Conversation 475-016

On April 8, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Rose Mary Woods, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Stephen B. Bull, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:18 am to 10:07 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 475-016 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 475-16

Date: April 8, 1971
Time: 9:18 am - 10:07 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
          -Reaction to staff
                -Donald H. Rumsfeld

[The President talked with Rose Mary Woods at an unknown time between 9:18 am and 9:37
am]

[Conversation No. 475-16A]


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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[Personal Returnable]
[Duration: 32s ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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[End of telephone conversation]

     Staff meeting

     Kissinger’s schedule
          -Briefing of columnists

     Kissinger’s possible call to Shirley Taylor
          -Public comments
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[Admiral [Thomas H. Moorer] talked with the President at an unknown time between 9:18 am
and 9:37 am]

[Conversation No. 475-16B]

     President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
          -Reaction
          -Senate and House “doves”                                      Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
          -Military
          -Marvin L. Kalb
          -Left wingers
          -Atrocity stories

[End of telephone conversation]

          -Moorer’s call to Kissinger, April 7, 1971
               -Woods
               -Praise for the President
          -Kissinger’s New York friends
          -Nelson A. Rockefeller
               -Comments
          -Rockefeller family
               -Kissinger’s meeting with David Rockefeller
               -Kissinger’s conversation with John D. Rockefeller, III
               -Wealth
               -N. A. Rockefeller’s support for President

     Congress
         -Support for President in House and Senate
         -Gerald R. Ford
         -Carl B. Albert
         -Robert C. Byrd
               -Prisoners of War [POW] issue
                     -Democratic Caucus report
                     -Troop levels
                     -POW “trade”

     People’s Republic of China [PRC] invitation to US Ping-pong team
          -Significance
                                         14

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H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
     -Location
     -Schedule

Staff and Cabinet
      -Kissinger and Haldeman
      -John D. Ehrlichman
            -Pressures                                        Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
            -Family
      -Ehrlichman and Haldeman
      -Robert H. Finch
      -Kissinger’s conversation with Taft Schreiber
            -Finch
      -Finch
            -Response to speech

President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
     -Length
     -Conclusion
     -Reaction
           -General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Kissinger
     -President’s bearing
     -Unknown woman friend of Kissinger
     -Reaction
     -President’s bearing
           -Foreign policy researcher for N. A. Rockefeller
     -Creative aspects of speech
           -President’s own idiom
     -Kissinger’s evaluation
     -Kissinger’s conversation with unknown Harvard University professor
           -Reaction
     -Kissinger at Harvard University
     -Cabinet and staff
     -Unknown Harvard University professor
           -Reaction
     -Responsibility
           -President as commander-in-chief
           -Congress
     -Withdrawal from Vietnam
           -Consequence of early departure
                                          15

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                                  Tape Subject Log
                                     (rev. 9/08)



     -Doves
          -Residual force in South Vietnam
                -Figures
          -US policy
     -Draftees in Vietnam
          -James L. Buckley
          -US Army
                                                           Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr.
     -Birch E. Bayh, Jr.’s criticism of President
     -Doves reaction
     -Country’s reaction
     -President’s role in case
           -Review

President’s speech on Southeast Asia
     -Unknown Georgia Republican’s call to Kissinger
           -Calley
           -Response to President’s speech

Vietnam
     -American people’s desire for victory
           -”Right wing” point of view
     -Definition of a US victory
           -Save South Vietnam
     -President’s speech on Southeast Asia
           -Impact on negotiations

Press questions to Kissinger
      -Television commentators and commentary
      -Laos
      -Cabinet statements on combat in Vietnam
            -Melvin R. Laird and William P. Rogers
            -Inconsistency with White House statements
      -Number of combat troops
            -Reduction
      -Combat mission changing
            -Defensive
      -Withdrawal date
      -Air sortie figures
            -Press reaction
                                             16

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                                     Tape Subject Log
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               -Reporting
                     -Washington Post
               -Instructions to Kissinger
                     -Kissinger’s comments to Albert
                     -[Distribution to members of Congress]
          -Questions
               -Air sorties
               -Killing of civilians                              Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
               -Substitution of Asians for Americans
          -Reporters
               -[Forename unknown] MacGavern [sp?] of Chicago Sun-Times
                     -Criticism of speech
          -Ronald L. Ziegler
               -Press bias
          -MacGavern [sp?]
          -Kissinger’s reply to press
               -Accomplishments by President in withdrawal program and in military situation
                     in Vietnam since July 1, 1969

[The President talked with Stephen B. Bull at an unknown time between 9:18 am and 9:37 am]

[Conversation No. 475-16C]

     President’s call to Haldeman

[End of telephone conversation]

     President’s speech on Southeast Asia
          -Writing press
          -Commentaries
                -Kalb and Dan Rather
                -Unknown Pentagon correspondent
                -John W. Chancellor
          -Television briefing

Haldeman entered at 9:37 am

     White House staff and Cabinet
          -President’s frustration
          -Haldeman and Kissinger
          -Ehrlichman
          -John B. Connally
                                             17

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                                       Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. 9/08)



           -Support for administration’s Vietnam policy
           -Support in future campaign
           -Butterfield and Bull
           -Opposition
                 -[Establishment, Washington Post, news magazines, television, Congress]
                       -Need to get tough
           -Charles W. Colson
           -President’s speech on Southeast Asia                      Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
           -Praise for Kissinger and Haldeman’s support

     Charts on casualties
          -Use in briefings
          -President’s possible uses
          -Talking points

Kissinger left at 9:41 am

     Kissinger’s forthcoming memorandum
          -Circulation to spokesmen, Congressmen, Senators, editors

     President’s speech on Southeast Asia
          -Chart used in speech
                -President’s evaluation
                -Line
                -Lettering
                -Mark I. Goode
                -William H. Carruthers
                      -Schedule
                -President’s conversation with Goode
                      -Importance of chart
                -Television crew
                -Dwight L. Chapin
                -Goode
                -Understanding problem
                -Connally
                      -Evaluation
          -President’s movements
                -Chart
          -Connally
          -Chart
                -Impact
                                       18

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                                Tape Subject Log
                                   (rev. 9/08)



     -Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS]
          -Rather
          -Troop withdrawals
                -Timing
                -Figures
          -Use of television images
                -Illustration of soldier
                -Troop withdrawals                        Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
     -Chart
          -Picture/chart contrasted
          -Rogers’ use
          -Goode, Haldeman, and Butterfield
          -Rogers’ chart
                -Picture of a soldier
     -Camera work
          -Evaluation
                -Praise
          -Difficulty
          -White House coordination with producers
                -Goode
          -Producers’ view
          -Haldeman’s view
          -Goode

Dinner for W. Clement Stone, April 8, 1971
     -Receiving line versus mingling
     -Attendees
           -Number
     -Announcements
     -Table
     -President’s remarks
           -Location
     -Press coverage

President’s speech on Southeast Asia
     -Poll
     -Telephone calls
           -Priority calls

Meeting with Peter G. Peterson
     -Opening remarks for briefing
                                               19

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                                         (rev. 9/08)



Bull entered at an unknown time after 9:41 am
           -Arrangements for forthcoming briefing [domestic briefing for Administration wives,
                 April 8, 1971]

     President’s schedule
          -President’s instructions to Bull
          -Instructions for Peterson [for forthcoming meeting of Council on International
                Economic Policy, April 8, 1971]                       Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)

Bull left at an unknown time before 10:07 am

     Moral support for President by staff
         -Reflection of country
         -Lack of use for weak men
         -Haldeman and Kissinger
         -Ehrlichman
         -White House staff
               -Rumsfeld
               -Clark MacGregor
                     -Kissinger’s attitude
                     -Congress
                           -Ford
                     -Administration’s spokesman
                     -Effectiveness

     Haldeman’s staff meeting
          -Kissinger
          -Response of staff
          -Evaluation
          -Backup
          -Bombing and casualty reductions
          -Charts
          -Dwight D. Eisenhower
          -Graphs
               -Use in revenue sharing speeches

     George P. Shultz
                                            20

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                                    Tape Subject Log
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Congress
    -House
         -Education bill
         -Ford

Polls
        -President’s performance
              -Approval rating                               Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
                    -Figures
        -President’s speech on Southeast Asia
              -Audience
                    -Figures
              -Favorable/unfavorable reaction
                    -Figures
        -President’s Vietnam policy
              -Approval/disapproval ratios
              -Political make-up of respondents
              -Gender of respondents
              -Approve/disapprove
        -Calley
              -Bayh
        -Opinion Research Corporation [ORC] poll
        -Calley
              -Instructions to Haldeman to publicize poll
        -George H. Gallup poll
        -Current standing
              -Figures
        -Calley poll
              -Publicity
              -Circulation to Congress
              -Ehrlichman and Robert A. Taft, Jr.

Taft
        -MacGregor
        -Colson

Polls
        -ORC poll
              -Figures
        -Gallup poll
              -Circulation
        -President’s speech on Southeast Asia
                                         21

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                                 Tape Subject Log
                                    (rev. 9/08)



Haldeman’s conversation with Colson

Calley issue
     -Taft
     -President’s conversation with Ehrlichman
           -Captain Aubrey M. Daniel
     -Possible strategy
     -Letter to President                                 Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)
     -Stanley R. Resor
           -Possible letter to Daniel
     -President’s possible conversation with Laird
     -White House handling

President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
     -Connally’s reaction
     -Press reaction
           -Ending
           -CBS analysis
           -American Broadcasting Company [ABC]/National Broadcasting Company
                 [NBC]
     -Telephone responses
     -Telegrams
     -Compared with November 3, 1969 speech
           -Silent majority
           -Telegrams
           -Emotional appeal
     -Possible demonstrations
     -Peace groups
           -John W. Gardner
     -Reassurance to followers
           -Finch and Rumsfeld
           -Opponents
     -Delivery, presentation
     -Charts
           -Rogers’ chart
           -Kissinger
                 -Department of Defense
           -Rogers
           -Effects
     -Telephone calls
     -Editorial reactions
     -”Hawks”
                                              22

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                                      Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 9/08)



          -President’s supporters
          -Laos
          -Vietnam
          -Casualties
                -Compared with 1970
                -Decline since 1969

     Kissinger’s conversation with Shirley Taylor                    Conv. No. 475-16 (cont.)

     Taylor family
          -Response to speech
          -Kevin Taylor
          -Karl (“Skipper”) Taylor, Jr., and daughter
          -Family watching speech on television
          -S. Taylor’s comments
                -Sergeant Karl Taylor
                      -Comments about Vietnam War
                -Visit to White House
          -Kevin Taylor
          -Story in newspaper
                -Kevin Taylor
          -Press play
          -Kevin Taylor’s salute
          -S. Taylor

Haldeman left at 10:07 am

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Yeah.
Yeah.
Anyway, uh...
But that must be his desk on the left end.
Oh, I left it earlier.
Well, anyway, I'm going to preach some colonists at 930.
Oh, you are?
The, uh... Why don't you call Mr. Taylor?
That's my fault.
Did you see what she said publicly?
I don't know.
She was terrific.
You'll see it in the news summary.
She said, honored the great privilege she sold to us.
She doesn't know what to say.
Tremendous pride because she always listens to the President.
He called me.
Hello?
Good morning, how are you?
Well, thank you very much.
Well, thank you.
Well, we gotta, we gotta keep, we gotta keep these,
Our options open a little while longer before all these Senate and House does runs out of the place.
But we will.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Well, as a matter of fact, you know, I know you'd appreciate what I said about the military out there, too.
I mean, I thought of, you know, that bank account.
All I'm trying to do is screw them up.
And that's the only reason I indicated that I'd redo the thing.
And I guess cool.
But on the other hand,
But it's true.
It's true.
Okay.
Bye.
Thank you.
I always know that.
He said he wanted me to know that it is an honor to serve this president and the only thing that he
It drives him crazy to think what would have happened to this country four years ago if you could only have been president then.
Yeah.
That was nice.
So you, uh, we've drawn the best punch we could, Henry.
Mr. President, it was Ike who talked last night with some friends in New York.
You still have some?
Not many.
I did call Rockefeller, you know.
Oh.
Yeah.
He had called and that.
Was he, uh... All right.
...favorable?
He's all right.
I thought he was a little guarded, but he was fine.
You know how Nelson is.
He's always, you know, rah-rah-rah, you know.
But I think Nelson is going to wait and see how things go.
It's all right.
He's under great pressure, as I understand it.
Mr. President, there is absolutely no excuse.
I'm working the Rockefeller family over.
As a matter of principle, it has nothing to do.
I've seen David today coming in.
And John called me the other day, and I...
And he's coming in for London Monday because I...
Here they are.
They must have a billion dollars.
They eat.
He eats.
What this country has done for them and they can't step up.
What do they risk?
What does Nelson risk in the first year of what has to be his last term as government?
He knows if some jackass, he knows you're right.
That's the worst of it.
I don't know how hard it is to step up to that, you know.
No support from the House and no support from the Senate.
Except for Jerry Ford.
Albert, of course, was playing.
He didn't say much.
Very discursive.
Burgess is getting hard after you left on the prisoner of war thing."
He said, he didn't think, he said, look, and I didn't want to take him out in front of the industry.
He said, I've got a report of them from our caucus.
They all said, oh goodness, they won't trade the prisoners of war when we've got 500,000 there.
Why wouldn't 50,000 help?
Of course, I couldn't say to him, look, when we get down to 50,000, then we'll make a straight out trade 50,000 for the prisoner of wars and that'll do it in a minute because they want to get our ass out of there.
I don't know whether you've noticed, incidentally, that Chinese have invited an American ping-pong team to visit China.
By itself, it doesn't mean a damn thing.
On the other hand, a lot.
Exactly.
Well, anyway, getting back to this thing, I don't know where they're going to hold him in their ranks.
Is he in today?
Oh, yeah, he's in, and he wouldn't come.
He mustn't have understood it.
I think if you call him, he'll close to be there.
Well, I was going to say to you that the, you know, I encourage you to be relaxed and everything about it, but I really, I really had it with all the staff and the general.
I got it, they took it for you and all of it, and it was a donation under Oatman, yeah.
Oatman.
I said to a great extent, if he were in Holland's spot, he'd be exactly the same when he knew Warren.
But he's there under enormous pressure.
And he has his family.
It isn't just his family, but the other people in his family.
Early on, as his family was in Holland, he said, be nice to these sons of bitches and listen to them.
And I must say, for example, Finch this morning, yesterday, I didn't tell you that, that driver came in to see me and he said he had just seen Finch.
He said, how can you be so calm when Finch is shaking all over?
He said Finch was literally shaking his head to the camera.
But this morning, Finch is very happy.
He thinks it was a great speech.
You know, it's a funny thing.
It was 19 minutes and 30 seconds, which is the right way.
But beyond that, that little conclusion that we stuck on there,
That's what made it for the Mr. Average show.
Absolutely.
Don't you think?
Oh, yes.
They couldn't help but be moved.
Well, and it was, and it completely, I don't know what the television people had intended to do, or whether they had always had...
They didn't know what to do with it.
You told me that last night.
But they couldn't very well go up there and then start spitting you and... After I knew the sincerity, I could make that book up.
I must say, you...
Haig had tears in his eyes, I had tears in my eyes, even though I'd heard it before.
But your whole pairing.
I talked to a friend in New York who actually happens to be on the right.
She usually thinks you're not tough enough.
And she said, God, she was so proud of you.
She said, your whole bearing was in command.
It was the best she'd ever seen you.
She's the chief researcher, foreign policy researcher, for Archipelago, and she does a little bit.
Well, we did it over and over again.
That sort of thing takes a lot out of a person.
Oh, God.
It's the creative thing.
I didn't create too much of it.
You created the architecture, Mr. President.
No, but you put it good, or you put even the parts you shouldn't write, you put it to your idiom.
But also the architecture, Mr. President, the balance of the speech.
I thought it was a really great speech, and...
And so many people, I spoke this morning to a young professor from Harvard who was one of my few remaining friends.
And, oh, I don't care about that.
I have no intention of going back to them.
I had to do this.
The people that weren't for it before, those other candidates, I had to let them know.
I've had to let them know.
I've had to let those circumstances go back to them.
I don't want to go back.
I don't know what I meant.
But, I mean, the people, oh, the good, the good.
The broad and the can't stand people and the rest, those that were ready to jump out of their boots, they know them.
But this man, who also says, of course, the war must be ended, but he said he was tremendously moved.
It was a very courageous speech.
And... Well, they're...
I mean, they know right as you said.
Any person knows real deep down it's right.
He knows goddamn well I'm right.
In hell, and I've taken my thing out of mind, but I told those boys I'd lay that political argument in front of my sessions.
I just want to make clear I can have one commanding chief.
God, I am willing to be the commander, and I will come and take all responsibility.
But I said, if the Congress wants to be the commander, then you take the responsibility.
You're responsible.
And I'll tell you that if you move up this date, South Vietnam will go communist.
And I said, but you've got to take responsibility for it.
Now, that, I don't know if it's what the case is.
You know, that's the case to their IT.
They stamped us, you know, a year ago, they were talking about a residual cost of $200,000.
Today on television, they're looking at a hack away at $100,000.
at the residual force of 50,000.
No matter where you go.
I didn't say it, but last time I said we were for a total withdrawal.
That's pretty well... Mr. President, I think before the end of this year, well, before the end of this year, we should announce the end of draftees being sent to Vietnam.
I do believe that Buckley is right on that.
I do, too.
And I think we should...
Remember, we had that before.
And I will not accept anymore that it can't be done by the Army.
No.
Screw the Army.
They ain't got the name for us.
And if you can do that before the term starts... You know, there's this goddamn buy trying to get in on this business of, uh, cowling, uh, intercarrying.
You know, the son of a bitch, if it had been the other way around, they would have jumped on it.
I'll tell you what it is, though.
I've now figured the cowling thing.
I know what it is.
The doves are really, really, you're right, deeply worried about Calvin.
They're worried because they realize that what it is is an animal instinct, a speed factor coming up, and most of the people don't give a shit whether he killed them or not.
That's the point.
And that's what worries the bodies.
In my eyes, if I didn't go a bit further, I don't intend military justice at all.
I uphold it.
I say, but as president, when the case comes to me, I will review it.
And God damn it, I should review it.
And another fellow who called me last night is a man from Georgia who called last week a Republican
He's on the Republican Committee for Georgia.
He called you?
He called me.
How did he get your number?
He called me last week.
He just called the White House.
And he called.
He was raising holy cane last week about Caley.
And he said he just wants me to know him because he's right.
He said how moved and proud he was of the President.
And he said,
Of course, your basic problem is, and I think he's right, he said, the basic problem is the American people want to win this war.
It drives them crazy to be in a war that they can't win.
But they said, we recognize the president at least wants to win.
Maybe these bastards won't let him win.
Now, this is the right point of view.
We're going to win.
You realize if we get out of the way we want, we win.
If the communists don't win, we win.
That's what we can't do.
We'll say it at the right time, but we can't say it now.
That doesn't walk the walk.
That's what victory is in Vietnam, Henry.
It was never to conquer North Vietnam.
It was only to save South Vietnam.
That is right.
Right?
Right.
But I think we have a...
They are...
Now this speech may shake the, shake the negotiators a little bit, but you and your briefings, you said the questions were pretty mean yesterday.
Well, but you never can tell the questions by the TV commentators were the meanest I've ever had.
Yeah.
What were they about, about Laos?
And the, but the TV commentary was the best we've ever had, and they gave back everything we gave them last night.
No, they were mostly because of these damned cabinet people having said there'd be no combat after May 1st.
So they asked me to expose them.
Well, Laird and Rogers sort of implied it last year.
We're practically there.
What in the name of God do they think you can do with 100, with 200 of you?
I think the danger is, Mr. President, we make these flat promises.
I don't mean to promise anything, because at any time anybody gets killed, they'll say you're wrong, you lied.
But what I told them is, I said, look, gentlemen, we are not going to play that game.
No one at the White House has ever said it.
That's right.
The number of combat troops is constantly diminishing.
Their mission is constantly being restricted to defensive missions.
And I think you can see for yourself how much combat there is, but I'm not going to give you any dates.
They gave that back pretty well.
Did you throw it?
Did you try to discount the ADHD?
Yeah.
The thing that was a knockout with them and the press are these air-sorting figures.
Yeah?
They had them here?
Well, they were stunned.
Did they put it down?
Yeah.
I mean, now they're putting it on the inside page of the Washington Post, so they're not...
But they put it down.
They did put it down.
All right.
All right.
and get that around, write a piece on it, write briefly what that is, what you said they all heard and those, send it to all members of Congress.
I'm getting it done outright, yeah.
But send it so that they don't know individually.
You may have, it's just, in other words, there are questions, the President's speech and everything, there are questions that have been raised outside that speech, one with regard to air stories, one with regard to what was the other one.
with the killing of civilians and then substituting Asians for Americans.
Yeah, that's right.
I think you could just go down the line.
Let me answer.
I just want to answer these in terms of when I got these.
I don't give a package of energy.
I'm telling you, I couldn't... No, the press, the writing press, I had a break in dissent.
That fellow McGavin from Miss Chicago sometimes got up and started yelling at me.
He said, it isn't enough.
This speech just isn't enough.
And I said, what's his name?
He went down to you?
Yeah, in front of 200 others.
I would almost walk up and declare, is this a briefing or do you want to make a speech?
Well, I said, I didn't know who he was.
I said, sir, I'm not here to debate with you.
I'm here to explain what the president is saying.
But the secret tells me the rest of the press was mortified because this was the best demonstration of their bias.
Yeah, I probably cut the neck off.
about the light at the end of the tunnel, and I said, now, gentlemen, I said, or you can see the end of the road, and I said, now, gentlemen, we started the withdrawal program July 1, 1969, had the president then gone on television and said that two years later, 365,000 troops would be out.
Two years and three months later, air stories would be reduced by 50%, and the military situation would in fact have improved.
You would all have accused him of the most outrageous credibility gap that you've ever seen.
He's done all these things.
You believe that a man who did this in two years and three months is not going to continue on this course, and therefore you cannot see the end of the road.
I will let this speak for itself.
I know he's on the line.
Oh, I pushed the wrong button.
Go ahead.
So...
Sorry, I was trying to get all of it, and I pushed the wrong button.
Thank you, Steve.
So, the press was...
The whole press.
The writing press was actually quite favorable.
And the interesting thing is, take Marvin now, for example.
Marvin, yeah.
Well... My old friend.
Still, his commentary yesterday was quite favorable.
He said the White House still deletes the negotiations.
They're doing everything they're doing in order to end the war even more quickly.
I was amazed.
The guy, Marvin Kauff gave us a very good summary yesterday, Calvin Raucher.
Yeah, and Calp was good, too.
The only guy who was life-swinging it a little bit was Seth Hendergan, who had a vested interest in his dissent.
He'd been a previous chancellor, but was sympathetic.
So actually, I think these separate TV meetings pay off.
People told him, though, for the record, Bob, that except for you and Henry and some isolated incidents, John and I had it with the staff and Kevin.
And, of course, Tom.
Because, boy, when people are not going to be gutsy, you know, I mean, you just can't, they've just got to stand up.
You know, they've got to stand up and they've got to, I mean, they can't go running around here like a bunch of
We've got to have some more strength around here.
We've been through bad.
We've been through free now.
Hell, they'll get another one.
What the hell do you think these guys will do in the campaign?
Hell, they'll all leave the train.
No, I don't think they would.
I honestly don't think that's a fair thing to do.
I don't think so either.
Well, Bob, you've got to defend it.
They'll never know how I feel.
They'll never know how I feel.
And I'm not referring to folks like Alex and Steve Ball and so forth, but I know them.
God damn it.
They are people.
They're so...
They're here in Washington.
They're established in Frank Washington.
They read the Washington Post, the weekly news magazines.
They're together with the television.
The Congress beats their goddamn brains out, and they get sort of discouraged and so forth.
They don't realize that that's the time to get tough, to get the bodies and the balls.
See?
That's what they don't do.
That's what I always do.
Now, they will not do it.
I'm not sure if they won't or don't care.
They don't do it as much or in a way that you like the hog or something closer, but he's not in the top group.
I think if time is to be purchased, if this speech doesn't do it, it can't be done.
Well, anyway, I just want to say that you two were a tower of strength, and I will not forget it.
And I will not forget that others were not there when I needed them.
Just like that.
It's the way that it could be crumbled.
I'm going to go see your boys now.
I'm not going to give any help to them, Sean.
They won't forget the charge for the cash used to use that.
They're going to.
That's a goddamn good idea.
Oh, and the cash we charge, too.
Yeah.
The president couldn't use that on TV, but we can sure use it right here to back up the chair.
Yeah.
But you've got that up, too.
No, not yet.
Okay.
But I mean, she has to do something.
Oh yeah, that's good.
And get that around as an actual thing.
We've talked about that at this point.
There's a lot of good talking points that have not really surfaced that we cut out.
I told him, let's write a memorandum, and then we'll have to put it in some shape and get it roaring around the can.
There is all this motion.
I mean, we have all of them.
That's what we've got at this point.
Not only to the spokesman, but also to all congressmen and to, I don't know, congressmen, I mean the administration spokesman, plus congressmen, senators, your editors, because this is a thing, again, that is useful.
And we can give it to editors in a reproduction form so they can use the charts.
We can follow up on this because there was so much interest in the chart on TV last night that we could say we had an inordinate number.
I had made a chart order.
I had the line twice as broad.
The chart was not well done.
I gave the little boy a hail for it last night.
And I went in and I saw him.
I said, look, I said that line's not broad enough.
I told you to check this chart.
I said, the next time you make one, double the size of the line.
A lot of people couldn't see.
There is...
that C-plus and the L was the matter.
It was, I mean, we just, we had, they had all these expensive people, couldn't one man make, remember I told you, I want a good chart.
What happened?
We didn't get as good a one as we could have.
It was a good chart, and a lot of them.
It should have been wider, but the line was easily seeable.
The thing that wasn't easily seeable was the letter, so you couldn't tell what... You had to really study to get the turning points.
It shouldn't have been checked out in advance.
Yeah, it was.
You should have taken a picture.
It was, and it just wasn't up to par.
I didn't think it'd be any good.
I mean, I knew they wouldn't check it out.
But next time, we've got to get a better person.
Good in the sense that Mark doesn't really have the best understanding.
Is that the problem?
I don't know.
I'm going to find out.
You better find out.
He just may not have.
I'm going to find out.
Because it wasn't.
It wasn't Bob, it was his job.
Maybe he should have come in.
Maybe he should have come in, which is the other thing.
We'll find out why he wasn't here.
He was taking his chance, but he's supposed to work his schedule so he could be here for these things.
It was a very important thing.
But what I meant, Bob, is I'm not, understand, I don't knock a guy in the stand when I figure it out, but I told, I told, good.
Two days before, I happened to walk out of there, and I said, now, look, that chart is terribly important.
I want a good, I don't know anything about charts, but I want you to take a picture of it and be dang sure that it's good.
I walked in there.
The minute I saw it, the whole TV crew heard me say it.
I said, that's not a good chart.
Now, I have to tell, I'm not very smart about this, but why didn't one of our people look at it, Chapin or someone, Jesus Christ?
Well, forget it.
She didn't get into it.
No, I mean, she didn't go to the station and television.
I didn't mean that, but somebody should think he did.
He could have been up to it, and if he isn't up to it, he'd be out.
Huh?
That's right.
If he isn't up to it, he's out.
That's all.
Look, they used to be trying, except they didn't understand them.
That's the problem.
They understood it.
They just didn't feel it was as clear as it could have been.
And not very many raised that comment.
He did because, you know, on the basis of the use of the chart, the idea used in the chart was very effective.
He felt, you know, it would have been better to point to it.
And he also said it was not clear.
It could have been clearer, which it could have been.
That's all.
That's it.
That's it.
going back to, it was a very big thing, going back to the, well, using the two charts, you know, and going back and saying, I'll look at this chart again.
But then CBS did, Rather came on, and he did a thing where they, he was on camera, and then above, he said, on June, whatever it was, you know, the first announcement, the president announced the withdrawal of 7,000 troops, but I forgot the numbers, but whatever the number was, by June,
At that date, and then the number came on, he had exceeded that by 2,000 or something like that.
Two days earlier, he had announced over the next three months a withdrawal of so many troops by the terminal date, and then the numbers kept coming on.
Very, very effective.
We did have that.
Then they finished that part, and then he said, so, summing it up, when the president came into office in January of 1996, there were 540,000, and they had a big soldier, an outline figure of a soldier that filled the whole street, the height of the street.
At the end of November, there will be 181 little teeny soldiers.
And the picture there, they look pretty awesome.
It was very good.
Maybe that's what we should have used.
that kind of a thing.
But I don't know anything about charts.
But what the hell was good building?
I mean, he taught Paris.
I told somebody to go to, maybe not you or Alex or someone, I said, get Rodney's charts.
Because he used the charts with the men on them.
Now, those wasn't more effective.
Then the bar, because the bar looks like an economic indicator.
Where the picture of a soldier is just, you know, we have a lot, we have fewer, and I have very few.
There's your story.
The camera work on it was superb.
The cut to the chart and the timing on that were absolutely flawless and they had plenty of time to see the chart.
And with your wording exactly right, I was thrilled into it and all that.
I'm worried about that because that can get to be tricky too when we don't control the production.
I know we don't.
They almost had a revolution on that.
The producer said, I don't take camera directions from them.
Why don't I cover them as I see them?
And this station will have to cut at the point for us to indicate.
I indicated on square physical.
The producer didn't want to do that.
They're taking it up to their booths.
My place is that we interfered with the production.
My view is that that's an integral part of your presentation.
They have to do it on the basis that you indicate, and they'll just indicate as part of the reason that they do it.
Well, on that subject matter, we've got to decide what you want.
Those questions, remember, if you want to receive 100, you want to make it with a person.
You have 49 people.
I don't have an announcement or anything of that sort.
No announcement or honors?
No, no honors.
I just stand there and they'll start coming around so that I don't, the main one doesn't work.
I try to be forward and get it tied down.
The rectangle table, you'd obviously prefer that.
I can't.
Maybe just a few too many.
I have a small E-shaped table, which is the next best.
I don't care.
The name of the marks in the dining room?
That's why we got that brief and the writer's doing a chair lap.
On our pool last night, would you mind going to the pool and close it?
They've been collecting us.
I don't need to take this out.
I just kind of have to do them right now.
What is this coming at us of?
I know that I already read all the papers.
I would like to get that paper back to him.
I'd like for him to cover those points.
I'll discuss that with him at 10 o'clock rather than for me to try to get it through my head.
All that I'll mention is that I'll go through some general things about the committee.
I'd like for him to cover those points.
Marks came to study at 18.73.
Yes, sir.
For him to be very rather than me.
Okay, it's one of the same requirements in that, sir.
The same would apply with this, uh, he didn't want to see me in there.
That's, that's just what he said before.
But, uh, what I can say about it, sir, I can't tell you how strong I feel about it.
I would not support it.
I don't think we should do that.
I really don't understand.
Then the question is done.
There's nothing you can do about it.
Yeah, well...
That is a fucking great agent.
I mean, you can understand that they, they grab a weapon, they will come up and get the man on the first bite, or maybe the second, or the third, or the three or four times, or, you know, it's in that bag.
They're the center of the fight in the country.
The country's all down.
That's everything.
I don't have anything to say about that.
I really mean that.
I feel very strongly about it.
And these, you may disagree with me.
I don't want to generalize.
Most of the rest are slightly.
They are.
It's because it's not in the sense that you're talking about.
I'm very disciplined.
McGregor, for instance, who I think Henry's giving a bum rap to, to a degree, is good.
I would have talked to him about the issue, but he feels that it's wrong for us operating the fact that we don't know what the Congress is saying to him and what they're thinking because we think we know.
Go ahead.
I don't think he is, I think he wants to be sure we do.
And he's one of our principal inputs for now.
I don't know if the person knows what the feeling is on this, but he feels that when he gets out, we should know.
He's also got to remember that it's his job to be up there, regardless of what the Congress says.
On the outside, he's got to be selling our point, and I think he sees that very clearly.
I want to try and get some readings on how effectively he has to do that.
In some length, that's where it's hard to do, because there's words.
And the backup that we can do relates to some of the stuff Henry has dropped in the briefings, like the cut down on bombing activity, and the casualty reduction.
And some of these other things that are, we're not.
Good charts, exactly what they asked for.
I bought a book with the good charts.
And they said, for instance, when I bought a number of casualties, and it's exactly what I did.
Right.
And then they ask for those to be done for their new ground things.
Now look, if we didn't make enough effort,
And, yeah.
What do you think?
Peace.
and kind of make the kind of feels for that person.
They had it.
They had it.
Right.
Right.
What's that word?
This is a demonstration of your last years on third.
or something.
Careful, that's the death of the person.
She said I was so proud