Conversation 487-019

TapeTape 487StartFriday, April 23, 1971 at 1:17 PMEndFriday, April 23, 1971 at 1:51 PMTape start time03:19:01Tape end time03:51:53ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  White House operator;  Rainwater, Herbert R. (Chief)Recording deviceOval Office

On April 23, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, White House operator, and Chief Herbert R. Rainwater met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:17 pm to 1:51 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 487-019 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 487-19

Date: April 23, 1971
Time: 1:17 pm - 1:51 pm
Location: Oval Office

     Haldeman's conversation with William P. Rogers
          -Rogers' press conference
                -President's People's Republic of China [PRC] initiative
                -Vietnam
                      -Press reaction
          -John A. Volpe
                -Possible ambassadorship to Italy
                      -Roger’s view
                      -Henry A. Kissinger’s view
                            -Haldeman’s response
                            -Forthcoming Italian election
          -Clifford M. Hardin
                -Purdue Presidency
                -Rogers' possible conversation with John C. Whitaker
                -Hardin's conversation with Rogers
                -Possible attacks
                -Rogers' possible conversation with Hardin
                -President's possible position

     Refreshments

     Haldeman’s conversation with Rogers
          -PRC initiative
               -Press release
          -United Nations staff [UN]
               -Reorganization
               -George H.W. Bush
               -Symbolism
               -Bush
               -Rogers

     Haldeman's conversation with John B. Connally
          -Turkey

               -Drug interdiction
                    -Daniel P. (“Pat”) Moynihan’s plan
                          -Control
                          -Acreage

     Youth Conference
          -Motion
               -Task forces

**********************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-023. Segment declassified on 04/03/2019. Archivist: MAS]
[National Security]
[487-019-w003]
[Duration: 1m 1s]

      Great Britain
             -William P. Rogers
                    -April 22, 1971 meeting
             -Planned diplomatic recognition of People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                    -United Nations [UN] vote
                    -William P. Rogers’ initiatives
             -Taiwan
                    -Consulate
                            -Withdrawal per People’s Republic of China [PRC] demand
                            -Other countries’ response
             William P. Rogers’ possible initiatives
                    -Delay
             People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                    -Admission to United Nations [UN]
                    -Vote

**********************************************************************

     Volpe
          -Reassignment

The White House operator talked with the President at an unknown time between 1:14 pm and
1:32 pm.

[Conversation No. 487-19A ]

[See Conversation No. 2-36 ]

             -Ambassador
                 -Italy

[Transcript #1: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

     PRC initiative
         -Intellectuals
         -Congress

     Welfare mothers
          -William L. Safire's view
          -Work
          -Votes for President

     Polls
             -PRC initiative
                  -Administration constiuency
                  -President's position
                  -Distribution
                        -Kissinger
                        -John A. Scali
                        -Patrick J. Buchanan
                        -Ronald L. Ziegler
             -Soviet Union
                  -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                  -Possible effects
             -PRC
                  -Ping-pong team

                  -President's stance

     Media
         -Television

     Vietnam
          -Issue
                -Effect of mass media
          -Demonstrations
          -President's television appearances
          -Polls

     Polls
             -Vietnam
                  -Approval and disapproval rating
                  -Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr.
             -Approval and disapproval rating
                  -Shift
                  -President's speech, April 7, 1971
                  -President's performance
                  -Percentages
                  -Economy
                  -PRC
                  -Vietnam

[Transcript #2: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

             -Louis Harris poll
                  -Charles W. Colson
                       -Figures
             -Approval and disapproval rating
                  -Figures

[Transcript #3: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records

Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

           -Vietnam
                 -Percentages
                 -Possible administration initiatives
                 -Administration efforts
                       -Connally's view
           -Laos operation (Lam Son)
                 -Effect
                 -Press coverage
           -Calley
                 -Administration actions
           -President's speech, April 7, 1971
           -Approval and disapproval rating
           -Laos operation (Lam Son)
                 -Effect
           -Vietnam
                 -Significance
                 -Negative impact
           -Cambodia
           -Approval and disapproval rating
           -Erosion of Administration support
           -President's speeches
           -Press conferences
                 -Possible effects
           -Disapproval rating
                 -November 1970-January 1971
                       -Percentages

The President talked with Herbert R. Rainwater between 1:32 pm and 1:37 pm.

[Conversation No. 487-19B]

[See Conversation No. 2-37]

[End of telephone conversation]

           -Public relations approach
                -Cabinet

                 -Administration spokesmen and surrogate speakers
                       -Revenue sharing
                       -President’s policies
                       -Success
                 -Media
           -Possible administration initiatives
                 -Cabinet
                 -Effect
           -Vietnam
                 -Cabinet
           -Approval and disapproval rating
                 -Percentages
                       -Effect of events
           -Public relations efforts
           -Calley
                 -Effect on polls
           -Haldeman’s view
           -Peace
           -Economy
           -Connally's views
           -Need for optimism
           -Economy
                 -Consumer attitudes

[Transcript #4: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

**********************************************************************

[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 11/07/2019.
Segment cleared for release.]
[Personal Returnable]
[487-019-w007]
[Duration: 28s]

     Hubert H. Humphrey

           -Unknown man’s view
               -Potential as 1972 Democratic presidential nominee
               -Compared to Edmund S. Muskie
               -Benefits for the President as Democratic presidential nominee

**********************************************************************

     Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy
         -Television appearance, April 22, 1971
              -Hubert H. Humphrey
              -Compared with President’s television appearances
                    -Differences
                          -Effect

     Television ratings
          -Numbers
          -Administration standing
          -Philip A. Hart and Margaret Chase Smith
          -Equal time
          -American Broadcasting Corporation [ABC]
          -Time

     The President's schedule
          -Press conference
          -Press
          -Press conference
                -Administration strategy
                -Subjects
                -Advantages for President
                      -Tony Ramsey
                      -President's meeting with editors
                      -Timing
                      -Advantages for President

[Transcript #5: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

                        -Supreme Court decision on school desegregation

     Supreme Court decision on school desegregation
          -Effect on administration
          -Raymond K. Price, Jr. analysis
          -Effect on administration
          -Price's view
          -Racial balance
          -Exceptions
          -Review

     Polls
             -Results

[Transcript #6: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

             -PRC initiative

The President and Haldeman left at 1:51 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

He made a very strong case with the president.
initiative on China.
What about Vietnam?
And he thought he had covered Vietnam very strongly.
He said, I want to see the wires.
I want to see what they move on.
They may not cover Vietnam.
Very good on him.
He says he has no problem at all on Volpe.
He wanted to move on it now.
What do you want him to do?
He says he doesn't bother to be able to do it now.
Henry, of course, it drives right up the wall.
Henry is absolutely horrified at the thought and said he will turn the country communist by putting Volpe in there.
I said, Henry, how can one ambassador turn a country communist?
He's worried about doing it before the election, which is until December or so.
You've got to do it before that.
If we're going to do it, we're going to do it.
He's the first one.
You should do that right now.
Talk to him about Hardin.
And he said that it was his feeling that Hardin was not interested in Purdue from what he had gotten.
But he would talk to John Whitaker about it.
He said it would
in a way be difficult for him to raise it apart, and then he got to think about it, and he said, no, maybe not.
But he said, Cliff did raise it with, talked with me about it at some point, and I could... You put it in terms of he's just going to get under increasing attack.
Yeah.
He saw the problem.
He saw the problem.
It's hard and small.
It's just the fact.
And he said that maybe the thing...
that he could just go to Cliff and say that he remembered that he'd be glad to talk to you on Cliff's behalf and see what you're feeling to be on it, if Cliff wanted it to or something like that.
That's a great, great opinion.
Talk to him about the...
cleaning up with the U.N. staff question, which, because Bush has already been looking at that.
He's going to get a rundown of what he has done, and he'll, there might be one symbolic one.
Hit him again on, well, what they can do is maybe make one symbolic, you know?
I've got a, Bush is calling me on something else, and I'll risk covering him too, but I was going to be sure I could build it and make those one, you know.
He's intrigued with the Moynihan Turkish dill plant.
He says, Scott, that makes all kinds of sense to me.
He said, what we've been arguing with is trying to get to eliminate the acreage, but it makes a hell of a lot more sense to go and tell them to buy the crop.
And when he pursued that, he got very excited about it.
I think it's a treat.
I checked on that in Congress saying they did not pass a motion to abolish the capitalist system.
There was a motion in one of the task forces.
It was debated that they never took a vote.
Good.
At least they didn't go that far.
These views about Gopi are just not all that important.
I don't think we can send an ambassador that can be so bad that he will, that the result will be the country going communist.
No, I don't think we can do that.
No, I don't think we can do that.
70, huh?
It's 500 people.
Yeah, 581 nationwide.
Nationwide standard is the same sample, solid sample.
On the early, we always ask to approve, disapprove, and that's 5133, which would put it about the same as it was right after the speech, 5232 it was then.
But it shows that the China thing didn't help us, in effect.
on this thing now.
Interesting.
The approve or disapprove of Vietnam has now shifted back to 40-45.
I guess.
I guess.
So we have to go 48-40 right after the speech.
I think it shows the effect of the demonstration, maybe, and other things.
I would think it would.
You're also assured, right?
Now, the demonstration, 77% awareness, which is high.
In general, first question, in general, do you approve or disapprove of this demonstration?
32 approve, 42 disapprove, 26 no opinion.
That's of everybody, whether or not they were aware of it.
Of those who were aware of it, 37 approved, 45 disapproved.
We heard that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court upheld the court order forbidding the veterans to camp on the Mall overnight.
Yes, 54, no, 42.
But of those who were aware of the veterans staying at all, yes, 63, no, 35.
In other words, two-thirds of those who knew about the veterans at all knew about the Chief Justice ruling.
If the demonstrators refuse to obey the court, do you feel they should be forced by the police to leave the area or shouldn't they?
58 yes, 31 no.
Two to one should be forced to leave.
If they refuse to leave, do you believe they should be arrested or shouldn't they?
48 should be arrested, 40 should not.
They're close.
48 said they should be arrested or arrested.
that are the same 48 that are, most of the 48 that are with us on the war.
Plus some, there's only 40 in the group of the war, 48.
So those guys should be arrested.
Well it does show that the,
That's an easy thing to say at this point.
That's different than if they had been arrested, staged all that stuff that they would have gone through, and then ask them, if we'd asked them, and they'd seen that on TV, then we'd ask them, did you approve of the action on arresting?
It would go down in my view.
We'll actually wait and show pictures of them.
Then they say, oh, it's a terrible thing to do to an artist.
Give the demonstration figures again.
Approved, disapproved?
Those who are aware, 37 approved, 45 disapproved.
So we're aware of the demonstrations.
Uh-huh.
Every 77 are alert.
Uh-huh.
And that's what the whole pocket was always.
The whole pocket was just 32 approved, 42 disapproved.
It's not a shame.
Yeah.
They must get across rather than be alert.
No.
It isn't they get across as much.
It does show that there's a lot of people against the war.
Well, if it's only a third.
I know.
It's a third, whereas they're, it shows a lot.
We were right, this is a group that they told us to release back to the border.
So we were right, it's too close for us to approve the problem.
Too close.
Now, we don't think you'll find the same thing.
We had a 42-32, or a 32-42 who approved this group on their demonstration, where when you ask about the approved student demonstration,
is 65, whatever it was, 17.
I think we can do it, actually.
We gotta watch how it builds up, if it is.
Yeah, and we've got to show some strength.
Some strength.
Sometimes people fall straight.
Well, we showed restraint this week with the veterans.
Attempted to work in an ordinary way because they basically were working on the approved, disapproved.
We were at, we were 55, 34.
After the speech, now we're down to 51-33, right?
Some of these, some have gone underscited, basically, right?
Five.
Not underscited, one.
Six, actually.
No, instead it went up five, the approved went down four, and the disapproved went down one.
So we really figured it.
Figured more than that, I'm sure you wanted it.
The reason to me, though, I get back to my point that I've said on several occasions, you know, that there's great intellectuals, but I'm not so sure that there's also any folks still in Congress, as you call them.
I think it's right.
I think it's right.
I think it's right.
I don't want this to go to anybody else, not in Canada, etc.
I don't want them to think that we're going to be, to this point, respect what we do.
Now, a Soviet move, on the other hand, is likely to have a more positive effect.
You see what I mean?
A Soviet move is more esoteric, isn't it?
But our little ping pong fed wasn't, see that?
That is what caught the imagination.
Maybe that part, maybe the esoteric part is the president's.
Yeah.
Well, we've got our posture.
That's absolutely clear.
We've got positive stories.
We've got a positive television and all the rest, right?
Everything else, yeah.
But does it not then show that the war agent, though,
Constantly cheating in front of the people he wrote to.
He's not ready for you to get shot.
He does.
I think that's right.
The demonstration period once it's concluded will be.
And the war issue, when you go on television, you get a little flick, but it doesn't hold.
It's what this other people have drafted.
Is it?
In fact, in fact, just as bad as you were.
I totally disapprove of the war.
You know, as bad as you were at the old, the real, uh, was 3246.
That was after the, uh, the bad weekend.
And that was Cali.
Well, that one I can throw out.
That's Cali, remember?
The bad weekend.
It's full.
It's fine.
That's right.
Now, what's the prove?
Disapprove now.
41.
45.
45.
The approval of the president went up over that period from 1952 to 1955.
So being able to hold, frankly, in that 51, being able to hold it there in 51, 52, 53, you know, that's a pretty good hold at this point.
It also shows we're not getting any help from the economy, doesn't it?
Remember the good economic news?
We're not getting it.
See, the good economic news, the China story,
Both of that has come out.
Both the economic news, the China story about, everybody was excited around here about, had come out since the 55-3 or pull, and so we dropped it.
I think those are the ones that you don't, the effect of those takes weeks or months before you agree.
The economic, not necessarily China, although it's going to be a slower, and it's still got the,
The demonstration is the only factor that's not going to put the dedication, and it's on television every night, isn't it?
Did Colson find a way to get out of Harris when he was here?
I don't have any indications, but no.
He had done his homework.
He's working on his figures, but I think Harris just, you know, he knows what he's going to do with them.
Let me say, they're 51-33.
54, 34, and 52, and 53.
They're the same figure, too.
You've got to figure that out for the next song.
Yes.
I think the one that is significant, though, is the Proof is a Proof of War, and it's a very significant shift.
And that isn't the same figure.
That isn't the same figure.
That's a shift.
You see some muscles and all the rest of it cracking all over.
And maybe the reaction...
a lot of our people are, basically people react negatively to the administration, whereas they act negative, whereas if they sorted out the way they deal in the war, they would react positively to the administration.
And in 45, 41, 80, I'm 30, 45, I'm 30, you know, there's still a little, there's still a little amount of impact for us.
But anything that we do that is, that is positive for us, we're going to have a hell of a track, isn't it?
It's a drag, it's a drag.
I've been, the more I think about it, actually,
You know, we've been doing all this business of, well, we get enough personal stuff on Ross and everything.
I don't think we have, I think there's a better job we can't be done as calm as we had it out.
But when we really look at the whole thing, the pattern is very clear.
The very fact of loss,
it kicked us down about 10 points.
Then, after that, you had the coverage of Laos.
The fact that even the fact of it and the coverage of Laos apparently didn't kick us down much more than that, but it stayed about there.
At the back, we had Kelly kick us down another 10 points.
And then, which we've got to throw in that Kelly reaction.
Our handling of the Kelly thing and the broadcast kick us up 10 points.
We're just sitting right in here at about 51-33.
In other words, we are ten points below where we were before people got stirred up about the war at the time of Laos.
Now, what does that mean?
It simply means that war is on people's minds.
It hurts, to get my point.
Unless we are out fighting it day after day, which we did at the time of Cambodia.
If we're not, we can't do that now.
We can't just be out there.
But if it erodes us, that's one thing.
If it just keeps us at the 51, we're all right.
If it erodes us a lot below that, then I think you have to start moving to take some other measures.
What this shows is that when you do take other measures, it has an effect.
Like, even just when I'm talking about it, sometimes I'll go up.
Now, press conference versus could just the fact of you being on again could crank it back up.
I'm not sure, you know.
The broadcast only shifted about three points.
Let's face it, Bob, the press conference is going to have that kind of effect.
It's going to be positive.
It's going to be on the best.
But looking at the disapproval,
which you've always said is the most significant issue.
You've got about a one-third disapproved that hangs in pretty tight.
I mean, even going back, November, December, January, the disapproved was running pretty solidly 31, 33, 33.
January.
What was it, January?
60 or 59 in January.
We were 60, but the disapproved was 31.
A bit wrong.
Three percent.
This is apparently going to disapprove pretty soon.
At this point at all.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I tell you, I thought you did a fine job on television last night.
Yeah.
And we're glad to get some of our site across here.
Well, I think we are trying to avoid getting rough with these people because I don't want to have the situation where the bonus market is bad.
And so that's why we have finally made it to the court order today and put the permit in.
But the real problem we've got here, Chief, is the fact that the media, all they gave you a minute ago, a year and a half, a third of a minute, went on.
But night after night, you run five or six minutes of these people.
It's really something, isn't it?
The fact that basically they ought to present both sides.
Well, you did.
That's a great thing.
Just say that, look, let's have equal time.
Come on.
I know.
I know you have to.
Well, let me say this.
We're doing the right thing here, and we're going to come out all right, but we just have to sort of sail through the next couple of weeks, and then... Coastal?
No, no, I haven't seen it today.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Well, you keep pushing them in to us, Chief, and we'll examine them, and you'll be possible whenever we think it'll work.
I know that we always like some good ideas from outside.
I know, I will.
I've just made a note of it.
And I appreciate it, and just keep slugging.
Don't worry, it will happen.
Bye.
I was trying to say that, uh, the, uh, the other thing that gets down to is that maybe y'all are, you know, way around about, uh, in all the work we've been doing, trying to get the cabinet to stand up and say a nice thing.
I see that.
I see people running around the country on red and shittering.
The president's, uh, tired and warped across.
Maybe it's all because he's crying.
I really think that what she's done too, it doesn't really matter.
I mean, you would think it mattered.
It helps some, but I'm just not sure with that.
And I think it gets back well with the media problem.
I just don't think you're going to get it through the iron curtain of the media.
So what we really have to do is to throw the story and keep your eye on the men's ball.
And I think we can work this one out.
Here you go.
No, I don't think you can do that.
I think you gotta...
Because what I've had in my life, what I've had in my life, we tend to think that, well, maybe we're not doing as well on the polls and so forth because, again, this is ending up because we're not getting across the story of the president's great qualities and all that crap.
Why do I don't think, whatever the cabinet does, and I don't want to decide for it, that
that it will get across.
I don't think the media will ever allow it.
Second, I think that the, again, that what really matters, what really matters, boy, has to come right now because it's subjectivity.
Right now, if it happens to be the war, maybe tomorrow it's something else.
Other than this way, maybe just to serve the priorities, keep, keep them doing it.
They've got something to do, you know, and
Let's not get all, let's not get all wound up in this business of, well, why are you up or down?
Why is the region up or down?
Because of the events.
Would you agree?
Yeah.
We need to find this out.
Hell's fire.
But I think, still, you look, you take all the events and lap it all up, you still end up that you've got about half the people that approve and about a third of the people who disapprove.
Six of the people who don't know.
That's what you're here.
We've been bringing stuff out pretty solidly.
It pretty much stays that way.
You get a book that can knock it down a lot, like Cali, which knocked them down to 40%, 41%.
But they all went to undecided.
They didn't bring any of those to disapproval.
Cali confused them.
They just didn't know what they thought.
But they came back fast and discovered that what they thought was still approved.
Who the hell knows about county today?
Slow build-up.
Good.
Good kind of slow build-up.
Over the long haul.
Do you think it changes?
I do.
I don't think people are going to... Because it looks like peace, and because it screws up the Asian thing.
It looks like it relates to the Soviet days, but it sure hasn't helped so far.
But that's my point.
I think it may help a little.
I think it will.
It may over a period of time.
And you notice it's only going to end up over a long period of time.
The economy, nobody's going to jump up on an all-inclusive basis and say anybody will feel better.
You've got to keep hammering at it to make them feel better.
What companies say and others must constantly say, things are great, things are good, things are better.
The only value of that, though people say that, won't change the polls on the economy, right?
All that will do is affect the consumer attitude on whether they do the things that are necessary to make the economy go up.
And as it goes up, they'll feel better.
If it goes up, they will feel better.
I wonder this.
Is there anything that can be done, or we're doing as much as we can to get it easy to fit, or to give some more balance to the coverage for this demonstration today?
I mean, I know it's all been hit hard.
Are they being hammered harder than that?
I don't know.
All week long, I watched Reagan on one minute.
That was our mid-track.
Yeah.
On the news.
That's the case.
The reports that they've given four or five hundred people, it's just astonishing.
It's not astonishing at all.
It's exactly what you thought it would be, what you would have thought it would be.
It's hard to explain, but could we, could you maybe have one of them, have the Colson operation, start to take that on?
They just started to zero in on that particular thing.
How the hell, all week long, you've had this?
And, for example, the rest of the time.
I've heard of him.
Saxby.
On the morning show.
I've heard of Saxby, too.
It's a classic thing, though, isn't it?
In a strange way, it is a little bit of a mistake, sir.
You're in hell, aren't you, baby?
like Teddy laid out of that television thing last night.
It was a damn smart thing to do.
He's not a candidate.
He's not a candidate, and he knew it was going to be a jackass thing.
Instead of getting the rating on it, it was five and a half million.
We did better than that on the Hart Smith thing.
Of course, on your, the thing they would give you full-time, too, was the three-network thing, and there you got 60 million.
But compared to, they were on in prime time, this show should go against the president in prime time, on an agency network, et cetera.
And we were up against the target competition.
That's right.
We still got two.
That's right.
They got five and a half, et cetera.
That means something, doesn't it?
Yes.
I think we were against target competition.
They were up against the start of the movie.
We were up against the second hour.
Then I think it's two.
Also, we were on for an hour, and that rating is our average rating over the hour.
They were only on a half hour.
What we have to do about what we have to do.
to just say our positive things, you know, and ignore all the other things.
So I have that feeling, but I don't know if I can quite figure something with it.
You've always thought that, I mean, putting press conferences on is a good thing.
I still think it is.
And even though we've, you know, everybody's seen the act, it's good that we're able to see it again now.
Yeah.
It's exciting.
Yeah.
The tone of your answers, you can be very much...
of the positive and all that.
You get that, even with, even in questions, you kind of make it work at the editors.
It's a good time for a press conference.
I think you're going to, with the press, you've got a lot of plus things in the economy, in China, and, you know, there's stuff like that.
They know.
I know they'll plan a demonstration, but you've got to say something about the demonstration somewhere and get that out of play.
It's pretty core precision.
It's cool.
That one is wonderful, but it's not been as bad as we thought.
Because I think it sort of appeared that we were doing it anyway.
You pay prices, and when you go to analyzing that, it's been interesting.
It comes out that it really fits exactly.
It doesn't.
is nearly as bad on us as it looks like it is.
The decision is much more narrow.
The decision is a very, from his viewpoint, it ends up being a damn good decision considering what we could have gotten.
And it clearly states to me, Jerry, that it doesn't require rating problems.
It doesn't require us to provide exceptions for little children.
And it doesn't provide review.
So once they've established something that doesn't, they don't have to keep going back and making sure they're maintaining it.
I don't know that it showed us anything different.
Except that I think it showed us that we didn't need any approval, which I think is significant to know that we had a shift in the Vietnam.
Yeah, as a result of the demonstrations.
In other words, the demonstrations, it shows that people don't disagree with the demonstration of this demonstration, as long as they do demonstrations in general of the students.
That is what they do.
through many of the firms that we were writing and not busting them.
Yeah, it does.
It also shows that China didn't help us.
Yeah.
Oh, yeah, well, I heard they had helped us out in the counterbalance the other day.
I don't know about this.