Nixon, Haldeman & Scali on SALT and Media Relations

Transcript (AI-generated)

This transcript is incomplete. The transcription skipped stretches of speech — roughly 4 minutes of this recording (about 16% of it) is represented by only a few words. Listen to the audio rather than relying on the text below; a corrected transcript is queued.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI (WhisperX) and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Names and numbers are often wrong; speakers are not identified. Do not cite it as authoritative — verify against the audio and the finding aid.

Download transcript (.txt) · JSON data

signal will dance up and energy set is up.

Also, think about this and it'll start, it may start ricocheting, give it time to think about it.

You know what I mean?

You'll see.

The problem that, uh, the, uh, we have is, uh,

First of all, we are not going to invite them until after the rose tomorrow.

Because it will be considered to be the other thing.

Right.

But tomorrow afternoon.

Well, I mean, it's tomorrow afternoon, you know.

But they'll call us right afterwards.

I mean, there's just one of those things.

But we should...

I wish they could, in some way, have a manned boat.

Maybe we should take the bush one.

They're about 98.

Before any determination is made.

Well, under the circumstances, I guess,

I'm sorry.

Why not have some cleaners in the town?

I think you risk it.

It would be inevitable.

So I think that you hurt yourself two ways, both of the Russians, and by not knowing who's going to twist what to take what credit for.

As far as the equal concern is going to be the president, I mean, eh.

Well, Hubert Humphrey has a proposal on record that sounds good.

The point is that he could claim that he caught it and came for the suggestion of the President, then accepted it.

I'm glad you covered it for the eyes.

I'm going to turn it back.

Good God, this has been negotiated for six months.

And it will be in this question, but the question I ask is, why this?

Yes, sir.

I think that any breach on congressional leaders as early as 9 o'clock is an inevitable risk that by the time you stand up there at TV, it's all past.

And it's already happened.

That's right.

Well, we've got to give it its full cap to the other parts of the number.

There's no way to communicate with very many people between 9 in the morning and 12.

Well, except they can walk out and talk to you.

We want to remember at this meeting, at least at this meeting, we're making a difference.

At this meeting, we've got to have both sides.

For example, to the son of a national leader, if you have any questions about him, go on and tell his staff, his goddamn staff, and call everybody in.

If you'd like that.

I've done it a dozen times over the years.

Yeah, that's right.

If the meeting ends at 9.45, they won't be able to help before 10.15.

So... Well, look, why isn't it really better to have them at 11 o'clock?

Well, let's take the disadvantages of 11.

I have concern, Henry, about the fact that some of them will want to go walk out.

Nobody will walk out with me.

I want to walk out and announce the goddamn thing, and that's it.

They go out and make their comments afterwards.

We have a short meeting, and we can say we called you at this time because it was vitally important that this be...

We've given assurance to the Soviets that we would make a joint announcement at 12 o'clock today.

We are informing you at this point.

Period.

That's it.

This is not a consultation.

This is not a treaty.

This is nothing.

And along those lines, what should put us to dispatch at 11 o'clock?

Well, my judgment is that you have to fight them off to walk out with you.

Go right out there and park some of the credits

I tried to ask them in their department.

When did I?

Well, let me say, the announcement will be made if we take the talk at 10 o'clock.

It'll all work before we have a great announcement at 12.

But if you said it would be detrimental to the national interest if you said anything about this before 12 noon?

I'm worried about that.

Not with so many.

but not where the dam in Fulbright is.

For example, he's got to be there, and he is the son of a victim, a leaker.

He's always done it.

He's never failed a leak.

I mean, we've had it before.

He doesn't deliver it.

So I guess that's how he's got on our side.

He's got on the hood just because he can't.

He just plays on himself.

Now, if we don't want to, I just suppose the moment that meeting is over, it's going to be out.

It'll be out.

They'll walk right out and say it.

I can talk about this as a national interest.

It requires nothing to be said to talk about that.

So screw it.

Who's he to say we're a national interest citizen?

That's the way to have it.

So that's that.

Even if you suggest they go out and not do it, I know them too well.

If you can keep the meeting going until 1130, you can beat them, because they won't have time to quit.

Of course, keep one thing in mind here.

If there is any backgrounding,

of the networks and wire services.

There's no way that they can move that because the wire services and networks aren't about to break them.

Even if someone leaks it, you're tying up the new source.

You're tying up the new source.

Yes, sir.

John, I'll bet you AP and UPI, if their background is before that announcement, would give a hell of a lot of thought before they would move that on the wire.

No matter what the source is.

There is no lack, Drusola.

Let me say this.

I think the best thing to do is to have a meeting.

Mr. President, very good.

Good call.

I have a question.

What does it mean to say these discussions are confidential?

It will be revealed during the course of the negotiations.

I cannot tell you anything.

So it ought to run out very quickly.

I will work out some talking points of what I think you can say, but the Soviets would take it very early.

For example, the Russian freeze, which they specifically asked us not to have.

I think the best thing to do is to do it at 11 o'clock and get the meeting over by 11.30, 45 at the latest.

And I'll just get up and not say, gentlemen, I have to go out and make an announcement.

Mind you that you stand there alone.

I'm going to.

That's for sure.

Mr. President, I think also we can... We're happy all the time.

I think Rogers will want to stand up and Laird will want to stand up.

One of the other arguments here, too, which you asked for earlier, I think in terms of backgrounding of any press, particularly the TV guys, we have found, you know, they're not going to leak, they'll hold it, but the

The closer you give them the information and what you want them to repeat, the closer you do that to their deadline, the less time they have to go analyzing it and thinking about it and so forth.

And when they're forced up against their deadline, as you found on the speeches, they go out there and they disparage it because they're saying whatever comes to their mind right out.

Then they're locked.

They're locked with their own space.

Maybe 10.30 is a little better.

10.30.

Then I could read the TV at 11.

11 to 11.30.

And then give them time to go rush into the studio.

Yeah, but then you will never, you'll read, you mean you'll just read the live, but there's an important TV, now you understand, for three major commentators.

See that?

I can't do it in the air.

Good afternoon.

It's important, Mr. President, that those who appear immediately after your broadcast be equipped to analyze it at a historic breakthrough.

And this is what we have to do.

And in this case, it would be the White House Correspondents.

I think 10.30 is about right.

And with all your previous speeches... And incidentally, Henry, if the meeting goes past 10.30, you get up and get the hell out.

You've got a chance.

The 11 o'clock briefing can be not a very deep briefing, it can be

who can be what we want them to say.

Now, we are, we are, on your Vietnam speeches, for example, Mr. President, which they all hated, basically.

We still got them to repeat exactly what we wanted them to repeat.

All right.

Well, screw us.

I'll see your other backgrounders.

I'll see Henry, Henry, to have some fact sheets.

One, two, three, four, five.

Well, let's look at them.

Mr. President, I think this weekend will be good.

These guys have got to do reasons.

Write the story.

Get it right now.

I heard it, but that's why I proposed it.

Yeah.

Well, the thing to do, the thing to do is let Henry talk to you.

And you get an appeal.

You'll know as you report what you do.

And then you write it down like you did the points.

And let Henry edit it.

In other words, find Henry on the substance.

I agree.

Give him five points.

Then the guy said, you're right in the story.

Let me be the AP story.

You write the UB story.

We're at the three-member story.

So, we can also convert... Don't let them write the story.

We can also convert into an important asset, I think, the fact that you had this information in hand.

And you avoided a golden opportunity to inform anyone in advance.

That's not bad.

And what this demonstration knew is the deep sincerity that you have in maintaining full trustworthy relations with the Soviets so that they can trust you not only in this, but in other even more delicate areas.

And none of that is also fiction.

That's a good point.

Because we did have the information we have now.

At least a week.

We've got this, and it's almost Thursday.

The last day they met the other Thursday, we got it.

That's right.

um we knew that they were going to come in discussing the desire to appreciate the tp people plus the wires mr president because we think it's important that the wires go on

immediately to talk about it in terms of historic breakthrough.

And by reading the language... Well, I wonder, Henry, do you want to build it that much?

Well, a breakthrough... Everything is historic.

A breakthrough at a minimum.

Even while emphasizing all the difficulties ahead.

Oh, yes.

If I know the importance of the works you have in influencing probably many of the other samples, sir.

You could use the word significant for, oh yeah, significant or, I think historic, it doesn't become historic until it finally becomes significant.

But, let's see, a, but the wire, the first leaf is what we have, the first bullet of the leaf.

You're trying to sabotage the agreement by asking for offensive limitations.

I don't want you to say that I don't want him to come to the White House, but I want him to get out.

This would not have been possible unless we had made and won by an AMIA.

We would have nothing to go through about it.

It would not have been possible, and having made it, won that fight, we didn't throw away the NAM card by agreeing to limit ABM alone.

Well, this proves the accuracy of what you said, that ABM was a big bargaining chip.

Yeah, over and over and over in every press conference, you know, so I used to say, well, now, ABM, yes, this is hard, but we're glad that we will have an offensive, but there must be an offensive and defense.

And, uh...

compromises, who were telling you to put it into escrow and any other personal sort of stuff.

No, I think we can, in the background, include anyone who knows anything about the subject.

We won't have to sell this to Donald Trump, for example.

Remember, a lot of those who don't know about this subject, they can.

I think John's point is very well taken in Ross.

That first bullet in the lead is going to set in the public mind, which is what is very important to us.

The round two deal with Thomas Rogers and Time and Newsweek and Eric Severide and John Chancellor and so forth.

That is the second wave.

That will be very important.

But that first story is terribly important because that's the one people are going to get.

As a matter of fact, Mr. President, we're tentatively planning three briefings.

That's good.

The regular briefing after your speech, which would have been your statement, which will be after we've already leaked the TV and the words, and then later on, in time to help carry the story over into the next cycle, later in the afternoon or maybe early in the evening, then the experts, the diplomatic types of Stuart Hensley and Chael Roberts and the rest of them.

We have done and still done from time to time.

He's here.

He's the one who wants to do a story on soul.

Well, I...

I need... How do you say it?

The problem that I have with Rogers' experience with him, though, is that he never said, oh, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.

The real question is, is it being him?

And tomorrow, he said, look, we just got this.

Yet, your fear is far earlier.

Ethan Coleman Smith ought to know about it because if Smith needs it from him, it will be a disaster.

Well, how about doing this?

How about shaping our plan?

How about going forward with both Smith and Rogers tonight?

We're going to go today anyway.

I have no problem with that.

It's not a question of time.

It's just a question... Well, you see, the problem point is time.

The time, I think, is important.

going to do this is one thing.

We were going to 48 hours, which is a little more probable, not a hell of a lot, but quite a bit, actually.

What he knew is that from clear back at the start of the weekend, that you had something that you didn't know whether, and you're totally true.

But he knew that there was something going, and he didn't know what, and he didn't think it was going in a different direction.

But that's my fault, not yours.

That's my speculation of not knowing.

The...

And he knows that, you know, you had the meeting set this morning and then you shifted it.

The point, which is literally true, is that you didn't know whether you were going to have it or not.

That's what he said.

There's nothing he can do about it.

Good night, Mr. President.

Good night.

And then it's going to be going cold on the SST.

And the centers are going to move to terminate it.

So we'll set a line and dump some load on that.

No, I understand.

There was one contract with someone that I approved on with them.

I mean, it's too late to have one of them ordered.

It would be important for me to be able to hang this up and work something down.

Well, that's dead.

That's dead.

Nowhere near it.

Hydro-oil is dead.

We're passing orders with it.

I want you to know that they didn't make the election.

We did our best.

Yeah, we did our best.

That's Dr. Jerry.

What did he say?

That he's mad.

What?

He's mad at us?

Not at all.

Mad at them.

And he's not agreed.

Nobody will say anything publicly on this without clearing the other.

How many of them are there?

There are 12 of them, sir.

Well, I don't know what it is.

Well, I think I've covered it as well as I can.

I mean, he's not going to be a god that they're happy with.

I don't think he's going to be nearly as selfish as he is today.

I think he's going to say he's absolutely delighted with the job.

Do you think it would be better to do it at breakfast?

I think it would be better.

Nixon, Haldeman & Scali on SALT and Media Relations

AI Summary

Audio

Transcript (AI-generated)

NARA Description

Nixon Library Finding Aid

Also recorded on May 18, 1971

Cite this conversation