Conversation 501-018

TapeTape 501StartWednesday, May 19, 1971 at 2:10 PMEndWednesday, May 19, 1971 at 2:56 PMTape start time03:08:36Tape end time03:58:27ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Laird, Melvin R.;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Sanchez, ManoloRecording deviceOval Office

President Nixon, Melvin Laird, and Henry Kissinger discussed the administration's strategic approach to upcoming NATO defense meetings, emphasizing the need to avoid being pressured into premature agreements regarding Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The participants reviewed the status of the SALT negotiations, highlighting the necessity of maintaining the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program as a critical bargaining chip against Soviet offensive weapons. They also addressed personnel changes within the Department of Defense, including potential replacements for Deputy Secretary David Packard and the Secretary of the Army, while coordinating strategy for managing Congressional relations and ongoing military assistance in Vietnam and Cambodia.

MBFRSALT negotiationsABMDefense Department personnelVietnam policyNATOMilitary assistance

On May 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Melvin R. Laird, Henry A. Kissinger, and Manolo Sanchez met in the Oval Office of the White House from 2:10 pm to 2:56 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 501-018 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 501-18

Date: May 19, 1971
Time: 2:10 pm - 2:56 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Melvin R. Laird and Henry A. Kissinger.

     Greetings

     Laird's health

     Laird's schedule
           -Defense planning committee
           -Meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
           -Nuclear Planning Group
                -Brussels
                -Germany
           -Meeting with European cabinet ministers
                -Relationship
                -France
                -Harmon[?] [Surname unintelligible], Helmut Schmidt
                -Agenda
                      -Violence
                -US policy
                -Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions [MBFR]
                      -NATO Council meeting

     MBFR
        -Defense Department study
             -Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty [SALT]
        -Alexsei N. Kosygin
        -US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] policy on forces
        -European Security Conference
        -Importance of agreement
        -Format
        -Timing

          -US policy
               -Laird’s and William P. Rogers’ statements
          -Europeans' position
               -SALT agreement impact
          -USSR
               -Andrei A. Gromyko
               -Kosygin

******************************************************************************

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-025. Segment declassified on 04/12/2019. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[501-018-w002]
[Duration: 4s]

     Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
         -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
               -Pierre E. Trudeau
                     -The President’s opinion

******************************************************************************

     Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
         -Strategy
         -Meetings
               -Europeans
               -US and USSR
               -Warsaw pact
               -US allies
         -Laird's and Rogers’ statements
               -Defense Department study
               -Laird's meetings with defense ministers in Lisbon
               -Kissinger's forthcoming talk with Rogers
               -Laird's and Rogers’ schedules
                     -Lisbon
               -Meeting of Laird and Rogers
         -Defense Department study
         -Nature of negotiations
               -NATO and Warsaw pact

          -USSR

     Defense Department staff
          -Deputy Secretary of Defense
               -David Packard
                    -Work
               -Reuben F. Mettler of TRW. Inc.
               -Financial regulations
                    -Packard's Hewlett-Packard holdings
                    -Mettler
                           -Possible tenure
                    -Blind trusts
                           -Secretary of the Treasury
               -Mettler
                    -Work at TRW
                    -Possible stock sale
               -Packard
                    -Schedule
                           -Possible notification of SALT agreement

     SALT agreement
         -Possible effects
               -Charles H. Percy, Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield, W. Stuart Symington
         -Antiballistic missile [ABM] and offensive weapons
               -US and USSR negotiating position
         -May 20, 1971 meeting with Congressional leaders
         -USSR
         -Laird's position vis-a-vis Congress
         -ABM
         -US and USSR negotiating position
         -Congress
               -James B. Pearson

An unknown person [Manolo Sanchez?] entered at an unknown time after 2:10 pm.

     Refreshments

The unknown person [Sanchez?] left at an unknown time before 2:44 pm.

     Salt agreement
           -Meetings with Congressional leaders
                -May 18, 1971

     -Soviets negotiating practices
     -Meetings with Congressional leaders
     -May 18, 1971
          -Notification of agreement
                -Laird
     -USSR
          -Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union [TASS]
          -Announcement
     -Public opinion
          -Administration handling of MBFR and Vietnamization
          -Columnists
          -Congress
                -J. William Fulbright
                -"Fence Riders"
                -Mansfield
     -Administration efforts
          -Announcements
                -Effect
                      -Senate reports
          -Gerard C. Smith and SALT delegation in Vienna
                -Performance
                -Soviets’ negotiation practices
     -US position
          -ABM and offensive limitation
                -USSR
                -Laird's previous statements
                      -Reiteration
                      -Effect on "Doves"and "Fence Riders" in Congress

Defense issues
     -Wright-Patterson Air Force Base [AFB]
           -Robert A. Taft, Jr., William B. Saxbe
                 -Votes on draft extension, ABM
                 -Interview with Cleveland Plain Dealer after meeting with President
           -Laird's strategy
     -Clark MacGregor
           -Role
           -President's meeting with Taft and Saxbe
     -Portsmouth, New Hampshire Navy Yard
           -Margaret Chase Smith
           -Thomas J. McIntyre
                 -Vote on ABM

           -Smith
     -MacGregor's and Kissinger's role
     -Wright-Patterson AFB
           -President's meeting with Saxbe
           -Possible Florida relocation
                 -Patrick AFB
                 -Edward J. Gurney
     -Laird's role with Congress
           -President's role
     -Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
     -Army reorganization

Defense Department staff
     -Deputy Secretary of Defense
           -Corporate executives
           -Requirements
                 -Mettler
           -Bert S. Cross at 3M Corporation
           -Requirements
           -John H. Chafee
                 -Future plans
     -Secretary of the Navy
           -John W. Warner
                 -Experience in negotiating
                       -Brazil
     -Secretary of the Army
           -Requirements
           -Stanley R. Resor
           -Army’s present status
           -Thaddeus R. Beal
                 -Background
           -Robert F. Froehlke
                 -Present position
     -Laird's possible forthcoming meeting with Peter M. Flanigan
           -Bob Wolf
           -Ambassadorships
     -Secretary of Army
           -Replacement for Resor
                 -Announcement
                       -Timing
                 -John S. Foster, Jr.
           -Army’s current status

               -Draft
                      -Saxbe's statement
                      -Prospects
                      -Saxbe's position
                            -Wright-Patterson AFB
                            -Son's Vietnam service
          -Replacement for Resor
               -Listing of possible replacement
                      -Flanigan
               -President's schedule
                      -Lyndon B. Johnson Library dedication
               -Announcement
               -Retirement date
               -Froehlke
                      -Possible confirmation
                      -Relations with Laird
                      -Background
                      -Century Insurance Company
                      -Work
                            -Public testimony
                      -Edward M. (“Ted”) Kennedy
     -Deputy Secretary of Defense
          -Robert Clinton Moot
               -National Security Council [NSC] undersecretaries group
          -Packard
          -Charles D. (“Tex”) Barton
               -Financial regulations
          -Financial regulations
          -Compared with State and Treasury Departments

Vietnam
     -Prisoners of War [POWs]
           -Laird's conversation with Kissinger
           -North Vietnam
     -Needs
           -Continued military assistance
                 -Modernization
     -POWs
           -Importance
           -POW wives
                 -A poll
                 -Kissinger's meeting

                      -Marianne Nelson
                -Mrs. [Forename unknown] Dahlberg [?]
     -US forces (Volunteer Army)
          -James L. Buckley’s amendment
                -Kissinger, President
          -Gen. William C. Westmoreland
          -Volunteers, draft
          -William F. Buckley's column
          -President, Kissinger
          -Buckley Amendment and other amendments in Senate
          -Laird’s analysis
     -Cambodia
          -Current situation
          -Needs
                -Personnel
          -Current level of assistance
          -Current military assistance program
          -Needs
                -Personnel
          -Marshall Green and Emory C. Swank
          -Possible meeting of President and Rogers
          -Green
          -Needs
                -Funds
                -Personnel
          -A forthcoming report from Laird
                -Meeting of President, Laird, and Rogers
                      -Green

Defense Department staff
     -Packard
          -Possible ambassador to Japan
          -Family
          -Relations with Laird and President
          -Work
               -Effect
               -Kissinger's experience
          -Possible ambassador to NATO
               -Robert F. Ellsworth
               -Job
                     -Family
          -Possible future Cabinet job

                      -Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD]
                      -Department of Transportation
                -Health
                -Work
                -Background
                      -Stanford University Board of Trustees
                      -Intellectuals, "Georgetown crowd", Business Council
           -Secretary of the Army
                -Laird's forthcoming meeting with Flanigan
                -Announcement of Resor's departure
                -President's possible meeting with Flanigan
                -Froehlke[?]
                -Requirements
           -Deputy Secretary of Defense
                -Mettler
                      -Previous work
                -Roy L. Ash

     President's schedule
           -Meeting with Smith and SALT delegation

Kissinger left at 2:55 pm.

     Defense Department staff
          -Deputy Secretary of Defense
               -Packard
                     -Planned departure date
          -Secretary of the Army

     Laird's health

Laird left at 2:56 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

How are you?
Fine, how are you?
You know, look, this lost a little weight.
Well, I...
I've got to start that again.
I've got to start that again.
I've got to start that again.
I've got to start that again.
There are several things that I did want to bring up, and maybe you have something to add.
I'm going to be meeting, as I told Henry on Saturday, for the Defense Planning Committee meeting with NATO, with all the defense ministries, and also the nuclear planning group.
And those will be going on for four days, two at each, two in Brussels and two in Germany.
I'm coming back to meet with the
a group of cabinet ministers from all over Europe.
But it's a personal sort of thing.
They're all former parliamentarians who were friends over a long period of time.
We have a prayer group that we're going to lead, and that'll be in France.
It's going to be out of the country experience, and it's just a daily meeting with people like Harmel and Helen Schmidt.
One of the subjects we're talking about is...
can do in the field of curtailing violence.
And there are other topics.
It doesn't have anything to do with the group.
But it's just a talk sort of thing.
So I'll be there one day.
And then it'll be next Saturday.
And then I'll be home Saturday night.
But there are, this is a rather important time to be meeting with all these people with what's been going on in the last week or so over here.
And I think we can give them certain assurances.
There's a great deal of turbulence as far as .
And they will want to go forward with discussions on how we will proceed with the mental imbalance force reduction discussions.
And they want to take a position to recommend to the council meeting, which comes the next week,
to make a recommendation, and I think we can lead that to the point.
Take these models that they're using there at NATO, and the fact that we have a better study going on here, which we will share with them, and we'll be ready to share it with them maybe by the 1st of July.
That's really essential, Mr. President, because what they've got is so superficial.
Right.
And also, our experience in SALT really shows that when we do it on the well-prepared pages,
We didn't stampede into those talks after a lot of pressure.
And we've got a really good study.
A lot of it was done by Melts, which we're now sanitizing.
And that could be the basis of the alliance position.
We'd be a hell of a lot better off than the superficial work they've done.
Sure.
And that's my point here, Henry, that I made to you, that I want to stress the idea of not staying in the media.
That's the...
on this thing, because some of them really want us there.
Well, frankly, that is quite a clever way of conceiving.
It's evidence that the other side of the word, I mean, well, that's the you-go-first boys, and the hell in their interest is maybe very different.
We can get some sort of agreement at some time with the Soviet subpact,
But only on the basis of, well, we both have our forces and we intend to continue them until we get an agreement.
You're not going to do it by either side, going first with some half-ass, either in a lateral action or some jackass statement.
Either one, right?
We've got to control the game on it.
whatever he gets down to.
The Soviet will control their game, that's for sure.
Well, and I think it's important not to get it tied up in the context of the European Security Conference.
And I think Henry and I talked about that.
What about that?
I noticed that crazy paper this morning, which is a mature...
I don't know.
What's the Europeans want?
Are they trying to tie it up or separate it?
Some of them will want to tie it up with it, but I think that we can tie it up.
Which do we want?
Mr. President, it's strongly in our interest not to tie it up with the European Security Conference.
The Soviets are eager to get a European Security Conference.
We can sell it to them separately.
The European Security Conference also is going to have the most valid sort of generalities, which will then be used to undercut the whole NATO effort.
And it's in our interest to get the Russians to negotiate something concretely like force reductions, rather than trade and cultural things and that sort of thing.
Trade is important.
In other words, do you have in mind what would be the format of such negotiations as we're talking about?
How would it be done?
How do we see the picture?
You've got to have a conference in order to negotiate.
I think we ought to do it the way we did it on Song.
We ought to express a general readiness.
Then we ought to find a negotiating forum.
I don't think we'll be ready to talk much before fall.
Then we ought to have the... Then we ought to have the...
The thing is, though, let's be sure that both Mel and Bill take that position with these people when they go to Europe.
Because I think the Europeans, particularly after this announcement tomorrow, they're all going to say, well, what the hell are these kids doing?
I'm not so sure because the Europeans...
We're afforded force reduction ideas as a way of keeping our forces there, figuring that the negotiation wouldn't get anywhere.
That's why they, many of them, came around to it.
Negotiation of what?
Of force reduction.
I'm talking about after the announcement on the salt tomorrow.
Well, now, anything is possible with the Russians, in my point.
I don't read the Gromyko things if they're ready to negotiate yet.
Let's go see it.
Well, the Gromyko-Bean conversation shows that all they left it is let's both review our positions.
But Mike gets us if we meet in September and have the first session the way we did it on Seoul on principle.
And then... Now when you say that we meet, who's meeting?
The Europeans meet first.
for a private meeting.
So I think there should be meetings between the U.S. and the Russians first before you go to a Warsaw Pact naval meeting.
And I should carry on the same quorum, sir.
We need you to work out this quorum.
It's a tricky quorum because you've got every ally there.
To be honest, you're going to have to dab this gap.
Well, I'm going to say that we have this study going, and I think you ought to sit down and build emotion.
same line and and that it's very important that we'll share this study with them in july in july well i'd like to put it off in july july july july july july july july july july july july
the negotiating position at that time.
I mean, they see the study.
They've got to see the study.
The problem is that they're going to run into this thing.
Some people will try to stampede action even in Lisbon.
If we can get the defense ministers to stand up, shut up.
If we can keep the stampede, we can go on in Lisbon, I believe.
And I'll talk to Bill also.
I just don't think we'll be centered.
I don't have much time.
And Bill will leave the day I get back.
I'm not going to go to Lisbon.
I don't believe I should be going to Lisbon.
But I told Bill that I could not go to Lisbon because...
When does Bill go?
Then I think we better get out of there.
This Sunday.
So we'd have a whole week next week.
We've got all night's week.
That's not going to help the position, Bill.
But I see no reason for my going to listen, because that's another weekend with all these things going on up in hell, I can't see.
It seems to me that you ought to go and talk sometimes, have a talk with Bill as to what you're going to be talking about, so that he'll know.
Next week, we'll be sure that we're all on the same wavelength.
Huh?
You know that you feel that we ought to wait until July, right?
Well, I'll talk to him before I go.
Right.
And the line you'll take in July is that you're going to try to keep the Europeans from...
going off right from there.
That's my... That's the way to get deals, too.
And I don't think we should come down to, for sure, as to the method of negotiations, whether it should be strictly Warsaw-NATO context.
We should agree to that now.
We should agree to that, too.
Right.
Yeah, if they raise the European experience, which is the best part of it, that should be better managed, right?
The next thing that I think that I should discuss is that I've got to get a new Deputy Secretary of Defense.
And Dave has been terrific, Mr. Price sure has.
But the problem with it is, you know, he's never had to
to spend as many hours doing anything as he has to do in this job.
And, you know, I live with it all the time.
But he gets to the point where he just can't take it anymore.
And he's got problems with the criticism that he gets and everything else.
Now, it's not easy to get a deputy secretary of defense.
I'm having Rube Medler come in here tomorrow and discuss it with him.
He's the president here.
He's the young man I talked to you about earlier in December.
He's coming in for an evaluation.
The trouble with people like that is, you see, we had to have Dave sell.
Of course, we're the only jobs in government where you have to sell everything you have.
We got an agreement on Dave on the Hewlett-Packard stock, and he sold $118 million worth of other stuff.
And he kept the $350 million worth of Hewlett-Packard under a separate arrangement we worked out in Congress that took special action.
now with a person like Ruth Medler coming in for 16 to 18 months, and that's, you know, he looks at it on that basis, and he really can't probably, we'll just say he can't afford to do it, because we're the two jobs that require everything to go.
You can't have a blind trust like the Secretary of Treasury or any of the other cabinet officers.
Everything must go.
You've really got to be published.
And so...
That's my problem, but I'm going to talk to him.
He's the best prospect we had.
Medler.
Medler.
Who?
Medler.
He's president of TRW.
Right.
But he's just taken over about six months ago, and I'm not sure what I can do to sell him.
I'll go over some others.
There's one man.
I think it would be a nice courtesy for Dave.
He's still out of the country.
Yes.
Oh, that's right.
I think it's pretty difficult.
He'll be pleased.
He'll be pleased.
comment on that, Mr. President.
I'm all for it.
I think it's terrific in every way, but I don't want to give the impression it's going to make it any easier for our position.
We're not going to pick up any of our opponents on us.
I mean, they may make a nice statement, but they're not going to change their vote.
Percy isn't going to change his vote or Mansfield or Symington.
The line I think we've got to take, which I'm sure is that
Because if there was ever any demonstration needed that now we need ABM, this is it.
Because for this deal to go, it is contingent upon us having something to give, and that's ABM.
that we want them to give, which is a limitation on offensive weapons.
Now, they will not do that now unless they, we're able to give them, and if we give them ADM, without what the hell is there, you see it's a two-sided deal.
They want to limit ADMs.
We want to limit offensive weapons.
Now, the game will not be set unless we've got them to play with.
Tomorrow, the matter comes up in Sears.
I think you ought to make that point.
I think you'd be a good one to make.
What do you think, Henry?
I think you're right.
We don't want to sound belligerent to the Russians.
We want this to be as conciliatory as possible.
I'll have to hardline it, Mr. President, as far as my position is concerned.
I've got to take a little harder position in order to sell our program up there.
That, I think, is good up to him after tomorrow.
After tomorrow, yeah.
Well, if anyone asks the direct question, we cannot put ABM in escrow, any of that.
No, we just can't do that, you see.
The deal is shot.
We just can't do that.
Well, they weren't putting any in escrow.
That's the way.
Well, look, we'd be delighted if they were in escrow.
They put their offensive weapons in escrow, but they're not.
If we put things... That's the point of all.
They're not asking us to put it in the escrow, and we're not asking them to do it here, but we're agreeing to agree, frankly.
We'll give them an incentive to string out the negotiations, sir.
I know you're going to have a tough time.
I know, but...
But let me say this.
Let me say this.
This agreement, however, will give pause to Mike Pearson.
and others who are running it.
Could I have tea, please, instead of coffee?
Thank you.
On the ground where we have the factory set, and I'm going to hear from all of them.
Well, I gave a group yesterday that said, don't come too fast on this, sir.
If you could tell us the...
without telling them anything, because I knew yesterday that, well, I wasn't sure, because we didn't get the final thing until last night at five o'clock, and you never know with these bastards what you're gonna get, you know, because they have been known to break a deal, and once they make it, they'll keep it, right?
Now, once they make it, they'll keep it till tomorrow, I mean.
Oh, yeah, but I meant it.
but less, but until the reason that I couldn't say anything, the reason we couldn't inform you, what we were going to do is to have you in yesterday, you know, we have an appointment yesterday.
We didn't hear, and I told Henry, I said, no, sir, you cannot, you cannot go out on this thing until the Russians come in.
Now they are, they are bound, so I understand it.
That's right.
I mean, the text is the one I showed you, and it's all agreed.
They have, well, we'd better be bound.
They'll issue, they'll issue an English version by TAS after.
There ain't a version to be the same as ours.
As they wrote this, it's about its grammar.
Let's remember this is the Russian version.
But what I want to say is that I think we can make strongly the argument now that we do know what we're doing with this administration, and after all,
whether it's reducing our troops and the immunization policy, or whether it's the question of negotiating on self-help.
All columnists, not all, but many of the columns that sold instead, both of which, they don't want to read any more about it.
Nothing's going to happen.
It's now going to have hearings on it to see why we don't make some initial one.
So here we are, something happens.
So what I meant is, I think it may help you in arguing, not with the devils, but with guys who are sort of on the fence.
They say, well, Jesus Christ,
Maybe better China.
Well, maybe we've got some other things in the wings.
As a matter of fact, there may be other things in the wings.
You know that and I know it.
We're all talking about things all the time in a number of channels.
As a matter of fact, I didn't tell Lyle, but when I saw Mansfield, I didn't know this was going to come about two weeks ago.
I said, you know what, there's more going on here than you think.
And now he's going to be surprised tomorrow.
you find that this is going.
And I think that, again, you can deal with it quite very shrewdly with your colleagues out there.
But here, did any of you expect to have any kind of response based on what you've been reading and pressing and criticizing?
No.
Well, finally, he has some.
And under these circumstances, this means you have an administration that is working day and night with progress in these fields.
But we can't announce it all.
That's another thing.
The moment you look at this guy at the public forum and say, for example, we were to go out and report to the Senator tomorrow as to what progress we should be getting, that is why it didn't happen in Vienna.
You see, there's no reflection on Smith and his boys.
They were doing great.
But the point is that with the Soviets, things have to be done, sometimes at the highest level.
And it has to be done with the highest secrecy.
Once it's done, then it can all be public.
And that doesn't mean the position, you know the position that we stayed here is one we all worked out back in January.
Well, our position shouldn't change.
Well, our position is exactly the same.
In other words, you were always for ABM and offensive limitations.
And that's what finally the Soviet Union has created.
Now, we met, we told him last year in our ABM briefings, as you remember, that they spent an hour with him.
Well, Mel made that point several times in his testimony.
Very good.
And now it looks good.
My point is that I will not hesitate to remind them.
I'd like for you to go back, if you would, and pick up the places where you didn't speak up.
on this trip, where you did say, you know, you lean on two all the time.
You said, look, we've got to have ABM in order to get it.
It's all right.
Well, I like to read from the start.
Throw it up to them.
I know you did.
You've said it.
But I think you should remind congressmen and senators and doubters that you said that and said, now, boys, look, it happened.
Because that will help us on a million issues, see, I think.
Not with guns, but with defense records.
I can talk.
I know what they're like.
Those guys said, well, gee, you were going to do anything.
Well, we will do make the best of it and try to get them shifted over.
I know how hard our ass is a little proud of some of those folks.
We've got to be careful we don't give some of these guys too much either, Mr. President.
Now, you know that I'm not here to talk to Russians.
No, some of our own boys too much.
Now, I always keep them tabbed and sacks me on the hook on this Wright-Patterson thing.
I wouldn't allow any announcement to be made over my shop one way or the other, because I want to keep on the hook.
Because I was worried about their vote on the draft extension, because TAP and SACS were going for one year and we need two.
I was worried about their votes on ABM and the U.S. level, and you get to let them have anything for a while.
Now, they walk out of here, and I don't think he gave, meant to give them the impression, but they went out, they were playing the alert analysis.
The president had decided that the Wright-Patterson thing was going to be, was routinely, the president personnel, you know,
So, not that it makes any difference, but I think you've got to be a little tough with some of these guys that leave their boats down the line.
You've got to know there are boys.
No, no, you're absolutely right.
See, I got that kid just locked up, and I wasn't going to say anything.
I wanted to worry about him.
I think what you should do, if you will, is be sure you inform Gregor when you've got such a deal, and then he will be sure that I don't see, because after all, a saxophone team, and with...
with Clark or something, I don't know.
I always had one guy in the other man's.
And they was the big one.
And we were the freaking big one.
If you've got any deals like that, you can be sure of nothing.
You've got to get Mark with that damn horseman.
And we lost McIntyre at 8 a.m. because of it, see.
And we didn't pick her up.
We're not picking her up.
No, you're not doing as well there as I hoped you would.
Oh, well, I'm not dying.
But I do think we've got to be careful about giving away these goodies.
He's got to be able to sound good.
That's right.
No, Mark, he's got to be nice.
Giving away these goodies.
You are right.
Would you do this?
Be sure, though, that you let, that you let McGregor's office, or Andrews, or whatever, be...
See, I don't know if these senators and Congress can come in here.
Well, I'm on it.
I see it.
But I thought that if I know, I will give them anything away.
But, you know, they're slick.
Yeah, they come in.
I don't remember.
He mentioned Wright and Patterson.
I said, well, I don't know anything about giving Wright and Patterson.
You know, I said, you're going to send them to Florida?
I said, what the hell are we sending them to Florida for?
You know, see what happened there is we weren't ready to make that move anyway.
But he made an announcement and Gurdy didn't even know it was even older.
Captain of the Air Force Base and now Captain of the Gurdy is so damn mad because he basically shut it off for good.
Listen, I want you to play that game.
Play it very hard.
Well, I do during this period right now.
You play it all the time.
Listen, from now on, I want these guys to understand.
And I'll hit it.
But I just got to know them.
to brief our guys and say, don't give this away.
If you've got something you can't give away, please let us have it.
Well, and by the time it helps you, should you become a candidate, then we can use it at the proper time.
You've got to save something to read with it.
The next point, and I really have got so many things I should discuss with Oregon, but the other thing is the change in the Army.
I would, uh... Let me ask you before we go that way, but do you, is there any other thoughts you have in there?
If you looked at, if you thought of other chief executives, take a whole life and tell me, well, of course, it takes such time to change anybody.
It's a difficult time.
You almost have to go to someone like, uh... Of course, Rube's had a long history.
Somebody who knows something about detention.
That's right.
Something about detention.
I mean, I think...
I wonder if you're better off to take somebody from within?
Is any one of your service secretaries up in trouble?
He's going to leave in January.
And I hope that we can let John Warner take over that job for one year.
One year, you know, John.
He can handle it for a year.
I have no...
He's good.
He's good.
He went over to negotiate some treaty.
Well, he's good.
He's all right.
John lived out in Brazil as the president of that
He's worked out a lot.
He's a... Well, now what about Army?
Well, Army, I think we ought to take somebody from within for Army.
And I'd like to go ahead with your research thing Friday.
So that... That's a real question, isn't it?
Because of the Army being in such a much more trouble now.
Not really the Army's fault.
And you can't take anybody from within the Army.
Ted Biel, who's
Of course, he comes from Massachusetts.
He was the Republican finance chairman or something up there.
He's a good man.
He's worked out well.
He handled himself well during these, all during these periods he's done well.
But he can't be Secretary of the Army.
There's only one person within, and that's the assistant secretary for administration, Froelke, who's handled our intelligence work.
What did you say?
Froelke, Robert Froelke.
He's been assistant secretary of defense for administration and also intelligence.
I think he should be moved up and we should bring in someone new for that job.
Now as far as, I'd like to see if you would talk to Clannigan on something to see if he's ready.
I've talked to Clannigan about this.
We planned this about a year ago.
I'll go and talk to him.
No, what I mean is to see if he's got any other people on our list.
He's got a whole, a whole row of them.
It's a good idea how to go with that.
He's got two or three good ambassadorships that are open now.
Well, I would like to do it soon after.
If you don't do it soon after, it just stirs up the, if we could go with the resignation.
will stay until his successor is qualified, and that's the way it should be, but I'd like to move on that qualification.
It should come soon, Henry, or much like, you know.
I don't want to delay research.
I had to work this research thing out.
He wasn't too anxious about leaving, Mr. Price, and I had to work that out.
I wanted to wait until he got these, a couple of these hardens out of the way, which he announced today, which are kind of tough things.
I wanted him to get those out of the way, and then I wanted to move him.
Now, Johnny Foster is a good man, and I thought some of him, but the trouble with Johnny is that he isn't well enough organized to run these.
He's a hell of a fine guy.
He's a great guy.
He's a great guy.
He's a witness.
But you have to have someone.
The Army is in the worst shape of any of the services.
And you've got to put a...
The strongest person can't do that job right now.
Yeah.
I know.
This is a very difficult problem.
Yeah, that's the real problem with this thing.
You've got to grab all of your arms.
It's actually getting a lot better, but it just won't work.
Maybe you were right, or you didn't think it would work.
Well, I'm going to make it work, but I don't know.
I'm not sure it will work.
I have to give these reports to you every three months on how it's going to work.
I was ordered to do that.
I'll do the best I can on it.
So actually, have you ever told him you're talking about it?
God, he feels so strong.
He says, this isn't going to work.
I know, but he's got a two-year draft now.
Somebody sold him on that.
Yeah, he would, we had him kind of,
How you frontin' that, though?
I was holdin' out right past the trip.
We had a trip off to the far east on the lot, too.
The sun turned around in Vietnam.
I'm gonna give you this, because I've got it.
Maybe I should give that to Simon.
That's the kind of election I'd like to have written to research.
What are we driving to do?
Friday.
Because you're gonna be gone.
Friday.
I'll take you there.
Aren't you gonna be gone Friday?
I'll be here at Friday, but I go Saturday night.
John, Saturday?
Saturday.
No, I don't think that's necessary because he won't be, there'll be a ceremony.
Well, you did submit his name, but his retirement won't come right away.
We want to get somebody up there and it can be confirmed right away.
We can get Brogan confirmed right away.
But then we have...
Now, he is a longtime friend of mine, Mr. President.
I think that should be known that he has been closely associated with me over a long period of time.
He's an insurance company executive.
He came down here from, I can't recall, probably the vice president of Century Insurance Company, which is a hardware mutuals company.
The question is whether you really think he can handle it.
He can handle it.
It seems the Army is so caught in a bunch of trouble.
He can handle it, and he can handle it better than anyone I know.
He does a good job in his appearances before committees.
He does a good job in the press.
He handled all of the testimony on the intelligence...
problems that the Army had and appeared up there with the Justice Department on the so-called snooping hearings, and he handled himself well.
He came in his confrontations with Kennedy, he came up on top always.
He does well.
And he does understand the Department, and he is the best man we have aboard at the present time to take over that job.
As far as the deputy job is concerned, there's only one other man that
capable enough to serve as deputy, and he wouldn't be as good as you need someone in the National Security Council undersecretary's group, and that's Bob Mook, who's a very capable man, but he's more of an economist and more of a budget expert, you see, and that's why we...
He couldn't handle this.
He couldn't handle this job.
That's the only other one that you have.
The controller is outstanding.
He's a career government man.
He's been there 28 years in government.
Oh, he's outstanding in his job.
But he really can't.
We can't.
He couldn't handle it.
Can't.
And the undersecretary is not capable.
He's not tough enough to handle it.
He's good at enrolling in service, but he isn't good enough to handle it.
Tax pardon?
Tax as far as deputy...
We can...
He'd like to take a job.
It doesn't require...
He's divesting everything for 16 months.
See, this is what I run into.
The problem I run into is that these guys have got to go out and pay their taxes on it now.
And they're the only people that will say he could be under Secretary of State and he doesn't have to do that, or he can be over as an ambassador, or he can go over to work in Treasury and set up a blind trust.
But we can't do that.
This law in the Department of Defense is the toughest to make.
I talked to Henry a little bit about this, and I want you, so that you understand my position, I think we're getting ourselves on this POW question.
into a position where the Hanoi is getting a very big ship to use.
I'm afraid they'll use it the wrong way, the wrong way against us.
Because the thing is, if we're going to succeed in Vietnam, it's going to require continued military assistance.
And if they would ever ship over that ship to stop military assistance to the south, this would have a great effect
on the Congress and our support and on the people.
Rather than just withdraw military assistance.
Right, and I think that this is the thing that bothers me most.
I'm not trying to say that we should try to work out something.
We ought to look on the standpoint of what we can cash in that ship for other than military assistance.
I take the hard-line position all the way down the line.
Every time I testify, everything that I do, I take the hard-line position.
But this bothers me because we cannot succeed in Vietnam.
Troops don't make any difference anymore.
But the military assistance does.
We can't succeed without it.
A long time.
And...
Henry and I have talked about this, and I don't want there to be any misunderstanding of why I think this POW chip has gotten so big and how it can be used against us, but I think we've got to be careful about that.
Because a lot of these women are breaking away from us now, and I meet with them and talk, hold their hand, and, you know, the last survey showed a third of them were leaving us.
Is that right?
A third?
Yeah.
And we've got to be... What survey was that?
That was one of ours, or?
This was taken by the whole, the women themselves, of their... What was your reaction?
Well, they were aggressive, but I thought I helped them.
The judgment would be present by the end of July.
And Nelson was the leader of that group, only a very warm, let us say, heart.
Well, we're holding on.
We're holding on.
But we do have to watch that.
Now, as far as the, I know there's some people here that are pushing us to go volunteer in Vietnam.
Yeah.
Whether you do know, there's an amendment coming up on that.
What is the amendment?
Can that be beaten?
Can you?
You think so?
Yeah.
You see, it won't work.
You know, we've tried it.
I told Henry, who's smart, he talked to the insurer.
He said it couldn't be done, so I said no.
Well, we can do it.
But it won't work.
But you have to get down to around, Wesley says $17,000.
I think you have to get down to around $55,000.
He says we're getting, particularly the
Now that we're pressing for volunteers worldwide, if you just cut off your worldwide volunteer program, then we're trying to stress now in order to cut down on draft calls.
Well, I understand.
I understand.
Matter of fact, the only reason that I asked you people to explore it was that I knew it was going to be coming in from a lot of people.
Bill Buckley, for example, on our case, he's been writing about what the hell are we suggesting.
So I said, in answer to the word, see what you do to do.
And I understand it can't be done.
So we won't do it.
That's all.
I just hope we can win it in the Senate, those bastards.
Well, we've got all those amendments coming up.
We're going to win most of them.
They're coming along very well.
I'm convinced that we cannot do it without substantially reducing our manpower levels at a much greater rate than we planned to reduce in Vietnam.
If we were to announce that we'd do it by December, it would put us in chaos as far as the next six months is concerned, and I think that's a mistake.
We've only got a few months.
The next item is the Cambodian situation is really a mess, Mr. President, I think.
I'm going to come in here with some recommendations, and I've talked to Henry about this.
We've had that team over there, and we've got to put some more people in there.
Not an awful lot, but we ought to be able to have 100 people in there.
I agree.
You don't have any intelligence, and we've got just a, just a, well.
I always supported this.
I don't care who you are.
Well, we'll come over with the recommendations.
When you're in the magnitude now of 100, we can do that.
Sure, I'm sure we just do it because it's silly for us to spend 200 billion.
Well, I haven't been able to.
Let's see, every time I try to put a few more in, I'm going to turn down.
I'm not bitching about it.
I'm going to put it through this other system now and see if we can get it for the undersecretaries, you know.
Well, it sounds what I mean.
I have to tell you, I'm all for it.
Because you need the money.
You cannot spend the money unless you've got people there.
And it's the second largest military assistance program right now.
Is it?
Yes.
Which is what?
Which is the biggest?
Well, of course, Vietnam.
And this is second.
This is second now.
My God, my bigger career.
As far as military assistance, we're over $200 million now.
And as far as our space, we can't get that much money in there.
It's a big brokerage.
You know, as a matter of fact,
With all the mess that it is, isn't it amazing it survived?
I know the Dan country was lost a year ago.
We all did.
We thought it was lost six months ago.
We think it's lost now.
Maybe it'll still be lost.
But there's some way they bungled through it.
Well, I think we can get through another year, and then this next year is important, and that's why we Israel is important, too.
Well, I agree.
You know, we've got it.
But Noah was mentioning that to those people in Vietnam.
President, I was going to discuss this with you.
I know we discussed it the last time you were here.
I said, well, when Dave Hatchett was talking about this, President, I said, well, what?
If you want to spend a few hundred bucks, we've got to have the men air-watch them speak.
And speaking of Marshall Green, it's Marshall Green and this fellow and Swank.
Swank turns us down every damn time.
So why not?
I just wanted to help you with your job.
Marshall Green happens to have been a doctor in a way that I know you've never been.
I'll tell you what we're going to do.
I'm going to kill him.
Kill him?
Yeah.
Or us.
Bill will see a difference from Marshall if you get him separated from Marshall.
You know what I mean?
Yes.
He's like anybody you've got to depend on your staff.
We know that Marshall Green is just wrong on this circuit.
We're not going to get any awards for not having American sales.
We're not going to get any awards for not spending our money well, too.
That's what I'm concerned about.
That $200 million box meeting, is somebody there to handle it?
And all the agony we've gone through to buy ourselves time.
If we don't use that time, we're going to be in trouble.
Well, I'm sending this report, so it isn't a cause for it.
And then I sent it a recommendation.
I suggested it really ought to happen, rather than having to go through too many channels.
Why don't we just, you get your numbers, and you and Andy work out the numbers.
And Andy, rather than putting it around and yacking it around and having to go through the bureaucracy, let's have you, Rogers,
We've got to get Bill.
We've got to get Bill on this.
Because he's got to overrule Marshall, right?
If you haven't done it, Marshall's done it.
You're going to be sued.
Yeah, I'll send it to the president, Senator.
All right?
And as far as this report, I have no recommendations.
Yeah.
The report, the autograph of the bureaucracy said that had no recommendations.
I don't mind that.
Because what I meant is that the mail has got this, we've got this responsibility.
You know, let me ask you about packages, Senator.
I'm pretty sorry to see him leave.
He's such a fine man.
He wouldn't want to.
He wouldn't want to do something like the Massacre in Japan.
I really don't.
He's probably tired of it all.
The problem with Dave is you know him.
I know his children.
I've known Dave since 1958 and I've dealt with him during his creative time.
Between us, Mr. President, he's come in and he's broken down and cried before me, you know.
He didn't wear the heat on him.
I get the same in Cambridge.
These academic missions are unbelievably vicious.
What I'm thinking about is this.
Let me just, can we take all of them above my head?
What did you do, Nato?
I thought he'd be a tremendous master.
Quite a teacher.
Just tremendous.
You see?
He's great.
He's wonderful in any job.
Just that he's got so many decisions before him over there.
I mean, in NATO, in NATO at this critical time, to have David Packard there would be a hell of a thing.
What do you think?
I think it gives a little impression of the yak ink that goes on.
Ellsworth is coming home.
Bob Ellsworth is coming home.
And that's a prestigious job.
And it's a damn important job.
And it doesn't require that back-breaking kind of a schedule.
His kids could have, you know, an opportunity to see Europe, travel around and so forth and so on.
What do you think, Henry?
Well, Packard is too valuable a human being.
Packard is a fine human being and has done a superb job.
I wish in Christ we had some hope in him.
And in that, it is what we have at the moment.
Well, I really don't think... You can call up a guy and say, H-E-V, or transportation, or any of those...
He's worn out, though, right now.
He is?
You know, all of these things bother...
It doesn't bother him so much.
You know, I try to have him... Mel, they bother all of us, you know.
I know, I know.
They bother me, too.
He'd go through hell with a lot of things.
Now, I've got a little easier.
And his niece, he's taken a lot of...
He comes from...
He's on the Stanford Board of Trustees.
I was a chairman of it.
He comes from that world of the intellectuals.
He runs with the Georgetown crowd.
You know what I mean?
They're his people.
The business council friends that he has are all, you know, they're those types.
And I respect him for that.
The people that he knows in his closest circle of friends, his children are that way.
But God, I don't see how he stood it.
Because Dave is not really, you know, even though he's made a half a billion dollars, he's not a
He's a ruthless man.
He's rather kind.
He's a strong man, but he's a kind, very kind man.
You agree?
Well, if you have any problems with making the change in the Army,
I haven't even talked to you about it.
Let me put it this way.
I would like for you to run it through the plan because I have a responsibility.
I don't want to go on the research thing until I get that checked out because I don't think we can move right away.
I'm going to talk to Peter about it.
Let me ask you to do this.
Let me ask you to do this.
Let Henry talk to Flanagan about it.
I just, because I haven't talked to anybody.
I deliberately now stay out of these.
And I need to bring it to you.
You've got all these political things that are involved.
Flanagan, I don't think he's talking about it.
And I'd like to see whether there's somebody, if they have anybody else.
I haven't.
And let me put it this way, I don't know the man.
I probably know him, but I don't know the, but I do not know the, what anybody else may have suggested.
Well, I think we ought to go from within and take this one and then put it in for that shot.
Here's the deputy shot, of course.
Let me do a little thinking of it.
I think Matthew, everybody's, everybody tells me he's quite a columnist.
Is that right?
Would you agree?
I would only look at him.
Well, he was kind of, he's kind of, we tried to get him before.
He's coming in tomorrow and I'm going to tell him.
He's one of the many.
He's got experience.
Couldn't get Roy in.
See, you might try, but they back away when they come to do that.
Smith is going to be coming in with his delegation.
If I could see you put him in.
All right.
But it's hard to... We'll work it out.
David, he doesn't want to be until September.
So he's...
I mean, that's...
I do want to make this recent change.
Because it would be good for the Army to make a change.
Let's go.
Let's go right away.
We should find out if that blogger feels better.
I feel you.
You lost about 10 pounds, huh?
Gee, I don't think I've lost anything.
I weighed about a little 191.
I weighed that when I was in.
Well, you're in good shape.
Good.
Thanks.
Take care.
See you tomorrow.
Bye.