Conversation 480-003

TapeTape 480StartThursday, April 15, 1971 at 11:02 AMEndThursday, April 15, 1971 at 12:00 PMTape start time00:02:17Tape end time01:00:31ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Toumayan, Alex G.;  Mosbacher, Emil ("Bus"), Jr.;  Laraki, Moulay Ahmed;  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob")Recording deviceOval Office

On April 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, Alex G. Toumayan, Emil ("Bus") Mosbacher, Jr., Moulay Ahmed Laraki, and H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:02 am to 12:00 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 480-003 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 480-3

Date: April 15, 1971
Time: 11:02 am - 12:00 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger, Alec G. Toumayan, and Emil (“Bus”) Mosbacher,
Jr.

    [General conversation]
Mosbacher left at 11:03 am

Moulay Ahmed Laraki entered at 11:04 am

     Greetings
          -French language
          -US-Moroccan friendship

Mosbacher entered at 11:04 am

     King Hassan II’s forthcoming trip
          -Forthcoming talks with the President
                -David D. Newsom
                -Stuart W. Rockwell
                -Rabat

     Middle East crisis

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[480-003-w001]
[Duration: 3m 57s]

    Middle East crisis
       -Potential settlement
       -William P. Rogers’ plan
       -Egypt
       -United Arab Republic [UAR]
       -Anwar el-Sadat
       -Delegation to communicate with [Moulay] Hassan II
       -Cease-fire agreement
            -Nearly terminated by United Arab Republic [UAR}
                 -Avoided due to [Moulay] Hassan II
            -Extension

******************************************************************************

     Middle East crisis
         -King Hassan II’s initiatives
               -Timing
               -Possible Arab summit meeting
               -Press reaction
                      -Le Monde
               -Islamic countries
               -United Nations [UN] resolution
               -Arab summit meeting
               -King Hussein ibn Talal
               -Anwar el-Sadat
               -Palestinians
         -Current situation
         -Arab summit
               -Moroccan objectives
                      -Realism
         -Arabs
               -Errors
               -King Hassan II’s possible initiatives
         -Arab summit meeting
               -Schedule
               -King Hassan II’s visit to US

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 10/17/2018. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[480-003-w002]
[Duration: 3m 24s]

     Middle East crisis
         -Arab summit meeting
               -[Moulay] Hassan II’s visit to US
                      -Potential conflict with summit meeting
               -Moroccan foreign relations
                      -Re-establish relations with Syria
                           -Change in Syrian leadership

                   -Communications from Hussein ibn Talal
                   -Communications from Houari Boumedienne
                         -Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika
                         -April 13, 1971
                         -Poor relations between France and Syria
              -Moroccan/Egyptian relations
              -Gamal Abdel Nasser

******************************************************************************

    King Hassan II’s possible visit to US
         -Schedule
               -Proposed visit, April 22, 1971
         -National Press Club
         -”Meet the Press”
         -Silence
         -Arabs
         -Middle East
               -US efforts
         -Difficulties
               -Silence or jeopardizing King Hassan II’s role in Arab summit meeting
         -President’s schedule
         -Options
               -Private visit
                     -Possible itinerary
         -US-Moroccan relations
               -Context
         -Options
         -President’s decision
               -Postponement
         -Postponement
               -Duration
         -Arab summit meeting
               -Arabs
               -Moroccan position
         -King Hassan II’s role in Middle East
         -President’s conversation with Moroccan ambassador
               -Morocco
                     -Status in region
                           -Stability

                       -Objectivity
                       -Strength
     -King Hassan II’s role in Middle East
           -Avoiding interference by the US
     -King Hassan II’s prerogative
     -Private visit
           -Schedule
           -Meeting with press
           -Statement
                 -Nature
                 -US-Moroccan relations
           -Toast
           -Dinner
           -National Press Club
     -Postponement
           -Timing
           -President’s schedule
           -Difficulties
                 -Official/private visit
                       -Avoiding misunderstanding
           -Arab summit meeting
     -Options summarized
           -Private visit
           -Dinner
           -Protocol
           -Statement
                 -Bilateral relations
           -Postponement
           -President’s schedule
           -King Hassan II’s schedule
           -Formal or private visit
           -Timing
           -King Hassan II’s role in Middle East
           -Postponement
           -Private visit
                 -Lunch or dinner
           -King Hassan II’s prerogative
     -King Hassan II’s delegation of decision to Laraki

Possible reaction to private meeting
     -Arab leaders

     -Press and public opinion
     -Impression

Postponement of meeting
     -Timing
     -Arab summit meeting
          -Possible Moroccan course of action

Possible future meeting
     -Private visit
           -Formal dinner
     -President’s 1957 trip to Morocco
     -Timing
     -Moroccan ambassador
     -President’s schedule
           -Timing
           -June/October
     -Postponement
     -Timing
           -Kissinger and H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
     -Postponement
           -Arab summit meeting
     -John N. Irwin, II
           -Briefing
           -Newsom
     -President’s schedule
     -Schedule
     -Blair House
     -Williamsburg
     -New York
           -Finance dinner
     -Importance for US-Moroccan relations

Middle East
    -President’s statement on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
    -President’s and King Hassan II’s tutors
          -Dwight D. Eisenhower
          -King Mohammed V [Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef]

Visit of King Mohammed V to US
      -Reception by Eisenhower at airport

                 -Eisenhower’s stroke
           -President’s role as host
           -Mamie G. D. Eisenhower

     Visit of King Hassan II
           -Postponement
           -Middle East
     Presentation of gifts
          -Golf balls
          -Cufflinks

     Visit of King Hassan II
           -Schedule

     Farewells

Toumayan, et al., left at 11:42 am; Kissinger remained

     President’s schedule
          -Meeting with Kissinger and Haldeman
     Reaction to Laraki visit
          -King Hassan II
                -Admiration for President’s speech on Southeast Asia, April 7, 1971
                -Comments about the President
                -Eisenhower and King Mohammed V
           -Foreign visitors

     King Hassan II’s visit
          -Postponement
          -Timing

Haldeman entered at 11:45 am

           -European summit

     President’s schedule

     State visits
           -Yakubu Gowon
           -Senegal
                  -Leopold Sedar Senghor

-Willy Brandt
-President’s forthcoming trip [to Florida]
-Tricia Nixon
      -Wedding
-Trip to Florida
-Timing
-Gowon
-Indira Gandhi
-European summit
-King Hassan II
      -Timing
-Peru
      -[Juan Velasco Alvarado]
-King Hassan II
      -Schedule
-President’s schedule
      -Western trip
-Congressional recess
-Peru
-President’s schedule
-Congressional recess
-Peru
      -State visit
      -Dinner
-Summer
-General Lon Nol
-King Hassan II
-President’s schedule
      -Press conference
-King Hassan II
      -Timing
-Congress
-General Lon Nol
-King Hassan II
-State visits in 1972
      -President’s schedule
      -Newsom
      -Ivory Coast
      -Value
            -Time-consuming
      -State Department

               -Importance
               -Africa
               -Latin America
                     -Brazil
               -Asia
               -Japan
                     -Emperor Hirohito
                     -US policy
               -Problems
                     -Scheduling
               -William P. Rogers
               -Irwin
               -Dates
               -State Department
                     -List of visitors
               -Foreign policy perspective
               -Edward R. G. Heath
               -1972
                     -Foreign activities
                           -Possible security conference
                           -Possible visit by Russians
               -Laraki
                     -King Hassan II
                     -Postponement
                     -State Department
                     -King Hassan II
                           -Schedule
                           -Timing
               -General Lon Nol
                     -Problems
                     -Cambodian situation
               -President’s schedule

Haldeman left at 11:55 am

     Cambodia
         -Possible enemy strategy
              -Interpretation of US military actions
                    -Sanctuary operation
         -US position

     People’s Republic of China [PRC]

     Vietnam
          -Fire Base 6
          -Deadline
          -Congress
                -John Sherman Cooper
                -Charles H. Percy
                -PRC

     PRC
           -John A. Scali
           -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                -Ronald L. Ziegler’s press briefing
                -Scali
                -State Department
                -US policy
                -USSR
                      -US relations
           -Evaluation of PRC diplomacy
           -American press corps
                -Compared with European press
                      -Peregrine Worsthorne
                      -View of the President’s initiative
                -Scali

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnamese position
               -Prisoners of War [POWs]
               -Negotiations
               -Effect of War
               -PRC
               -Laos

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-022. Segment declassified on 07/23/2019. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[480-003-w003]

[Duration: 5s]

    Vietnam
        -North Vietnamese position
            -Intercepts
                 -Effect of war
                     -North Vietnamese wounded
******************************************************************************

     PRC
           -British ambassador
           -USSR
           -Chou En-lai
           -North Vietnam

     Vietnam
          -North Vietnam
          -News magazines
               -President’s November 3, 1969 speech on Vietnam War
                     -Messages to Kissinger

Kissinger left at 12:00 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

And also to express my thanks to you for receiving me this morning.
It is always a pleasure for me to visit your country.
A country in which I feel the greatest honor.
of my visit.
This connection was a preparation for His Majesty's slow-coming trip to Tokyo for a Chinese invitation.
And you'll learn about the great interest that His Majesty attached to
And it's the reason why, a few days ago,
All the people of the world are getting more and more serious about it.
We should be here.
We will be done.
All the countries and all the papers, even responsible newspapers like the New York Times and the World, they had declared that the convening of such a conference was done in order to declare a global war.
But they realized that it was on the opposite and that for the first time the Islamic countries and the Arab countries were supporting
And to be very candid, the situation right now in Medellin is not very good.
Now, the technique of convening this meeting is to inject more realism into the outcomes of the events and to speak to them with great candor, as we have always done.
If you look back at the history of the last 25 years, unfortunately, you must note that this is the history of events on the part of the
Oh, yeah.
So,
present, there are bilateral relations that will probably be discussed, and then His Majesty will then depart.
We realize that there is a certain element of inconvenience in the context of changing the nature of the military official to private, but we do not want that.
The case here is not for taking a decision.
We can't have this as long as we're together.
He, uh, we, uh, as far as the town and airport is concerned, uh, we don't think that is hard on His Majesty's wishes or on His convenience.
As far as the private visit is concerned, I would suggest that what he might do, if he could find, would be to, uh, come over, uh, say in the afternoon, uh, and, uh, uh,
in that trailer.
This is the protocol that you have to say deserves.
But only if you're wrong.
You don't need to know.
that he wants, or may, again, I should say,
uh
... ... ...
we would have a dinner in its honor and His Majesty would be able to return to his mother in the morning.
The fact of a dinner would give, I think, a little more standing to this visit than to have a lunch.
In these conditions, His Majesty would not have to go to his address, but would have to receive a declaration, except for the words that
I think that a private visit should be held.
We estimate that it would be more appropriate, it will remain, and it will remain important, if, in the case of such a private visit, a dinner will take place, rather than a lunch.
A single dinner is not followed by all the other events that come to mind.
.
.
... ... ... ... ...
Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
I would like to thank you, Mr. President.
I would like to thank you, Mr. President.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
to be able to have leaders as useful to make
of Morocco is only coming for a few hours.
We'll be right back.
And I don't know if King Mohammed V never served in the face of the assumption of responsibility.
When his Majesty's father was here, you may recall President Eisenhower headed to the airport and then had a stroke that day.
And that was the only time as Vice President when I was substituted for President Eisenhower as the host.
to go out and .
.
.
.
.
Thank you, remember, if you get it this summer, you will want it.
You'll get it this summer.
That's a good one.
That's a good one.
hell it is.
It's right up this minute.
They certainly don't have much in front of them.
All they see is somebody around them.
What's the next message?
of Brazil, but he's coming to .
So there aren't many countries left
We're going to do it.
humiliated to make it come.
to the right, yeah.
Because he may be down the track next to you.
Get ready.
snow broke a bit and they decided to
Ambassador, and he came and said to the Hanoi Ambassador,