Conversation 462-005

On March 5, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, unknown person(s), White House operator, Alexander P. Butterfield, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Ronald L. Ziegler, William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and Richard M. Helms met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:30 am to 10:15 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 462-005 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 462-5

Date: March 5, 1971
Time: 8:30 am - 10:15 am
Location: Oval Office
The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     Laos (Lam Son)
          -Military situation

     President’s March 4, 1971 press conference
          -Laos
          -President’s performance evaluated
                -The President’s preparation
                -Kissinger’s view
          -President’s statements about the press
                -”Today” show
          -President’s response to questions
                -President’s advisors
          -Kissinger’s viewing
                -Winton M. (“Red”) Blount’s dinner
                      -Charles L. Bartlett
                      -Melvin R. Laird
                            -Response
                      -A Democrat Congressman from Oklahoma [John Jarman]
                            -Response
                      -Bob Dudley
                            -President’s acquaintance at Office of Price Administration
                      -Bartlett’s response
                            -Cambodia, Laos
                                   -The President’s policies
                            -Democrats
          -John C. Stennis’ call to the President
          -President’s performance
                -Kissinger’s view
          -Middle East
                -Possible settlement
                -Cease fire
                      -US guarantee

                            -Israelis
                            -Soviet Union
     Vietnam
          -Possible US military action
                -Bombing of North Vietnam
                -Winston S. Churchill’s book on World War I
                      -On the Eastern Front
                -Response to North Vietnamese action
                      -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
                      -President’s comments at press conference
          -President’s strategy
                -Bombing of missiles sites
                -President’s view
          -Bombing
                -Effect
          -Laird, Richard M. Helms, William P. Rogers, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer meeting
                -President’s position
                -Briefing by Moorer
                -Time

[Kissinger talked with an unknown person at an unknown time between 8:30 am and 8:44 am]

[Conversation No. 462-5A]

     Forthcoming meeting on Vietnam
          -Laird, Helms, Rogers, and Moorer
                -Calls from General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
          -Briefing on Laos and Cambodia
                -Moorer
          -Haig’s telephone calls

[End of telephone conversation]

     President’s March 4, 1971 press conference
          -Questions about President’s advisors on foreign policy
                -Rogers
                -Kissinger
                -President’s comments
                      -Garnett D. (“Jack”) Horner
                -Kissinger
                      -Calls from press
                            -Response

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[Duration: 31s ]

     CANADA

[The President talked with the White House operator at 8:44 am]

[Conversation No. 462-5B]

[End of telephone conversation]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

******************************************************************************

     President’s March 4, 1971 press conference
          -Preparation
                -State Department, Kissinger
                -The President’s role
                -John F. Kennedy comparison
                -The President’s role
                -Possible Kissinger press statement
                -Kissinger’s staff work
                      -State Department

     Pakistan
          -National Security Council [NSC] study
               -Rogers, State Department
               -Conflicting views
                     -US policy options
               -Kissinger

     President’s press conference
          -Kidnaping of US soldiers in Turkey

               -President’s comments
                      -Kissinger’s view
          -Executive privilege
Alexander P. Butterfield entered at 9:02 am

     President’s schedule

[The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:02 am and
9:17 am]

[Conversation No. 462-5C]

     President’s call to Pierre E. Trudeau

[End of telephone conversation]

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 12s ]

     CANADA

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

******************************************************************************

     Leadership
          -On the Eastern Front by Churchill
                -German generals
                -President’s evaluation
                -Erich F. W. Ludendorf
                -Paul von Hindenburg
                -[Forename unknown] von Schwanslof [?]
          -General William C. Westmoreland

          -General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
               -Compared to General George S. Patton, Jr.
               -Kissinger’s view

     Forthcoming meeting on Vietnam
          -Timing
          -Congressional meeting
Haig entered at an unknown time after 9:02 am

     President’s press conference
          -Haig’s view

Haig left at an unknown time before 9:19 am

     Forthcoming meeting on Vietnam
          -Participants
          -Timing

     The President’s press conference, March 4, 1971
          -President’s response to Executive privilege question
                -Rogers
                     -Congressional testimony
                     -Private meetings with congressmen
                     -Relationships with the President
                           -Public relations
                           -Foreign policy
                     -State Department views
          -Agency input
                -Department of State
                -Department of Defense
                     -Laird
          -Vietnam
                -Troop levels
                     -President’s comments
                     -Number
                     -Review
                     -Announcement by President
                           -Forthcoming meeting with newspaper editors
                           -Television
                           -Timing
                -Ellsworth F. Bunker’s view

                -General Nguyen Van Thieu

Vietnam
     -Leadership
           -President’s reading of Churchill book
           -President compared with Lyndon B. Johnson
                 -Laos (Lam Son)
                       -Tchepone
                       -Support for the President
                 -Moorer’s previous conversations with Kissinger
     -US victory prospects
           -Kissinger’s view
     -Military situation
           -President’s press conference, March 4, 1971
                 -Questions on possible peace proposal
                       -The President’s response
           -Possible effects of US withdrawal
                 -North Vietnam
                       -Cambodia, Laos
     -Possible agreement
     -Military situation
           -Moorer
           -Momentum
                 -Kissinger’s view
                 -Churchill book on World War I
                       -Germans, Russians, Austrians
                       -History of World War I
                       -von Hindenburg, Ludendorf
                       -Germans, Russians, Austrians

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7
[National Security]
[Duration: 49s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 7

******************************************************************************

    Brazil
         -Possible visit
              -Date
                    -State Department
                    -President’s instructions

    President’s press conference, March 4, 1971
         -News reports
         -Taiwan, People’s Republic of China [PRC]
               -President’s comments
               -United Nations

    Brazil
         -Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
               -Assignment
         -President’s instructions

    Italy
            -President’s forthcoming letter to Pope Paul VI [Giovanni Battista Motini]

    President’s leadership
         -World role
         -Effect of Vietnam
         -Dutch leader
               -President’s foreign policy report
                     -Impact in Europe

President’s “World Report”
     -Distribution
           -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
           -Members of White House staff and Cabinet officers
     -Elliot L. Richardson
     -President’s accompanying letter to foreign leaders
     -Distribution
     -Importance
           -US policy
                 -Relations with Soviet Union
     -Contents
           -President’s philosophy
     -Press
           -Joseph W. Alsop and Stewart J. O. Alsop
           -Chalmers Roberts
     -Evaluation
           -Robert S. McNamara
                 -Cyrus R. Vance, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Vietnam and Laos (Lam Son)
     -President’s March 4, 1971 press conference
           -Laos (Lam Son)
                 -Prospects for success
                       -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
     -Enemy supplies
           -James C. Hagerty’s press report
           -Moorer
           -Level
           -President’s comments
                 -Rationale for military action
           -Decreases
                 -Effect
                 -Compared to previous year
     -Laos
           -President’s comments
           -Press coverage
     -Military situation
           -Tchepone
                 -ARVN progress
                 -Importance
                 -Effect

                    -ARVN progress
         -President’s forthcoming meeting
               -A report from Bunker

    US foreign policy

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 11
[National Security]
[Duration: 19s ]

    GERMANY

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 11

******************************************************************************

         -Letter from President to the Pope
         -Targut Menemencioglu
         -State Department
               -Peter G. Peterson
               -Nathanial Samuels

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 12
[National Security]
[Duration: 21s ]

    GREAT BRITAIN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 12

******************************************************************************

         -Cevdet Sunay and Suleyman Demirel
              -Domestic situation
         -Greece
              -Henry J. Tasca
         -Pakistan
              -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 13
[Privacy]
[Duration: 3s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 13

******************************************************************************

              -Khan
                    -The President’s position
              -A possible letter from President to Khan
         -Possible Presidential letters
              -Lieutenant General T. N. J. Suharto
              -Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
                    -President’s previous meeting with Menemencioglu
                    -President’s position
              -Suharto
                    -President’s foreign policy report
                          -Economy
         -The President’s foreign policy report
              -Dissemination to foreign leaders
                    -Accompanying letters from the President
                          -Yahya

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 14
[National Security]
[Duration: 1m 51s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 14

******************************************************************************

     Vietnam
          -Aleksei N. Kosygin
          -Kissinger’s possible meeting with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                -President’s press conference
                -US policy
                      -Bombing of North Vietnamese missile sites
                            -Justification
          -President’s press conference, March 4, 1971
                -US bombing
          -Press inquiries to Kissinger
                -Radio broadcasters’ dinner
          -President’s press conference
                -President’s demeanor
                      -Television
                      -Kissinger’s view
                      -Compared with Kennedy
                -McNamara’s previous comments to Kissinger
                      -Cabinet

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 9:17 am

     President’s schedule
          -Rogers, Helms
          -NSC meeting
                -Possible statement to the press
          -Quadriad meeting
                -Possible press briefing by John B. Connally

Ziegler left and Rogers, Laird, Moorer, and Haig entered at 9:19 am

     Greetings

     President’s March 4, 1971 press conference
          -Ziegler
          -Question on Executive privilege
                -Rogers’ meetings with Congress
                     -Number

     Meeting agenda
          -Vietnam policy

     Rogers and Laird
         -Forthcoming press conferences
         -Laird’s forthcoming Congressional testimony
               -Anti-ballistic missiles [ABMs]
               -Defense procurement
               -Responses to questions
         -Schedule
         -Press conference
               -Rogers
               -Timing
                     -Press coverage
                           -Wire services
                           -Television
                     -Robert J. McCloskey, Ziegler

     Vietnam
          -Military situation
          -North Vietnamese missiles
                -US response
                      -Bombing
                      -President’s position
                      -Pass area

     Military situation in Laos (Lam Son)
           -ARVN First Armored Division
           -Artillery support
                 -Routes 9, 914, 23, 92

                     -Location of ARVN troops
                     -Developments
          -Abrams’ reports
               -President’s March 4, 1971 press conference
                     -Comments about ARVN forces
                            -Public relations
               -Rogers’ forthcoming press conference
                            -ARVN forces
               -Enemy losses
                     -Abrams’ report
               -Artillery, tanks
                     -Use
                            -Effectiveness
          -An anecdote
          -General John W. Vogt, Jr.
               -Performance
                     -Briefings
          -North Vietnamese supplies entering South Vietnam
          -Enemy losses

Helms entered at 9:25 am

          -Enemy build-up
              -Route 9
              -Abrams
              -Thieu
                   -Possible action
              -DMZ
              -US countermeasures
              -Capability
              -Location
              -Possible US response
              -Trucks, missiles

     Vietnam
          -Thieu
               -Possible ARVN offensive into North Vietnam
                    -US policy
                          -President’s press conference on March 4, 1971

           -Enemy missiles, trucks, guns
                 -US countermeasures
                       -President’s statements
                       -US aircraft
                       -Supplies and equipment
           -Lessons of military history
                 -Levels of force
           -Enemy missiles
                 -DMZ
                 -President’s Response
                 -US strategy
                       -Area of operations
                       -Public portrayal
                             -Rogers
                             -”Protective reaction”
                       -Bombing
                       -Public statements
                             -Protective reaction
                             -President’s previous statements
                             -Justification
                       -Press inquiries
           -Nguyen Cao Ky
                 -US air support
                 -Bunker
           -Vietnamization
                 -Public relations
                 -ARVN ability
                       -Compared to North Vietnamese forces
           -Cambodia
           -US air power
                 -Amount, type
                 -President’s position
                       -Increases
                       -Public opinion
                 -Duration of increase
                       -B-52 strikes
           -President’s press conference, March 4, 1971
                 -Tricia Nixon’s comments
                       -W[illiam] Stuart Symington’s comments

Rogers left at 9:45 am

An unknown person entered at an unknown time after 9:45 am

     Refreshments

The unknown person left at an unknown time before 9:47 am
     Vietnam
                -B-52 air strikes
                     -Numbers
          -Churchill’s On the Eastern Front
                -Lessons
          -President’s position
                -US military action
          -Possible South Vietnamese military actions
                -North Vietnam

Laird and Moorer left at 9:47 am

     Laos
            -Military situation
                  -Possible outcome
                        -US efforts
                              -Air strikes
                              -Preparations
                  -Long Thieng
                  -Vientiane
                  -Importance of public relations
                        -President’s view
                  -President’s view
                  -Kissinger’s view

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8
[National Security]
[Duration: 29s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 8

**********************************************************************

                   -Vientiane and Long Thieng
             -Need for public relations
         -Cambodia
             -Health of unknown leader
             -Effect of Laotian action
                   -North Vietnamese
                   -Press reaction

    President’s press conference on March 4, 1971
         -Questions
               -Vietnam, Middle East, PRC, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
         -Possible result
               -Press
                     -President’s comments
         -Helms’ view

    Vietnam
         -Vietnamization
              -Helms’ view
              -President’s view
         -Possible future
         -Laos (Lam Son)
              -ARVN forces
                    -The President’s decision
                    -Helms’ view

          -Justification
                -North Vietnamese forces
                       -Effect on future operations
                             -I Corps
                -Public relations efforts
          -Helms’ conversation with J. W. Alsop
     -Importance
                -Effect on US position in the world
                       -Possible US withdrawal
                -Need for action
                -Public opinion
                       -Laos (Lam Son)
                       -Polls
                -Possible US withdrawal
                       -1969
                             -Justification
                       -Impossibility
                             -Justification
                                   -”Domino Theory”
                                          -Indonesia
                                          -Thailand
                                          -Malaysia
                                          -Philippines
                                          -Japan
                                          -India
          -President’s policy
          -Haig’s opinion
     -US public opinion
          -Kissinger’s meeting with student body presidents
                -Discussion of President’s policy
          -Media influence
     -Importance for US
          -President’s position
          -Cambodia
          -Helms’ view

US foreign policy
     -Cuba
          -President’s position
                -Effect on Latin America
                     -Chile

                    -Cuba’s foreign policy
                          -Communism
              -Helms’ position
                    -US policy
                    -Latin America
                          -Chile
              -President’s position

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 10
[National Security]
[Duration: 2m 36s ]

    CUBA, ITALY, SPAIN

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 10

******************************************************************************

    Catholic Church
         -Ideological change
              -President’s view
              -Latin America
                    -Influence of Marxism
              -American Catholics

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 15
[National Security]
[Duration: 17s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 15

******************************************************************************

         -Study by Roger [Surname unintelligible]
               -Contents
         -Compared to Protestant Church
               -William F. (“Billy”) Graham
               -Quakers
                     -Pacifism
         -President’s policy
         -Eastern Europe
               -Poland
               -Political orientation

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 16
[National Security]
[Duration: 42s ]

    SPAIN, ITALY

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 16

******************************************************************************

US foreign policy
     -Radio Free Europe
           -Senate committee hearings
                 -Clifford P. Case
                 -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Bartlett
     -Brazil
           -Forthcoming visit to the US by Emilio Garrastazu Médici
                 -President’s position
     -Latin America
           -President’s policy
                 -Leadership

Leadership
     -President’s view
           -France
                  -General Charles A. J. M. de Gaulle
           -Italy
           -Spain
           -Latin America
                  -Colombia
US foreign policy
     -Latin America
           -Helms’ view
           -Possible 40 Committee meeting
           -Nelson A. Rockefeller’s visit
           -President’s view
                  -Chile
           -Ecuador
           -Brazil
           -Argentina

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 17
[National Security]
[Duration: 16s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 17

******************************************************************************

                  -Importance
             -Venezuela
                  -Oil
             -Colombia
             -Possible visits
                  -Peru
                        -Announcement
                  -Brazil
                        -Medici
                        -Announcement
                        -President’s view
                              -Population increases
                  -President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [PFIAB]
                        -Latin America
                        -President’s view
                        -Compared to previous Southeast Asia trip
    PFIAB
        -Possible appointment of Thomas E. Dewey
             -Call from Kissinger
             -Possible call from the President
        -Forthcoming meeting
             -Schedule
        -Dewey
             -President’s view

     Helms’ schedule
         -House and Senate Armed Services Committee
               -Testimony
                     -Soviet Union
                     -PRC

Kissinger, Haig, and Helms left at 10:15 am

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

But you see the pull of every... That's all essential.
That's essential.
I'll tell you, one of the most impressive men I've met was the Secretary General of Central.
Jesus, he was smart.
So damn, he was smart.
But, you know, take your personal relationship with world leaders.
You talk to Pete Peterson.
Twice this week, State came in and said, I'm not going to talk to Bill, but...
Now, the Turkey president, my dear, who's got the stroke, the president or the prime minister?
Well, the prime minister doesn't.
But he's too weak now because his domestic situation is really coming.
What do you do with the Greeks?
Well, we have to stop kicking them around.
Now, Tosca's excellent and I keep sitting.
What do you do with the Aryans?
That same thing.
Well, I'd like to have, this is, if you will let me insist on that meeting.
What?
Well, we've had a policy review on Pakistan, which the state now refuses to participate in.
Why?
On four other issues I'm going to give in on, because they're not important.
Well, I'll get at this.
Well, I'm sure the consumers are interested in the audio.
I stay out of that now what we should do is we should
Suharto and the Shah, absolutely.
I had a good talk with the Secretary General and he gave me a...
I was very pleased to know his comments about the Ilan.
I think it's terribly important that his country plays a part.
I want him to keep me posted on a personal basis.
And Suharto, he did say that my reports on the economy are excellent.
I'm very delighted and sent him a copy of the World Report.
In other words, the World Report letters should be ones that reflect
You can send the world report to Yaya with a whole letter.
That reflects our meetings and my war pressures and so forth.
That we should do.
Yeah.
I think that's the way to get the world.
I'd like the world report to go down just a four-letter, but to every believer that I've met, I think it should reflect about our war of association meetings.
No, that's the one hesitation I had about bombing.
I thought I might have the freedom to come in today and call it even.
I don't intend to answer that.
No, but I'll call his attention to what you said on the invasion.
I think you should say this.
The president asked me to call you back and say, and he said, Mr.
Ambassador, he heard what you said and he wanted to be sure of it.
He said, no, the one thing that you must understand as far as bombing the North is concerned, there have been these missiles that have been fired and there will have to be some strikes on those missiles.
I tell him.
Oh, no, this one next week.
The advantage of this one is that we can call it protective reaction while blasting the Patriot's officer.
We don't even have to go a lot into the supply business.
I have a basis for that, but I think we can call this a protective reaction, and we can say, oh, did you notice, I don't know, I said, we are trying to get those things, and we didn't protect them.
Do you hear that?
That's a good one.
But the press, for example, I had several press queries prior to your press conference.
They thought you were going to announce a strike last night.
Oh, shit, I don't know.
So they are all set for it.
Oh, there you are.
Well, the night before the radio broadcast, the number of them came up to me, as I told you yesterday.
I said, we don't know what to ask, and we only had a conference two weeks ago.
You know, it's not a true fact, as I said two weeks ago, but I'll say it now for the benefit of the television audience, which made it appear today that it was not recorded.
All that was very subtle.
That was a stinking thing to say, but it's all right.
It wasn't the second country, it wasn't.
Well, I know, but... No, you said everything very moderately.
I didn't, but I did.
But you see, by saying it on television, I always react that way when the press comes.
Believe me, I never erupt.
Never erupt, as you know.
Well, it's...
But you've got to be on television, or otherwise you do it in your office.
The press will go out and say he snarled, nasty.
Even when I'm on, sometimes they say he was nervous and so forth.
You remember when I wasn't?
Yeah.
It's three or four times to write that.
I probably said I was nervous last night.
It was, I mean, what was, yes, last night, the strength, the knowledge, the self-confidence, I think it came from all of you.
That was a spectacular performance.
But it wasn't just, Kennedy had spectacular performances, but there was nothing behind it.
Yeah, but he didn't have this combination of subtlety, complete command, nor did he shape it himself.
He got together a few smart alecky answers.
And a magnum aleck when he was in yesterday said he'd never...
He never would have believed that he could think this, but he now thinks that if he'd been a cabinet member under you, he could have done more than under Kennedy.
Which is unbelievable for a man.
He could.
And I believe that's right.
You're not smart.
Really?
You'd know how to use him.
Oh!
You're not smart, man.
You're supposed to be a man.
You're supposed to be a man.
You're supposed to be a man.
I can't hear you.
I can't hear you.
Every one of them helps.
Wow.
Every one of them helps.
Yeah.
We don't need to help.
Let's put the... Yeah.
Okay.
Come on.
Oh.
I suppose I have to hear you say that you are one of our regular NSC meetings.
Are you one of our regular NSC meetings?
Okay.
It is.
We're going to call you tomorrow.
So you want to bring her in this evening?
I thought that this person from the, uh, kind of the community that, you know, on the front of the figures, the Quadrat, that you don't have to take Conway out every Quadrat.
Yeah.
He would really be able to do an effective job.
Yeah.
We could do it the spontaneous way if I'm noticing.
I like this one.
I think we should go a little larger.
I love to screw those press guys up here.
You know, really, the way you have to do is go right over their heads.
I thought you were very gentle on us.
We can do it, right?
They just do it so...
Uh, this won't take long, so I know you've got to get upset.
I think the best thing I said was, I might have said the same thing about you a bit.
What did you say?
I said, if I got, and it's really true, and I apologize to you folks, I was asking all of you to check.
One out of three times you're on the Hill.
Believe it or not.
One out of three times you've been on the Hill.
Now, this is a third time.
Let's believe these others.
No, we're actually going to share a case with one of our best partners.
And this idea of not trying to solve it all, we're going to have to do it ourselves.
But we're set.
I don't know how to do much more.
And I thought Bill's running that figure 499 times.
Which is something that's true, but you can leave that up to Dave Barney.
The 167 I made, I don't think I told you.
The 167, remember, backed me up, as I told you.
Let me say that what I would like to get this morning, if we could, is more here.
I thought it would be useful to see the current situation so that we know what their purpose is.
There are two purposes.
If we could get our game plan in mind.
Bill is going on next week for the press conference on Thursday or Friday.
Well, what am I going to see?
You're going to see, you're going to see how the dealership, the metal is going on.
What is the night?
I'm not going to report.
The committee will release that report.
Do you have a public session?
A public session.
You're going on, that's what I mean.
You'll be going on a public session on the 9th, but that basically will be, you're going to try to, that will be zeroed in on 8 p.m.
It'll be on the heat and the total overall defense and procurement scale.
That's the sort of thing I'd add up to.
I think our team has reported you have any questions on the other.
I would think that your questions are safe.
You should give it a big go.
All right, stay away.
Stay away.
And so you can go on the next week if you want.
What I thought would be good, a bill could go on, assuming everything is, don't commit.
Then about Wednesday, we'll take a look at the drill.
And then I think a bill could go on all of them.
There is a bill if you want to ask.
is that I want to be sure that we're not doing things .
So if you would have Thursday .
Could I ask you one thing about when you go on?
And could I suggest this?
And this is very important in the case of both of you.
You go on to the television.
I have a feeling that you do better
First, I wouldn't go on too early in the morning.
I think the 11 o'clock thing is great for painters and all that.
They don't need all that.
I'm inclined to think about three.
Three.
Four is too late.
If it doesn't get, if it's four, they'll use something for two or four or something.
About three, if you just go on, then they'll pick up enough of the wire.
Now, if you do...
And then, of course, have just a little chopped up.
They'll only use it for a minute and a half.
What time do you usually go home?
Usually 11.
11, 12, 8.
Yeah, well, let me tell you about it.
Why don't you have McCloskey talk to you secretly as to when our guy's fine at the best time.
Why don't you hear him?
Well, I think he'll hear me at 10 o'clock.
Good.
Good.
Well, we ought to have that in mind.
Now, the second thing that we want to do, the main thing after we get through this bridge, directly run down here, is the second area, with regard to these missiles that are being fired across here, and what you want to do about that.
So I think we ought to, I think we have now set up a situation where we are in a position to do it, and let's do it and get it over with.
But I don't want to just take protection.
On the missiles, we're referring to the missiles.
Now, the other thing that we haven't referred to is the, we haven't referred forward to the, the pass area.
That's funny because that can all be related now.
If you're firing a few missiles and so forth, the whole thing can be read if you do it.
And whether we get the missiles right now.
Well, in the next 48 hours, I think you could do the whole thing, do the pass area where there are also missiles.
You know, that's the only authority we have going forward with our lead line.
All right.
Well, let's talk first.
We'll go ahead about this and tell us how this sounds at home.
All right.
Well, the group in this direction is continuing a foreign plan now.
We've just received the most recent act.
It has been all we've wanted.
Thank you, Colonel Sophia.
Well, we have two of the best battalions of the second rank of the 1st Army Division.
They have been putting out and taking in ammunition and so on.
It was, as you know, a very flat area.
There were nine people involved in the process.
Seven of the crews have already been extracted to the ROA.
and they think they can get the other two crews back and some of the heroes and stuff like that.
But they're down, they're down.
And Mr. President, this will give you, I believe, another deal for what they have against this top of that one.
Yes, sir, see that?
Where is what you're going for there?
I don't know.
We have these buses.
I'm here through tonight.
Nothing moving on that road
That's what they just had here.
So you're commanding that side from here.
That's the ground speed, not all this road.
Put the Marines on it, Canada.
Now, what is this road?
Well, that road goes on all the way up to 23, but we're not trying to cut it off.
What kind of traffic is there on that?
There's been a very little traffic.
Now, this is an enemy rail road here.
It's been working against our war.
We work about three rails.
What are the three rails?
Oh, here it is.
That's good.
That's good.
Thanks, sir.
I just want to be sure we all know what the facts are so we can state no more of the facts.
The other thing I was going to say is that I was strongly urged, I know Mel was one of the seniors, I asked him and I asked the president, this president as well, I asked Akers to send me his evaluation.
And it's extremely interesting, don't you think, Admiral?
Yes, sir.
And I can use that as an analogy that, you know, as an history, and I think it's good for your staff, is that I don't believe, you know, I don't believe it.
And he probably had an attitude.
I mean, Abrams is a cold fish, right?
Fair.
And particularly the thing that was most impressive about him, the reason I said it last night at this conference, is what he said about the security of the Army.
You know, that's what I said to you.
The spirit, there's a word that he used in there, which I would suggest that you get out and you can press down.
He said, the spirit of me, the spirit, the spirit is the, well, there's a little phrase that he had in there about the spirit, and I've used it, I've used that.
And that's, I think, don't you agree, is the important thing here, is that whoever built the ark wouldn't even fight this well.
Oh, I don't think there's any question about this.
By themselves, it seems to me that this is going, in terms of the way it was planned originally and what we foresaw and so forth, it's just about to do well.
And we expect it, I think, to do remarkably well by the front.
Point two.
Point two.
Can I suggest this?
Now, before Bill goes on, if he goes on 13, get Abrams and or Rob Bill together, Abrams and Bunker, to send a joint wire and, of course, that should be all of us.
so that Bill can have it, so that he can say, I have just received a wire.
Now, that's .
You see what I mean?
It's a funny, it's an interesting thing.
It's like a lawyer, a lawyer in a case.
You can say, I just received a wire.
They don't believe us.
They may not believe him, but they're more likely to believe the two of us.
You're answering it?
If that says something, yeah.
If there is any good stuff, there's bad stuff, I forget it.
That's better than anything.
I went out with Mr. Ernie.
Ernie, we're doing tonight.
There was a big fight right here where they, uh, uh, took the R-105, meaning it had all these B-105 artillery, and they killed the 325 of them right here.
Just, uh, yesterday, there's a couple of...
There are two aquatic neighbors.
Yes, sir.
Think of, uh,
Lost, uh, now according to the, uh, evidence, you know, uh... Seventy-seven.
Seventy-three now.
Seventy-three.
Yes, sir.
And, uh, all I see is these tanks.
It's, uh...
I've become an expert.
These tanks, as I understand...
are not the kind of tanks that we usually think of.
These are actually, these are mobile artilleries.
Isn't that right?
They're really used, they move around for artillery purposes rather than just tanks in the sense of carrying
Or am I wrong?
This is right here.
Because there are three kinds of tanks down here.
There's the PT-76, which is a very light, really arm-adaptive vehicle.
That's where they have the most output.
Then for the first time, they have the T-34 and the T-54, which are heavy tanks.
So they have 100-millimeter guns, and they have heavy armor.
All right, thank you for bringing some buckets there.
I can't wait to put them over.
Yeah, but that's the way they do it in the fall.
It's raining.
They don't have any choice.
They have to run.
In our case, it's 10 shoes.
It's used to go in.
in which they're leaving infantry and going around.
That's what I meant there.
Most of those destroyed by our other president, both of those I remember the best part are that they got to leave the charge of infantry, which we think of tank battles of in a normal sense.
That's right.
And then the armored carriers, though.
I'm assuming that that's what they first started taking out of them.
And they abused these tanks against us with Base 31.
We have several photographs of them now destroyed by them.
uh six months ago
That's because that's a tough terrain for those tanks.
They've never used it in that kind of a country before.
And I don't think that that can be used.
But I missed the unfortunate time.
You always take a great line, John.
I trust you.
I told somebody I asked about that pipe.
I was going to say, well, I said, as a matter of fact, you know, he had that piece of pipe.
That is a piece of pipe that runs down there.
And, uh, but I checked that with the Secretary of State and he said, he's on a crank.
And she said, I suggest getting more current pieces.
Don't let him feel bad about this.
He's a good officer.
He's been doing extremely well.
But he feels badly about it that he wasn't there.
But you tell me that both the secretary and I, Bill and I, both were very impressed by it.
He says, what the hell is up?
And not to be a bit, don't get a little gunshot.
He said, this is the next time.
He doesn't get away with it.
The activity inside the northern part of South Louisiana has been
Welcome to the light.
It was exactly this one battle where, as I reported, the 325 were killed by artillery and kilos primarily.
The rest of the action was monitored until they made this assault into Sophia early in the morning, early this morning.
One question.
What about the things I've asked you about two or three times since we've talked tonight?
What is the situation that Bell has raised about the attempt of the North Vietnamese, the potential of the North Vietnamese to cut off, you know, coming down here to Route 9?
And what about that?
You know, you're watching that and you do not see a building up there yet.
Is that correct?
Well, they do have a build-up, you might say, of these ramps just right here.
concerned about it and the reason that we still need a little loosen to my attack of course is they got a lot of troops around on that place of it like it all across the DMC if we let them think that nothing's going to happen I would assume they just move them all over there to come in and said possible not only
We have our own blocking positions out here.
Our patrols out, 24 hour air patrol taking a look with flagships and gunships.
We have the two positive support bases 38 and 31 and we know by and large where they are.
What's your capability?
Well, there's no question that they have the capability to fire into that area and put about 1,000 rounds.
They compare it to the DMZ area too, and it is a threat, and we have to watch it.
We have to watch that constantly.
That's why I think that perhaps a hit in that area that isn't limited to saints would be a good thing to do.
You described the area again.
What do I get?
Where do I get it?
Is there a build up there?
There's not a substantial build up Mr. President.
Why would you call it that?
There are troops in the area.
Well, there are a lot of trucks in that area.
There are a lot of supply cabs.
There are only three of them coming in, and we know where they are.
Yes?
Do you know where the trucks are?
Do you have seen them?
Well, the trucks are moving, but what we will do is I want to make it up and down that road.
The trucks are always there.
Every time we go in for the missiles, we see the trucks.
And instead of just taking the missiles, this time we'd like to spill over a little bit.
I get your point.
He went pretty darn darn far in saying to the poor Jew that I don't care if you go dark or you go very silent.
Now, on the other hand, we, uh, we said, uh, you know, we bought a man with a hundred, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh.
But we have also said that whatever we do will depend upon two things.
One, whether they fire their planes, and two, whether or not we see movement of infiltration, which endangers our main force.
Then I said we will hit the passes and put places on the border that were in effect.
Now we've said it enough, and we've done it already three times.
Bill, I think we've, I think we're in a position now to move without any trouble.
You also said that you'll hit the, if they use missiles, you know, hit the missiles, but the surrounding area, the surrounding area, the complex is to support the missiles, which of course means the trucks, it means the guns and everything else.
Well, we have a plan to do it, but the reason I didn't want to do it now that we're moving the other way, I didn't want it to look like it was desperation.
I wanted to look now, I think, is the time to do it, because it does not look like it's a defensive road.
But what kind of, because the one problem is this, to what extent do you have to denude the planes that you were presently using to make your battle of manners?
In other words, do you have enough planes and everything to hit this?
Do you see what I mean?
Yes, sir.
Well, let me make a sign after this for a couple of days and we'll see you in Oregon.
You don't know military history, of course, better than anybody else.
But the greatest mistake, and of course this is a stinking little war, compared to what Rebner wrote, the major mistake is to, at a critical time in the battle, to...
to not force it either way.
Now, if there's any question about it, you need the force here, put it here, and so forth.
This is a collateral.
On the other hand, if you could do the other, it seems to me that this is the opportune time to do it because we have threatened.
Everybody has written about it.
It was on the television last night about these missiles, you know,
They're being fired across the DMZ.
I answered it.
I thought quite a restraining way.
But I think they're right.
I think they're really hit a few things.
Let me go see if they think they're going to have a problem with this.
No, we don't.
We don't think they're going to have a problem with this.
We want to make sure that it doesn't look as if this is the beginning.
We want to give them the opportunity of choosing the time.
So that we should give them maybe 48 or... Oh, 48, so that we get a good date.
In other words, see what happens, President, is that they happen to go in the first day, will observe and pick up many of the guitars, they won't have an opportunity to strike, so we go back the second day.
All right.
Anyway, there's any thing that you can do that will make the task difficult to reverse.
Well, we've been up on the 52s in the past as we've had those truck fights.
Well, we're going over the border this time.
Well, go ahead.
They're only 30 kilometers.
We'll just go up the wall.
This will be a tactical airstrike and it will cross the border up into those routes.
It doesn't look like a nation or region.
There's no way they can get out there in three or four days.
Nobody knows a damn thing about it.
As long as what we say doesn't seem as if we're trying to do it.
I think it seems to me that this could well be described as a protective reaction.
What do you think, Bill?
Well, that's what we'll handle it.
Probably others won't, but that's what I call it.
Protective reaction.
As to what Phyllis said, I think it was in the December 10th conference where I said it, or earlier, where I said that protective reaction meant that we're, and last night I even noticed I left it open where I said it would not be taken or tapped.
And I said, all right.
They shot these missiles.
We've been taking it.
Now we're going in on a protective reaction.
Of course it wasn't 10 for 10.
That's just, we want to tell them to quit building it.
Destroy the missiles.
And the complexes, if you could say, we're going to destroy the missiles and the military complexes that support the missile sites.
Yeah, okay.
How's that?
And the missile defenses.
That's all that matters.
It's fine.
That's okay.
You don't get a line.
The White House is actually expecting it.
We got a lot of phone calls yesterday asking whether the president was going to announce it.
We just haven't been able to try to at least satisfy them.
Okay.
But he has to take it to the Senate.
No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no
What concerns me is, are we, what are our keys to plant that we're not giving them enough air power and so forth?
Is that just politics?
There's politics, Mr. President.
Now, what can we do, Bill, about, I think something ought to go out the bunker.
Well, I guess nothing he needs to know.
He knows it just can't keep him here.
It has nothing to do with our life.
The other thing, if that comes up, the whole thing should happen.
The other point is, are we doing the right thing?
Now, as I understand it, 75 percent, this is a very good point that needs to be made.
You know, when you talk about that the South Vietnamese can pass, everybody says, oh, yeah, with our air support.
But it's 75 percent their air, as I recall.
Is it not about 75 percent?
Yes, sir, about that.
And are not the North Vietnamese divisions there fighting each other?
They're divisions.
Yes sir, they've been there best, they've been there for a long time.
So they've been aesthetic, and they've been through, and they've been, they've lost 900 or so men, but quite a bit.
And I think, of course, they're going to lose many more.
Is there anything more we can do than shut?
Because Cambodia, you know, can be, if that thing stirs up a little while, we'll get some help down there.
No, I think we have control.
There's a plan to go 1 July.
We have more time weather-wise.
Do you need any more air?
Is there any way we can, any way, for example, we can...
Put it in some more air.
It's a critical point.
What I mean is, whether in this area or in the rest, are you doing this on the basis of whether or not you want to be allowed to serve actors?
Let me know.
Well, we've got 14,000 sorties in the bank that they haven't even touched.
As far as the budget is concerned.
Use everything.
Now is the time to pour on.
For the next couple of days, because from a political PR standpoint, we can get away with it.
Pour on.
And it's been three days.
It's been 72 hours.
We've put more B-52s in there, too.
Okay.
So what is it here?
I'm going to put it back.
I'm going to put it back.
I told Bill last night that my daughter
My daughter, Tricia, you know, she's a very quiet person.
She hates, you know, most of the quiet times.
She hates it when people speak to her.
She says the best thing you said to me was when you said to her, she died.
You guys want to cheat?
So it was a great last night.
I'll talk to you guys over here.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
So they want you to make one full bucket for it.
Do you want to use it in an office?
Do you want to make one bucket?
You can go to my office.
I'll tell you how to use it.
You'll try it here, you know.
So...
You go back and read, if you go back and read, I don't know if it's in the military library, the criminal story of the Eastern Front.
It's the second volume of his life in the First World War.
Read what happened to the Austrians and the Leopards and what happened to the Jews.
also Canberra and so forth and also actually what happened to Marne when the Germans were there in their stupidity got panicked and took a couple of divisions out and were on the rails and never got into the cabin and we just threw them to the lakes for the rest the main thing is this you know those were the best those guys that lived for warfare and so forth the main thing is for God's sake this is our last problem
Let's be sure that we dump everything we can do.
Now, I mean everything.
The only thing you can do is to drop anything else and do it.
You know what I mean?
And so I don't know if you're running those little turf field load things up there and all those other things.
Now, one other thing, one other thing.
Is there any chance of any raid in the north by the Saudis?
Did they put on a little commando raid up there?
And it's going to be shocked at this, but I think it would be very, very, very scary right at the moment.
But I'm in command over here.
Anything they could do?
All I can do is look into that.
Was it yesterday, sir?
Keep them on.
Keep them guessing.
Keep them guessing.
Well, we were making that paint with that carrier in there, and then I thought it was the dead carrier.
Carrier.
Going back and looking at those brains off there.
And we had literally 18 boats the next day.
You're used enough to think of something that will confuse the enemy.
Now you think of something.
That's right.
That's right.
You are aware, I think, that President Julie might have put what you sent us into as those tattooed lotion-drilled jeans that have... Yeah, there's a bunch of those pictures out there.
I've picked up a dead pipe that could possibly have been blown over there at that time.
But the only reason we had it back here, quite frankly, was because we were so late.
We were trying to assume that we'd set the chickens and they'd be a child.
They said that we had action.
How did Mel get ahold of it?
You borrowed it from us.
No, no.
We had it in the basement of the living room.
Forget about it.
He's fine.
You're better, actually.
But I'm not a real defender.
Dick, how are things going in there in Los Angeles?
It's touch and go.
It is touch and go, Mr. President.
Is there anything more we can do there?
Well, we've thought up everything we know how, and we've got more airstrikes.
Well, I think we've got pretty good air support, considering the weather and everything.
All that's been straightened out, I think.
If it goes, are we prepared psychologically for it?
I guess we just have to be prepared psychologically.
I don't know the goal, but it's quite... What do they do?
First they take Long 10, and then what happens?
Well, then you have to regroup and decide what they're going to do next.
And the drills will just disappear into the woodwork.
We'll have problems with refugees, the male refugees that are a few kilometers away.
But they can be got out of there.
We've had a number of messages on it that we haven't had any contact with.
It's more a headline, Mr. President, than it is the loss of Laos.
That would be a very important defeat.
There's no doubt about that.
Because after a long game goes, there really isn't any combat force left in North Laos.
Yeah, we really laid the foundation.
I'm just thinking that's the whole point of the headline.
We've got to be damn sure we control the headline so that Laos, that this is something we've been expecting in the rest.
I think that's the important thing in the game plan, regardless of psychology.
I personally don't think it's going to go.
I don't think so.
We've got a fighting chance.
I think Longchamp can go, and no one will know the difference except Dick.
I don't think they should make a move towards Bench yet.
There's got to be a good sign before they take it.
Oh, they have a question about that.
And that they'll have to read through that at the long term.
So I think we have about four to six weeks.
Let me ask you if you would talk all of you about the psychology or something to be prepared about having in mind the fact it's all one piece.
That's why we've done everything we know how to hang on to this whole piece of real estate.
It's all one piece.
What's the situation in Cambodia when you hear about it?
How are they feeling there since the old man died?
I mean, he had a stroke and so forth.
Is he recovering?
Is he recovering?
Actually, I don't think it's going to be competitive.
Guess what he considered?
All the layaway things seem to have cut down the interest.
Apparently they're not comfortable as much as they were earlier as well.
But they're still finished, shot, refined, and they're still busy.
We just don't see it in the papers or on the television.
It's been totally taken over by the law.
I must say, I was absolutely riveted last night at your press conference.
that you've got exactly two questions on world affairs that have to do with Southeast Asia.
One on the Middle East, and one on communist times, Senator.
It might have been a third, but I think there will be two.
It's all of them.
It's all of them.
But when you consider there's a half an hour on world affairs, and it was all on Southeast Asia.
It's all the times.
It's because all these cities are taller.
But one thing is important to listen to.
was to create a credibility gap in the press.
And I think a lot of people are going to have one after that from today.
After last night, I looked out for that television camera and I said, every night I heard it was going to expand the war and increase our casualties.
I think we're wrong.
Oh, I thought it was an excellent press conference.
I mean, you've got to accomplish your objective in space, in my opinion.
How do you feel this thing is picking up around here?
I mean, you're judging me, but it's breaking down.
There's no question.
I don't know how funny it turns out.
They just can't.
They think they're doing better now, apparently.
It's all enemies, it must be.
Well, I think they are, but it's going to be a lamb-basting, rock-and-socket fight before it's all over.
I think there is just beginning of a long war.
Well, I mean, a battle.
A long battle, yes.
That's my idea.
The enemies can't keep this up.
You know, if they do, they'll throw them in their hands, in fact.
And they've just got to fight it, and they've got the men here to fight it, and I think they're going to do it.
Yeah, but if they don't make it, I really don't know where they could go strategically from there.
That's just the point.
I mean, if you get a standoff, that's why they've made the first, whatever the date is, you won.
And that ought to be the maximum you won.
It was a matter of fact that I don't know if it was with the Soviet media station where they were first.
Now, they've caused a hell of a lot of havoc already.
I live out of it.
I mean, it's got to, you can't let those matches not realize that some things have happened, can you?
I think that the, you know, let's unfurl this thing and go back to where we started.
We're sitting here today having the same meetings we had three or four weeks ago.
I think we would come to the same conclusion again.
Let's try it knowing what we do in the headset.
No, it's not.
If these four-division 100 tanks get debunked in July and April, in August and September, I have to be a drop-down sample of troops.
You have to do this.
What is it?
I mean, even if the South Indians get a bloody nose out of this.
That's a good thing to get out, you know.
You're talking if you would, you know, because you see people, and I know you shouldn't.
I spent some time talking to our old friend Joe Walsh yesterday.
Well, he was pointing out the understandings.
He understands that from my perspective on this, I think it's very well from you.
And you know, you can base it on the fact that I've asked you to talk about it.
Well, I believe that you've got Tom, and Tom, it's the truth.
But right now, I'll keep it up this way.
If we fail in the Southeast Asia, this country will have stuttered along, but you will never recover the power again.
I know this.
This wasn't true before.
You could have failed at the beginning, or failed even in the middle.
But you can't fail after staggering through six years.
You can't fail.
and say, no, the United States just didn't have a plan.
See, that's the whole problem.
And right now, that's why we've got to do everything we can to make it succeed.
We've got to take risks.
This is a risk.
I don't want to show you that.
People are all worried about Laos and all that sort of thing.
And we've got a character of popularity and a toll on crap.
The important thing is that this has to succeed now.
I mean, it's the fight.
We could have copped out in January when we first came in.
It would have occurred in January.
They'd say, well, the old administration got us in and got us out.
And so we would have had some repercussions to stop these days.
But the United States would not have decided to fight.
If I count the United States, I don't see my state again fighting this long.
But he got to it.
And by winning, I don't mean conquering North Vietnam.
I mean securing a reasonable chance to assault Vietnam and live in peace without having a communist government pulled to the force.
That's all.
Do you agree?
I do.
You know those people out there, so I know this is a matter of conviction.
I don't know if Donald knows or not, but it's going to affect Sahara, and it will affect our poor people in Thailand, of course.
It will affect the Malaysians, and obviously, the Rohingya troops.
It will affect the Sili-Sili, the Filipinos, a hell of a lot.
And, deep back, most importantly, the Japanese.
And the Indians don't care what happens.
No, you see my point.
We've got not to... Henry, how do you feel about this?
You see, it's the point.
It's the point that then we did it because we thought it was right two years ago.
Now we have to do it because the United States cannot fail.
I had a very interesting experience.
What do you think, Al, before Henry answers?
Don't you agree with him?
Very much so.
But I think experience, Mr. President, is a group I haven't had a chance to tell you about.
Presidents of student bodies from 10 universities who were in here.
And they were very late, of course, all over the place.
And then I said to them, answer me this question.
I know you want me to get out of here.
But let me ask you this.
Look back from 73 or 74.
What would impress you more?
The president goes on television now and says it was all the terrorists that came in and came out.
All he does is he sticks it, comes out of his army in the country, although it's been 59 years, sticks his roof, and after what Chief Kennedy said, he may not like this, I think he says, but I think it will be something we're going to do, which will impress him more.
And thankfully enough, he didn't say the second will impress us more, but he said we'd love to think about that.
I'm not educated on that.
That was amazing.
A year ago, they would have said, like, you stupid bastard, you ought to get out now.
And the whole hood of that student, the whole path of these two, but it wasn't friendly to me, and I stretched despite them, from what it was a year ago.
The most of what I create at the moment is negative and it will continue to be in the next couple of weeks because of the television.
Television has created the doubts for three weeks.
They've shown this horrible killing.
They've shown the hell out there people.
They've shown the soft end and he's getting killed.
And the people get the idea that the United States is taking the hell away.
That's why we got to win.
This country doesn't like to lose.
This country doesn't like to lose.
We have got to win this.
And I just feel so strongly now that that's why we popped in here.
We popped in here and it's done the same, Drew.
Can't believe the last year.
We haven't.
Can't believe the last year.
Can't believe the last year.
Can't believe the last year.
Can't believe the last year.
Can't believe the last year.
Can't believe the last year.
they would have kind of deserved it for us to go and find out.
But now, I've had no personal reservations about any of these decisions, Mr. President.
I've been with you all the way.
I mean, these are my profound convictions.
I think that the United States, if we had to stick our tail between our legs and come slinking out of Vietnam, is effectively, as you say, finished as a world player.
Now look at Cuba.
That's terrible.
The Ubers, the Ubers still, and my conviction is very strong, we cannot relent in our policy toward Cuba.
I think, you know, there are, I can see the effect of Chile and Turkey, I don't even know what's happening.
They're all fighting for territory.
The problems in Cuba are enormous.
They are still, of course, in our ambition.
So do we.
we throw in the towel the killings and the effects on the rest of life could be massive in encouraging that, encouraging communist, Marxist identity or colorful human-type revolutions.
Now, I have made the question already, but I want to know what your honest opinion is, too, from the intelligence and everything else.
I think we should hold course with the killings of our own.
We start being nice to Castro.
Sir, I sat at your desk about a year ago on this question, and I gave you the answer then that I was opposed to the idea of relenting on Cuba.
I'm just as opposed today.
In fact, even more so, I think what's happened is that children make it even more advisable to keep a tough line on Cuba.
I think if you give the impression that we're now soft on Cuba because of any of these things, I think that what I'm afraid is the wave in Latin America anyway is going to crash on the beach a lot faster.
It's a lot easier for this country to handle Cuba the way we handle her now than to start these little pacifying moves, which are really cosmetic and which just make it difficult to face the problem.
I don't know if any of those pacifying things get any, well, they get hit, but we're going to be sure that they're triggered because I put, oh, a hell of a lot of sheets down through this office on that one.
I'm sure he had to do this or that or the other thing, but they had to kill him.
The most single event in terms of ideological and philosophical
What has occurred in the last ten days, in my opinion, has been the deterioration of the attitude of the Bible Church.
I, being on the trial of the pro, the strongest pro-catholic, who is not a Catholic, have the greatest admire as a Catholic, who knows what they have done in the years to save us, and I say to everybody else, the Catholics of the present time, the 70s, the 70s, there, and Latin America.
We're about one-third Marxist.
And the other third are in the Senate.
And the other third are Catholics.
Now, at the present time, the old days, when you'd count on the Catholic Church of any of us to play an effective role in this serious question, we see there is a very
What has happened is that the American Catholic Church, like the Eastern Catholic, and all the other Catholics in Latin America, and everywhere else,
by a private group, I think I sent it over to you, which on the Catholic church outstanding field was done by a French priest.
on the publishing houses, telestrines in the Church of Dayton, for example, and the influence of the Dutch Catholic Church, which in some ways has come very far.
It's a delicate thing for the government to do, Mr. President.
Oh, it's a delicate thing for the government to do, but we've got to now assume that the Catholic Church is going to... Let me say, the Protestant Church isn't going to be worse than I can say that they are.
They are horrible.
I mean, except for the Bill and Grace, but not this time.
Most Protestants.
Like my Quakers are passing the servers.
That's what it is.
The Catholics now, the Catholics, this rock bed, at least in the Antiquities.
There's some of them that have to get through to the Catholics.
What has happened to the church?
They must know this in Eastern Europe.
They're just...
I mean, they talk about the Polish Catholic Church.
The Polish Catholic Church does pretty good.
I know, I know, I know.
What they allow them to do.
The Polish Catholic Church has allowed them to do more than most.
But nevertheless, everything doesn't have the kind of freedom that they really need the Catholic Church to have.
I thought you saw the Polish Catholic Church.
Oh, the closest Catholic church is conservative as hell.
Oh, I know that.
In fact, in all the Eastern European countries, the Catholic church, whatever level, is conservative.
But usually having the brown nose, the government's.
Are we still continuing to agree to approve or somebody forced us on?
I don't know what the Senator Casey's hearing is going to be like.
My God, what a profound patriotic thing.
Anyway,
Going on from there, that's another thing .
So it's a special case .
Can we ask one other thing?
Henry, if you could dig all over the .
Oh, yeah.
You know, the state doesn't want it.
Now, I haven't had a Brazilian up here.
You understand why.
I believe we support whoever are our friends any place in the world.
And I believe that in most Latin countries, not dictators, that's a horrible word, and reverence over the most Americans, but that strong leadership is essential.
They all proved that.
I mean, France is a Latin country.
It couldn't, even France, with all of its sophistication, couldn't handle a democracy.
It can't.
The attack of the 10th Second Front, they can't afford the luxury of democracy either in Spain.
And no country in Latin America can.
But I am alone.
They said, well, come on, kid.
Would we like that here?
Well, the party in power wouldn't like it.
Where the damn party on power would say, great, let's change every four years.
I'm glad to hear this, Mr. President.
I don't think, frankly, that on the social circuit we've paid the attention to Latin America that we might have over the years.
If you will examine the way I feel about it, Brenda, and I have one thing, Henry, that you do, if you put this in the Boarding Committee, it's also a good thing to do.
These guys like to go on big trips and so forth, and I do it much.
Let's get them to get it done, Mary.
Nelson Rockefeller's made this.
If I got in these Latin countries, we can get another chili off the pass someplace.
I don't know how we're going to stop it, actually, because I know that Brazil, the biggest country, makes it.
That's going to have a massive effect.
We will keep Argentina lined up until Argentina.
Argentina and Dao, those are the two that matter, let's face it.
Venezuela, Colombia, Venezuela, that's what I call them.
Colombia, the rest.
Peru.
A nice little private visit.
State budget gets too complicated, and I talked to him about it.
We'll make it a state visit, but we will explain publicly that it's really true.
And the state before.
And Brazil is laying on it.
Brazil is laying on it with determination.
I've been talking to our friends in the House of Peruvians, a bunch of announcements.
We haven't talked to them yet.
You know, if we could announce it in tandem, Brazil and Peru, that would be great.
But actually, Mr. President, are you feeling really secure that the bad consequences never happened?
And I don't know who in mid-History would like me, and I don't know.
But mid-History, I want.
And we're going to make that a hell of a show.
I think the Brazilians are a big country, and by the end of the century, they'll be as populist as we are.
We're talking about years after that.
So let's go on that.
But I think Latin America is a good place for the beyond to take a quick look.
What do you think?
I think that's excellent.
I think it's a good place.
I think that's next.
Thanks for doing what you did last year.
You sent some of them to Saudi Arabia.
Yeah.
Got a part of the little group down to Latin America.
Now, I'm going to ask you one other thing.
Did you follow up on putting my friend Tom Dewey on there?
I thought you had one.
Did you call him earlier?
Yes, I talked to him about it.
He was going to let me know whether he wanted to do it.
I'll check him again.
Yes.
He said he had to think about it and wanted me to call him.
Would that be a nice thing?
Uh, yes, it would be a good reason.
But you've offered it.
You don't know if he offered it or not.
Yeah.
When would the next meeting be?
It's early in the library.
You call him again.
Let me check it.
Let me do a check-in again.
You call him again and say the President raised it this morning meeting with Mr. Holmes.
And that if he accepts, you could call him.
And that there are obeisances, you know, we could... Doty would be a superb man, for example, to send him in and have a private meeting.
This is a guy with one o'clock bills.
He's trying to be a good man.
You know, he's stronger than some of the other guys there who are just as well-intentioned, but talk your damn heart off.
Anyway, Mr. President, I have spent three days with the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I want to assure you that I have presented the threats, and I think it's been wasted before.
The threat of the Soviet threat of the Chinese government and the rest of the world, I believe I've accomplished my mission.
Let's see.
Huh?
Yeah?
Aren't you a Catholic?
Yes, I am, sir.
Oh, God damn it.
Get the boat to shape up, sir.
I agree with you completely.
Huh?
Get it to shape up.
Let's go.