Nixon, Haldeman & Butterfield on Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnam War

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Yes, he just had some things he wanted to take away.

Are they there?

All right.

I've had a meeting to assess where we are.

It's done.

First of all, to give them all a sense of participation, and also to make sure that we weren't kidding ourselves.

And I had Mora and Volk give the military assessment, I had the CIA give their assessment, I had Alex Johnson give the political one.

And the meeting again on Thursday to finish the logistics.

assessment of what we actually did to the logistics service.

I'll have some tea too please.

And we are also going to get on Thursday afternoon a public line that we're all going to take in all of the departments coming out of the operation.

Just as we did coming into the operation.

That we all stress the same achievements so that there aren't too many divergent stories

that people can play off, uh... Well, yes, but, uh, Mora tells me that he is putting the maximum pressure on Abrams.

He's getting pretty sore at that command out there, too.

No, no, to put... to put on that... that flow into Moong Nong.

To look to land direction at Moong Nong in that southern town.

And I think, Mr. President, if during April we do a series of sporadic raids against the supply line, Reagan-Mong-Nong may be raided to the bottom of the plateau, so that the headlines show a contiguous South-East-East thrust, then we can cover a lot of this propaganda that's not there yet.

Oh, I see.

Don't bother.

No, it's not important.

I'll call when he returns.

So, uh...

So...

But the assessment of everybody I've ended on the table did not ask Alex.

I couldn't wonder what's there for CIA.

And more of... Tackett, what's his, a net gain or a net loss?

They all say it's a substantial net gain.

Considering all the fuss that's in mind, I just... Well, I...

I...

I'm very...

I have very little doubt that it was.

Oh, yeah.

I think you're gonna see it later.

I think the problem right now is...

But I...

I just say that we just gotta take their public relations and grab to an extent.

Except that, uh, let's just...

They'll start building the backfire right now, creating some doubts.

in the minds of people.

I think some of those doubts, I created some of them last night.

Oh, yeah.

Oh, hell, there are people watching that.

They're going to wonder, well, what the hell, they're going to hit another withdrawal, and maybe the selfie of the beach didn't do so bad after all.

Ah, let's take another look.

Don't you think that's true?

I think that's right.

I think that is right.

I think what you did last night, I don't know what you later report has been, has been enormously, I think it's been enormously effective, and

I don't know how you want to handle a speech for the 7th, but I thought I'd get a young one of my staff members to draft one.

And I thought we could use a lot of the material that you had last night.

Even the people who heard it last night, if they hear it as a speech, it doesn't occur to repeat some of these thoughts.

Maybe we want to use some charts to show what's happening.

That's right.

Very, very dramatic.

We'll get some charts and say here's what's happening, here's what we're doing, how the Nixon Doctrine is working in Asia, and how it's worked here, and how our involvement as we come into an account of our stewardship, how we're working this war and that, and how we're the same.

I hope this all will get done.

You know, I put it hard on the line last night, too, that the war was the right thing to do.

I rejected the whole line about we're in the war, so what the hell?

We've got to do the best way we can to get out.

And I said, like what I said when I said that this last war thing, I said that's possible only if we have this war the right way and only if we maintain our strength.

I think that just needles the field.

I think you did it in a tremendously courageous way.

That's true.

Yes.

And he cared.

And also...

Of course, we've got this credibility problem, like everybody else did.

It's primarily created by the war warrants.

We're in a goddamn war.

We also provide the war warrants to the press, but the press are also against Johnson, so we can't do anything about that.

It's the gap between their expectations and what's happening, between their desires and what's happening, not between what you say and what you do.

It's between, and it's the uncomfortable behavior of the press.

I have an interesting call this afternoon from Phil Trayvon, the head of the editorial page.

of the Washington Post.

He writes the editorial, he's the head of the editorial page of the Post.

But I, as I told you, had taken a very aggressive line at lunch yesterday, and they had had a match.

No, he wasn't, but David Broder was.

And he wrote up his notes and gave them to Schiller.

And he said, I hope you realize I was praying for you on the Lava's operation.

And you made a tremendously effective case yesterday.

I just hope you keep your momentum.

I thought it was very interesting.

That he bothered to call.

There may be a lot of them.

There may be a lot.

Some really don't, when they really look right at a gun, don't want the answer.

I mean,

Well, let's face it, that's what it is.

That's what we're getting rid of in America today.

How they can destroy the president if they do everything they want.

They want the United States to get rid of that black guy, to lose that war.

And he also referred to what you said last night.

He said, do I really believe we have disclosed the success?

And I said, now look, Phil, that within a year, you'll know whether the president's judgment turned out to be right or not.

He wouldn't say this unless he was confident of it.

So I think that, uh...

Very enthusiastic.

I wasn't to show the empathy.

I was at the Soviet Embassy, and Haig called me.

They had said this was the best he had ever seen you.

Haig liked you?

Oh, he was enthusiastic.

And this morning, I... Well, Haig is crushed by what he saw of the Army there.

He says that he was mad.

He did?

Well, I am, too.

But he feels that I wasn't mad.

And he knows what I'm saying.

You free him, too.

You let the record show that I love him.

I said, well...

This was not a very good performance by the American Armed Services.

Mr. President, the Arvin actually fought damn well considering what they were up against.

That they were in the line for 40 days, that they had sloppy backup, that the attack air for the first two weeks wasn't functioning properly.

considering that they stayed in there for six weeks against two-to-one superiority, enormous vitality.

This Arvin wasn't the problem.

The Arvin fought damn well in men.

In fact, it's fighting less well in Cambodia since Tree's death than it did in Laos.

In Laos, it fought very well.

But the performance of our guys, I mean, I just don't see, quite honestly, how Abrams

could go to Bangkok last weekend while Laos was unravelling and the airstrikes were going on.

You've seen Bangkok?

He visited his family in Bangkok.

That just doesn't give a sense of urgency.

Now, it's only an hour and a half away and all of this, but... That's nuts.

That's nuts.

He's a general.

Exactly.

If I had been up there myself, I'd have got my ass up there on the line.

Well, you were on the phone

And four hours every day, at least, over the weekend.

I know.

We were all worried.

We didn't know what was going on.

And Mora was in his office till midnight on Saturday and till midnight on Sunday.

And we all said...

I don't want any more.

I know.

Night after day, every day.

Just to get his little reports.

And I can see how this poor guy's enthusiasm began to diminish.

But he tells something which I'll screw down.

Now, understand, it isn't all that bad.

Look, let me tell you, it may have been a gross reply, but we still had a story that night.

We still had a story that night.

It's, uh, what we're talking about is why we didn't do even better.

But we did shake them.

We did have a major success.

There's no question about it.

And everyone at the meeting this afternoon thought the same thing.

And they've all seen what I said, and that's been all along.

Oh, yes.

All along.

We have written guidance on Thursday afternoon for all of them.

And, of course, I'll check it with you and Bob before.

So that we...

But I think it's helpful to have the departments have a sense that they all participated.

And... All we have to do is bring this truth in our way that we...

We can do that.

I'll tell Rodgers before we go away.

I'll go.

I agree with you, Dr. Rodgers.

You treat him as if he were your family lawyer.

He will never tell his wife.

You've got to do it that way.

You've got to make it clear.

And also tell him you're not telling the lawyer.

And there's no ego involved for him.

So, uh...

He wants us to succeed.

Oh, yeah.

how he extracted from you the first troop withdrawal, how you didn't really want to do it.

I said, I took delivery, I said, listen now, Robbie, you know Matt, he's a great guy, and he was for the troop withdrawal, and he deserves some credit.

But the President had that on his mind before he ever was inaugurated.

The first time I talked to him in Bud, Vietnam, he had that on his mind.

And the only question was when would he start it, not whether it should be started.

Do you remember we went out there to CQ and struck that 25,000 job?

You know, looking back, it wasn't a ridiculous favor to the rest of the squad, and that was her decision.

I tell you, the military out there has been, the record is not one very admirable one, in my opinion.

Now, did you remember with the second increment, when we made it 35,000, they acted as if they were... Of course, it is, in retrospect, who said that to me?

I think it was Everett.

He said he had read the Democratic platform, minority platform in 68.

He had realized that he had exceeded every significant proposal in it.

If anyone had said we could withdraw $260,000 in less than two years, then it would be $365,000.

This is going to be the announcement of May.

So it means they'll have to just begin arguing about residuals.

But, you know, you say 100,000, well, only 184,000.

I think it should have a considerable... Well, and also, we've now got them so conditioned to the withdrawal rate argument that you don't even have to make the argument.

They'll figure out for themselves that you're upping it from 14,200 to 12,500.

It's only $700 a month.

No, no, it's $1,700 a month.

Oh, fine.

$1,700 a month.

They'll pick it up and say, why didn't it be an increase?

Why didn't you realize that from there on, you've got to keep it that level?

The next one, Mr. President, has nothing to do with the race.

And the next one, you can say anything you want, because you'll be going down to the residual force or whatever it is.

Oh, yeah.

Give us the prisoners in return for a withdrawal.

In nine months, we withdraw in nine months.

Mr. President, my proposal is that I would suggest this to him already, to them already, at the end of May.

At the end of May next year?

This year.

That we will... No, no.

At the end of May next year, you will suggest what?

That we will withdraw in one year.

One year.

In return for the exchange of prisoners and deceased five for that period.

Now...

By the time them hackles is around for a while, we may have to go down to nine months, but by that time, by the time they hackle, we'll also be, uh, uh, we'll have wasted three months of hackling.

And, uh,

I think, on the whole, it would be best if we could end this now through a negotiation.

Oh, Christ, always, Henry, always, always, always.

Negotiations are trying.

That's what we've all been saying.

And that's why I said, well, I have to be honest.

I said, I'm not holding off very great hopes, but there is some hope.

We must not destroy that hope.

You know what I mean?

That puts it again that I have to deal with a government function, not with a...

that case like a lawyer last night.

Those bastards knew it.

No, they have in fact called.

This morning he said that you had already again committed yourself to $12,500.

I know.

He knows what I say.

He knows it damn well.

He wants you to throw it into the negotiations now as an offer.

But how you can throw something that you've already said into a negotiation is...

Lay it now.

Lay it, it's playing the game.

He likes to build a record that he's the one that pushes us.

He's such a true guy that one thing he won't believe is that he has no credibility as a candidate, as a presidential candidate at all.

He really hasn't?

He has.

I don't know.

No, he hasn't, sir.

No?

There's no doubt about it.

Well, nobody really.

I like him because he's such an engaging fellow.

But he's, uh, and he's a patriot in his crooked way.

You should not worry about the fact that we're getting a bad PR at the moment.

And it isn't, incidentally, all that bad.

What I meant is that we cycled at sun by the last time.

Oh, by the sun.

Well, at least we get a day's play.

And then we'll be on the night.

And that'll sort of balance off the somebody hang on a truck, right?

That's right.

Anytime.

But even, you know, if people looked at these pictures thoughtfully of the guy looking at the city.

They're all got their theater on.

That's right.

And that is not the action of Panicky Truth.

God damn it, it just burned my ass that we didn't support him there.

Exactly right, we didn't give him good support.

Oh, Abrams meant as much in his own background as Mr.

Truth.

Two weeks of not having the coordination.

Yeah, but that's no excuse.

He should have... Haig tells me that the guy he had up there is Corps Commander Sutherland.

He's an old crony of his and he's incompetent.

She says, here goes that barge, she's in trouble.

Well, he's not good.

He should have sent Wyatt up there.

He should have.

We had everything riding on this.

It was the last shot, and I... Last shot?

Frankly, he's a real dick in the ass.

I showed Bob the cables I sent out there.

Every three or four days, I sent...

I said, this doesn't look right to me.

And as far as he was informed, as I told Bunker, you were here when the president made his decision.

You know that he must have a grand warning.

And Bunker went to Abrams.

Bunker is all right.

He doesn't know military after all.

You haven't heard from Bunker yet, have you?

No.

What time is it out there?

6.30 now?

It's 6.30 now.

I'll call them.

I'll call them now.

I'll call them in about an hour.

I can call them now.

I'll call you.

And I'll call you.

Right.

And let me know because that's important.

Right.

He's got to know how the morale is, what the subject of this thing is.

Or should you wait and call him later tonight?

No, I'm calling now.

It should be... You don't mind waking him up?

It should be 7.30 at that time.

Oh, 7.30.

That's all right.

I think it's 13 hours.

We've got the TV broadcast out there.

He did it before.

Oh.

They always cut it on the radio, but I... Oh, maybe they just got it on the radio.

That's all we need to know.

He certainly had it on the radio.

Yeah.

All right.

As I said on the military, we gave them a real chance to get a pop in there.

We gave them a hell of a chance in Cambodia, and they did that as well.

That's what they did to him.

On the other hand, we gave them another real chance for a knockout.

If they'd shot at this one together, it was a knockout.

If they'd not have shot, they'd just had bad luck.

Three got killed.

Oh, he had them on the run, Mr. President.

He was jumping.

He was doing it just right.

He was jumping all over the place.

They were always on the defensive.

And he was just positioning themselves to that much that he could hit them.

These present guys, I watch it every day, and they go five miles and back.

It's very conservative, very careful, and I don't think you can get them or treat them as that way.

They're too violent.

But they're keeping them on the defensive.

The withdrawal, Mr. President, has been superbly well done, actually.

That's the most difficult operation, except for that first battalion that was dropped there.

But everything is building on that battalion.

They got 18,000 men out of there in four days.

without major casualties, without any panic.

The only troops that are still even conceivably in trouble are these Marines who are taking losses, but on the other hand, they are also claiming that they're inflicting huge losses, and they must because we've had B-52 attack here and there, and they've been in trouble the other time.

Oh, it must have.

Again, it was a pity we couldn't get it off early.

That is something that we might consider doing again in April, after the party concretes.

Because we didn't take any flak for it this year, this time.

We will, next couple of days, maybe.

But, after we make the next troop announcement, we can do it.

That's what I mean.

Just before you, uh... Just before we go ahead.

We have a little chat in Paris.

I think towards the end of April would be a good time to do it.

Just get them one, and the method will be better, give them one more tremendous wallop and then... That's right.

Get everything there as a row that moves.

And then we can stop.

We'll have two days again.

They'll give us provocation.

So no doubt about it.

Exactly.

We'll just stop doing it.

It's got to work out.

that's why we ordered loss we ordered it because and i say every night i say thank god we did because even if they come out all of them running they're coming along they believe me if they hadn't been in there and stopped them for six weeks they'd have got the help you've got especially if those have a massacre if those if

This whole concentration of our air power, with the gunships, with this whole logistics support back of them, plus the entire strategic reserve of the South Vietnamese, if they had this much trouble, what would the South Vietnamese 1st Division, which is the only division that's up there, have been able to do against 100 tanks, 150 tanks, plus 4 combat divisions?

It will take them...

I asked the military to give me an assessment.

They think it will take them six months just to rebuild the division.

That's not talking about the supply situation at all.

What did Hull say about the whole thing?

Well, Hull wasn't there.

He thinks it was a considerable net plus.

On the military side, he pointed out some of the reasons that he thinks the arms and phone well.

You know that?

Yeah.

And he points out also some of the problems.

Which are?

Well, attack air and all supply problems and so forth.

And we'll have to see about this.

There's another thing that we must do.

Leonard has been playing a shell game about the equipment that's going to be left behind.

And I think the best thing, after this next troop announcement, the best thing we can do for this Army to meet

to make clear what will be left behind, uh, to get a program and stick to it.

And, uh, I would, uh, I want to talk to Packer to get a schedule over to him.

Wait, no, not earlier.

Go away, Kevin.

Oh, man.

I'll be better.

It's kind of obvious.

It's obvious.

Did you do that?

He said, climb on around.

10 o'clock.

I'll be out.

I'll just finish you back.

Nixon, Haldeman & Butterfield on Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnam War

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Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on March 23, 1971

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