Nixon White House Tapes › Tape 465 › Conversation 465-006

Nixon & Flanigan on Textile trade negotiations and Japan

Wednesday, March 10, 1971 · 10:13 AM–10:23 AM ET · Oval Office · 18 min

ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President); Flanigan, Peter M.Conversation465-006 on Tape 465 (tape position 00:34:03–00:51:53)StartWednesday, March 10, 1971 at 10:13 AMEndWednesday, March 10, 1971 at 10:23 AMRecording deviceOval OfficeSourceNixon Library record for 465-006 ↗

AI Summary

President Nixon and Peter Flanigan discussed strategies for handling recalcitrant textile trade negotiations with Japan and addressing perceived overreach by Congressman Wilbur Mills. The President rejected a soft approach, insisting on a forceful public stance and the preparation of tough, direct legislation to pressure both the Japanese and Congress. Additionally, Nixon directed staff to clarify his firm support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, specifically ordering a public refutation of reports suggesting he or nominee James C. Fletcher harbored doubts on the matter. Finally, they reviewed the progress of William J. Casey’s Senate confirmation process, noting successful efforts to neutralize opposition.

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Position in tape: 00:34:03 – 00:51:53

part A, 34:01

465a.mp3
465b.mp3

NARA Description

On March 10, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Peter M. Flanigan met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:13 am to 10:23 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 465-006 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Conversation No. 465-6

Date: March 10, 1971
Time: 10:13 am - 10:23 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Peter M. Flanigan

Textile trade negotiations with Japan
     -President’s conversation with John N. Mitchell, March 9, 1971
     -Concessions
     -Wilbur D. Mills
     -Flanigan’s conversation with Mitchell, March 9, 1971
     -Mills’ efforts
            -Effect on negotiations
            -President’s position
     -A letter to Eisaku Sato
     -Possible Presidential statement
            -Textile legislation
                  -Possible action
            -Mills
                  -Wording
                  -Conversation with Peter G. Peterson
                  -President’s message
            -Draft
            -Review
                  -Mitchell
            -John B. Connally
                  -Tone
                  -Administration position
     -Textile legislation
            -Timing
            -George P. Shultz and Peterson
            -Possible action
                  -Congress
                  -Administration
     -Administration’s position
            -President’s view
     -Japan
     -Peterson
     -Flanigan’s conversation with Japanese ambassador
            -Mills’ role
            -President’s position
                  -Trade requirements
            -Mills
Show the rest of the log (33 more lines)
     -Mills
            -Steel compared with textiles
     -Textile industry position
            -Public relations efforts

                -Administration
                -Mills

     Anti-ballistic Missiles [ABM] treaty
          -Ronald L. Ziegler
          -A statement on Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
          -James C. Fletcher
                 -Meeting with President
                 -Position
          -Ziegler clarification
          -President’s position
          -Daniel L. Schorr
                 -Meeting with Fletcher and university presidents
          -President’s position
          -Ziegler’s meeting with Fletcher
                 -Clarification of comments
                 -Schorr
          -Fletcher

     William J. Casey
          -Senate confirmation
                -Committee
                      -Full Senate
                -William Proxmire
                -A federal judge’s testimony
                -John G. Tower

Flanigan left at 10:23 am

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

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I talked to him last night.
Yes, sir.
We talked to him, and he...
It's all right.
But it has to do with another thing, not that I'm just going to have a congressman, any congressman, any board member.
I'm going to write a goddamn tough letter to Succo, too, on my own.
You know, I don't know what it's going to be very tough.
I don't have the sort of things.
I agree with you.
I think what we ought to say is, or I think about it is rather than, I know you're worried and trying to get in safety.
First, let me say, forget all the free trade crap.
Forget the fact that the trade bill may come in.
They may send a bad bill.
I'll handle that when it comes.
Who knows, I might sign it.
I understand.
Particularly if they let you wave wherever you want.
Particularly if they let you wave wherever you want.
That's right.
That's right.
Because basically we may face a situation where a lot of people in this country report, no, what I'd like to say is basically that this is unsatisfactory.
It does not meet these criteria.
Therefore, I am sending this legislation to the Congress.
And until we have, until we get a satisfactory arrangement, or, I mean, I don't know how you would put it in a way that says, well, maybe this deal with Mills is made, might or not be satisfactory.
That worries me.
That's quite a worry.
You got another idea?
No, I was following your idea that, frankly, Mills told Peters and Yesset they're not going to be in textile quota legislation this year.
Period.
Therefore, it seems to me you can properly say in your message that the flow of legislation is controlled by or is affected by him, and you're going to enter this monitoring thing.
Only if alternatives say you're going to monitor it, and if it doesn't work, then you'll send up legislation.
But frankly, that makes it look as if you believe it's going to work.
No, never.
No, the legislation will score me.
Right.
And I think that you're just, I'd like to bring in a draft view.
Well, I mean, you work on the thing, and then take it over, and let John Mitchell get him in to take a look at it to see whether he thinks it's hard enough.
I will.
I had to go the hard way.
I talked to John Connolly, and boy, does he agree with you.
He says, don't use that stiletto, use a meat axe.
He says, say it so the fellow in the street can tell.
We'll understand what you're trying to do to you.
Know what he said?
Yeah.
He said, I see nothing wrong with this approach, and I see nothing wrong with the statement, but I think you ought to be good and strong.
He said, I think you've been jobbed by those people over there.
That's right.
That's right.
And we've got to say so, and I go ahead and bring it up.
Well, that's my line.
I just wanted to... All right, Mr. President.
I mean, I've got to tell you that there is the usual consternation in the...
to some extent, with regard to sending legislation now, is concerned.
Well, I'm talking about George and Pete are afraid you're going to get bad legislation.
The legislation will be, whether we send it down or not, will not determine whether it's going to be legislation.
That will be determined by other factors.
George and Pete this year, they're concerned about the fact that, you understand, if they want to have legislation, it's not going to be what we send down.
Bill, sure, their guy's already there.
The other factor is that it will be determined by whether or not they,
the filibuster and all the rest.
I wouldn't worry about that.
I know I'm joking.
They're concerned about the other side of the coin.
They don't want anything to do with the Japanese.
I do.
I'm not planning for the Japanese to do this to us.
It isn't just keeping the commitment.
The Japanese have broken an actual commitment.
We cannot have this.
We're going to have other clashes with other big names.
And I think the fact, and if we try and be above it and sort of just, no, Mickey Mouse, they're going to do it again.
The problem that I, another problem that I think is attacked by this is when the ambassador came in and talked to me about this on Sunday night, I said, Mr.
Ambassador, this does not meet the administration's requirements.
He said, well, are you sure?
Mr. Mills has indicated that the president would not find this unacceptable.
And I said, Mr.
Ambassador, I know the president's position on this, and he would not find this acceptable.
And he said, well, didn't Mr. Mills have breakfast with the president?
Sure.
But the indication is that Mills went out of that, and by what he said, indicated to the Japanese that you wouldn't mind this thing.
Well, that's it.
i never even saw it i said that i wouldn't i said that i should favor it which i've always said always said was sure to make it a voluntary action but that they haven't gotten in yet right that's what i like um
You see, Mills made it work fairly well in steel, and he's not really gotten into the guts of this problem, and he thinks it'll work in textiles.
It's a different problem.
Oh, yes.
They have promised.
They've kind of Mickey-moused, frankly, on attacking Mills yesterday.
And I said, don't ask them back in here unless they're ready to attack Mills.
We don't want anything.
So they have now promised that if we take some action such as this, they will immediately come out with a strong statement in support of you and attacking Wilberville.
Why, sure.
They've got to carry some of the heat on this thing.
What's the matter with him?
Nothing.
Okay.
Now, the other thing I was going to ask you is if you're going to tell a secret about him.
I saw this statement on CBS.
It was called Fletcher's Postal Department.
I had never met with him on a bench.
He's not against ABN.
Sure.
Sure, at lunch three months ago, before anyone talked to Fletcher, with Fletcher and three or four other presidents of universities.
I have never in my life been in a doubtful stadium.
I've always been for it.
That's what's wrong.
We can indicate what his views are, but not mine.
What?
What?
What I got?
Fletcher was here for breakfast this morning.
Got Ron to talk to Fletcher.
He's talking to him, getting exactly what Fletcher said, and then putting the lie to shore on you're talking to Fletcher, you're having doubts, and on Fletcher having doubts.
Yes, sir.
He's a good, at least on the face, he's a good man.
Incidentally, Casey won 9-3.
I saw the committee.
I think it's a good report.
Yes, I agree.
I hope he does as well.
I hope he does as well and gets the full Senate, because the thought is he won so, so the full committee will do all right when he gets it.
One sidelight on the proxmire got a federal judge down here to testify against Casey on a case that he's been in, and apparently we had Brian Tower and those fellas on the thing, and they just tore the federal judge apart.
He hadn't read it and reviewed the case for me.

— 9 min 2 s with no transcribed speech —

See if Mr. Price can feel cooked.

Also recorded on March 10, 1971

  • 465-001 9:25 AM · 2 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:25 am and 9:33 am.
  • 465-002 9:33 AM · 15 min — President Richard M. Nixon, William L. Safire, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:33 am to 9:45 am.
  • 465-003 9:50 AM · 57 sec — President Richard M. Nixon and Mark I. Goode met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:50 am to 9:51 am.
  • 465-004 9:51 AM · 12 min — President Richard M. Nixon, John W. Scott, Robert N. Hampton, Lowell J. Endahl, C. W. McMillan, John E. Butterbrodt, Don F. Magdanz, John Palmer, Eugene Moos, Robert Lederer, Patrick Healy, Harry Graham, Claude Gifford, Devoe H. Willard, John I. Sutherland, Parke Brinkley, Frank Frazier, Walter W. Goeppinger, Charles Toan, Albert Russell, Robert J. Andrews, Elbert Harp, Ralph T. Jackson, Lorraine Kirker, Roy B. Keppey, unknown person(s), and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:51 am to 10:01 am.
  • 682-001 9:57 AM · 6 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:57 am and 10:06 am.
  • 465-005 10:06 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:06 am and 10:13 am.
  • 465-007 10:23 AM · 3 min — President Richard M. Nixon and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 10:23 am and 10:42 am.
  • 465-008 10:42 AM · 2 hr 33 min — President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Raymond K. Price, Jr., Noel C. Koch, Alexander P. Butterfield, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House from 10:42 am to 1:15 pm.

All 15 conversations from March 10, 1971 →

Cite this conversation

Conversation 465-006, March 10, 1971. White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives. Audio and AI transcript via Easy Nixon, https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/465-006 (accessed November 2, 2026).