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Conversation 467-011

TapeTape 467StartFriday, March 12, 1971 at 8:51 AMEndFriday, March 12, 1971 at 9:01 AMTape start time00:21:37Tape end time00:32:55ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Butterfield, Alexander P.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met to discuss the status of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, specifically navigating Soviet proposals regarding the sequencing of defensive versus offensive missile negotiations. The discussion also covered the military situation in Vietnam, with Nixon emphasizing the need to communicate the success of operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the press to counter rising domestic isolationism. Alexander P. Butterfield briefly joined the meeting to address administrative items, including the President’s schedule and documents requiring his signature.

SALT negotiationsSoviet UnionVietnam WarHo Chi Minh TrailMilitary strategyForeign policyArms control
AudioNARA Description

On March 12, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, and Alexander P. Butterfield met in the Oval Office of the White House from 8:51 am to 9:01 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 467-011 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 467-11

Date: March 12, 1971
Time: 8:51 am - 9:01 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     Kissinger’s meeting with an unknown person
          -A draft letter to the President
                -Reply
          -A letter from the President
          -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

     Possible summit with the Soviet Union
          -Announcement

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] negotiations
           -US proposal
                -Kissinger
                -President’s previous letter
                       -Dobrynin’s response
                       -Soviet Union reply
                -Soviet Union proposal
                       -Order of negotiations
                            -Kissinger’s response
           -Anti-ballistic Missile [ABM]
           -Soviet missiles
           -ABM
                -Kissinger’s view

Alexander P. Butterfield entered at an unknown time after 8:51 am
                                               7

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. 9/08)




     Items for President’s signature

     President’s schedule

Butterfield left at an unknown time before 9:01 am

     SALT negotiations                                               Conv. No. 467-10 (cont.)
         -President’s view
         -Soviet Union proposal
               -President’s response
         -Future meeting
         -Draft letter from the President
               -Kissinger
         -Timing

     US textile negotiations with Japan
          -President’s assessment

     Vietnam
          -President’s Call to General John W. Vogt, Jr.
                -Military situation
                -Washington Post story
                -National Broadcasting Company [NBC] News story
                      -Need for White House response
          -Military situation
                -Vogt’s view
                -Ho Chi Minh Trail
                      -Increased interdiction
                      -Decreased traffic
                -Possible call to Howard K. Smith or Thomas E. Jarriel
                      -Success of Laotian operation
                            -Effect on Ho Chi Minh Trail
                -Tchepone
                      -Truck traffic
          -[Arnold] Eric Sevareid’s commentary
                -US foreign policy
                      -Isolationism
                            -Compared with position after World War II
                                  -Marshall Plan
          -Lyndon B. Johnson
                -Relations with newsmen
                                               8

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 9/08)



           -Military situation

     SALT negotiations
         -President’s position
               -Instructions for Kissinger
               -Forthcoming letter from the President
                     -Kissinger
         -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson                                 Conv. No. 467-11 (cont.)
               -Kissinger

The President and Kissinger left at 9:01 am
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Oh, yeah.
He brought me a reply, a draft letter which they would send you.
And now there's a bit of a negotiation.
I don't want to, unless they want to hear the details.
They want to show the letters from you.
There was a lot of detail happened by the previous day.
Well, at least he replied.
Oh, they're dying, they're real soon, they're suddenly bleeding.
All right.
And they're saying... Do you want that announced now?
No.
You don't want it announced?
No, no, no.
What do you think, Mr. President?
I don't know, I just can't deal with it.
All right, but on this, do they want this exchange of letters to occur now?
Well, uh, yeah, oh yeah.
If you think you can, why don't you just summarize it for us?
Well, the exchange of letters is that I have proposed to him...
in the draft of your letter, a very detailed agreement of freezing.
They don't want to do that.
They, uh, to bring him in, frankly, they don't want to do it because he thinks
With the preparation for the party congress, they can't all get married.
So they gave us a much shorter reply, and they recommended we give them a much shorter letter that just talks about the principles rather than the technical details.
But does it mention offensive and defensive?
Yes.
There we have one point which we have to settle with them.
They, of course, are driving their usual half-barking.
They say, let's go get the defensive first, and then we will discuss the freezing.
I told him that I didn't know what he was thinking.
But that that was too vague.
I think what we have to ask them is this, Mr. President, that they agree to the principles of the freezing of the organs.
Then we will authorize them to discuss A.D. England.
And then before the whole thing gets wrapped up, we will agree to the specifics of the freezing.
I don't think that they can do something with the bill that we can afford to sign at the end of the agreement.
No, that isn't what I'm saying.
What is this?
This is not what I'm saying.
This is not what she's saying.
This is not what I'm saying.
This is what I'm saying.
The money made at the end of the day is going to be spent on more and more things.
And that's what I'm going to do.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I don't know.
I think the significance of this is, it takes out this, this is Senator's position on the intersectionality that I'm trying to get the best possible feeling about.
I don't believe the need to think of the amendment to be a dissent this fast.
Yeah.
Uh, so you've got to work it out.
You've got to, uh, you've got to be ready.
You've got to be ready.
You've got to be ready.
Why don't you get it?
I've got to get it.
Oh, you've got to get something.
You've got to get it.
You've got to get it.
You've got to get it.
You've got to get it.
You've got to get something.
You've got to get something.
You've got to get something.
You've got to get something.
You've got to get something.
You've got to get something.
I think the Japanese will turn out well.
The other thing is that I talked to, I tried to reach him this morning.
He said they had a meeting in the center of the state.
He said in the center of the state and rotating groups and so forth and so on.
I'll show you how it's done in 10 minutes.
You're watching a post-mortem monitor and you see both hands, both serves.
In fact, they were pulling me off.
All right.
I just want to thank you for hearing that.
Hey, you see that?
Sir, I put both of my hands on the mark.
I really love it.
I'm sure people around this time are going to do it.
I'm trying to knock down a truck truck truck truck truck truck truck truck truck truck
The other thing is that they have now interdicted the field back toward 914.
Absolutely.
They took nine of our other vehicles and interdicted nine as interdicted.
Goddamn, this thing may be going down in the meantime.
I said, General, how's this going?
He said, he said, I don't want to be overrun.
He said, you don't even want to be overrun.
But he said, this is the best.
This is the most effective example of his force.
This is how I felt.
He really believes me.
He may be right.
He may be worse than me.
This is why I, why I'm so, I think we have a good side of the movie.
Really, it's a major victory.
We already have a significant number.
But I'm watching the front traffic.
For example, these little boys who put out these boats there, there's less than 50%.
I thought they were going to do something.
They're counting all the traffic from the path to the town.
They do not take into account what we did.
I said below, below the operation.
And there you were actually very conservative because below the operation, never I asked you to give me an exact number.
You said 55% would be conservative.
I think you ought to get on with it.
Oh, I'm saying you didn't see what he said.
That's right.
Did you do that personally?
I think, oh, I called Smith or Darrow or somebody and I said, you're on bad with it.
If you take the total traffic, then it was likely overslept.
If you take the significant traffic that is south of St. Paul, south of the point, 25 south of St. Paul, 55 is very, very...
You notice how several of the active and the, uh, and the, uh, and the, uh, the isolationists and the, uh, I think it's kind of a deep, but I believe it's not, I think it's, and that is another group that's, uh, uh, they all, you know, they were all for intervention, right after World War II.
They were all for the marching plan.
Well, now we're not so sure.
They said, you know, even some of us are probably bogged down in trying everything.
But, you know, what the hell?
They started a little bit of a change there.
I think, John, I think one good thing about Gov is being that it's been used in business.
He and Talia, who's been in the company, that's the thing.
We've got to stay for a chance, but I think running this thing now, but having nerves of that weed, something like this about now, is that this just ain't the kind of thing that needs to go on.
We've got to bring this thing to life.
His drive is the hardest thing to do.
There's two drives on the right and the left.
Oh, yes.
What we can do is not only have to give them, they have to give them a lot of stuff.
What about the scoop catch?
Oh, that's what I was going to say.
But you have to get some sort of thing in there to make it work.
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