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Conversation 450-011

TapeTape 450StartTuesday, February 16, 1971 at 10:49 AMEndTuesday, February 16, 1971 at 11:03 AMTape start time01:33:24Tape end time01:47:36ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to coordinate strategy for an upcoming press conference, specifically focusing on messaging regarding arms control, the Soviet Union, and ongoing military operations in Vietnam. They discussed the tactical necessity of linking offensive and defensive weapon limitations in future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations. Additionally, the pair reviewed the military situation in Vietnam, focusing on road access and enemy movements as they finalized public talking points.

Strategic Arms Limitation TalksSoviet UnionVietnam WarArms ControlMilitary StrategyPress Conference Strategy
AudioNARA Description

On February 16, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:49 am to 11:03 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 450-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 450-11

Date: February 16, 1971
Time: 10:49 am - 11:03 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     Dinner for Jean Monnet
          -Telegram from the President
                -Impact
          -Kissinger’s schedule

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-020. Segment declassified on 10/10/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[450-011-w001]
[Duration: 3m 49s]

       Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] naval deployment
              -Nuclear submarine
              -Cienfuegos
                     -The President’s comment on unknown television program
                     -New York Times story
                            -Henry A. Kissinger comment to John D. Ehrlichman
                     -Henry A. Kissinger's potential talk with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                            -Impact of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] action
                     -Location and type of vessels
                     -US reaction
                     -Past US-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] relations

                    -Desire for US-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
                           -Berlin negotiations
                    -Possible developments
                           -Nuclear submarine
                           -United Kingdom
                           -US Navy
                    -US reaction
                           -Possible suspension of dialogue
                           -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin reaction
                           -Implications

******************************************************************************

    The President’s meeting with Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
         -Kissinger follow-up
         -President’s instructions
               -Robert C. Hill
         -Message from the President to General Francisco Franco
         -Walters’ report back to the President

    President’s press conference on February 17, 1971
         -Vietnam
               -North Vietnamese troops
                     -Location and number
               -Cienfuegos
               -Anti-ballistic missiles
                     -Safeguard
                     -Melvin R. Laird announcement
                     -President’s decision

    Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
          -Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle [MIRV]
               -SS-9
               -Intelligence estimates
          -Technology
               -Effect on United States-Soviet negotiations
               -New Soviet efforts
          -SS-9 slowdown
               -Kissinger’s belief
               -Public comments by the President

           -United States’ arms control position
                -Public comments by the President
                -Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM]
                -Arms limitation
                -Offensive/defensive weapons link
                -Future SALT negotiations
                      -Vienna

     Schedule
          -Press conference
          -Foreign policy report to Congress
                -Kissinger

     Vietnam
          -Troop activities
               -Lam Son operation
                     -South Vietnamese Army
                     -Enemy resistance
                            -Artillery
                     -Press accounts

Kissinger left at 11:03 am
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

The line of armament is at the pinnacle of Jean Monnet tonight in New York.
And they are eager for you to send a telegram.
It's 80 years old.
I think it was so good in New York.
It's all there.
It's all there right now.
I thought I might call.
Is that all right?
You told me I don't have to follow up with Walter if you talk to him about it.
Yeah, I don't know.
I just started looking into it.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
and uh, and he's, you know, he's got a message, you know, he wants to go to Washington, and he's trying to figure out, you know, if he's upset, but then he blows you to it, and he's like, in fact, report Barley tonight, and thank you very much for my service, and for you guys, I, I need to, for the, for the, for the, for the, for the,
Two point three, seven, eight.
With regard to your statement, I'm going to ask you to be clear on that announcement.
I'd like to just kick off that way rather than saying the announcements are kind of in the future.
I assume it's too fuzzy.
I actually have to layer them to testify on them.
It's my day.
It's not my day, but I get to declare it today.
Again, it's just going to be exactly what it's like.
I'm going to be the Secretary of Defense, and so I'm going to do what I'm going to have to do.
I'm going to make the decision.
Anyway, this is a year of marketing.
I will discuss it at this point.
But it would help us if we can't go forward on that other thing with the Russians.
So we can grab it on the 7th.
So please, I'll get to the current base for the base services.
Well, it would be hard for others to say that I made this decision under guard.
I was being honest with the secretary.
That's why I'm trying to go into the hotel.
That's what I did.
And if I don't do that, I'm going to fall.
That's the kind of thing that I'm going to have to think about.
You know, are you a better at doing a few of these?
The other thing is, I did, it says, that we now have the SS line as a murder warhead.
And that's a good thing.
I heard our heads, yep.
Well, uh, that's why we, uh, that's what we, uh, we came in here to the office.
This isn't a, uh, uh, I don't know what the water is, I guess.
That's what we do all along.
That's what I do.
Remember, I told you that in May, 69 and 97, we partnered up in an R.E.V.
program.
And that was actually the housing exchange system intervention.
And it's not what we think.
That's why the housing exchange system is actually an independent target to do things.
It depends on the degree of time and space, and the degree of time and space.
Well, no, they have three.
Three.
The six, they think they may be able to tell you what it is.
Well, they have got buttons with different conditions.
There is a release time of those three things.
Yeah.
And that gives them an independent advantage because defending a military doesn't give them an advantage.
It's a year or two that this whole thing needs to turn.
That's why they're talking about an SS-9.
Right.
Well, that could be one reason, but the primary reason, I think, is they're building a new cycle.
I told you that over the weekend.
So what do you think of the design to do with MERS?
Well, we don't know what it has to do with it.
It might be an entirely new missile, a new warhead.
But you can't mention that that's very significant.
Okay.
But what do you think of this MERS?
Well, the MERS slowed them on the, on the, as the MERS slowed down, I would say, it might mean that they have enough, if,
It might mean that they're putting on new borders.
And it's evident he's very ambiguous.
And he's not in a good position to take care of that.
I'm really surprised, sir, that you're getting my routine.
What I want to say to you is that it's not the answer for all things.
with regard to bombers without going into anything about ATMs, where they are, and just saying that we believe that there can be no meaningful arms control without the control of both offensive and defensive missiles.
That's what we are, that is our tactic, and the arms that we have with the arms control delegation that will be present in our position at the end of March.
How does that sound to you?
You can take the interviewing position
Uh, not from the borders, but they've, in the light of what has gone on before in the negotiations.
But, I would say there has to be a link between offensive and defensive weapons.
And remember that this threat comes from the offensive weapons that are now deployed.
I would get that out.
That's, that's what the danger is.
So there we go, then.
Let's try.
Okay.
I will now not be able to do anything because we need money and time.
But I won't have to have a Friday night.
If I have a Friday night at 6 o'clock, she'll have it.
And I want that to be something that we can go with.
Never mind the fact that I may want to use maps, that we may use any tools and maps, maps, maps, as we can also be parts of our community as there are.
I do worry about that.
But I think you're going to need the max.
And if you do more and more, the actual maximum of 100 miles an hour will be closer to 2,000 miles an hour.
It's not going to be 20 minutes.
It's going to be 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 51, 52, 51, 52, 53, 52, 53, 52, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53, 53,
The light is coming.
The light is coming.
So why don't you just concentrate on all that for the rest of the evening?
I don't think there's anything else to do.
If you're done, let's get back to the important thing.
So they are going around from the south, they've cut this road, they've now cut this road, now after they've cut this one, they've cut every road.
They've come so from this side, we're going to get some attack from this one last, and then go from the other side.
They never plan to come from that far over anywhere.
And they're not going to travel at all, from making the odds on this one so important, because they've already cut every road here.
And they've cut 9-14, and now they're going for 9-34.
Whether they get them to fall or not is very important, because they cut every road.
I agree.
And then they, uh...
They'll be coming down here, or they have to get over here.
How do they get into there?
From rehab.
They're going to have to go to the load, and then they're going to have to come down here.
They may get over there, but they have a lot of activity up there.
And they may need to cut all these out.
OK.
... ... ... ... ...
Thank you.
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