← 490-024491-002 →

Conversation 491-001

TapeTape 491StartWednesday, April 28, 1971 at 9:34 AMEndWednesday, April 28, 1971 at 11:37 AMParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office
AudioNARA Description

On April 28, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 9:34 am and 11:37 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 491-001 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 489-35/491-1

Date: April 28, 1971
Time: Unknown between 9:34 am and 11:37 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and Henry A. Kissinger; this recording began at
an unknown time after 11:06 am; an unknown portion of this conversation was not recorded
while the tape was changed.

     Melvin R. Laird and William P. Rogers
         -President's People’s Republic of China [PRC] initiative
               -Credit
         -Appointment
               -Black admiral [Samuel L. Gravely, Jr.]
         -Robert S. McNamara
         -Lt. William L. Calley, Jr.
         -Gravely

     PRC initiative
         -US policy
         -PRC messages
                -Compared to those of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                    -Summit


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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]
[Duration: 4s ]


     CHINA


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

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                                               2

                           NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. 9/08)



           -Exchange of messages
                -Vietnam
                     -US table tennis team
                -Nicolae Ceausescu
                -Taiwan
                -US leftists

                                                     Conv. No. 489-35/491-1 (cont.)
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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4
[National Security]
[Duration: 1m 8s ]


     CHINA


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 4

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           -US approach to negotiations
           -Staff
           -Press
                 -Ronald L. Ziegler, William L. Safire, and John A. Scali
                 -Support for President
           -Congress

     Congress

     Kissinger's conversation with John W. Chancellor

[Transcript #1: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]
                                         3

                     NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                 Tape Subject Log
                                    (rev. 9/08)



President's forthcoming press conference, April 29, 1971
     -Vietnam
            -US proposals
                  -Ceasefire
            -Enemy responsibility

Woodstock conference
    -Vietnam                                               Conv. No. 489-35/491-1 (cont.)
         -Ceasefire
    -Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
         -Statements
    -John D. Rockefeller, IV
         -Reactions to statements
               -Unknown Danish socialist
               -Unknown Norwegian socialist
         -Charles H. Percy
    -Europeans
    -Communists
    -[James] Harold Wilson
    -Denis W. Healey
    -Reaction
         -Americans
         -Europeans
    -Vietnam
         -Press
               -Russell A. Kirk
    -Alastair Buchan
         -Letter to Kissinger
         -Background
               -Imperial Defense College
         -Letter to Kissinger

Possibilities for administration successes
     -Draft
     -Domestic situation
     -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]

SALT
    -Rogers
    -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
         -Schedule
    -Leonid I. Brezhnev
                                            4

                        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                   Tape Subject Log
                                      (rev. 9/08)



               -Message
         -Negotiations
               -President’s response
         -Rogers’ schedule
         -Possible debate
         -Rogers’ schedule
         -Position
         -President’s response                                Conv. No. 489-35/491-1 (cont.)
               -Timing
               -USSR position
               -US position
                     -Anti-ballistic missiles [ABM]
               -Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson
               -Possible announcement
                     -Timing
         -Notification
               -Rogers
               -John N. Irwin, II, David Packard, and Thomas H. Moorer
               -Gerard C. Smith and Rogers
               -British, French, and Germans
               -Announcement
               -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
               -State Department
                     -Latin America
               -Smith
         -Announcement
               -Smith's schedule
                     -Austria
                           -Visit to Corinthia
               -Rogers’ schedule


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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[Privacy]
[Duration: 3s ]


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

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                                                  5

                            NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                       Tape Subject Log
                                          (rev. 9/08)




                 -Politburo
                 -US position
                 -USSR options

     James E. Johnson
          -Swearing-in ceremony                                 Conv. No. 489-35/491-1 (cont.)
                -Laird
                -[Gravely]

[Transcript #2: A transcript of the following portion of this conversation was prepared under
court order from December 1978 through March 1979 for Special Access 8, Ronald V. Dellums,
et al. v. James M. Powell, et al., No. 71-2271. The National Archives and Records
Administration produced this transcript. The National Archives does not guarantee its accuracy.]

[End of transcript]

Stephen B. Bull entered at an unknown time after 11:06 am.

     President's schedule

Bull left at an unknown time before 11:35 am.

     McGeorge Bundy
        -Speech on Vietnam

     Anti-war sentiment within administration
          -Staff
          -State Department

     President's schedule
          -Meeting with Gerhardt Schroeder
                 -Dr. Rainer Barzel
          -Meeting with anti-war protesters
                 -Robert H. Finch
                 -Elliot L. Richardson

Ziegler entered and Kissinger left at 11:35 am.
                                                6

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                      Tape Subject Log
                                         (rev. 9/08)



          -Upcoming photo session
              -Timing
              -Rose Garden
              -Look Magazine
              -Control

Haldeman and Ziegler left at 11:37 am.
                                                             Conv. No. 489-35/491-1 (cont.)
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

Tomorrow at least.
No, he doesn't believe it can be done, and I'm not as confident as you.
But he will announce it, Dr. Warren.
Why, he really jumps in and takes everything.
Both Larry and Roger swear to Bob that every goddamn cheap shot there is, that's what hurts me.
Why the hell do they have to get every little decision?
You know, they wonder why we don't talk to them.
Huh?
What do you think?
Well, in any event, if McNamara were Secretary of Defense, he'd make damn sure
You'd get the credit for it when it was Cali.
Well, at least on this screen it's saying Nixon threw a point at Black Ambrose.
So what a man.
My point is, though, I'd like to cover up.
I mean, the other one was about the boat that Blair Rogers, you never know if you fail.
Rogers now jumped on the China thing.
Of course.
I'm not.
I'm not trying to exploit it.
Not one damn bit.
On the contrary.
And we've got to play a cool, controlled game with these guys.
They've made history for 3,000 years.
Their communications, I've got a book full of them to us.
You compare them to the Russians.
If I read the Russians, some of them, the Russians keep picking up loose change wherever they can, like pickpockets.
These guys have had their eyes on the main thing.
They could embarrass us, to beat Jesus out of us with Taiwan.
They've never done it.
Let's come to the most significant thing of these exchange messages.
That's right.
Well, we have another message.
Well, we have the message.
And they mentioned in the message they sent you to Kuterska, which I haven't read to Bob.
They said the only issue standing between our two people is Taiwan, which is very significant.
They have not a word about Vietnam.
That's why I'm so sure we can...
They could have said to us, as long as you blood-sucking imperialists are in Vietnam, if they had talked like our leftists here...
The real problem is what price they're going to ask to come on.
Not they're going to ask.
Oh, what do you mean?
They won't ask a price.
You mean they're going to say, they're going to say, Tyrone can remain?
No, I think we can work that out.
Sorry, but we haven't delivered yet.
Absolutely not.
They're not, they're not, that's not shining.
It's not like it's just getting troops out.
They'll settle for our getting our troops out.
We don't have any there.
80,000, right?
Symbolic force.
We, I mean, one of the good moves we made towards them, which no one knows,
Except you, you remember a year and a half ago, we'd been dancing a minuet with them.
They had cut two destroyers out of the budget that were in the Straits of Taiwan.
So we sent a message through the Pakistanis saying that as a sign of goodwill, we are withdrawing those two destroyers from the Straits of Taiwan.
That's what got us the war so tough.
In reply to that, they said, all right, now we're ready to resume the war so tough.
They're going to destroy these destroyers anyway.
So I think, Mr. President, if we do it suddenly, and that's why it's terribly important how this preliminary stuff is handled, they will settle for an agreement that over a three to five year period.
But at the meantime, what you have to do, and this is the real tough thing.
even breathing to any member of his family.
That's particularly to anybody that ever sees the breast, like Sigler, Sapphire, Scali, anybody else.
than anything to the wind.
Probably don't know anything, nothing to the wind.
Second, that must be very important.
Second, however, it means that everybody's got to be stiff back bone, hard nose, the President standing firm, now God damn it, back him up and quit squinting and squealing around.
Do the very best we can with the Congress.
Try to get a few of our friends to speak up.
That's that.
That's what we've got to do.
I'll do that.
At this point, I think maybe they can.
I think these clowns up here in the hill might help us a bit.
Who knows?
You never know.
I think some of the senators should get a little pissed off.
Are they?
Well, somehow, I don't know what Chancellor, for example, said on NBC yesterday, but he was in for lunch, and he said he has the feeling you're up to something.
He said you are too cool, you're too controlled.
Well, I had a very interesting sort of analysis.
You know, if you can't, it's not done.
You know, he says in the meetings, I go, all right, everybody.
And he writes free of it.
But he wrote the, he said, you're a suggestive answer, a progester.
He said that this answer is a minority.
And he's always honest with you, doesn't he?
He said it.
I do not agree with those who say that you should take notice of the fact that the demonstration was peaceful.
He said you do not praise people for doing what the law requires of people.
And I do not think you should take notice of the fact that it was ordered.
I think you should say, yes, it was large, and there have been a lot of other large demonstrations.
But he said, I think you should be, on this case, firm and strong and controlled, but tougher than you've been before.
Check on them.
Check their everything.
When those people come in, I don't think that that's a difference.
It doesn't mean that.
Unless they're bad.
But your opponents, if they come in with a nasty question, kick them in the balls.
I think, Mr. President, we have to fight these guys now.
Well, everybody is in common with being strong in the night, but if you get shot, you're blind.
But I think this is...
Most people think the President should submit about Ryan, but I think he wants me to take off the gloves.
But I think, for example, Mr. President, this is not a bad occasion tomorrow to show a little indignation of saying, we've offered a ceasefire.
We've done all of these things.
and some indignation at these charges that they are responsible for the killing.
Most people don't know it.
Even up in Woodstock, it was great news when I said we had offered a ceasefire.
And I think some of our attackers, Regal collapsed completely up there when I tackled him.
Was Regal there?
Oh, yeah.
It was a pretty horrible conference, wasn't it?
Oh, he is something.
But he just turned into jelly when I jumped in.
Rockefeller, the force.
One thing a Danish socialist said to John Rockefeller, Rockefeller was pleading about the bombing, and he said, my generation isn't interested in power.
It's interested in moral regeneration.
And the Danish socialist said, all I can say to you, Mr. Rockefeller, is
I sat under American vows, and I thank God for everyone that dropped, and I thank God now that your parents had more strength than you do.
Great, isn't it?
Great.
A Danish socialist, a neutralist country.
Great.
Great.
And a Norwegian socialist got up and he said, Mr. Rockefeller, all I can hope is that you speak for an American youth and not for the American youth.
Really?
Yeah.
Oh, to Jay Rockwell.
To Jay Rockwell.
Yeah.
Who was giving a really revolting speech.
Good God, isn't that great?
Some of those...
It was an amazing...
The Europeans, the funny thing, I mean, except for the comments, the Europeans, and even old Harold Wilson, and Frank Wilson, he'll be with me on that.
The President, Dennis Healy, a laborer, always anti-American, got up there and said, Mr. President, in front of us, born aliens.
It is the wisest post-war American foreign policy.
We are with him completely.
The Americans were attacking the President.
The Europeans were unanimously supporting him.
I was the only American who... That's coming out.
There's a column saying, you know, you get all this American attack, the British war on us, the British war on us, all of a sudden you're doing exactly the right thing.
That's Russell Kirk.
No, but unless they're fucking wrote to me...
I had a letter from Alistair Buckingham in which he said, I just want you to know... Is he in Canada now?
No, he's head of the Imperial Defense College.
Oh, he's back?
Yes.
He was in Canada for a year.
He wrote a letter saying, I just want you to know that all the thoughtful people in Britain, without exception, believe that the President is conducting a wise, sane, and constructive policy.
He's a great man.
Foreign policy across the board, yes.
He's a great man.
That's the anomalous situation.
But I think if we bring off 60% of this stuff this year, well, actually now I think we can bring it all off.
Just bring one off.
I get to see one come off.
I mean, just give me the draft, okay?
No, no, no.
Actually, actually, in terms of our domestic situation, we've got to have one thing that affects these mothers.
I agree.
It's complete.
Salt will, too.
I know you don't think much of it.
No, I don't.
But we've got to, if we play it out right, well, that's that.
Yeah, salt will have an effect.
It may affect, Mr. President, that you're pulling another rapid out of there.
That's going to be a hard one to handle with Rogers.
I guess not, too.
One time, the way I started that program, I'm simply going to say that when the Regent got back, he came into the White House one day, and I had a letter that they'd tell him that I was saying something.
And when the Regent came back, he came in and said he had a message from the President that they would like to do, frankly, they ought to try to make a break in the SALT office.
And they said, well, we have to offer him.
So I wrote this letter.
Here's our response.
Boom.
Is that the way to go?
Absolutely.
Because you could have that all done before Rogers gets back.
Well, I don't think you will.
I don't think it could drop him.
That also means it's a problem.
Well, at least it would prevent a long debate about it.
Well, it's not going to be a debate.
I agree.
I'd like to have it done before he gets back.
If you could get it done next week.
No, I just cannot.
No, sir.
It's in their court.
Frankly, I believe that there's nothing now they can do except a yes or no.
Suppose you do.
How is there going to be a long debate about that letter?
My letter to them?
I've always said that we will have ADMs plus theirs.
Now that would be, if these bastards would agree to that, that's a hell of a start.
And I'm determining the policy here.
And you'd have linked offensive and defensive weapons.
You've always said Scoop Jackson would have to shut up.
It would be...
Well, anyway, we have to do it.
We have to do it.
Well, I think there's a chance that we'll get it next week, and then we'd have to decide when to announce it.
We'd need two days.
We ought to send a messenger to Rogers to let him know that it's coming.
Oh, hell yes.
We can't just announce it.
Oh, well, I'll go and decide tonight.
Could we spread my sentiment to you?
Too many people read it.
The way to do it, in my view, Mr. President, if you agree, is that you call in Irvin Packard
and tell them two days before you make the announcement and say, this is it.
No.
Then send a messenger to Smith and a messenger to Rogers.
Then we call in the British and French and German.
And I want Smith to know about five minutes before it's announced.
Will he keep it quiet?
He'll keep it quiet.
OK. Then send a message, right?
Then, then.
You might as well play it to get something out of it the night before we tell the British, French, and Germans.
Then the day you make the announcement, you have to, our ambassadors, take it into the NATO Council.
We can put on a terrific consultation production here.
And then we can get Smith back and we'll send him over again to the Navy.
Why don't we have Smith back when we make the announcement?
It depends entirely on how it breaks.
If the announcement is made, I think my information would ask Smith to come back.
But the only problem, it depends.
what the date is, and I'll tell you what the problem is.
On May 9th, he and the Russian delegation have been invited by the Austrian government to go to Carinthia.
Now, if he...
I understand.
And if he cancels out of that and is called back, that will indicate that something big is coming.
Well, I don't know.
Unless he just leaves the night before.
But...
If the announcement is after May 9th, there's no problem at all.
It is before.
But I think there's a chance that it could be next week.
When does Rogers get back?
May 9th or 10th.
If we have no problem with Rogers, because he cannot break his schedule, we'll just send a messenger to him.
No, no, Rogers will be fine.
We'll have the choice.
We'll have to do this as an era of assassins, but...
So we'll either have May 9th, it will either be next week, but there's a meeting of this, of the Politburo this Friday.
They'll either decide it then.
See, we've got them in a position now, their choices aren't all that great.
If they turn it down, then all they'll have is a long negotiation in Vienna anyway.
Right.
Well, let's see what their choices are.
We speculate, we'll know when we introduce them.
Do you, I think we'll hear from them probably next week, probably Monday.
In the black animal story, the role of the black assistant secretary of the Army or something.
Anyway, Bob, as far as I'm concerned, I know all the snappers are probably wondering, but I've got my own thoughts about this conference.
I'm going to do it my own way.
I'm not going to go through the age of preparing goddamnedly like I have the others.
I'm going to be prepared for four or five answers.
And if some of these bachelors get out and start calling everybody in the United States, and they're vicious, and they're questions, I'm going to nail them right on the spot.
I think we have it too soft, and I think we've given it too much.
Do you have any answers that could have evolved into some of this breathing?
The whole demonstration was too soft.
It apparently got away with it.
It's kind of incredible when you read the breathing anyway.
One of those questions, I don't know who it was.
and whether the President, why the President doesn't see the students, you know, and all that stuff, the demonstrations, the anti-people, and Ron Mayer, I don't get all the unusual things.
The guy said, well, has the President had any exposure, has anybody been in to see the President who opposes his views of Vietnam?
And Ron just flipped back and said, you've been in there three or four times a day, at photo opportunities.
And to the reporter, the reporter said, yes, but I don't express my views of the President.
Which, in a sense, that's right.
That's a new line they're pushing, incidentally, now, Mr. President.
Yeah, the 1130 rules here, Mr. President.
And that's that McGeorge Bundy has now made it clear that he had always been opposed to the war in Vietnam.
He's discovered that now.
He goes back and forth.
Oh, he is a cheap guy.
And we ought to see people.
And therefore, today, I read somewhere that somebody said, well, maybe the president doesn't hear the anti-Side.
Oh, for Christ's sake, I heard the goddamn administration.
What are they talking about?
You're not sure about the antigen?
No.
You're not sure of it?
Oh, hell to hell, the whole goddamn staff.
How come Mr. Ealy did a pro-sign?
Staff?
I don't want to say that.
I don't want to embarrass the State Department.
What the hell do they think I did?
There's no question about it.
Mr. President, we have heard that Ida worked out that I could bring him in for five or ten minutes.
Yes.
If Ida him or Bob selects the Chancellor candidate, then...
Yeah, I see.
Senator.
I'm not going to, uh...
I'm not going to get into that business so long, but... Let me decide the attraction.
See these people.
Now, that's Bob Fitch's line.
Nobody needs to bring in those assholes.
That's why, that's why I'm not going to do it.
Nobody's suggested.
Not a soul to know, but I mean that they really have...
They're just mind-blowing.
They're a dialogue.
I don't think that might be what they've got to say.
Don't tell me right now.
We'll do it.
One outside.
Now listen, there's the, on this, is there any further concern?
Do I make the pictures?
I will, you tell me.
There's no certain picture.
Well, I'd like to look at it in this office.
Every picture is, they use it.
And again, Mr. Green, we have two of you here right now.
It's been a great question.
I want to be sure.
I'm not going to expose myself to be something.
But it is a good question.
Thank you.
← 490-024491-002 →