enough.
Good.
All right.
Then we've opened everything up.
We've opened everything up.
It needs to be a problem in a sense now.
In a sense, let's just take a look at how this thing looks.
In any event, they are taking problems.
Thank God we didn't take the 14th, because it would be something to announce you this and then blow it.
See my point?
Yeah, yeah.
Oh, the 14th of September.
Oh, you know...
The idea of announcing your visit on the 14th, which they originally submitted, we turned down.
We could have done that and announced it by now, and then all this would have happened.
See my point?
Yeah.
No, no, they wanted to announce it on October 14th.
That's your point.
All we would have had would have been a private agreement to announce that on the 14th.
Well, that would have been irrelevant.
I think that's it.
Oh, well.
Well, my view is it never brought trouble.
It could be a military, it is as probable as anything that they've had a, that they think there's a military conflict.
It would be, for our game, it would be, we've got it humming really now like a, it's just really working out beautiful.
We've got everything linked together, just as you said.
We've got the Middle East, we've got everything in the game now.
Well, if the Chinese could knock this thing off, what does that do to the Russians that still want to visit?
Oh, yeah, but we've just got a little less pressure on them.
With the visit, I think if the visit to China is in the cards, the Russians are going to be most eager to, not most eager, we have a pretty good chance now of bringing out that flurry which I have in my memo to you.
If the visit to China is not in the cards,
They'll be a little less eager.
They'll be a little less under pressure.
On the other hand, they might figure they'd better use this time to get us lined up.
It would be better for us if there were no turmoil in China.
If there were no turmoil in China.
We can do absolutely nothing about it.
We've already gotten a hell of a lot of mileage out of it.
Let's suppose they have turmoil and blows.
Hell, we've helped create it.
You get my point?
Oh, yeah.
Let's be ready to play that right to the hills after all.
The fact that they announced it with us and if something goes in China, that's fine.
We've taken our step.
Oh, yeah.
How would you evaluate that?
No, I would evaluate, Mr. President, if it blows, I wouldn't crow over it because the winning faction may still want you there and may need more to prove that they have foreign legitimacy.
If Joe emerges as the leader, he'll want you there.
If the group that I saw is the really dominant group, then
What is this situation?
We've got to go look at the cars.
I'm going to sit down and take an answer to the study.
Make some remarks, some brief remarks as well.
Maybe, so if we walk or just take things on individual photographs.
We'll be taken by all the guys.
There's no press in the American side.
They've been abused by the sports car racing magazines and publications of that nature.
This is a press situation out here, but it is a no-reward situation.
Thank you.
Whenever you're ready, sir.
They're rigging it out.
There will be about a five minute interval between, I'll get out here with my car, sometime we can get up in the stairs at the same time.
Anyway,
But I'll show the truth till now because something has to happen.
I mean, we'll find out.
Why?
Because it's their national holiday.
They cancel all the tours.
It's their day.
That's it.
It's their day.
I would think we'd get a response from them, all of a sudden.
They're in problem, so that's what you think.
You think they are a late response.
But it has to be not, Mr. President.
On August 15th, or whatever it was, August 13th, I think, or 16th, I made a number of specific proposals to them.
All right.
Thank you.
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