Nixon White House Tapes — Conversation 470-008
Date: Friday, March 19, 1971 at 11:45 AM
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Kissinger, Henry A.; [Unknown person(s)]; Bull, Stephen B.
Recording device: Oval Office
Source: https://www.easynixon.org/tapes/470-008

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite it as authoritative.

[0:01] And I didn't know you had already talked to Moore.
[0:13] Yeah, he had told me he was going to have this meeting with these people.
[0:21] No, no, I didn't.
[0:22] But I got very, very clear that they are going to move out, and they're going to be by April 5th or 6th, he said.
[0:36] Yeah, Mike had this view of it.
[0:37] Yeah.
[0:37] Well, whatever it is, my point is, like I say, Monday night.
[0:41] So I believe that if you'll give your thought to that, I personally make an idea to just look at it this way.
[0:43] I think the most important thing to bear in mind is what you said yesterday.
[0:56] Looking at it right today, it has had a very great effect.
[0:59] It is, my second point is that, therefore, as I said when we went in there, remember I said, whatever happens, whether it's a walk, or I said, remember you were saying, I said, if they even spent three weeks, we're going to claim that it was a success.
[1:09] We can.
[1:11] It has been.
[1:12] They have done well.
[1:13] Now, therefore, I think that's got to be the straight line.
[1:16] I'm going to put it right out there.
[1:18] I pray that it's true.
[1:20] I don't let these press people force us to the other side.
[1:22] You know, not at all.
[1:27] You can't do something anywhere else at all.
[1:29] It's unbelievable what they're trying to say, but nevertheless, that doesn't matter so much.
[1:41] What I really want to happen is to tell the son of a bitch from town.
[1:44] And I think your analysis, as you said, after struggling with that for two hours, is the most reassuring thing of all.
[1:47] And I think Moore felt that way, too.
[1:48] He thought better than he did yesterday.
[1:52] But he was at that same meeting, Mr. President.
[1:53] Of course, one had to be disappointed that it wasn't as decisive as it might have been.
[1:56] But if we compare it with anything else we could have done, it is a tremendous advantage over that.
[2:03] Secondly, after scrubbing down all the figures, I could spend now this week five hours on it.
[2:09] the impact of the operation has been a major plus.
[2:14] I'm going to have two memos for you.
[2:16] One that gives you a suggestion of how you might explain the nature of the impact to the public without going into great figures.
[2:28] That you can do a little of that on the Smith.
[2:33] And a lot of it, on the 7th, just give a hint of it to the Smiths.
[2:40] Secondly, some figures that would illustrate this.
[2:44] So I think that we can justify the claim that it has been a considerable success and that it is better than anything else we could have done.
[2:58] And...
[2:59] The other side was badly shaken.
[3:01] For example, there have been altogether 600 Arclight strikes at B-52s.
[3:08] We've entered only 80 of those boxes.
[3:13] In each one of them we had a high body count, and in almost all of them we uncovered large weapons casualties.
[3:21] So undoubtedly the destruction of supplies is greater than we know.
[3:25] Because even if not every box hit something, if even 50% of them hit something, it worries me.
[3:32] Your view is that they will not go in on these raids that they referred to?
[3:36] If you want my frank opinion, I do not believe that.
[3:39] You think Chu now has got his fight and he wants to come back?
[3:44] I believe that Chu's reasoning, I try to reconstruct it for myself.
[3:48] What do you think?
[3:49] I think Chu has decided that he needs the 1st Division and these other units to run the election for him.
[3:55] They all live in the areas from which they were recruited.
[4:00] He doesn't want them to come home and have a lot of casualties in the areas where he's going to run for re-election.
[4:07] He wants the officers to have a high morale so that they can control the population for him.
[4:14] I see.
[4:14] And he doesn't want to run the risk of morale because to us one battalion isn't a hell of a lot.
[4:19] To him one battalion is a district.
[4:23] And I would say it is not like it was on those days.
[4:32] Well, let's not say anything about it.
[4:35] I would not say a thing about it.
[4:38] Well, they say in their legal... Well, this is...
[4:41] They're not...
[4:41] They'll be in their legal...
[4:43] They can't be out...
[4:44] They can't be out in the next...
[4:46] This is already...
[4:47] The major problem now, Mr. President, is to conduct the withdrawal in such a way
[4:52] that the enemy doesn't get a major victory out of it.
[4:55] This is what warrants me.
[4:57] Haig has a cable here in which he says that they've put in another division after Chappelle.
[5:04] They could have broken the back of the North Vietnamese.
[5:06] It's one of these battles where both of them were on the ropes.
[5:10] But let's forget about that.
[5:13] The danger is that they will, that of course,
[5:17] The plan to retreat is very hard, and if the enemy...
[5:21] It's a very small group.
[5:22] In particular, you have to do it with helicopters.
[5:25] So if the enemy locks on one or two regiments, we may get a few more Bloody Noses.
[5:32] Well, we'll get a lot of Bloody Noses.
[5:34] Oh, yes.
[5:35] Oh, Mr. President, there's absolutely no doubt that we have inflicted the five regiments that were north of Route 9, have never attacked again after Hill 31, even though...
[5:47] This would be a good time for them to attack.
[5:49] We are now doing the same thing to the 5th Regiment south of Route 9.
[5:54] So the other side isn't...
[5:56] The only way they do a more effective job, well, I know they're trying, but the press won't carry it.
[6:07] Just to tell you what is the truth, that the, as I said yesterday, the...
[6:10] South Vietnamese are not withdrawing.
[6:13] They've accomplished their purpose.
[6:15] They, you know what I mean?
[6:17] And that's that.
[6:18] But we've got to do some tunnel briefing next week, and we've got to claim, I think your talk should kick it off, and then we all have to go out there and grind away at it.
[6:30] I think maybe I ought to give the background.
[6:32] I'm not eager to do it, but we have to tie it together so that we can
[6:40] So it can look effective.
[6:42] And it was effective.
[6:45] It's a good victory.
[6:46] It's a good achievement.
[6:48] It isn't a decisive achievement.
[6:49] That's my present reading of it.
[6:52] But it has set back the possibility of their offensive.
[6:55] There's not going to be an offensive in First and Second Corps by them this year.
[7:00] There's no possibility of an offensive by them in Cambodia this year.
[7:05] And so we've achieved 70% of what we set out to do.
[7:11] And I think we've hurt them enough and shaken them up enough still to trigger the negotiation this summer.
[7:21] Our critics are going to give us a hard time now.
[7:33] And I'm afraid it's true.
[7:34] And if Q had been a little more forthcoming, he had told us after he was in Japan what he was really up to, we could have played it into it.
[7:55] From a public relations point of view, we could have trumpeted the withdrawal as being made possible by the victory.
[7:59] But we can still do this.
[8:00] But they're getting the hit that hard.
[8:02] Well, actually, the Washington Post had a good story.
[8:05] It had a good story for the first time.
[8:11] It gave a rather balanced account.
[8:15] It said there's a lot of confusion, but it stated a lot of pluses.
[8:21] I must say, Mr. President, after scrubbing the figures myself and
[8:26] If you talk to soldiers, people have been at these meetings with me.
[8:30] I'm the devil's advocate.
[8:33] I give everybody a hard time.
[8:34] Right.
[8:36] I had been very focused on the number of trucks that went through.
[8:39] What I had not focused on before these meetings was that it mattered also what's on the trucks.
[8:47] So that, for example, the fact that they had 50,000 troops in southern Laos where they had had 8,000 last year.
[8:56] meant that a lot of the trucks had to carry rides and not ammunition.
[9:02] Secondly, with the destruction of the pipeline, a lot of the trucks had to carry gasoline.
[9:06] The pipeline, without question, was destroyed.
[9:11] Oh, yes.
[9:11] No question about that.
[9:12] Well, they did rebuild it, but still it will take them a bit.
[9:15] It has been out of operation for such a period.
[9:19] That's right.
[9:19] That's right.
[9:20] So one of the results of all of this has been that even at constant flows,
[9:26] A lot of it was consumables and not ammunition.
[9:31] Then if you add to it the expenditure of ammunition for 10 residents, all the anti-aircraft expenditure, the destruction of cashes, even if you don't count a single truck destroyed or interrupted, the throughput this year has got to be a lot less than it was last year.
[9:51] Now, the DIA figures, the CIA disputes
[9:56] show a ridiculously small amount of fake claims that only 2,000 tons had come through.
[10:05] And while CIA argues with it and then... Well, they won't claim anything.
[10:12] Well, that's the trouble.
[10:16] They, uh, the CIA... Well, now the CIA is sulking because of Shearer's will.
[10:22] And, uh...
[10:23] Why?
[10:24] Because they made a mistake on them?
[10:25] Yeah, so now they won't give us any figures anymore.
[10:31] But the fact is that even if the 2,000 pounds is wrong, and they tell us that so far only
[10:53] an eighth of the amount has gone in, whatever that eighth is, whether it's 2,000 tons or 10,000 tons, as last year.
[11:02] Now, that no one disputes.
[11:07] And
[11:10] Now, if they do these raves, that would put another trip into it.
[11:15] That would be great.
[11:17] That would be great.
[11:20] Because it would completely disarm our force.
[11:22] I mean, they just make a rave in there.
[11:26] I think we will see, as we did after Cambodia, a dwindling of military activity, a drop in our casualties.
[11:38] Yes, sir.
[11:39] And you'll have the troop announcement.
[11:43] I think what you should do with the troop announcement, Mr. President, just to give you my present thinking, is if
[11:51] If you announce the withdrawal of 100,000 by December 1st, this would be then add a rate of above 14,000.
[12:00] A little higher.
[12:02] It would be a higher rate.
[12:04] No one expects that.
[12:06] 100,000 is a good round number.
[12:08] It's a good round number.
[12:09] Everyone would write it's a higher rate.
[12:12] the figure.
[12:13] Increases the rate.
[12:14] I think we've got to indicate an increase in the rate and then say, I'll take the money over there.
[12:19] And Laird has no idea.
[12:21] In fact, Laird is bellyaching that he can't make $12,500.
[12:25] I personally feel that at this stage, we've got to look after what may help you.
[12:32] But the thing, too, is this.
[12:34] I know this is a new summary on this ridiculous stuff going on with Kissinger and Laird and all this fight about troop control.
[12:41] You and I know it's true.
[12:43] Well, only about tactics.
[12:45] I think Laird is putting it out.
[12:49] Laird is putting it out.
[12:50] Nevertheless, Harry, like I like Laird, Laird is his enemy.
[12:55] I'm sure Bill O'Gillen has plenty of talk to Bill about it, but I guess I haven't talked to him.
[12:59] Bill is with us.
[12:59] But I think Bill understands it because he was very good at his press conference.
[13:01] If he called in, as a matter of fact, to show you that at least Bill can play it right on this issue,
[13:07] He called me before the press conference.
[13:11] He said, look, I'll say anything you want.
[13:14] My intention is to say that the president is going to make an announcement, and I'm not going to say anything about it.
[13:18] And he said that.
[13:18] Well, my fight with Laird, such as it is, is to protect you.
[13:22] I want you...
[13:23] you to be in the position to make the announcement, not him.
[13:42] Well, the whole point, so even if I...
[13:43] Even if I waited until 1972, I think it was well to point out that I was very careful in my statement in the press conference.
[13:46] I didn't promise that we...
[13:47] I said the next troop announcement, I'll make the next troop announcement.
[13:48] If you read the sentence, I said, first I will make the next troop announcement.
[13:50] The rate of withdrawal will be at least at the present rate.
[13:51] That's the present rate.
[13:51] But you see, Mr. President, this stuff about Laird and I fighting,
[13:53] It's going to be made look ridiculous because you put out a figure, right?
[14:00] I thought we ought to come up with a number of 100,000.
[14:08] I think it has to be a number that is dramatic.
[14:14] And now the Joint Chiefs will die.
[14:15] Well, God damn the Joint Chiefs.
[14:16] But we've done Cambodia with them.
[14:17] We've done Laos with them.
[14:18] I might have stuck with them.
[14:19] And I get a strike when the weather didn't clear up out there.
[14:21] I'm going to get a strike on our people.
[14:23] I don't think it would be a good time to get it off because it would be a signal to the North Vietnamese that we're still in there.
[14:31] I talked to Moore a few minutes ago.
[14:33] If it doesn't go Sunday morning, I think we've got to knock it off by Sunday morning.
[14:40] I don't see how...
[14:41] This is my scene with the party Congress coming up.
[14:45] The Chinese really blasted Russia.
[14:49] The Chinese did?
[14:51] About what?
[14:54] About those bourgeois, real all-out blasts just before their party conquered.
[15:04] So a real fight?
[15:05] Yeah.
[15:10] On the Laird thing, we ought to go to 14,000.
[15:11] I could say 100,000 by this number.
[15:12] You know, some of them have, frankly, some important portions.
[15:13] You know what I mean?
[15:14] Well, but the way to handle that, Mr. President, now is just to tell nobody.
[15:20] Let them talk the other way.
[15:23] And then bring them in the day before.
[15:25] Yeah, if then.
[15:27] You mean not tell them before I make a deal?
[15:29] No, no, but last time we told them an hour before.
[15:32] Yeah.
[15:35] But we can only... We've got to find a way to get it.
[15:39] Let's do it.
[15:42] They've got to know, and they've just got to say it.
[15:53] And listen, they've got to realize, too, that our services...
[16:00] Who the hell's going to be sitting in this chair, defending them?
[16:07] They haven't got it.
[16:09] They haven't got anybody.
[16:10] Texas, you see my point?
[16:11] They have to call a statement making us look a little good with their change, you know what I mean?
[16:15] Well, I just can't believe it, Mr. Treasurer.
[16:18] It's a one-month stipend.
[16:19] Supposing if we set $100,000 by January 1st, which we could also do, that's at the rate of $12,500.
[16:26] No.
[16:26] You'd get them out anyway before Christmas.
[16:29] You wouldn't pull out any... Then we'll say we'll have another announcement.
[16:35] At the appropriate time.
[16:39] Well, what I mean is, when we are asked, we'll say right there.
[16:42] But that way, you are doing it in... You're not giving the whole program.
[16:47] You're again doing something unexpected.
[16:50] Laird has been talking himself blue in the face about a rate of $12,500, and you're upping the rate.
[16:56] All this talk about the White House sitting on layers of nonsense.
[17:01] Incidentally, I told this to Bob before this debate started.
[17:05] This is not a reaction.
[17:08] And I'm not fighting with Laird about only one thing.
[17:12] About two things.
[17:13] I want you to get the credit for it.
[17:15] You take the heat, so you ought to get the credit.
[17:18] And secondly...
[17:19] I want us to not indicate what we'll do next year so that we have a bargaining chip left with the North Vietnamese.
[17:28] That's after November, after October, I don't give a damn what we announce because by then it doesn't, we won't be able to negotiate it anymore.
[17:40] So I wanted to get it managed.
[17:41] That's really when the time runs out.
[17:44] It seems to me that the time for negotiation runs out about the 1st of October, which is great.
[17:50] Yeah, 1st October, 1st November, in that time frame.
[17:58] But you're going in on the lockdown?
[17:59] Yeah, that would be it.
[18:01] I guess you're right.
[18:01] But what is there then to negotiate about?
[18:06] We don't have enough check left for ourselves, do we?
[18:07] No.
[18:07] I'm a prisoner with the residual force against prisoners.
[18:10] But then I will do that next year.
[18:16] Yeah.
[18:16] And people will understand and support us on that.
[18:18] And we'll...
[18:20] But I think we've got the... We'll lose all the hate that will be beside themselves.
[18:33] Why?
[18:34] Well, what the military are talking about is about 80,000 by January 1st.
[18:38] Well, they always have.
[18:42] What we've got to do, we've got to go for a bigger play now.
[18:48] That's my view.
[18:50] Tell them we've got to go for a bigger play now so that we can make a lesser play later.
[18:54] But I won't tell them anything until we get out of California.
[18:55] I agree with you.
[18:56] I think at the present time, we're going to start playing the game.
[18:58] And I won't tell, I don't think we ought to tell Laird anything.
[19:03] I don't think we ought to tell Laird or Rogers anybody a damn thing about this.
[19:05] You, you didn't see that.
[19:06] They called that you had talked to him on the phone this morning.
[19:08] Laird?
[19:09] Yes?
[19:10] No.
[19:11] He didn't.
[19:14] The only person I talked to was Moore.
[19:18] Who was Moore?
[19:19] Moore.
[19:20] Moore.
[19:21] I talked to Moore about this thing before he gave it to me.
[19:22] Because, uh... And I never talked to Charles Moore either.
[19:24] No, I haven't talked to him.
[19:25] Larry didn't call me.
[19:25] Maybe he told me he thought he would.
[19:27] He didn't.
[19:27] Oh, but he knows he got slapped down yesterday.
[19:34] That will never end.
[19:34] Yeah.
[19:34] That's enough.
[19:35] Uh, I think still that for the reasons of their own,
[19:39] I'm gonna have a cold turkey talk with Dobrynin on Monday night.
[19:43] Tell him now that he's going back.
[19:48] Mm-hmm.
[19:48] Because they are dying to get it through an agreement.
[19:50] Yeah.
[19:50] Frankly, Brunt has practically given the damn thing away.
[19:56] This is the matter of this side, exactly.
[19:59] I think now with their Chinese troubles, their Polish troubles.
[20:14] Are they ready yet?
[20:17] Yes, sir.
[20:17] Mark, you just said that.
[20:18] No, I don't.
[20:20] I don't need any.
[20:20] I don't want to talk about this.
[20:21] Well, there is some leverage.
[20:21] Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President, Mr. President,