Conversation 471-002

TapeTape 471StartFriday, March 19, 1971 at 7:03 PMEndFriday, March 19, 1971 at 7:27 PMTape start time00:01:39Tape end time00:25:16ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On March 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 7:03 pm to 7:27 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 471-002 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 471-2

Date: March 19, 1971
Time: 7:03 pm - 7:27 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     Vietnam
          -Troop withdrawal
               -President’s conversation with William P. Rogers
                     -Forthcoming announcement
                     -Kissinger’s previous conversation with Rogers
                     -Forthcoming announcement
                     -Number
                     -Forthcoming announcement
               -Effect on South Vietnamese
               -Timing
                     -Figures
               -General Nguyen Van Thieu
               -Timing
                     -Number
               -Rogers
               -Melvin R. Laird
               -Potential problems
                     -Laird
                     -General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                           -Ellsworth F. Bunker

                  -Timing of announcement
                  -Laird

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Duration: 6s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

******************************************************************************

                  -Abrams and Bunker
             -Kissinger’s schedule
                  -President’s forthcoming trip to California
             -Support for President’s position
                  -Rogers
                  -Abrams, Laird, and Bunker
                  -Rogers
             -Possible press story
             -Bunker
             -Laird

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[Privacy]
[Duration: 33s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2

******************************************************************************

              -Laird’s position
                   -Number
                         -Compared with White House position
              -Number
                   -Timing of withdrawal
                   -President’s goal
              -Laird
                   -Abrams
                   -Thieu
              -Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Privacy]
[Duration: 6s ]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

******************************************************************************

         -Air strikes
               -Kissinger’s dissatisfaction
               -President
               -Moorer
               -Trucks
                     -Lack of visibility
               -Timing
         -Troop withdrawal
               -Rogers’s view
                     -Laotian operation (Lam Son)
         -Laotian operation (Lam Son)
               -Possible speech by President
                     -Effect on North Vietnamese Army
                          -Supplies
                          -Sihanoukville [Kompong Som]
               -Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]
                     -Withdrawal

          -Effect on North Vietnamese Army
                -Kissinger’s analysis
                      -Supplies
          -Forthcoming withdrawal announcement
     -Possible speech by President
          -Laotian operation (Lam Son) success
          -Forthcoming troop withdrawal
                      -Timing
                -President’s position
          -Thieu
     -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
     -US objectives
          -Public opinion
                -North Vietnam
     -Troop withdrawals
          -Number
          -Timing
          -Effect on South Vietnam
                -Kissinger’s view
     -Negotiations with North Vietnam
          -Effect of troop withdrawals
          -Timing
     -Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
     -Laos operation
          -Effect on North Vietnamese Army
                -Compared with Dien Bien Phu
     -North Vietnamese supplies
          -Soviet Union
          -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
          -Effect of Sino-Soviet split

Soviet Union and PRC relations
     -Public pronouncements

Communist world
   -President’s view
   -Kissinger’s view
   -Poland
         -Riots
   -Aleksei N. Kosygin’s visit to North Vietnam
         -Ho Chi Minh’s funeral

Vietnam
     -Possible negotiations
          -President’s view
          -Troop withdrawals
          -Return of Prisoners of War [POWs]
     -Troop withdrawals
          -Possible effects
                -Public opinion
                -Forthcoming Presidential election
     -US Air Force
          -Need for strikes
                -Trucks
          -Equipment

President’s schedule
     -Camp David

President’s forthcoming speech
     -Laos operation (Lam Son)
     -Middle East
           -Rogers’ statement
                 -Problems
           -Arabs
     -Laos operation (Lam Son)
           -ARVN troop withdrawal
           -Howard K. Smith’s forthcoming interview with the President
                 -ARVN success
                 -Effect on future negotiations
                 -Effect on North Vietnamese Army
                      -Supplies
                             -Compared with previous years
                 -Forthcoming Presidential speech
                      -Troop withdrawals

Vietnam
     -Troop withdrawals
          -Timing of announcement
               -Peace demonstrations
               -Kissinger’s view
          -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
          -Rogers

                -Possible lack of announcement
           -Events
                -President’s November 3, 1969 Speech
                -Demonstrations
                -Cambodia, Laos
           -Laos operation (Lam Son)
                -Media coverage
                -Senate
                -President’s forthcoming interview with Smith
                -President’s forthcoming speech
                      -Effect on North Vietnamese
                            -Supplies
                            -Casualties
                            -Supplies
                -Kissinger’s conversation with Henry Hubbard
                      -Effect on North Vietnamese troops
                            -Supplies
                                   -Food
                                   -Ammunition
                            -Sihanoukville [Kompong Som], Cambodia
                -Compared with German offensives in 1918
                      -Effect on ammunition and supplies
                -Results
                      -Objectives achieved
                            -President’s assessment
                            -Kissinger’s assessment
                -Effect on media coverage
                -Possible losses of ARVN forces
                      -Compared with North Vietnamese losses
                -Objectives
                -President’s forthcoming speech
                      -Justification for ARVN withdrawal

     Kissinger’s schedule
          -Camp David

Kissinger left at 7:27 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Uh, I had a good talk with Bill, and he's in very good shape, so you know what I mean.
So I said, now look here, he's sure this next treatment is possible.
He said, Mike, he couldn't agree more.
He realized, he says, that he had talked to him about it.
And he said, I just told him this.
The president's got to give credit to the state.
I said, well, we've done some thinking about it.
We're going to do it.
We're going to do it.
We're going to do it.
Right at the last.
We're not going to tell anybody because you just can't get the military to raise the count and so forth.
I said, we may think in terms of a little more.
He said, that's exactly the way to do it.
He said, you're going to tell me and they do not want to know a thing.
But he said, that's exactly what we should do.
He said, don't tell anybody anything.
Don't tell them a thing.
And he says, if you can, up the figure a little.
He said, that just is great.
He said, the whole plan would work only, however, if we can.
First, secrecy is the thing.
And the other thing is,
We've got to be sure that it doesn't scrub us off the enemies too much.
Why would we?
Well, what we have to do is, if you say till December 1st, we have to pull out more in October and November.
We promised you we'd have upward of 200,000 in there, at least on October 7th, which is... We won't say how much tomorrow.
Exactly.
We just have to say... At the rate of...
We don't have to say a hundred thousand.
No, no, I just didn't say we will reduce a hundred thousand by December 1st.
But we wouldn't even say delay.
Let's not say delay.
Because it's a little more...
In other words, you've got Bill completely on us.
No argument, whatever.
And he'll play the game.
So we don't have to tell him anything.
There's no reason for us to...
Well, we'll have a massive problem with layered, and we'll also have a problem with the one advantage of having agents in bunker there is to tell this that we can tell them, or at least we can tell bunker.
The disadvantage is that it creates a big groove with layered.
don't you think we should not have ableist bunker there i think you ought to go uh you want to go to california i mean we ought to go out there so that we're working on the goddamn thing but i'd like to have but i'll tell you i don't think we've got a pc we don't have rogers bill is uh he's he's all on south we can i didn't talk to anybody possible individuals
Bill knows the whole game.
He's going to play the game.
Oh, Bill.
He knows.
And what truth withdraws, Bill, has never been the problem.
But now...
The only problem is it cannot hit the absolutely code.
No, but who's going to deal with it?
We can tell Funker he's reliable.
Then how do you deal with the players?
There's just no way, in true withdrawal, it's his thing.
And he's now, he's happy, he gets, he's stuck, he's committed himself to 12,500.
He's created the impression that the White House is against that.
All right, well, we've got to change that.
We've got to, Mr. President.
If you say 12,500, that's why I thought of 100,000, because if you say 12,500, Lear has already given that away for the next 19 months.
That's right.
And... No, you're exactly...
In other words, it doesn't mean it doesn't... All it really does... All it does... Well, it takes 12,000 more truths out than 12,500 would take out seven times 1,500.
I see.
A little more than 1,700.
And if you stretched it to January 1st,
then you'd be at 12,500.
And in practice, you still would do it that way, because you would have everyone who's going out out by December 15th because of Richmond.
So...
The one thing we may be able to do is to bring Laird in at the... Just at the last moment, I had to see how we handled the...
I mean, uh... No, last time we did it with Funker.
Right, Funker just went toe-avers, that's it.
With Funker, toe-tube, and apron.
That's the way to do it anyway.
And, uh...
But then, more...
Well, they blew it themselves.
I just had no patience with the Air Force.
That in two and a half weeks, when the Commander-in-Chief was willing to take the heat for a massive bombing attack, can't get one damn strike-off.
I don't need it.
Here's the story.
And I think it's a pain in the damn story.
It sounds to me like cursing.
You heard it, Senator.
I don't need to spell it out anymore.
The reason they won't do it is they said, well, these trucks are moving targets, and you've got to be able to see them.
Bullshit.
Just cream the place.
I mean, this idea that they're going to change trucks?
Now, what the hell?
I think that's ridiculous.
Don't you think?
I gave it away.
I think their test was whether or not they could see the trucks moving on the road.
They, well, they may still do it.
They still have 36 hours to do it, but I'm beginning to doubt it.
You know, the thing that Bill says is a very interesting point, which you, of course, realize so clearly, is that the proof of announcement itself is the best proof that LOPS was successful.
Yes.
It's more what we've got.
It's true, right?
Well, I think you can give a very thoughtful speech.
It doesn't have to be long.
No, no, no.
In which you say, this is, we believe Laos, I wouldn't say anything about troop withdrawal at the beginning.
I just say, we believe Laos has been a success for the following reasons.
And you can give them some figures.
Last year they put that much through.
This year...
They've had to consume so much more Sheehan and Willis, just a few figures, they won't check them.
I think we can make a most impressive case.
As I told you yesterday, before I had the confirmation that they were pulling out, that I was actually, that once I worked through these intelligence figures, I got a more positive view than I had by working through the Chuck figures.
Because the drug figures don't tell you what's going to happen.
The thing, though, is this.
They're going to be debating in Harvard two weeks as to whether Wallace was or wasn't a success.
In my view, you end the debate dramatically only by announcing a bigger future.
That's what I mean.
And then at the end of that presentation, you can say, and
Express all my confidence in this.
After the most careful study, we have decided to withdraw.
And we will withdraw 100,000 troops by December 1st.
Please, we will increase the rate of troop withdrawals.
It should enable us to withdraw another 100,000 by December 1st.
We've got to do it.
We have no choice.
You know, Michael, it takes a very long time to go low now, and this is still... You've got to remember this.
It's your point.
We've done everything for you.
We've done everything for the military.
We've done everything they've asked.
All right, up and down the line.
Now, we haven't done it just for the sake of proving it.
We've done it because we think it's right.
We also have to realize, as you pointed out, that the time has now come for us to look to a bigger mission, for all the agreement, the written, and all the rest, all these things.
And also, whether or not we survive is going to depend upon whether we
We hold public opinion.
We can do it.
And actually, if you can hold public opinion for some more months to give you more maneuvering room, that has to be weighed in the balance by the North, East, and East.
I mean, a small withdrawal that triggers a big public debate is actually less useful, even from a diplomatic point of view, than if we get ahead of the power curve with the announcement.
And so I think all things considered,
And basically cannot make a hell of a lot of difference whether we pull out 20,000 more troops by December 1st or not.
That's really all it amounts to, the difference of maybe 25,000.
And they'll just have to swallow it.
And I think they can.
And it still gives us enough troops in the country to...
to bargain about the money.
Yeah.
Then I think early in May, we ought to approach the North Vietnamese for another meeting.
Yeah.
What did you say that, uh, uh, that Walters and George had said?
Well, Walters had sent in a cable that he had a North Vietnamese contact who in turn...
This was ten days ago.
Yeah, about a week ago, who, uh, who in turn had had a conversation
There's a North Vietnamese who's just arrived from Hanoi who says they're taking tremendous losses in Laos, worse losses, and they suffer the TMP and flu, and they're going to get some big losses.
And that they are, it's a terrible, it's a terrible tragedy that they're suffering, that so many of their best people are being killed.
He just gave it as an account of the mood that the Russians are pulling away from them, that the Chinese can't supply it.
all the goods and there may be something in that because the Russians and the Chinese are really going at each other hammer and tongue again and the Russians are accusing the Chinese of trying to get them into a war with us and the Chinese are accusing the Russians of sending out and of starting an arms race
And the Russians are most interested.
The Russians have just published an article, which they've even distributed in English, saying the Chinese are getting memoranda made for you, that the Chinese are trying to get them into war with us so that the Chinese can inherit the world.
Alternatively, they say the Chinese are pulling, creating enough nuclear weapons so that they can join with us against them.
So their mentality is really... You know, they must have problems.
They have problems.
I think the whole communist world is in hell of a shape.
What do you think?
Well, I think, I remember I said in December when these Polish riots occurred, I thought they would start opening to us again.
And with all zigzags, they've done it.
And they've got Polish problems back.
Oh, they've also declared that this Kosygin, that this heaping of relations that started with Kosygin's with it,
after the Ho Chi Minh funeral, which was in 1969, that that period is now over.
So they are right back to where they were.
And I think that there's a chance of a negotiation with some of them.
Again, it's less than he, but it's...
Well, I think, Henry, there's never been much of a negotiation, but I think we're going to get down to the nut-cutting.
It's very much to their advantage to have a negotiation to get us the hell out and give us those prisoners.
That's right.
And we've got to do it.
And if they don't make that kind of a deal, we'll make better any time they're ready.
Well, we've got to get enough time to get out.
It's got to be, because we have to make sure that they don't knock that old place over.
Our problem is that if we get out, after all the suffering we've gone through, we can't have it knocked over brutally, to put it brutally, before the election.
That's right.
So that's why this strategy works pretty well, doesn't it?
That's right.
You see, the thing is, as long as we keep our air force there, I think we do have these countries.
It's, of course, an absurdity.
The 12 gunships are accounting for 80% of the truckloads, while hundreds of planes are roaming all over the bloody planet.
That's not that many planes that aren't worth a damn for anything else, is it at all?
Yeah.
12 gunships are coming for 80% of the truckloads.
Yeah.
And they are composed of C-47s or C-54s.
Jesus Christ, that guy's 25 years old.
Yeah.
Well, it's a modified version of the zebra, but it's, uh... Well, it's a modified version of the zebra, but it's, uh...
Monday, you know, or Sunday, Monday, I'll call and get some additional thoughts.
So it's keeping it pretty up to date.
And I think most importantly, we remember what the hell we say about Laos.
I'll avoid the Mideast, of course.
So Bill went much too far in the Middle East.
He knocked himself on the 67 borders.
I still have to say, if we keep doing this, we're going to produce a war there because we're going to force the army.
Your formulation was exactly right, Mr. President.
Yeah.
I will.
I'm going to keep it extremely buzzed that way.
And then, I don't know what else he'll get into, but I think we've got to make this thing with Howard Schmitt.
as we get out of the House, it's got to be basically hopeful.
Not polyamory, not claiming the great victory.
I don't think we should say this is a victory.
I don't like that.
I think we did more, I'd say a lot of the characters thought it was a victory or something, but it isn't.
It was a great plus, whatever it is.
It's a very significant achievement.
It shows that the South Vietnamese can hold their own against the creed of the North Vietnamese.
And then you go on to say, but it's a moot question as to whether it was or wasn't.
This is an argument that's going on.
But as a matter of fact, that's best going to be shown by what happens.
That's right.
I would suggest that those who are watching should wait to see what happens.
I would stick by my figure that I would say that less than 50% of what went through this year is likely to go, or last year is likely to go through this year.
Sure.
I think this is going to stand out.
Good.
Well, I'll say that.
and say, and this is one of the results is, of course, how we've made a very careful study, and you can say in due time I will report the full details to the American people.
But I stick it, I keep it around April 15th.
in the minds of people so that otherwise if you give an indication it will be earlier to move the peace demonstrations up.
I think the advantage of keeping it at April 15th is it keeps everybody quiet here.
Oh, yeah.
Is it one of the peace demonstrations?
April 24th.
Oh, I see.
You mean they move up?
Well, I think we shouldn't give the peacemakes
too much of an opportunity to set off another one.
And also it's helpful for the bureaucracy.
Well, I haven't given the date yet.
No, I didn't tell Bill.
I didn't tell Bill, but good.
I didn't tell Bill.
I said, I don't want to go to jail again.
But Bill himself doesn't leak.
As you've often said, lawyers don't leak.
You gotta tell them.
I mean, Bill, if he's engaged in a bureaucratic fight, he may be- On this thing here, we just gotta play it cold, where now we've been, Henry, we gotta look at this whole thing.
Do you realize we've gone through hell here?
We went through November 3rd, the demonstrations, we went through Cambodia, we've gone through Laos, and now,
But one good thing, Mr. President, at the end of the operation is the goddamn thing is going to be off television.
That's right.
And sure, for about two weeks, they're going to yammer a bit about, was it a success or a failure.
It's going to be one hell of a time.
Particularly when we sent them to the Senate in Georgia.
Exactly.
And this thing with Horace Smith in the 22nd is cool.
But if you are up there and seem confident and say, the way you put it is very good,
Say this, our belief is that we have substantially cut the supplies.
We've made the most careful analysis.
You might even say, sure, they've had a lot of kids on there who saw a little tiny bit of the battlefield.
We know that...
I understand that.
That happens in all battles.
We understand it completely.
But I know that in terms of the casualties we've inflicted, in terms of the...
supplies that have been picked up, the supplies we know that have had to be consumed in the battle.
I said this to Henry Huppert.
I talked to Henry Huppert.
He called me a little while ago.
And I didn't give him any figures, but I said, look, just use common sense.
Ten regiments that had to be fed for two months, that expend ammunition,
as if it were going out of style for two months.
That has to be brought down somewhere and it couldn't be sent down if you add to it that they've kept 40,000 troops in addition there in the whole area just to protect themselves against the possibility which had to consume rice.
The Chianukville was closed and they couldn't buy rice in Cambodia.
They are surprised at the fact that it has to be worse than Russia.
That's right.
Because I don't know whether you're right or not.
Well, you stop to think of the war as way worse, unless you've got the harder advantage.
You know, if you think of the Germans in 1918, there were tremendous offensives against the British first and then against the French.
And they pounded and pounded and pounded.
The old man's family has lost the war.
You know what I mean?
So even though they drove the back, which they expended huge amounts of ammunition, they had more casualties than their defenders, and else the damn war.
Well, we didn't get to knock out with this operation, but... Sure, but... We didn't really check.
You know, we knew it was a long shot.
Well, it's better than anything else.
It's about what I thought it would be.
Maybe the shade better.
Up to 70% of what we could have done.
Well, it's had a hell of a check.
Okay, you know, the other point about getting out is that it gets, as you said, gets the goddamn war off the television.
That is good.
I mean, they can't have the helicopter pilots night after night.
And if also one couldn't know, of course, we'll have her up two weeks because as they disengage, we may lose another battalion or regiment here or there.
But...
The other side's losing, too.
Oh, yes.
The other side must have
suffered incomfortably greater losses than we did.
It just cannot be any other way with the artillery we have, the air power, and the B-52.
And you might also say, might consider saying that
The reason we didn't give any exact dates of withdrawal is because nothing is more difficult than to disengage an army in combat, and we didn't want to give the enemy a target date on which he could fail.
Sure.
Okay.
You want to talk to Ken Davis, you're welcome.
I have somebody coming in this weekend.
Good.
But if you need me, I'll be in Ohio.
I'll see you at the phone.