On February 27, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), Stephen B. Bull, Melvin R. Laird, Richard M. Helms, Joseph J. Sisco, William P. Rogers, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and Lt. Col. Walter B. Ratliffe met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:35 am to 11:57 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 459-002 of the White House Tapes.
Nixon Library Finding AidConversation No. 459-2
Date: February 27, 1971
Time: 9:35 am - 11:57 am
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield and H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
The President’s schedule
-Astronaut dinner
-Attendance
-Guest list
-Social Office
-Ronald L. Ziegler’s view
-President’s role
-Tricia Nixon
-Julie Nixon Eisenhower
-East Room
-Seating arrangements
-The President
-Astronauts
-The Vice President
-William P. Rogers
-John B. Connally
-Dr. Edward E. David, Jr.
-David Packard
-William L. Safire
-Hole-in-One Club
-Alan B. Shepard, Jr.
-Awards
-The President’s remarks
-Citations
-William A. Anders
-The Vice President
-Children
-Camp Hoover
-Butterfield
-Peter M. Flanigan’s visit
-Robert H. Finch
-Condition of camp
-Furniture
-Possible visit by the President
-Major General James D. (“Don”) Hughes
-Possible visit by the President
-Difficulties
Butterfield left at an unknown time after 9:35 am
-Florida trip
-Thelma C. (Ryan) (“Pat”) Nixon
-Camp David
-Upcoming schedule
-Trip to Florida
-Weather
Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 9:35 am
-Hughes’ report on Camp Hoover
-Recommendation
Butterfield left at an unknown time before 9:46 am
-Weekend activities
-Church
-Camp David
-Florida
-Forthcoming trip
-Camp David
-Presidential work schedule
-Forthcoming National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-Victor Lasky
-Book
-Lasky’s research
-Proposed interview with the President
-Questions
-Fiftieth anniversary of Reader’s Digest
-Possible White House dinner
-DeWitt Wallace
-Announcement
-Lila (Acheson) Wallace
-Attitudes
-Arrangements
Butterfield entered at 9:46 am
Morning schedule
Henry A. Kissinger entered and Haldeman and Butterfield left at 9:47 am
Laos (Lam Son)
-Military situation
-Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
-Briefing
-Attitudes of military
-General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
-ARVN airborne forces
-Strategy
-ARVN military
-North Vietnamese forces
-Kissinger’s assessment
-News reports
-Kissinger’s meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
-Soviet position
-North Vietnam
-Soviet view of Cambodia and Laos operations
-Cambodian operation
-Reports
-ARVN
-North Vietnamese casualties
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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-020. Segment declassified on 10/10/2018. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[459-002-w001]
[Duration: 2m 21s]
Middle East
-Israel
-Border proposals
An unknown woman entered at an unknown time after 9:47 am
Schedule
The unknown woman left at an unknown time before 10:06 am
Middle East
-Border proposals
-1967 borders
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Arab view
-Joseph J. Sisco
-Henry A. Kissinger’s judgment
-Arabs
-Anatoliy F.Dobrynin
-Israelis
-Need for strategy
******************************************************************************
Laos (Lam Son)
-Marines
-Reinforcement
-Airborne forces
-Tactical movement
-Supply routes
-Military situation
-Strategy
-Supply routes
-Tchepone
-Timing
-President’s view
-North Vietnamese supply routes
-Rationale
-Casualties
-North Vietnamese
-B-52 Strikes
-Tactical proposals
-Future prospects for success
-ARVN
-Media coverage
-October 7th speech
-John D. Ehrlichman
-James B. (“Scotty”) Reston
-Democratic briefings
-Kissinger’s forthcoming conversation with Reston
[The President talked with Haldeman at an unknown time between 9:47 am and 10:06 am]
[Conversation No. 459-2A]
-Ehrlichman’s call to Reston
[End of telephone conversation]
-Reston’s reaction to Laos operation
-Kissinger’s previous conversation with Reston
-Cambodia
-The President’s policy
-Reaction of European press
-Henry Brandon
-Media coverage
-Kissinger’s view
Haldeman entered at an unknown time after 9:47 am
The President’s schedule
-John N. Mitchell
-Florida
-Des Moines
-Charles G. (“Bebe”) Rebozo
-The President’s decision
Haldeman left at an unknown time before 10:06 am
Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:47 am
Schedule
-Forthcoming NSC meeting
-Melvin R. Laird
-Joseph J. Sisco
-Rogers
-Richard M. Helms
-General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Bull left at an unknown time before 10:06 am
-Television
Melvin R. Laird, Richard M. Helms, Joseph J. Sisco, William P. Rogers, and Alexander M.
Haig, Jr. entered at 10:06 am
******************************************************************************
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-020. Segment partially declassified with 1h15m2s cleared for release and
1s remains exempt as 459-002-w002 per Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(1) on 10/17/2018.
Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[459-002-w002]
[Duration 1h15m2s]
Middle East
-William P. Rogers briefing
-Security Council Resolution
-Background
-Israeli withdrawal
-Decision on border
-1967 border
-US position
-Arthur Goldberg's role
-Talks with Abba Eban
-Israeli position
-Egypt
-Territory compound to peace
-US role in resolution
-Joint efforts
-Jordan
-Arthur Goldberg
-[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal
-Joseph J. Sisco’s trip to Israel and Jordan
-August 1968
-George W. Ball
-Purpose of the trip
-Message from Israel to [Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal
-Compromise
-October 1969
-Security Council Resolution
-Development
An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 10:06 am
Request
-Coffee
The unknown person left at an unknown time before 11:21 am
Middle East
-Background of Security Council Resolution
-US position
-Israeli position
-Security
-Territory
-Moshe Dayan
-Israeli cabinet
-Territorial boundaries
-Israel
-Egypt
-Jordan
-Israel
-Desire for security
-Security Council Resolution
-Recognition of boundaries
-Israeli position
-Arab position
-US position
-Negotiations
-Gunnar Jarring
-Israeli position
-Egypt
-Recognition of Israel
-Egyptian position
-Israeli position
-Security
-Gunnar Jarring proposal
-Egypt
-Recognition of Israel
-Termination of hostility
-Boundaries
-Egypt’s response
-Navigation of the Suez Canal
-Israel
-Territorial boundaries
-Militarization of Sinai
-Security arrangements
-Israel’s response
-Peace negotiations
-Jerusalem
-Golan Heights
-Israeli fears
-Egypt
-Pre-1967 boundaries
-The President’s view
-Jordan
-Israel
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Presence in the United Arab Republic [UAR]
-Willingness to negotiate
-[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal’s position
-Egypt
-Difficulty
-Territory
-Abba Eban’s conversation with Dean Rusk
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-Israel
-Gunnar Jarring’s proposal
-Israeli response
-Yitzhak Rabin
-Gunnar Jarring’s proposal
-March 1, 1971 deadline
-State of the world message
-Egyptian and Israeli reactions
-Withdrawal of Israeli forces
-Refugees
-Egyptian reaction
-Israeli response
-Four power involvement
-Extension of cease-fire
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR], France, and United Kingdom
-Opposition to US
-Israeli objections
-United States support of Israel
-Jacob K. Javits
-Howard H. Baker
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
-Israeli demands
-Territorial adjustments
-Security
-The President’s opinion
-Jerusalem
-West Bank
-Golan Heights
-US position
-Analysis of Israel position
-Split in Knesset
-Effect on negotiations
-Press reports
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
-Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories
-President’s September 1970 letter to Golda Meir
-Split in Knesset
-Territorial boundaries
-President’s policy
-July 1, 1970
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-Negotiations
-Berlin comparison
-Militarization
-Yitzhak Rabin’s views
-1967 war
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-Sinai
-Defenses
******************************************************************************
BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[459-002-w002]
[Duration: 1s]
END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
******************************************************************************
Middle East
-Suez Canal
-Peace negotiations
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Israeli internal divisions
-Israeli views on peace
-Egypt
-Jordan
-Gunnar Jarring
-Implementation of peace agreement
-Reciprocity
-Cairo
-Gamal Abdel Nasser
-Death
-Effect on peace negotiations
-Israeli demands
-Golan Heights
-West Bank
-Golda Meir
-Conversation with William P. Rogers
-Death of Gamal Abdel Nasser
-Effect on peace negotiations
-Israeli attitude
-Golan Heights
-Israeli position
-Territory
-Suez Canal
-Fortifications
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] presence
-Effect on Israel
-US position
-The President’s position
-West Bank
-Jerusalem
-Golan Heights
-Security
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] presence
-Congressional appropriations
-Aid to Israel
-Military
-Airplanes
-Relation to negotiations
-The President’s position
-Henry A. Kissinger’s analysis
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-Security Council
-Egypt
-Jordan
-1967 borders
-Israel
-US policy options
-Sinai
-Demilitarization
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-Effect of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] involvement
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-US and British presence
-US assurances
-[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal’s position
-Forms of assistance
-Long range military
-Long range financial
-Formalize political consultation
-Security guarantee
-United Nations [UN]
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Israeli territories
-Golan Heights
-Jerusalem and West Bank
-Jordan
-[Hussein, King of Jordan] Hussein ibn Talal
-Fedayeen
-Israel
-State of the World Message
-William P. Rogers’ opinion
-Suez
-Yitzhak Rabin
-US diplomatic plans
-Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
-Joseph J. Sisco and Henry A. Kissinger
-Laos
-Richard M. Helms [?]
-The President’s opinion
-Importance of unified US position
-Carrots and sticks
-Sharm el-Sheikh
-Golan Heights
-Four Powers compared to Security Council
-Disadvantages compared to advantages
-France and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Egypt
-Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-United Nations [UN]
-US public position
-George H.W. Bush
-Concerns about domestic repercussion
-The President’s opinion
-Joseph J. Sisco [?]
-Moshe Dayan
-US State Department position
-White House position
-Golda Meir
-State of the World Message
-Senior Review Group meeting
-Joseph J. Sisco
-David Packard
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-John N. (“Jack”) Irwin, II
-William P. Rogers’ opinion
-Clark MacGregor
-Strategy
-The President’s position
-Need for unified position
-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Potential reaction to US lack of support for Israel
-Importance of US to Israel
-Henry A. Kissinger’s opinion
-Israel
******************************************************************************
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Ratliffe entered and Sisco left at
11:21 am
Laos (Lam Son) operation
-Previous briefings
-Status
-Congress
-Rogers
-The President’s forthcoming television appearance
-Rogers’ forthcoming press conference
-Strategy
-US policy
-Public relations
-Abrams
-Rogers
-Military situationd
-Casualties
-Goals
-Death of General Do Cao Tri
-Effect on South Vietnamese forces
-Military operations
-General Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson
-Gettysburg
-Importance of leadership
Laos (Lam Son)
-Military situation
-Strategy
-Military operations
-Ground forces
-Bombing
-North Vietnamese forces
-Casualties
-Tank Fight
-South Vietnamese [ARVN] forces
-Military situation
-Casualties
-Military operations
-Abrams’ plan
-Airborne troops
-Marines
-ARVN reserves
-Laird’s view
-North Vietnamese strategy
-Troop movements
-Effect on US strategy
-General Vo Nguyen Giap
-US Air Force bombing
-North Vietnam headquarters
-Command centers
-Problems
-Intelligence
-President’s view
-Helms’ response
-Press accounts
-Abrams
-Ho Chi Minh Trail
-Decrease in North Vietnamese use
-Supplies
-Effect on Lam Son operation
-Routes
-Moorer’s assessment
-President’s view
-Need for public relations
-Intelligence
-Goals of Lam Son operation
-ARVN forces
******************************************************************************
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-020. Segment declassified on 07/23/2019. Archivist: MM]
[National Security]
[459-002-w003]
[Duration: 5s]
Laos (Lam Son)
-Intercepts
******************************************************************************
Laos (Lam Son)
-Intercepts
-North Vietnamese troop strength
-American troop strength
-Khe Sanh
-US troop strength
-Estimates
-Roles
-US strategy
-Effect on North Vietnamese forces
-Marines
-Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]
-Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]
-Infantry role
-Search and rescue missions
-Rogers
-John Sherman Cooper
-Search and rescue missions
-Son Tay mission
-Administration position
-Press accounts
-Department of Defense briefing
-Jerry W. Friedheim
-Press briefing
-Ziegler
-Questions and responses
-Administration position
-Vietnam policy
-President’s previous experiences
-Dwight D. Eisenhower
-Middle East
-Relations with press corps
-President’s position
-Ziegler’s role
-Answers to questions on Lam Son
-Goal of press corps
-President’s view
-Abrams
-Responses to questions
-Importance of public relations
-Theodore S. (“Ted”) Williams
-Relations with press
-Denny D. McLain
-Need for objective coverage
-President’s position
-Rogers’ view
-Laos
-Abrams
-ARVN
-Need for victory
-Terrain
-Prisoners
-Casualties
-South Vietnamese morale
-North Vietnamese morale
Press conferences
-Ziegler
-Methods of handling
-President’s position
-Responses to questions
Laos (Lam Son)
-Objectives
-Changes
-Tchepone
-Ho Chi Minh Trail
-North Vietnamese supplies
-Decrease
-Media coverage
-Laird/Kissinger Experience
Farewells
Instructions to Moorer
-Abrams
-Report
Kissinger, et al. left at 11:57 amThis transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.