Conversation 496-009

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Yeah, I'm seeing the head of the Institute of World Politics from Moscow.

Oh.

And he's well connected with the Politburo.

But they really are playing a rough game with us on that sort of business.

Why accepted they were?

Because what they're doing now is they put into Vienna the proposal which we turned down.

They made this a formal proposal.

And I had Hank call in to Brennan and raise hell with him last week, as he probably told him.

And to Brennan said, oh, it was all a mistake.

But of course, what they may do is they may finally accept our proposal.

but deprive you of the credit for it by putting it into Vienna.

I mean, they won't deprive it.

It's just a cheap little stunt.

Of course.

This is the message that I'm... What about the...

This week, I think, Mr. President, my view is...

My view is that, Mr. President, we can't let them diddle us along.

And with both Hanoi, we haven't heard from Hanoi either.

Now, for Hanoi, there's a good chance.

Well, I have this, there's this problem with Hanoi.

Litwan has been in Moscow for the last three weeks.

And he just left Moscow yesterday.

And I think they're so shaken by this Chinese thing that they've had to take another look at it.

It's also explained by the fact that he wasn't available this week, and he was in Moscow, too.

Well, now, I won't...

I will hear from them, but not before the end of this week.

But my... My question...

My instinct would be, Mr. President, that if the Green and Dittl test be on this week, on the salt, we just ought to go public with our proposal.

They put their proposal in.

And we have a very strong case.

We can do it either way.

One of the things...

They have... We've just sent new instructions to Vietnam, they've never done it that way.

It isn't going to be an awful big thing just going public with it.

Yeah.

You understand?

It isn't going to be anything good for us in the United States to go public with it.

This president's had their, uh, so his part, so it doesn't make any kind of difference.

It's not even for us.

But the second thing that we might seriously consider, because I think we're going to be bled to death on Vietnam, is at some point,

I've now come to the view, if you still hold in the June 8th, it's the best time for June.

Well, I do have something to ask.

You're not going to get anything on salt, are you?

Well, I'm not sure yet on salt.

If we don't get anything by week from today, we have to assume we won't get anything.

He said two meetings of the Politburo, which means we should have it this week.

Because it will take them a few to the Politburo on that Friday.

then it will take them two or three days to draft instructions.

We should have it by Wednesday night, if it takes a normal course.

Now, on the Vietnamese, on Hanoi, Mr. President, I think we might seriously consider the following.

That if they come back with an unsatisfactory reply, that we just drop it.

And

that you might consider this Howard K. Smith idea of going to Congress and make the whole proposal.

And you could say, which would be true, that on January 8th, we in effect told them through the Russians that we would be willing to set a deadline if they gave the ceasefire.

I did suggest to the premium the general outline of it in a somewhat vaguer way, but it was clear enough.

They then said they waited for two months before they replied and said they're willing to talk.

We offered to talk and they didn't talk so we're making it public.

Make it as a public offer and then we'll be on record.

I think we have to find some way of going on the offensive on this issue instead of always defending ourselves.

We don't have a draft then.

The only thing now we can do in Vietnam is meet Chu and have a contact then.

What's the other thing?

The other thing is that...

The other thing is that we have to have...

I don't think they're going to pay him, so we have to solve it.

I think we have to do it.

They don't make mistakes.

The other thing is that I think in terms of seeing off, it doesn't mean anything.

They're going to have to put up some offer.

It might mean something to put up the offer of the... What would be the date of the reveal of this week?

The deadline?

No.

This week, we would make that offer.

We would reveal it this week.

No, I would thought after you've seen you intrude sometime by the middle of June.

You've got to do something before June.

Because we have a... Congress.

See, that's the real problem with guns.

We have to get some play to make in order to keep the Congress

completely destroy what little margin is left.

Now my view is, too, that we ought to and that we've got to move in regard to get no action from them.

They're pretty well going to move the Bruce thing.

I never hoped to move the Bruce thing, as then we had removed one of the arguments for not saying no time.

The only thing that we're sure that we can do is to have a meeting with June to act on it, to have it, to reveal the demand, offer a negotiation publicly for a deadline to cease fire.

That's the Congress to support it.

I'm coming to the view, Mr. President, it's mainly colored by the fact that I've seen so many right-wingers out there.

What?

But Hayden told me, he talked to the agricultural people on my behalf on Friday, that there was only one question on Vietnam.

Wow.

I, if I heard a hundred times out on the West Coast, why doesn't the President get up and fight these people?

Why doesn't he keep turning the other tree?

Well, not on demonstrations so much.

And I had a long talk with Reagan on Saturday, who was... Well, now, Reagan made a point that was actually not so bad.

He said, he listened to your television speech on...

April 7th, and he said the end of it was superlative.

The body of it, he said, he thought it was too defensive.

I'm just giving you his reaction.

Well, that's the reaction, you're right.

And a number of people on other spotlight, as he is, we thought the body was pretty strong.

That's right.

But most of the people back here will be strong, basically.

Oh, yes.

Yes.

But you see, it shows you know that there are a hell of a lot of people in the country that want you to move a little further.

I'm not...

This wouldn't have been my view.

Well, it's important.

But I've been really struck out there by...

It's good to be out there, isn't it?

Yeah.

First of all, how much support you've got here.

How much support you've got.

You've got some.

And...

I think that when he came back, they watched the demonstrations and the rest.

You notice the old craftsmen warping around with the Russians on one next to the other.

I think that Russians, they keep playing a strict political game.

That's right.

And they are, they can't play with us.

Well, that's what I mean, Mr. President.

I don't think we should get into a position where we are caught

between the doves and the hogs, and where the Russians are whipsawing us.

So how do you avoid that?

Well, what I think, if they, what I would suggest is if they don't come through with an answer by next Monday.

Right.

One week.

We tell Russia he's no longer authorized to talk on Berlin except in formal channels, no private meetings with the Russians on Berlin.

Do you think that'll hurt him?

Oh, yeah.

All right.

Good.

I will stop talking to them about Berlin.

Right.

And, indeed, about anything until they come with a proposal that comes along.

Does Rogers know that Russia's been talking privately?

No.

He hasn't started talking privately yet.

We've just authorized it.

Oh, I see.

Okay.

No, and Rogers does not know, so it's easy to tell him.

No, he doesn't talk to me.

They haven't taken it up yet.

Oh, no, they have taken it up, but their ambassador to do it has just arrived.

All right, we'll stop that.

We'll just tell Raj not to do it.

Stop that.

Stop this.

All right.

And we'll just drag our seat on Berlin.

We'll tell Raj he should be slow as hell on Berlin.

We'd be the ones who kept it going.

And then I think, Mr. President...

If we know we're going to be in trouble with the Russians, you might consider the Chinese, well, the Chinese anyway, going on television with the facts of the military situation and just put it to our opponents.

Rent and play very tough in Seoul.

What we mustn't do is yield in Seoul, all beyond the point which we've already given them in my channel.

because that will just encourage them to withdraw.

What have they offered?

They offered, they already installed, they offered Vienna the national command center.

Now, they've done two things in Vienna.

They've offered the national command center, and they've offered the construction freeze after the ABM agreement, which, while we have insisted on simultaneous and on safeguard,

Now, we could conceivably give one safeguard, but we cannot do it afterwards because there'd be nothing left for us to negotiate.

If they're not willing to give us a freeze before an ABM agreement, they sure as hell aren't going to give it to us after an ABM agreement.

They want to discuss it afterwards.

They're trying the Hanoi tactic.

And that, Mr. President, I really think would be disastrous to national security.

Also, we have told... You told him not to do anything.

We told him he's coming back for consultation anyway.

Nothing can happen.

Now, luckily, the Russians have asked what speaks on the other side, Mr. President, to put a good face on it.

They have asked for a recess on May 28th and a reassembly on July 1st.

Now, that would be consistent with facing it into the summit schedule.

And it means they're not going to beat us over the head for four weeks.

Secondly, you could argue that they've put forward their proposition for their own bureaucratic reasons that they can't turn around 180 degrees without having made some bureaucratic record from which they then retreat.

Actually, their proposal is making our bureaucratic position easier on the exchange of letters.

If they still come through.

Okay.

If they don't come through by next Monday, then we know they're stonewalling us.

Up to now, it's still a normal decision-making time.

It does take them about two to three weeks.

You'll know next Monday.

Don't fool around.

Don't have any illusions.

They don't come to you next Monday.

Then it's done.

And that I would let Sabrina know coldly that that's it.

We've got our answer.

From now on, we can play the Knights Stonewall in Berlin.

We've got a great brand now, don't we?

It's too damn bad.

It's fine.

But it'll be tough for you.

I thought they were supposed to know this one.

You'd rather thought they were, isn't it?

Yeah.

This week...

If it goes beyond this week, they're either having a serious disagreement or they're playing us tough.

Right.

Until next Monday evening, you can give them the benefit of the doubt.

After next Monday, you know that they are maneuvering us.

May I put it that way?

Well, the Russians won't get it.

I think what's probably going to happen, the Russians will not do anything.

We'll let them sweat and die on Berlin.

I think that regardless of what's going on, when we're trying to get people all mobilized to support national defense, we've got to be sure to have some soundness to see what kind of support we're going to get on that.

You see, you can't go out and wade around without having some chance.

There's a little bullet in that.

On one week, Mr. President, may be caused by this statement that China-Soviet disputes.

I thought...

I thought right away that this might delay the assault then by a couple of weeks.

Because that... For both China and Russia.

Yeah, it was a disaster.

The dividend statement.

The Taiwan Straits one, that was... We tried to clear it up.

Well, you did it very... Yeah, I mean, the point is, the damage is done.

Four days later, we tried to clear it up.

Because it happened, unfortunately, a day after Dobrynin told me that if we played them off against each other, there'd be a very tough reaction out of Moscow.

It's hard for them to believe that it...

Right.

Exactly.

You know, that's awfully hard to convince people of.

Well, he...

The other thing we have to do is on Vietnam.

That's the game.

Let's forget the Russian thing for the rest of the time.

The game is all that matters here is Vietnam.

That seems to me all we've got to play is the combat role, but what about making the office sooner?

I think it would bring two down.

I think the regular... We can sell it to two.

I think you can tell it to Pew, but no one else.

I had to tell him they're going to offer a ceasefire and...

But we wouldn't go there.

No, you'd do it as soon as you... within a week of coming back.

And he goes back and we do a sign-in.

Something may come out of people at one visit to Moscow, Mr. President, three weeks.

And that...

They may be getting ready to settle it.

I've still...

A three-week visit for the leading North Vietnamese in Russia.

Maybe six.

No.

Highly unusual.

In fact, four weeks he stayed on after the party conquered.

He's never left.

He's a big man.

Yeah.

He's the party's number one man.

That's one way.

But then, let's understand, at least we have...

plan to go to, let's just plan to go to midway.

I think that's good.

We've got to start planning that now.

I've thought about it all night.

Let's get it done.

In fact, there's a lot to be said to get early to do it before it's good to have it before the election.

It's good to have it in a way before the Chinese answer.

Yeah.

Coming just two years after the organization and making an announcement that the American combat role will end on, what is it, what's it going to say?

1st of December, 1st of January.

End of this troop patrol, that 1st of December.

Yeah.

Oh, we can make it screen pretty soon.

Oh, yeah.

And then a week later, you come up with another.

What are the casualties this week?

32.

I thought they'd be down.

I thought they'd be lower.

32 is pretty low.

Once you get below 50, it's really...

It's really bad.

There's still probably some carrying over.

It's all a couple of pilots, for example.

One thing that confuses me.

All right.

Then, at the other part, so that's the Vietnam.

In the meantime, we've got to keep our goddamn troops in the Senate.

You know, it's...

For example, if you read the weekend news summary that all these people are, you know, yelling around about what they're going to do on this.

The church has shared a responsibility with Congress, you know.

Responsibility.

You know what they're petrified at?

If you'll succeed.

Well, they're not at war.

They started it.

And that's exactly what we're going to do.

I think we can beat them on that issue.

But provided we take one step ahead.

Now, unfortunately, I was hoping we'd have a salt in it.

That's a soul we don't have.

That's a soul we don't have a son in it.

That means we just, I think at the very least, we've got to figure it out.

We're going to have a June 8th announcement, and then we've got to come back with another announcement.

A new negotiating offer.

And our final negotiating offer, right?

And we made it publicly.

We're done with it.

What date did you put?

I put September 1st, 72.

July, I don't think that makes sense.

I don't think that makes much of a difference.

That's right.

Cease fire, all the rest.

I think it's July 1st.

You put it September 1st, it looks like you're doing it just before the election and before the election.

See my point?

Right.

I think you've got to move by the...

We've got to sell Q on it.

Just say, let's do it July 1st and see what happens.

He knows goddamn well we're not going to agree.

You know, on the prisoner thing, their attitude is a cold-blooded deal.

They're not going to do a damn thing on prisoners.

You know why?

They know they got us to the balls.

I know they're going to use the prisoners as soon as we get the deadline.

They'll insist that we stop military.

You know what?

I don't think we should consider any more bombing at the present time.

I think we should consider it seriously.

As of now?

Until we get their answer.

We will get an answer this week from Hanoi.

Why didn't you get it this last week?

Well, they had told us, up to now, they've not been, they had said right away, they almost certainly couldn't do it on May 9th because Chuan Tui would be out of town.

And they might have to propose to succeed.

Now, I believe, Mr. President, if they do propose to succeed, I should not go on that such short notice.

I should then suggest the 23rd.

Only one note.

I'm going to succeed.

There's a reason for it.

The reason is the truth.

Well, I've made the offer.

We want to get it done.

We've got a lot of things we've got to do.

And right now, it's a race against time with us.

That's why we have to re-monitor.

We don't want to do anything that's wrong with the 16th and 22nd.

We can't do it all.

It depends when they come back, Mr. President.

They didn't come today.

I think if they came on Wednesday, for me to come on three days' notice to Paris is something to which they'd be very sensitive.

But they may not propose to see, let's see what they propose.

If they propose anything.

You're re-abusing me.

Governor, I don't mean to give, they might not even answer at all.

Yeah, but then they're in great shape.

Yeah.

To take on that particular tactical.

He made an offer and they refused.

Yeah.

The groups he made an offer and they refused.

You know, the private meetings and stuff.

They've been hurt by the law, despite everything they've done.

Oh, yeah.

And, of course, they think they'll cut us on the run with all these demonstrations.

Which demonstrations?

Well, they may.

But they also know that the demonstrations have not succeeded.

I, of course... Palm Springs isn't the United States.

It's a hell of a place.

I'd like to see a few good Americans.

But you really...

It really is moving.

Well, you're curious.

You go back there, everybody thinks we're too hard.

Out there, they wish we were harder.

Yeah, but what I find interesting, even the movie people who are basically liberals are healthier than the television people here.

That's the thing I always tell our staff, you know, we must get out of Washington and New York.

Those are the two places that are weakest and softest in the country at the moment.

almost any other place in the country you go, with the exception of Boston, you'll find that they were attitude.

That's what I found so interesting, and really, they...

It doesn't mean, unfortunately, we've got rip-roaring support for the war.

Everybody wants to get the goddamn war over with, but they don't want this idea of caving in to the communists.

That's the point.

Of course you want to get the war over with.

Well, they...

We will certainly hear from Hanoi this week.

There's no question about it.

What about the demonstrations, though?

We really heard the bad news.

Too many apologetic.

Huh?

Too many apologetic articles in the newspapers.

Oh, right.

We know.

And that finished all that.

You see, most people don't separate on the switch.

The problem with doing it in Pakistan is that he thinks they tape it.

And given the volatility of the situation, he thinks it's bad to have them have the tape if a new government comes in.

So we're better off having the Chinese have the tape because they'll have the record anyway.

He says there's an airbase right across the Himalayas where the Pakistanis and the Chinese meet.

He was certain, and I've confirmed that with the Pakistan ambassador, that the Pakistanis

could fly me across, it's only an hour, it's right across the mountains, and that he thinks that would be the best place to have the meeting.

I had suggested to him to do it in Pakistan, but he strongly counseled against it because he thinks if Butoh gets the tapes, it will go down.

Let's ask one of you, what is the, maybe in view of the Russians,

I've already told the essence of it to Farland, who's giving it to Yaya.

Yes, this is going with the package.

But we could have, if this comes along, we could have a puppet, but then this idea of a special... Yeah, I know, I saw that, but that was all a secret.

Uh, you see what I'm getting at, is if the Russians are gonna play this kind of game with us, we may have to play it public, or...

If we only had a man in this letter, we're gonna come to death outside of this.

Our game won't work.

It won't.

It won't work.

I say, uh...

This is the best way to get results, because... We could talk turkey.

I could talk turkey and we could announce this, if it works at all, say August 1st.

And then have an emissary, and then have you go.

I wouldn't have the emissary if I was against it.

No.

Well, you might, but... Would I announce me going if I had somebody else take the cream off?

Well, if we send an inconspicuous...

If we send a guy like Bruce, he wouldn't take any cream off.

Or even Murphy.

Just in case the Chinese want some public demonstration.

I see.

Well, we've got other plans to display that.

I think, I'm inclined to agree to say that we have weathered this storm demonstration and so forth extremely well.

Yes.

It has consternation that all the intellectual, all the intelligent critics of our policy, they're worried as hell about it, that we didn't take it.

I just don't know, Henry, whether somehow you could be a lot tougher right now.

I mean, I don't know what we can do at the moment.

Well, we can... We've got a turn on the Dalai Lama Russians.

We've got a turn on the Russians.

Russia, there's no question, and that's why the public service, the visit to the Chinese, it's quite apparent it's going to show up.

I wouldn't give it away, though.

I just think that what we absolutely have to have to the Chinese is a reliable contact and a game plan which they and we follow.

And if we can get, once we get that visit set up, we may still get the secret meeting as the other advantage.

Of course, you're assuming we won't get this all.

I'm not so sure.

I'm not yet.

We'll see.

See you later.

Good night.