Conversation 476-025

TapeTape 476StartFriday, April 9, 1971 at 1:47 PMEndFriday, April 9, 1971 at 2:37 PMTape start time04:54:36Tape end time05:43:29ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Burns, Arthur F.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Peterson, Peter G.;  Bull, Stephen B.;  Watts, PhilRecording deviceOval Office

On April 9, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Arthur F. Burns, Henry A. Kissinger, Peter G. Peterson, Stephen B. Bull, and Phil Watts met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:47 pm to 2:37 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 476-025 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 476-25

Date: April 9, 1971
Time: 1:47 pm - 2:37 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President talked with Arthur F. Burns

[See Conversation No. 1-63]

Henry A. Kissinger and Peter G. Peterson entered at 1:50 pm

[Peterson talked with Burns at an unknown time between 1:50 pm and 1:54 pm]

[Conversation No. 476-25A]

[See Conversation No. 1-63A]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Peterson’s Council on International Economic Policy [CIEP] briefing
           -Kissinger
           -Significance
                 -Future policy
           -President’s conversation with George P. Shultz

-Audience
     -White House staff and other administration officials
           -Under secretaries
     -Congress
           -Bipartisan group
           -Sanitization
           -Clark MacGregor
           -William P. Rogers
           -Possible problem in briefing
           -Trade policy
                 -Bipartisan
           -Opportunities
           -Congress
                 -Size of group
-Location
     -State Department
     -Commerce Department
     -White House theater
-MacGregor
-Organization
     -President’s opening remarks
     -Length of briefing
           -Discussion
     -President’s conversation with Shultz
     -Briefing with Burns
           -Anti-trust
           -Influence with Congress
     -Length of briefing
     -Instruction to Kissinger
     -Use of chart
     -President’s possible attendance
     -Briefing
           -Shultz
     -Charts
           -Peterson
           -The President
-Possible conversation with Maurice H. Stans
     -Businessmen
     -Labor
-Business council executives
-Foreign competition
     -Issues

          -Charles H. Percy
               -Conservatives

Anti-trust policy
      -Need for planning
            -President’s conversation with Burns
      -President’s conversation with Chicago businessmen, April 8, 1971
      -Long-range projections
      -US goals

Peterson’s CIEP briefing
      -US competitive position
      -Japan
      -Europe
      -Communist world
      -Chart
      -Bloc countries versus free world
Mexico
      -Issues
      -Ontario Airport landing rights
      -Eggs
      -Textiles
      -New group of leaders
      -Foreign Minister
      -Kissinger’s forthcoming call to Ambassador Jose Juan de Olloqui
      -Luis Echeverria Alvarez

Bolivia
     -Tin
     -Stockpiling
     -President’s conversation with Ambassador Antonio Sanchez de Lozada
     -Shultz
     -Sanchez de Lozada
     -Stockpiling

Pan-American Highway
     -Panama
     -Memorandum to President
     -Role of departments
          -Bureaucratic problems
     -Importance of Latin America
     -Benefits to Mexico

             -Mexico City
             -Economic growth
       -President’s trip to Mexico, 1955
       -Bureau of Public Roads
             -Long-range plan

Tariff preferences
      -Effect on Latin America
      -Need for legislation
      -Franco Maria Malfatti
      -Rogers
            -Unknown conference
      -Need for legislation

Sugar
     -Importance to Latin America
     -Quota
     -Page Belcher
           -Conversation with Peterson
     -State Department
     -Latin America
     -Philippines
     -Possible US policy
           -Kissinger
           -Ambassadors
           -State Department
                 -Charles A. Meyer

CIEP
       -Peterson
       -Rogers
       -State Department
             -Representation
       -Commerce Department
             -Stans
       -Trade with Eastern Bloc
             -Perspective
                  -Likelihood of trade
       -Timing
             -Possible US overtures
             -Economic basis
             -Time magazine article

                -Stans
                -Evaluation
                -Opportunities
                -Possibilities
                -Perspective
          -Political standpoint
          -Commerce Department
                -Meeting at Executive Office Building
                -Report to Peterson
          -Use of trade abroad
          -Stans’ speech
          -US policy
          -Foreign policy aspects
                -Kissinger and Peterson meeting

Peterson’s meeting with Time editors
      -April 13, 1971
      -Possible briefing
      -Economic stance
            -Defensiveness
            -Regulation
                  -Outdated policies
      -”Generation of peace”
            -Possible review with Kissinger
      -Economic leadership
            -Future
      -Belief in competition
            -Home and abroad
      -US leadership
      -Emergence of free world
      -President’s leadership role
      -Need for programs
            -David Davis
                  -Peterson’s meeting
            -Technology
            -Raw materials
            -Business-government relationship
            -Anti-trust
            -Airlines
                  -Burns
      -Reaffirmation of US leadership
            -US political position

      -US diplomatic position
      -Administration’s policy
      -Economic leadership
      -Malfatti
-Multinational corporations
-Role of government in industrial research
-Peace
-Era of economic competition
-US preparation
-Revitalization
      -Public and private sector
-Trade policy
-Anti-trust laws
-International monetary policy
-Long-range view versus election view
-Difficulty of long-range goals
-Past perspective
      -President’s congressional career
            -US aid to Europe, Japan, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
            -Reciprocal trade
            -Foreign aid
            -Marshall Plan
-President’s internationalism
-New isolationism
      -Economic policy
-Need for Presidential leadership
      -Impact on industry, labor, Congress
-Military study
      -Gaither Committee
-President’s leadership position
-Need for constructive partnership
-Technology study
      -David M. Kennedy
      -Presidential commissions
      -Staff
            -Timing
            -Joseph C. Wilson, Xerox
            -Other leaders
            -Business-government relationship
                  -Anti-trust
            -Business Council
            -Raw materials

                      -Recommendation
                      -Business Council
                      -Representation
                             -Heartland
                             -Chicago
                             -Los Angeles
                             -Dallas
                             -Houston
                             -Atlanta
                             -Easterners
                                   -Parochialism
                             -Patrick E. Haggerty
                             -H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
                             -Peter M. Flanigan
                             -Energy policy
                                   -Breeder reactor
                                   -Clean energy
     Peterson’s briefing
           -Peterson’s staff

     Kissinger’s briefing, April 8, 1971
          -Research and Development [RAND] Corporation

     Burns

Peterson left at an unknown time before 2:35 pm

     Ronald L. Ziegler’s press briefing
          -Hugh Scott
                -Impressions of President’s statement
          -Vietnam withdrawal date
          -Press
          -Residual force
          -Terminal date
          -Circumstances
          -Election
          -Negotiations
                -Administration’s position
                     -Withdrawal
                -Unilateral withdrawal
                -Residual force
          -President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971

     -Melvin R. Laird
     -Memorandum on residual force
     -Goal of total withdrawal
     -Vietnamization
     -Prisoners of War [POWs] wives
     -Ziegler
     -Timing
           -Conditions
                -POWs
                -Negotiation
                -Vietnamization
     -Negotiations

Kissinger’s conversation with David Brinkley
      -President’s program of seeing POWs
      -Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr.
      -Domestic tensions
            -Relation with war
     -Administration’s opponents
     -Post-war reconciliation
     -Kissinger’s possible call to Brinkley
President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
     -Reaction
            -Calley
            -Brinkley
                  -Mail
                        -Public opinion
                             -Frustration prior to speech

Cambodia
    -President’s conversation with General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
    -Press story by Terence F. Smith
          -Floyd E. (“Red”) Smith

Possible leak
     -State Department

Kennedy’s trip to Asia
    -Marshall Green
    -Indonesia
          -T. N. J. Suharto
          -Military aid

    -Peace Corps
         -Micronesia
               -Haig
               -Joseph H. Blatchford
         -Evaluation
         -Haig
               -Micronesia
         -Blatchford
    -Indonesia
         -Staff
               -Green
    -Vietnam
         -Sir Robert Thompson
               -Optimism
                    -[Laos and Cambodia]
Thompson’s views
    -Views on Indochina
         -Timing

T. F. Smith article
      -Cambodia
      -[Forename unknown] Ladd
      -T. F. Smith
      -Cambodia
            -Possible loss
            -Timing

Vietnam
     -Withdrawal rate
           -Mistakes
                 -Deadlines on operations
     -Re-equipment of South Vietnamese Army
     -Cambodia
           -Military aid
           -Consequences of loss
                 -Impact on the President
     -Laos
           -Lam Son
     -Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
     -President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
     -Instruction for Kissinger
     -Laird

     Economy
         -Vietnam
              -Possible “Tet” [North Vietnamese military operation]
                    -Timing
                    -Consequences
                           -For US and the President
         -RAND
              -Recession
              -Unknown San Francisco and New York bankers
              -Pockets of recession
              -Interest rates

     Agency for International Development [AID] personnel
         -Thompson
         -Numbers
         -Saigon
         -Indonesia
               -US aid

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 1:50 pm

     President’s schedule
     Documents for president’s signature

Bull left at an unknown time before 2:35 pm

     Vietnam
          -Residual force
          -Instructions to Kissinger
                -Telephone call to Rogers
          -Laird
          -Residual force
          -US goal
                -Total withdrawal
          -Timing
          -Conditions
                -Training of South Vietnamese Army
                -POWs
                -Negotiations
          -Vietnamization
          -US plans

           -POW issue
           -Enemy objective
           -US goal
           -Negotiations
           -US policy
           -Laird
                 -Forthcoming meeting with Kissinger

Phil Watts entered at 2:35 pm

     Greetings

     President’s schedule
          -Saint John’s Episcopal Church
                -Good Friday services

President, Kissinger, and Watts left at 2:37 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Oh, I didn't disturb you at lunch.
I called back to wait.
I'm just fine, thank you.
I had two things urgent that I would like you to do with my mom.
We have an extra three weeks together.
You know, we set up this to remedy your internet problem.
I know he's the leader of seven companies.
He's got it at Pete Peterson.
He's an hour and a half briefing.
It raised a lot of problems.
Not a great deal.
He's looking for the future of the American economy and the balance of payments.
A lot of other people are not liking the deal with their national monetary policies and that.
What I thought would be a very great interest, and I think the staff of the Fed ought to see it.
I think it's interesting for you to see it.
I'd like for you people to know the kind of things that we're looking at, and what would you think of the idea?
Yeah.
And I, as a matter of fact, I want to add to that.
The reason we started, I thought, was because this is where we get the independence deal, but I have told Dean Peterson to call you and arrange it.
Now, what I am doing, and I thought so much of it myself, and I am having it given to the rest of the Cabinet and the whole White House now,
Now, second point, and the reason that I brought you is that I'd like you to do what you do.
I know your staff will want to take this and not throw in here another hat.
I mean, it has nothing to do with my parents.
But I, one of the things that's really great, it's a very fundamental point I want to make is
the question that I have across the wall, and how we can continue to compete with, for example, in airlines and so many other areas, with foreign governments, and with foreign concerns, who are subsidized by the governments and so forth and so on, and legal in other directions, you know what I mean?
Now, I wonder if your staff, I've had to, I've not even practiced that in the study of this, and also Mitchell's, who were asking earlier,
I wonder, independently of that, you've got a lot of right, your staff, if you could spend some time, after you hear this thing, to give me your views on it.
You know, there hasn't been any real change in the head of Gus Lawson or Sherman.
The country's changed a lot, and I don't think you and I have ever talked about it, but after you've had a chance to think about it, I wonder if you'd come in
Because I just don't feel that we've made some space here.
I mean, I don't mean for that that we don't.
And I think that for the future, we're all in the carbonization and all that.
But I also hope that we cannot just apply the rules of our 50 years ago to the problems of today.
Right, right.
That's one of our sick ones, one that we're worried about.
Well, let me tell you, if you could, what really concerns me is that if you could look at this agreement and then also give me a strong memorandum on it, and then when we come in, I'd like for you, I think it'd be worth your time, it'd be worth an hour and a half of your time to see the briefing, too.
It's done with charts, and he's gone over the whole situation as to what has happened with the American position in the courtroom.
It's a fascinating, really a fascinating period.
Much of it will be old hat to you, but members of your staff like it, and I'm like, our people all around here just sat there and said, my God, we've got to see it again, see?
So from my view, on the aviation thing, I'm working on that.
And second, but I'd like the I.D.
for my purposes of getting the heat on this and that in the Justice Department.
I understand vigils are heavy, but it's the people that have the law.
I could use an MRN from you, and I'll just keep them.
So third, would you give consideration to the whole problem of antitrust in your staff?
Because you've probably got some experts over there that can get this around, don't you?
And it would not be, uh, it would not be, uh, it is inconsistent with what you do otherwise.
Fine.
Then they'll look at everything, banks, everything else.
I'm not so sure.
The other thing is that if, uh, if then, uh, on this international situation, after you look at it, since it is so closely related to the whole question of balance of payments and the international monetary thing,
Then if you independently, I mean, I'm really interested in what you think, not just what you said.
If you could then either come in and give your views about it, it would be very helpful.
Could you do that?
Okay.
This is after Pete Peterson just walked in the office.
I put him on the phone and we set the date for you now.
Well, I was surprised you weren't there, I'm sure.
I think I should get a piece that... All right, the minute I get back to office, I'll call you and we'll set up a time.
Great idea.
I'll be very brief on my matter this year.
The first thing is that you probably already got the word.
I would like that briefing that Henry did, where you're sitting, to drive back into the international and economic deal.
It comes across so many other things.
It has to do with our policies in the future.
I talk to Schultz first among the White House staff and other top administration people, including undersecretaries and so forth.
I think you ought to put the show on for them.
Second, I think the, and here, I don't know, I think a selected group of congressional types.
Now, by that, I think what you should do, I think you should be bipartisan.
You should see.
You might have to sanitize some of them if you think so, but you talked to McGregor about it, and he talked to
Let's talk to Bill Rogers about it, as to whether he feels there's been a problem with them seeing this kind of briefing.
But I think it's, you see, it has to do with our trade policy, and that's supposed to be bipartisan, understand?
Now, I think that briefing is a good, it'll shake some of these guys.
They'll see what's happening when we're going under the mic, but they'll also see the opportunities.
Some areas of opportunity, some opportunities.
But also, I want them to know what they're thinking about.
Maybe on the congressional side, it might be a,
You could go over and do it.
Do it in the theater here.
We've got to get a better place, a room for breathing.
I don't like to go to the State Department, but I .
No, do it in the theaters.
But now, you work with the graders, because here's a good way we can complement the progression.
I'll come when you have the progression breathing, and I'll open it.
And I'll say, I heard this, and I want all of you to see it.
However, I want you to take two hours.
In other words, don't rush.
Two hours, so that there can be a little bit of discussion.
It's not much.
Most questions are better.
But Schultz and I were talking afterwards, and as smart as he is, I didn't get involved.
He said, you know, I'm going to have to hear it again, hear part of it again.
Now, the other thing is, if Burns is through, because I trained to enlist Arthur, I want some other man, if you know what I mean.
I want to enlist him on the Underdress League, I want to enlist him on a few other, because Arthur, when he speaks, has an enormous clout, and he goes up there to that hill and talks about some of these things.
He can help us enormously.
So you go over to Arthur, you come over any time, and get him, I mean, on his route, plan a two-hour session.
Your briefing actually takes about an hour and fifteen minutes if you get it right and true.
Take an hour and a half and go.
And I will say, Henry, when you've got time, send it to listen.
You've got an attorney, a background attorney, and this is so good that, as a matter of fact, when you do it the next time,
I think I'm a part of it myself, particularly the last part.
I'm sure it will hurt my feelings if I say it was the best briefing he had heard in the cabinet room.
Yeah.
No, I asked Pete for his chance to read them, but if you're going to give the briefing again... No, it's better to hear it.
No, I'll come.
I didn't know he was going to...
It's worth the time when you can kind of sort of sit back and make sure you can think about it.
And then afterwards, I'm gonna study, that's the way I'm gonna do it, I'm gonna study the charge later.
But that's, now that we've put this together, don't waste it on us.
Another thing I think you should do is that,
talk to Maury Sands with regard to a top group of business people.
I'm afraid it will end up later.
The later people will run it along, if you know what I mean.
I'm afraid that they will say, ah, we need voters, you know, we want this chief or a neighbor.
But a top group of business people
who, you know, are the biggest business council types.
I mean, people that really need to understand and say, now look, you've all been talking about foreign competition.
Well, here are the facts.
My people.
You see, there are so few issues where we can generate totally bipartisan support.
Now here's a case where you can help your friend Percy a little too.
This is something that he's enormously interested in.
And it's something where he can get off the hook a little on some issues where, you know, the Conservatives don't like, but even before, won this.
Right?
But I, uh, I'm really fascinated with this subject.
Henry, I decided on that because we have got, what does it mean?
It's not just one of our concerns about the antitrust.
God damn it.
We've got a plan now about what the United States is going to do.
In other words, like I said to a group of businessmen in Chicago yesterday, I understood the differences on that subject.
I understand it was there.
But,
The question is, where is the United States going to be headed?
What are we going to make?
What are we going to do?
What is our competitive position?
Should we get out of this?
Should we get into that?
Et cetera, et cetera.
If we think now about that, we'll do a lot.
Because he shows, for example, how the Japanese leader has grown.
He shows how the European world has changed.
He shows us mentally how the communist world's version of Latin was so great.
One thing, if I were you to change the chart, when you say all other countries, could you break it out into a lot of countries plus three world countries?
But you didn't do that before.
You see, I had to figure it out because I was thinking ahead of all these countries before.
But there we are.
Now, in terms of the other things, Henry, I don't know whether this is... What the hell does that mean on Mexico?
Did you ever find out?
There are two, there are three minor issues.
One of them is cleaned up.
It has to do with the landing rights at Ontario Airport.
The other has to do with some problem of eggs.
The third one has to do with
a minor textile problem, and they're all in the process.
I think the basic issue is that a new group of leaders has come in in Mexico, younger people.
Their foreign minister is somewhat insecure and a little more uncertain.
Just so he knows that we care.
The ambassador should take care of that.
I will call the ambassador and point out to him that
The President has a personal interest.
These matters were raised.
He wants to assure Echeverria that we will take care of these matters.
Now, second thing, Bolivia 10.
I know that I've said we have to get rid of that stockpile, but the Bolivian ambassador spoke to me, and he said, look, that 10 thing that was made very valuable.
Well, we'll have to change it.
All right.
We can't break down.
So tell George, is it a hell of an economic club for us?
No, I frankly, I must say we're doing it because you've ordered it.
All right, now, say Bolivia.
Say Bolivia.
It's not at all.
When you do it, you call in Bolivia's ambassador.
You call in Michael.
Do you understand?
Because I want him to know he's a young bugger.
But second, what this is is a stale stockpiling.
And we have to reduce the stockpile.
It happens and it hurts below you.
The other thing is what in the hell is happening on the highway?
Now, I'm not just interested in that highway and the way that it counts.
I'm interested in the highway clear down on the tip of the thing.
What in the hell is happening on it?
Well, we have a memo coming in to you now.
There was a time that bureaucratics grew up between the various departments, and I know your interest, and frankly, that's how the Darien Gap got done, or that wouldn't be done.
You see, Pete, I think one of the most important things we can do for Latin America is to complete that highway down through the center of the country, all the way up.
You know what that's done, for example, for Mexico.
I mean, the road, the fact you've now got a good road on the Mexican border down to Mexico City has meant huge growth in that area.
And here we screwed around this highway.
That wouldn't be done, that Mexican one, unless in 55 when I came back from the trip, I had this, you know, the Bureau of Public Roads had a 25-year plan.
The bastards have a, you know... Well, it's, that's the usual thing.
They want you to go, you know, it's a good, good, good experience.
And you watch things like it.
You ever see them, you bring an indicator and they'll kick them around.
But the highways, people, no, tariff records.
They don't have tariff records.
Are we following up on that, Henry?
Yes.
Adequately?
I think so.
That is to the best of my knowledge.
This is the one that will protect us.
I think that we have to submit legislation within the next few weeks.
What I, what I'm getting at is I've met with enough bodies and residents.
We, I have the labs, we've got to do something for them.
And I want, the bill goes down to that next conference, and I want them to be able to say that we're going to do it.
In other words, uh, No, we have said that, Mr. President.
We have now to make a legislative move on it.
Okay.
One final thing.
All the, all the little labs, uh, just talk to me, talk about their day after your board.
Now, why is it that we can't fool around with that?
I frankly don't know the facts.
Do you want to check the sugar?
Well, I've been two hours with Mr. Belcher.
Is that his name?
Your friend?
Belcher?
No, I'm the Congress fellow.
Belcher?
Belcher Cage.
Yeah, two hours with him.
There's a fixed amount, and what they're afraid of is if you take it from somebody, you've got to...
You know, give it to somebody and take it from somebody else and stay very worried about changing those relationships.
It means so much to Latin America.
And the other place that it parallels, I don't know, the Philippines.
I just think if you're out of the business, let's talk about me.
In other words, I tend to be more active.
You will find around here people you've already found.
Everything's like a boss.
And so you do this, I'll have you stay out of these things.
When you find one, then kick it around a little bit.
So we don't have to have a big meeting about it.
But you see these ambassadors are bugging me about something.
So I'll get a little charge of mine, and he'll smile, and nothing happens.
Right?
That's right.
So it works.
There's no reflection on him.
It never happens when you ask him.
Now, with regard to how many administration people should see this, I personally think that if Bill Rogers
Frankly, the State Department, some of those guys over there, they've got to understand that when they do a brawl, they've got to represent us, not just the other guy.
They've got to start thinking about that.
You know?
The other thing, of course, it's good for Mark's hands to speak, because they meant too far the other way.
The one case that I would put in here, the first one we had,
on the east-west trade.
First, get it in perspective.
Get it in perspective so that people realize, first, how big it is, but also how very small it is.
And I know the idea.
They think, well, we've got to get our foot in the door.
But in dealing with these block countries, as long as they remain at that kind of system, there ain't going to be a hell of a lot of trade with them.
You know that as a businessman.
Second point.
Let me tell you, as we've said before, things you've got to know, you've got to understand.
And I'm ready.
At an appropriate time, we'll be ready to make a significant move.
That time may come quite soon, but we don't want to make it now.
So lay it out there and say, well, now, under these circumstances, it can't be justified solely on the basis of an economic thing, but at the moment, it might be something to consider.
It's something we ought to think about.
The Time magazine article I did read, because Maury Stanton sent it over to me, and you read it, Henry.
It went too far, didn't it, as far as the opportunities that you could gather.
You didn't read it?
You didn't read it?
No.
Well, it was a time piece about
Three months ago, I said in East-West, we just had more trade with the Eastern European countries and everything.
It's not true.
It goes way overboard in terms of the opportunities.
But on the other hand, there's something to it.
See?
So I think what you have to understand, though, is that we have got to look at it.
We've got to keep it in perspective.
We mustn't have people think everything's going to open the moment that we do start trading.
all these great industries and markets and the rest.
But yet, it could be enormously important that we do it at the right time on the political side.
I took my cue from those of you at our meeting over at EOD.
Commerce has got an eight-day job on its hands yesterday of everything they're going to look at.
But I'm saying June 15th is early enough.
On the other hand, the gentleman also told them this.
Everybody in the government should shut up about it.
Because if our friends abroad think they're going to get it for nothing, we aren't going to get anything back for whatever it's worth.
Now, they use trade as a weapon.
We've got to use it as a weapon.
That's all.
And to draw with Maury, because Maury made a speech, he gave it all away, you know, at one point.
And we had to pull him back a little.
Because every little smidge you can give these clowns, you've got to make them pay.
And they'll do it.
They make everything.
And we got work.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
Okay, that's all I had.
All right.
Can I cover something good?
Sure.
He and I just spent a few minutes last night on the foreign policy side of what I was talking about.
I think we've got to give a lot of thought to these blocks and where they're going and what the potential is and how we might fight with Henry and I will meet separately on that.
I'm meeting with
the timing board of editors on Tuesday.
Remember, you good old men here, you wanted me to do it.
And before I go ahead and get on the line now with the editors, I want to see whether we're together on a signal I might be getting.
The line goes something like this.
First, first, as we're in... You know, I wish we could do it with them, just given that briefing.
I think the bachelor's listened to it.
But go ahead.
All right.
My sense of our stance now as President is that we're quite defensive, you know, in our whole economics.
We're frightened.
We're worried.
We're protecting.
You know, that's the whole... We're looking inward, et cetera.
On the regulation side, we're still operating under an arena where we had excessive power and we were trying to regulate it.
You know, the job concept was 20 years ago, but not today.
The thing that's kind of beginning to appeal to me is this notion.
You've talked with a generation of peace and try to get a bridge, and I was going to review this with Henry and more of that, which it requires a generation of economic leadership in order to make that second generation, I mean, that the two go in to serve another leadership.
And we believe in competition.
Our whole system is based on it.
We not only believe in it here, but we believe in it worldwide.
And we're going to not only compete, but we're going to lead.
And in a sense, the last 20 years have been a great success in the sense that the free world has emerged from, you know, whatever it was to whatever it is now.
But now there are different relationships, and you are now going to lead the country into a new decade of worldwide economic leadership.
And we can, I don't know whether you do it as a challenge or how you do it, but you see what I mean.
Then maybe we take the areas we were talking about.
I was having lunch at David Davis this morning.
And we take technology and come up with a program there.
We take raw materials and come up with a program.
We take business-government relationships and say it's a new era.
And you incur the antitrust.
Well, that's implied in the business-government.
You know, airlines are very crazy airline properties.
Right, right.
Now, the thing I wanted to be sure of was whether a signal to them that you are in the mood of kind of reaffirming our leadership or, you know, rebuilding it, renewing it.
I don't quite get what the formulation there is.
As a matter of fact,
The whole coverage of our activities is of our political position, which is silent.
And our diplomatic position.
And nobody really knows an honest amount of time we've done with the economic side.
And of course, this is a very significant new initiative in this field.
I think it would be very helpful to say that this administration is really doing something that has never been done before.
That we are thinking of America, of the American people.
Let's talk about leadership.
Maybe America doesn't want to be a leader in arms.
You can argue that.
But we sure as hell are, in fact, the leader of the world in our economic structure.
And we should, and therefore, have responsibility.
We were expected to.
I thought he was in there the other day.
But God, I mean, he's asking us questions, you know.
We ask some of him, too.
It doesn't mean, and it doesn't mean economic imperialism and so forth, but it means, for example, these multinational corporations, we've got to decide about that.
We've got to decide about the role of government in industrial research.
That point made that one, and I think we outstripped that one.
That's a...
But I think that the idea that if we have an era of peace, that the next 25 years will be an era of intense economic competition.
And the United States, and it can be constructive, and it can be hopeful, but that the United States must prepare for it now, and be prepared to compete like hell, and to revitalize our machinery of competition in the private and public sectors of the United States.
Now that means trade policy, it means foreign funding, it means also re-looking the antitrust laws, it means international monetary policy.
We've got to take a look at that so we don't have these crises every six months.
I think it's a bit of a tough discussion.
If I can be very blunt about this, I would like to see you constrict where we can.
as taking the longer view of America, which is the statesman leader thing, rather than the 1972 election view.
And I think if we can talk about the 70s, at least to yourself, if that makes any sense.
Well, that's what we're talking about.
We're not concerned.
We have no problem with what America's going to be five years from now.
But we had a couple problems to where America might be 20 years from now.
And now is the time to decide.
And the way we can tell when we're gonna have a problem is what has happened in the last 20 years.
And if you can put it in that perspective, here's a man that came to Congress at 32 years of age, in 1946.
And then the United States dominated the world.
And, you know what I mean, we had to pick up Europe, we had to pick up the Japanese, we had to pick up everybody else.
The Soviet was not moving along.
And I voted, I supported everything from the beginning.
I supported reciprocal trade, and I supported foreign aid, and I supported the Marshall Plan, and I supported everything that you can imagine.
I basically have been an international instructor.
I mean, many of them may not know this,
All right.
Now, I'm still an internationalist, but a hell of a lot of others have become new isolationists, not only in terms of their political policy, but they turn isolationists in terms of their economic policies as well.
Some of them don't admit it, but they do.
So what we have to do is there must be leadership, leadership of the presidency that will keep American industry and American labor and American congressmen and senators reflective of America.
I want to do it.
I forgot the result.
I don't require it.
This is not population.
No, the one that looked at our Air Force, essentially.
Oh, no, that's it.
There were two Gator missiles.
Do you remember that got the whole thing reoriented?
Yeah.
I mean, it didn't make a lot of noise.
I think in addition to your being positioned as a man that's going to lead us into the late 70s and 80s, you've seen these long-range interruptions.
I think if we could make this some kind of constructive partnership between the various segments of society that are involved with this, it has something to say for it, as long as you're the guy that's articulating.
I wonder if you can tell what I'm thinking about.
Just talking to David about this.
Let's take technology.
I'm not one of these damn presidential commission types.
It doesn't take 18 months, et cetera.
But for instance, I think if we were to call in four guys, five guys,
within 60 days, you know, or 90 days, they could come back on the technology side.
I'm thinking of guys like the two trucks, Joe Wilson and Xerox.
I mean, men who are...
I know you're calling me, but I just disagree.
But tell them that you'll do it in 60 days, and we don't want to go through the publicity.
We want to go through the action.
Right.
Right.
You've got the business-government relationship thing you talked about yesterday that includes antitrust.
I'm speaking at the business council.
We might be able to get, you know, a few of those guys that got charred by the guy running the trucks.
That's right.
The raw materials thing might be another, you know, piece of that.
But I think there's something, if you believe, in which you enlist...
The business council is not a bad place to bring some of that, but let's not just limit the business council.
Let's try to get out to the heart of it.
You know what I mean.
It's the Chicago crowd, the Los Angeles crowd, the Dallas and Houston crowd.
The Atlanta crowd.
You see what I mean?
We are too often to be obsessed with just the Eastern crowd.
The Eastern crowd doesn't have the imagination anymore.
They're girl kids.
You'd be surprised if you were to find a hell of a lot more strength in this sort of thing.
You could be more excited about what it's going to be.
Okay.
That's the only answer there.
You've got to have a clean source of energy.
And that's a good source.
Our life is not closed.
That was a fine treat.
You got to tell your staff that.
I appreciate it.
Thank you.
Henry did a diamond job last night.
Yeah.
He always does.
I thought he was even more brilliant than I thought.
The ranch corporation.
Yeah, he did very well.
Well, good.
Have a good weekend.
Thank you.
Treat partner with tender loving care.
Thank you so much.
I actually just wanted to run over a couple things with you.
First, I think Ziegler got in the same position as you.
Actually, it was a press query that Scott said.
He didn't say that I said anything.
He just said he had that impression.
I said, I have a plan for total withdrawal, but I'm not going to tell you when.
It was the press is now trying to get us to stop talking
I think the answer to it would say we have no plan on the decision.
Second, as far as the terminal date I have, I would say the President refuses to put himself in a straitjacket with regard to the date.
The date is going to depend upon the circumstances at the time.
Right.
Right.
So we leave it open.
Right.
And if he says, well, how about the election?
Although we should keep... Well, the election is not the consideration.
It's a question of whether or not they got it.
We should keep... We should not promise a total withdrawal.
That is the one thing we need for the negotiation.
Well, we've got to dispute it.
Yeah, but you said your intention is that we can always put it into context.
But what they...
I mean, we can always say it depends on what they do.
That's true.
Well, if we put it in the context of unilateral withdrawals and say we have no plans for a, for a reception, for a stable mean, then they have, then the only thing they need then is the day.
But I don't know what he said.
Well, no, he said exactly what was in the speech, but no more.
Go beyond it.
But I don't know what else he said.
We've got it in there that it says that we are... Yeah, but that's what Laird is now trying to do.
Laird is trying to interpret your speech that way.
In fact, I was going to suggest we get a memo out to them.
It is not in our interest to have a discussion of...
no residual force or the size of the residual force, because if we say we have no residual force, then the only thing left is the date and that's... All that we are saying is that our goal is a total... Oh, that's right.
That's what we say.
By Vietnamization, necessary.
By the end, of course... Also, we'll get into massive struggling with the prisoners.
So the prisoners' lives, if we say, will withdraw totally without the prisoners being- No, that's what I- No, Ziegler's covered that nicely.
He said the question about the time withdrawal will depend upon the circumstances of what happens to our prisoners, what happens to the negotiation, and what happens to the indemnization.
That's fine.
We've got it covered.
That's fine.
I wouldn't be concerned.
I'd let them keep right along the same line and then don't answer anymore.
I really think I should frankly-
Well, you had asked me a week ago to have a program of seeing one of them a week.
And that was set up a long time ago.
And I just said to him, do you really mean... Well, he was taken by the Cali thing.
He said it means to him there's tremendous frustration in this country and that they want to win the war.
They don't know how to win the war.
And I said to him, do you really think that...
If the war were over tomorrow, we wouldn't have domestic tensions.
And he said, no, I know we would have.
And I said, you know, the real sadness is the war is over.
There is no big issue left.
Only we can end it now, and we need authority to do it.
So our opponents can make it terribly painful to end it, but they can't.
But what instead people ought to worry about is how to keep the society together after the war.
And they're not doing that.
Well, when he left, he said, what can I do to help you?
Can I do anything?
I said, no, I didn't get you any of those.
Because I figured what I ask won't affect what he will do.
All right, but you have a hundred on a call about what they did.
It's a rough time.
Say, look, David, Frank, I thought you were going to call.
That was a pretty bad business that you talked about there.
Look, it always happens after every speech, though.
They have to start thinking.
They were hit with this.
The Kelly thing hit them.
The speech hit them.
And now what is happening is they've got to start fussing around and see if they can't fuzz it up.
And Brinkley said he can't say that his mail indicates the public wants out.
His mail indicates that the public is totally frustrated and confused.
That was before your speech.
I asked him what about since the speech.
He said he hasn't checked his mail yet, of which I assume it's probably favorable.
But, uh, he wasn't as hostile as I thought he would be.
I spoke to Hay about the other day, so I want to talk to you about it.
I don't know if it's Terrence or Rick Smith.
But anyway, it came... No, they're both no good.
But I'd just like to know how...
First of all, why didn't somebody in state put it out?
That's the point.
That must have been from state.
You know, I have a problem with David Kennedy.
He really is down on Marshall Creek.
He says Saharo, not Saharo, he says it's all the brethren.
I think military assistance is looking elsewhere.
And he says Marshall, he also says the Peace Corps is not a disaster.
There, and I thought, in my cremation, I told David, I want out of there.
Get the goddamn things out of my cremation.
Or fire Lashner, one of the two.
He said he's cleaned it up.
The Peace Corps are agitators all over this world.
The Peace Corps is nothing but trouble, and here it is not even a foreign territory, and they are agitating against the United States.
But I told, I told Eddie, I told Eddie, I said, I want the Peace Corps out of our country.
I didn't, I wanted out.
Out, out, you know what I mean?
Do it as graciously as they can.
This man, Blackford, he's coming to play on the team and get the hell off.
Well, he's got his own political ambition.
All right, staff, another thing he said, that the staff is totally incompetent in the nation.
All picked by Marshall Green, of course.
And he said it was just unbelievable to get a comment.
But his view is very, very strong.
On plus side, Kennedy said that Robert Thompson is very optimistic.
He said, we're doing better than we think.
He said the loudest... Well, that, Mr. President, is the saving grace.
You remember when he came back from Vietnam the first time,
After Campo here, we all thought six months.
He said you've got at least a year and a half out of it.
That's right.
We thought six to eight months.
We'd be doing well if we got eight months.
We got a year and a half.
In fact, now it will turn out we got more than a year and a half.
Well, it's got at least two years.
Well, according to Terrence, did you read his piece in here?
Yeah.
Oh, yeah, I read it.
But it gave the impression that Campos was ready to go down the drain and everybody was discouraged and so forth.
It's absolutely untrue.
But he was written from Washington.
Yeah.
It is absolutely untrue that they have... Oh, that is, yeah.
Can we get the report directly on that lousy story?
To Smith?
To us.
Oh, yeah.
But you're not leaving, sir?
No.
Of course, in Cambodia, what was that?
We've always figured that.
Cambodia will not go before next spring at the earliest.
You don't think so?
No.
Next spring it might go, but what I want to do, Mr. President, I want next week, I was going to talk to you about it.
At the rate at which we are withdrawing, we can't afford making any more mistakes.
We made a mistake, or I made a mistake, not you, in not sitting on top of that landslide operation.
No, we cannot blame...
We can't trust these people anymore.
I want to get a program of re-equipment to South Vietnamese armies.
Exactly.
I want to get a program in which we push the Cambodian re-equipment.
I would say that's one of the more money in Cambodia.
And I want to do that with an iron hand, Mr. President.
If next year that thing blows up, if it blows up next year, you are going to be the one that pays the price.
None of these guys who screwed us on lands on stepped forward to take the heat.
I take a motorist beside himself.
He says...
We were that close to total victory, and these bastards in Saigon prevented it.
He realized we were ready to knock him out.
Oh, yeah.
He really was very moved by the species.
Oh, he told me again, he said, you are one, you are the greatest American, oh, he...
And you know, he's not a soft sofa.
On the economic programs, we just have to do it now with an iron hand.
Because if we have a tetanus spring, it's going to be a disaster for the country, in addition to being a disaster for you personally.
Generally, these fellows of the Rand Fort, you might be interested to know,
A number of them are bankers.
They say the recession is over and the corner has been turned.
There was one from San Francisco, I didn't get his name, and another one from New York, and both of them said that there'll be pockets of recession.
But if their bank loans are any criterion, in fact they are sorry now you reduced the rate,
Because they... That's bankers, though.
Yep.
Well, because they...
But their point is they can make as many loans at a higher rate as they can...
I know, I know.
But it's a good sign because... Incidentally, Thompson, they actually did...
Uh, I-A-I-D personnel, there are too many, you know, inside.
Personnel.
Yes, I'm sure.
But change it to money.
Get those goddamn, and they're the ones that are fly speck in our program.
Yeah.
You know that.
On Indonesia.
On Indonesia, we've got to save Indonesia.
You hear it?
Could you sign this so that I can stop there?
But the whole point is we want to know background of the residual force.
We want to know when to set things on the beach, period.
Now, with Bill, I would call and say, the President wants you to know this is not for your benefit.
We're doing this because he's got to get it in the way.
We're not doing it.
I don't understand.
Bill, you're going to get a memorandum.
But we've got to keep away from throwing away.
We don't want to talk about the residual force.
We don't need to.
The way I always put it is our goal is total control.
And they say, when?
I'm not going to put myself on a stretcher.
what are the criteria, what's going to happen.
I'll make another announcement based on the three things, the training that they are, the POWs, and the standard of negotiation.
And that'll determine it.
But the goal is total withdrawal.
Period.
That's fair enough.
Absolutely.
That's the right thing to do.
And they say, suppose that they do not negotiate.
That's the question you're asking, and how do you answer that for me?
Supposedly, we don't think of it yet.
But we will not put you in withdrawal.
Of course, we can say that total withdrawal might be a possession if necessary.
So we are really sorry to get into that.
But let's just, I would, I think at this stage,
Partly because of the prisoners, Mr. President.
All the prisoners.
The one thing, the one way they cannot, Mr. Watson, they will not be able to end, they have made the objective is to get us out of there.
If they think they're going to be a marriage concern, then they know they haven't got any hope.
That's right.
No matter how bad this is.
No, that's right.
We've already laid the groundwork.
They're not going to be able to draw when we get the prisoners.
Yeah.
You know, you may have said, I just want to give you a comment on the prison.
Yeah, you could say that, but with this comment on the prison?
Well, I have no problem with that.
No, no, I'm just trying to get... Our goal is to control, and they will try to pin it in terms of, well, will you do it regardless of any negotiation, and the answer is no.
I always say, we've now made the withdrawal announcements for this period, and
But don't cut us up.
He's got to leave this parking position.
You know what he's trying to do is to rush out and go to the credit.
Oh, I already know.
I'm going to have to go to my favorite, Mr. Bagans.
We're going to go to church.
How you been, boy?
I'm really good.
It's a lovely day.