Conversation 501-016

TapeTape 501StartWednesday, May 19, 1971 at 1:03 PMEndWednesday, May 19, 1971 at 2:05 PMTape start time02:24:34Tape end time03:08:19ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Kissinger, Henry A.;  White House operator;  Rogers, William P.;  Ziegler, Ronald L.Recording deviceOval Office

On May 19, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, William P. Rogers, and Ronald L. Ziegler met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 1:03 pm and 2:05 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 501-016 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 501-16

Date: May 19, 1971
Time: Unknown between 1:03 pm and 2:05 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman.

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
           -William P. Rogers’ role
                -Haldeman's call
                     -President's previous meetings with Rogers
                           -Gerard C. Smith
                           -Antiballistic missile [ABM]
                           -President's role
                     -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
                     -Rogers’ trip to Europe
                     -Public statements
                           -President, Henry A. Kissinger
                           -Presidential initiative

Kissinger entered at 1:14 pm.

                 -Melvin R. Laird
                       -Kissinger's forthcoming meeting
                             -President's meeting with Rogers
                             -Smith, ABM
                             -President's role
                             -Rogers’ role
                             -Smith
           -U. Alexis Johnson
                 -Forthcoming call
           -Rogers’ role
           -Laird
                 -Kissinger's forthcoming meeting
                       -Laird's memorandum on Vietnamese modernization

Kissinger left at 1:18 pm.

           -Rogers’ role
                -President's role
                      -President's press conference
                            -Statement of position

     Rogers
         -Call to President
               -Purpose
                     -Gaylord Nelson and Michael J. Mansfield Amendments

                      -Vice President Spiro T. Agnew

[The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 1:14 pm and
1:18 pm]

[Conversation No. 501-16A]

[Conversation No. 3-66]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Rogers
         -Call to President
         -Role in SALT negotiations

     Laird's meeting with Kissinger

[The President talked with Rogers between 1:18 pm and 1:29 pm]

[Conversation No. 501-16B]

[See Conversation No. 3-67]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Presidency

Ronald L. Ziegler entered at 1:29 pm.

     Ziegler's daily press briefing
          -Supersonic Transport [SST]
                 -Boeing Corporation
                       -Gerald R. Ford
                       -Contract

     SALT agreement
         -White House handling
              -Schedule of events
                   -Cabinet meeting
                   -Congressional leaders meeting
              -Possible leaks
                   -Cabinet

                     -Announcements of meeting and agenda
          -Congressional leaders meeting
               -Time
               -Possible leaks
                     -Ziegler's conversation with Kissinger and John A. Scali
                     -J. William Fulbright
                     -President's statement
                           -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] sensitivity
               -Time
          -Cabinet meeting
               -Time
          -Congressional leaders meeting
               -Ziegler's announcement
               -Possible leaks
          -Television crew arrivals
          -Congressional leaders meeting
               -Possible press calls to Ziegler
                     -Subject
                     -Mansfield and Nelson amendments

Foreign policy
     -Mansfield
           -Position on Nelson Amendment
     -Charles McC. Mathias Amendment
           -Time of vote
     -SALT agreement
           -Congressional leaders meeting
                 -Rogers
                 -Possible press calls to Ziegler
                 -Timing of calls
                      -Congressional vote
     -President's May 18, 1971 meeting with Congressional leaders
           -Peter H. Dominick
           -Mansfield and Mathias amendments
           -SALT agreement
           -Purpose
     -SALT agreement
           -Mansfield Amendment
                 -Congress
           -USSR
           -Schedule of events
                 -Cabinet meeting

                            -Time
                            -Calls to Cabinet
                            -Ziegler's announcement of May 20, 1971 schedule
                      -Television camera arrival
                      -Cabinet meeting
                            -Time
                            -Alexander P. Butterfield
                -President's announcement
                      -Forthcoming press conference
                      -Language to be used
                      -Significance
                      -Duration
                      -Significance
                            -USSR
                            -US position
                      -Importance of delivery
                      -President's demeanor
                      -Text
                      -Public perceptions
                            -SALT
                            -ABM
                      -Chalmers Roberts
                      -Public opinion
                            -Peace
                            -Students at George Washington University
                      -Content
                      -Significance
                            -Public opinion
                            -Dan Rather and commentators
                            -Progress on nuclear arms
                            -President’s earlier speech to the American Red Cross
                                  -Press reaction
           -People's Republic of China [PRC]
           -USSR

Ziegler left at 1:50 pm.

           -SALT
               -President's announcements
               -Rogers’ role
               -President's role
               -Haldeman's talks with Rogers

      -Public statements
      -Rogers’ role
           -Haldeman's talk with Rogers
            -President's previous meetings with Rogers
                  -Smith
           -Rogers’ call to President
                  -Agnew's possible trip to Korea
-Rogers and Kissinger
-US-USSR Summit
-Middle East
-Rogers’ tenure
-Vietnam
-PRC
-Kissinger
-Rogers
      -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] meeting
      -Possible Summit
      -PRC
            -Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan
            -State Department
      -SALT
      -USSR
            -Dobrynin
-Paris peace talks
      -North Vietnam
      -Kissinger
-Rogers
      -Possible meeting with President
-Paris peace talks
      -Kissinger
            -Rogers
      -Xuan Thuy
      -Kissinger
            -Lyndon B. Johnson, Nelson A. Rockefeller
      -Xuan Thuy
      -Kissinger
      -Ho Chi Minh
-Mansfield
      -Meeting with President
-Yayha Khan
-Kissinger
-USSR

           -SALT agreement
                -Kissinger's statements
                -Rogers
                -USSR
                -Kissinger's briefings
           -PRC
                -Rogers
           -Europe
                -Kissinger
           -PRC
           -Yahya Khan
           -PRC
                -President's possible talk with Rogers
                -Yahya Khan
                -Joseph S. Farland

Kissinger entered at 2:02 pm.

           -SALT
               -Kissinger's meeting with Laird
                    -Weapons programs of US and USSR
                    -Rogers’ role
               -Rogers’ and Laird's response

Haldeman and Kissinger left at 2:05 pm.

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

He was very gentle.
He said, I told him I had a chance to catch you before you went in.
Did you remind him of the conversation?
Did you remind him of what he said?
He said, yeah.
He said, yeah.
And he said, I told you I thought that I remembered it.
You told him I had a memorandum.
No.
I just said that you had told me that I didn't want to get the memorandum.
I didn't want to get to the date because I'm not sure about the date.
So I just said the president said that we were playing the conversation.
He said he was sure you would remember because he had made the point to you
he didn't trust Jerry Smith and the people in there and because of the way the ADM situation was going and all of that, that you had the feeling at that time that you were going to have to get out one step ahead of them.
Sure.
I just said get one step out ahead of them.
And, uh, that, uh, therefore, if you may send a message or a letter or something to try and get the thing off dead center and, uh,
that you had, as I understood it, you had done so sometime shortly after that, and that the result had been just garbage up until the time that Dobrynyk came back from the party congress, which, as I recall, was right after the lead-up for Europe.
And that there had been no serious developments until that time.
That Dobrynyk came back at that time with essentially the same offer that you had proposed in January,
and that they had refused earlier.
And that's when they looked like there might be some chance, and you started moving on it to develop from there.
And so as far as the line is concerned, I talked to the president about it, and I also checked with Henry after I talked to the president, and it's clearly understood here that the line will be that this is a presidential initiative undertaken to break the deadlock, and that that's all.
The implementation of it and how it was worked out is something that would serve no purpose to discuss.
The negotiations were not something we're going into.
Excuse me, may I just say one thing, Mr. Spahn?
Yes.
Could I just lay it there?
Is it all right if I lay it?
Ted Rogers knew about it?
Yes.
Oh, he doesn't?
Yes.
Now, in fact, you should tell him that I informed the President that he was... See, the way I put it with Rogers was the way I said, would you do the proof?
I told Roger, I said, first, don't tell everybody I don't trust Jerry Smith.
But I told Roger, I said, I felt it was important for us, for the president to try to play the game.
And he was the way he had, and so was his mind, that I had made this proposal.
And he knew about it.
So I looked at it, and they only had the person who knew about it was Rob.
Yeah.
They only heard that terribly.
I said I'd talk to the president and also check with him.
On consultation, he said he has not told Alex yet.
He will right after lunch, and he will have Alex call you.
That's the way it goes.
No, that's fine.
I deal.
I deal.
That ends our lives.
That's what Henry just asked me to check on.
That's exactly what I wanted.
I don't want to fall out.
I think Alex would be good.
I'll just send him his instructions.
He gets in touch with me.
I think we can make it up.
It's working.
It's working.
You'll come out looking like a hero.
Go ahead.
You're all right.
Go ahead.
I told him there's a letter.
We don't want to see one of the memo from him.
Maybe he'll have something to tell you about it.
But what if he's talking about this yet?
No, that's next.
But what about that, the memo?
You told him it's not a comparison.
Well, he's now put it in another memo.
I know, but you told him he got it in that comparison.
I told him it's not his class.
I told him you are the guy who always stands shoulder to shoulder with us.
You don't want to be the clock that sets a visit and a stretch.
What'd he say?
He said you.
I know.
He said, you don't want to get the reputation of being an unreliable person.
He said, you'll take care of it.
He said, you'll take care of it.
He said, you'll take care of it.
He said, you'll take care of it.
I said, if you're asked by the Congress or anything like that, were you involved in it?
Your answer would be, and then he interrupted.
He said, my answer would be that this was a presidential initiative to break the SALT deadlock, period.
And then I said, well, and then if you're asked if you were involved in it, he said, I was aware of the former president's actions.
And development.
Well, were you involved in it?
Well, I was in the position.
Then I said, also, you can make the point, of course, that the position would work out ahead of time.
That's right.
You were all involved in that.
And, as a matter of fact, the president stated the position in the press conference.
There's nothing secret about the position.
The only thing secret is the process of negotiations.
Bill said, I understand that perfectly, and that'll work out.
He was quite bumpy.
Now, the reason he's calling you is he wanted, first of all, he wants to ask you, you know, he wants to tell you about the Nelson vote, and there's something about the vice president that he wants to know.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back.
And I told him, I was sure you'd be calling me back
I think we're back.
What a great vote.
And I have to say that Matthias is the one that they expect the most trouble on.
I didn't watch this.
What post is this from?
Well, what about the bias, sir?
How is it?
Yeah.
All right.
I'd like to talk about it in a different way.
It's highly delicate, but it might be worthwhile in relation to our relation to the mass of it and to the state of it in fact.
I deliberately am not going to inform the leaders of the meeting until after the vote, because I think it will be interpreted as, you know what I mean, they say, aha, there's something, you know, they're sort of trying to, see, we wouldn't tell them what it was about, and it would be considered as a power play, and this is a good thing, I thought, to wait, in other words, we'll call around 6.30, and I actually have voted.
Now, however, I wonder if it's possible, I mean,
If you thought about it in a very taboo of a program, but I wondered if you would manage to do it, which is totally trustworthy, that you might go to see him and say, now look, Mike, I think you should know that after the vote, Mr. President, I think you should know that we're going to see that development installed.
That we learned about it last time.
that the President did not want to, though it would be unfair and horrifying to have him get confused with this issue, but that we are going to call back to the vote for a leaders' meeting tomorrow, that, you know, that utmost secrecy is required, etc.
Now, here's my reasoning, and I don't get anybody else around here that, of course, trusts my influence.
But what I meant is, most of you don't understand what I mean.
I mean, I can deal with it most of the time.
I've only talked about it about 10, 10 and a half moments.
But here's the deal that I have.
Just to get it right now, before you start.
It would first sort of heal the rough edges of Mike's,
Now, we understand Mike is never going to be with us.
He's not going to be with us on the cruise.
He's not going to be with us if he's not.
But on the other hand, Mike cannot be as hard on us if we're decent to him.
As you know, he's been awfully nice to us.
In other words, he really has.
He's said good things.
Second thing, it really shows, Bill, it seems to me, a pretty damn decent line of these senators.
Can you imagine how an enemy or a council would have played this, or they'd have tried to do this to influence the vote?
Third, Mike.
Mike will know that we leveled, that we didn't just figure out something right after the vote to call them together.
But you could say, Mike, we've known about this, we've gotten involved, and it just occurred.
The president wants you to know
He asked me to tell you once, you know that it's coming, that he's going to be calling the leaders, asking for a meeting tomorrow at 9.30.
We must be together.
Absolutely.
What do you think of the idea?
Could, uh, well now, well, I think you ought to, uh, yeah, you see, because he'll have to be on the floor, and you can go up and see him, and you can say that I have a, that, uh, uh, that kind of message.
Correct.
Isn't it a good idea?
Yeah.
There's no question in your mind that he will not say anything.
We just don't want the word salt to get out any time before 12 o'clock now.
They'll be calling for us to get the leaders together tomorrow, tomorrow morning for a meeting.
We're going to call the leaders, but we want to make a note that it's going to happen, that we did not want to because it is a systemic development.
We did not want to do it today so that it would have any effect on the issues involved in the vote.
I think it's good to deploy.
All right, thank you.
He and his people are going to be the ones that are going to bring it all.
I mean, the negotiations now have to take place.
They're going to bring it all.
They're going to be totally, totally candid on that because we didn't, I didn't know until last night at approximately 5.30 or 6 o'clock, about that time,
that they would go, I mean, that was the time before they even, before they approved the letter, the letter text.
Well, you get a public announcement, yeah, I'll tell you why we can't change that.
That is not our, the public announcement bill, they prepared, they prepared Russian and English text, you see.
Well, it's terrible.
It's terrible.
And when I saw it on, in fact, I saw it on, when they were still having many heads on Christ, my God, that is terrible.
They came back.
You understand, I did not talk to Green at all.
My January message was forward.
And I had not seen him in this period because I didn't want to get into the heat.
He came back and he said, well, the change of any part of the announcement at this point would require another meeting of the 15, because they've done this at the highest level, apparently, at the Congress.
So therefore, the substance was not changed.
But it is terrible.
I would agree to agree to agree.
But you see, this is theirs, not ours.
Now the letter, the letter on the other hand, that the exchange of letters involves a joint, that's a joint proposition.
None of that, none of that would be made public.
The letter, the letter would be... Yeah, but, well, the public announcement, but the letter, no, you shouldn't have a copy of the letters.
You ought to keep them there.
But the letter is there.
But you see, on the public announcement, if we tried to change it, I just didn't think it was worth getting into it now.
And I agree, when I read it, I'm going to feel embarrassed.
That is not, that is basically, that is...
totally their text and not ours.
And frankly, it's better from the standpoint of substance, even though the language is better than the letter itself, because it's more concrete on the lineage.
Anything that wants to go, yeah, yeah.
Yeah, yeah, good.
I'd like for it to go.
I think it's good for him to,
Shouldn't have that kind of, uh, there's no...
He wants to put it on the corner of the beaver.
Yeah.
Yeah.
No, that's good.
Now there's no...
Could you keep yours open a little bit?
I think you should keep yours open because it might be, if this thing starts up, it might be that you want to play with your head as you go.
Your head is really walking the title between Russians and Chinese and I just don't know what it is.
Yeah.
I think you could say, you could say, well, I was about to say, I don't know if you can see it.
I can see it.
Yeah.
Yeah.
What I had is that I had enough.
What I had is that it just might be an opportunity for us.
Yeah.
Once a day.
Oh, but keep it all, keep it open.
But have in mind the fact, have in mind the fact that I told you today, there is a possibility that they'll come back with an offer.
If that happens, that just knocks everything else out.
See, because you will be all, you will be left with the other things.
You pay.
One other thing you said?
Oh, one other thing.
Laird is being, I will see Laird at 2 o'clock.
He's being interviewed now.
And he has been told that the only person in the government, because naturally he'll be sensitive about it, the only person in the government that knew that we had,
that I had made this approach, you know, which has now been accepted with you, which is true, of course, because you were the only one that I did say that I was going to send a message and a letter.
So, but Laird will be sensitive about this, and I just want you to know that, but we've, Henry's raising him on the papers, and I'm going to see, but he will be,
You will be told that if he raises it by, you can say that you had to know because of other, but we haven't told Smith.
And the reason we didn't want to get him activated is because we had a deal.
Okay.
High five.
It's not that easy to run this office if you didn't have a deal.
I'd like it if you didn't have a deal with me.
No, not really.
Well, I did.
I really kind of put the knife into him a little bit.
But I indicated after I had talked to Congressman Ford and indicated that, well, it appears that the mistake was made in March and that the manufacturer was unwilling to renegotiate at the previously established contract level.
So that being the case, it doesn't appear that the SEC
The prototype will be developed and we'll handle it that way.
The situation now, in regard to how we handle this, we do not want a order to blow the whole thing.
You still have to be on the cabinet.
The cabinet is probably at 10.
It is at 10.30.
It is at 10.30.
or the cabinet of nine varying the leaders of ten.
I think that probably would be better.
And you can really lay it on the line with the cabinet.
I don't think you have anything about the cabinet.
I'm not concerned about that.
I was concerned with the cabinet office, whether it would look like it was a big, make it look like too big a deal.
I think it turned out to be a big deal.
There's no other cabinet.
That's what we did.
I just call it a race.
We don't even have to announce it.
We just call the cabinet meeting.
See what happens.
No, it's just, well, it's better to announce it.
In the time span when people will know that and do anything about it, it's not going to make any difference.
That's right.
And I'll put a couple of other things on the agenda.
No, I never do.
I never do.
Never brief, never give an agenda.
On the other leaders, you know, we'll have to hold the message to the left.
Well, my view is, I may be wrong on this, but I'm not concerned that the leaders will leak.
I told Henry and Scali that.
They didn't leak before.
I think if you say of just... Did they ever totally leak before?
Yes, they have.
The president's told them before.
The president had full breakdown here before some of the Vietnam speeches.
And he may have leaked to his staff, but it's never moved on the wire.
I'll just note that the president's very sensitive about leaks.
on this and that we have agreed to a contemporaneous announcement.
You're absolutely no count on this until the announcement is made.
Right.
I think that'll do it.
Sure.
I think that'll leave us at 10 o'clock and have the cabinet at 9 o'clock.
Okay.
We can get the cabinet out of there by... Why don't we get the cabinet?
It's a little break-in between that Seattle time.
I won't announce the leadership thing until, actually, you know, when it's, they'll see him coming in, and so if I said the president called the leadership meeting.
Well, but I won't announce it.
I don't have to announce it.
They won't.
No.
I'll be flexible on that, but actually the, you know, the momentum will start picking at about 10 o'clock tomorrow when the TV comes on.
The question tonight, somebody's going to pick it up, you're going to get a phone call at about 8 o'clock tonight saying, Mr. President, call the bipartisan leaders meeting.
Yes, what about the leaders?
Call the bipartisan leaders?
Call the foreign policy briefings.
I don't even have to say that.
Well, it's obviously foreign policy.
That's right.
You better just say it's foreign policy.
It's foreign policy.
No, I think it has to do with the Mansfield vote, because that'll be able to...
The Nelson thing was just... We knocked the Jesus out of it.
The good of going there is probably some of the Mansfield people who worked for Nelson and voted against him.
Mansfield threw a support vote.
What about Mathias?
What about Mathias?
When does that come up?
On Tuesday, I said.
Now that's the one we lose.
Coming on here.
Rob, there's something to say, maybe for you to say.
There will be a legislative leader's meeting sometime.
I just responded to a call.
Is that what you have in mind?
If I get one.
Okay, fine.
We'll just keep on with it.
Certainly.
See, they say yes.
The president was told to bypass me.
If we would, we were going to pass it for him.
That's your normal process anyway.
If we call a meeting at 6.30, Ronald doesn't have a briefing then anyhow, so there's no way that we aren't going to call it until 6.30.
Until after the vote, because the point that was made in here yesterday was the key point on this.
We're not using it to hit the vote.
The President's remarks yesterday in the Cabinet, in the Cabinet room, to...
I've had them typed up so I can use them.
I forget the group even, but I've got a legislative group.
Legislative leadership.
Yesterday morning on to Dominic, on to Senator Dominic.
I believe it was to Senator Dominic on the Longer View matter.
It was on the Mansfield-Mahoney thing.
Right, right.
I've got it.
But I didn't tell the damn thing.
Not a thing, no.
Not on this.
But anybody reading between the lines.
It had to do with Matthias.
Yeah, so I said, sure, this is the guy that was popular in all the rest of the government.
Yes, it tied in with Matthias.
I think the fact that he didn't use this for an office meeting before him and back to the Chosinburg of two names, one
Recruiting the Congress for a second also showed that we're the Russians to trust us.
Right.
And rather than taking a cheap shot at the expense of the Russians, the Congress said that it was more important to get the deal.
Second time the call leaves, we'll wait a little after the vote to call the cabinet meeting, too.
We don't need to do that, actually.
We can call it now.
We're going to do it at night, we should.
Clock, I'll just routinely announce tomorrow's schedule.
We'll get the cabinet meeting at 9 o'clock.
Yeah, I think he should have known, sir.
Okay.
At a four o'clock meeting, they'll have a break at the cabin.
Okay.
The other would just unfold and begin with the leadership to come and with the TV cameras.
Yeah, and tomorrow night is a good idea.
So they can, Alex can make those calls.
Call the special meeting.
Here's one in the development.
Announcement.
We're honest.
And I thought about it and I determined not to.
Really?
I can't be a judge of that in terms of the delicacies of the foreign policy standpoint, but without saying historic, and I understand the point you make, I think after reading that, in terms of the
presentation of this and to make the significance felt out of the country.
I think the President on his stage referring to, in general terms, as you have done, you did today, in terms of the peace hope for about three minutes, excuse me, could be very meaningful.
No.
No?
Okay.
There will come a time when he can actually express confidence.
I see.
This is hard and
I'm just trying to imagine how hard of a use this is.
This is very hard.
You don't think you need to take one minute, though, to explain what it says?
No.
That's one thing I've got to say.
I'm going to try to put in a little rhetoric about peace, all right?
But if I start explaining and saying this means that we're going to do this and that they're going to do that, uh-uh.
It personally can't be done in one way.
Well, I see.
On this, Mr. President, I think... And the Russians, if I do that, I wrote an agreement.
This is an agreed statement.
And that's got to be it.
That is all I can say about that.
I cannot interpret it.
I cannot embellish it or add to it in any way.
Go ahead.
You wanted something on peace.
Well, perhaps that's wrong.
I expressed my support in terms of the peace thing, but without getting into the
the details of what this means and where we will go at fault and so forth.
I just think that we consider this thing significant to a lot of the views we're sending out.
It's a thing that I bring in the more peaceful world or reduce the danger of war in the world and so forth.
It's a major step in our policy of negotiation rather than confrontation.
Right.
Things like that.
See, what I'm referring to is the generation of peace.
This is such a major announcement that I don't, the one minute rule I don't think applies here.
No, it doesn't.
It is not.
I'm not limiting it to one minute because of the concern that they won't use it.
They'll use ten minutes.
They'll use anything you say.
But I just don't want a minute.
It's very important for me not to oversell this.
I guess my suggestion would be then after you do the first part, after you read the statement, without explaining or embellishing it, you look up and look in the camera and
put forth some, to the guy sitting out in the country who really doesn't know about SALT and what, he doesn't know about ABM and offensive, and offensive, well, I've looked at, it's not, it's very, but I'm thinking of the transmission of that message out beyond the Chow Roberts and these guys out here.
Some of the students in the GW have their fingers hands up, so I realize I've really changed.
The governments of the United States and Soviet Union, including the course of their talks on limitation strategic arms, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.
They have also agreed that together with the concluding agreement to limit APM's
They will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.
The two sides are taking this course in a conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms.
These negotiations will be actively pursued.
That says a hell of a lot, huh?
But I could add, I could add something to the effect of this.
You have struck several notes since the very start of the administration.
One, that we were there to accomplish something, and this is an accomplishment, obviously.
We, as a government, have been well prepared for the negotiations.
There's a way that you could put that.
And then the final element of hope, in other words, hope for a world where there's a limitation
In other words, it tells the person...
In other words, it tells the person...
In other words, it tells the person...
In other words, it tells the person...
We need to tell the guy what he thinks about this before Dan Rather comes in and tells him that he doesn't know anything.
Basically, it's an agreement to talk rather than an agreement itself.
Oh, they're going to have a hell of a time pissing on this.
We'll find ways, but it's going to be very difficult.
I mean, it's a really difficult form to do.
Or is it in a period moving from period of confrontation to negotiation?
One of the elements of that is progress in the strategic arms limitation talk.
This is significant progress.
Reaching an agreement to talk about these two areas is referring back to the statement.
It has been the goal of this administration, of your administration from the very outset, to have our negotiators prepared or to have the—you wouldn't want to say that.
No, no.
This stuff says solid, well maybe the Russians know that.
I never use that term.
Nobody knows what the hell it means.
People say armed and solid, nobody knows what it means.
People don't know what strategic means, but they know what armed limitation means.
Armed limitation means.
That's right.
If they hear the word, well you could say, you have to put the word strategic.
Right.
For the French.
Another reason why strategic, arms limitation, they all know that that's a good thing.
I gave a lot of jazz to the Red Cross about peace.
Could it work for them?
Sure.
And the leads are like the President expressed confidence that the different people in the United States and people in mainland can reach within the next decade or so.
They've earned enough good in any country in the world so that they can change the Russian weather conditions.
People want you to tell them what this means.
Not in any detail, but just a
Something that sets in their mind that this is good because it's a start.
Again, something's happening.
It's a piece.
It was.
The possibilities of what's going on.
Is he going to be a part of it?
Or does he want to play?
I wasn't a consultant.
Usually, he's got a reason to do it.
People say, I wasn't sold, and it goes slowly, but when things go bad, they kick off.
I've heard a month, a day, a few people leave, and then things are going to kick off.
That is very personal.
That's a personal thing.
I think you don't deserve what you're going to get.
I can't put it that way.
I mean, making the point that you weren't concerned about credit and all that, you were concerned about getting the thing worked out, that scored when I was talking about it.
When he called back, or when I called him back, I had the feeling that
that he had gotten to thinking about this and was kind of embarrassed about the position he had put himself in with me and complaining about it.
Because when I started to report on the line and everything, I said, I did get a chance to give the president a brief rundown of what your views were as you asked me to.
He said, oh, well, that's not, you know, that's not important or something.
And he wanted to move right to a game, and he was very positive about that, how to pick up the line and all that.
He has to be, he's a smart guy, he has to...
When he thought about it, he called me over there, because he was, gosh, I'm so scared.
But then, as he got to thinking about it, he realized he wasn't really being a very big man.
Well, so he must have realized, too, that even though I didn't do it, too, I did it obliquely, I agree.
But, God damn it, I did it for him.
That he knows.
He knows.
Yeah.
Particularly when you were able to sit, which I remember.
That was good, because I said, I remember.
I don't trust Jerry Smith.
He knows it.
He doesn't want to argue about it.
He's moved to the ground, which has carried off being very positive and upbeat about that.
Didn't he sound pretty good to you?
On the phone, didn't he sound upbeat?
Was it all right?
Because I was talking about something I had with Korea, and I said, well...
We've got to find a way, though, Bob, to handle these other two things.
We've just got to find a way that wherever we don't run, we'll keep running.
I can't be constantly having situations develop where there's even another one that develops, and Roger, do you agree with me on this?
Agree or not?
I hear you.
I think, Senator, I think you've got to either use this as a way to move Bill out of it,
I don't know.
It's just that the... Or if you need to keep it open.
Because I think they can't move out now.
Okay.
Not that there's some disagreement that's going to be made, but maybe they've made it all until the fall.
And second, the Mideast is going to be made until the fall.
So maybe that's the time to look for it.
I hope that you might go after the sun in the Mideast.
Yeah, but that's right.
Before that, you've got to be in Vietnam and China.
That's my point.
And you need it.
And if you do, and I, Henry won't like this, I'm sure, but I think you've got to talk.
Yeah.
You've got to do it.
I think you just want to just say go.
And you ought to do it pretty soon.
Before he goes to NATO.
You ought to say that I just want you to know
And we're moving down a pretty good path now.
I told you we may be getting the sun up quick, and that looks possible.
Now, there are two other things that may get in the fire that I want you to be aware of.
And I know you'll understand what I'm saying now.
We've had a feeler from China.
We've got a feeler through the IACON.
Through the IACON, and I'm going to pursue that.
I don't think anything's going to come of it.
But obviously, as with anything else, I've got to pursue it.
I don't want you or the State Department to get into it at all, because it has to be on this one that you'll understand even more closely than the soft distance test.
That involves the Russians.
It involves the Russians, exactly.
kind of preparation, you're better off not knowing about the picture, because if you see the green, you don't want to know that anything else is happening.
That's that.
The other thing is, which is even more remote than that, because we've got to establish the record of pursuing everything, is that we have a healer from North Vietnam, and we're going to, but I think you've got to say, I'm going to send Henry to Paris to talk to him next week.
And I'm going to put it out there, the healer from North Vietnam, basically, so it's not going to be
And a personal basis through him, you know, for something that he says, he wants you to come over later.
He wants you to know he's going, but again, it's imperative that you not tell anybody or do anything about it.
Not that he won't.
And that will get him back.
You can do that easily now.
If you're waiting any time to do it, you're going to have a hell of a time doing it.
And you're going to be right back in the same soup you're in today.
When, if something does happen recently,
Now, part of it, you're going to Paris, as I understand it, and you're doing this to make the record.
That's right.
And then you're going to release it later.
Sure.
And you'd damn well better let Rogers know that you're going to release the record.
If Rogers doesn't know.
I'm just going to blame it on Sonny.
That's perfect.
Henry was involved in the Paris study in Paris before we came into office.
You're good.
For Johnson.
Yeah.
Rock's not involved.
You see, Sonny is asking to come to Paris.
to the fact that he's had some previous correspondence and contact with Santanyi.
So when he said that he already had some contact with Santanyi, he said, well, we ran into a letter that we had from Ho Chi Minh.
That was through Santanyi.
I said, no, the letter I sent to Ho Chi Minh, I don't see it.
I think this will improve his mood when you tell him this.
Because then he will be, see, that meets his need of being brought in, which is self-protection, which is more what he's concerned about than he is in the only separation that I have on Tony and Bob over these things.
Now, you'll think I've known him for some time and just decided to tell him now.
I think we've got to indicate that they have just happened.
You can say things are always going to break up once and this log jam is all of a sudden turned into a flood.
You have two things that are going on here.
In addition to the, you know, we've had this connection.
On that, I know I have great difficulty in not having Henry go out there on that.
You see, the problem is that we may not get Henry out there.
You can just say you've got a healer on there.
You just let Henry go without telling him.
That you may be pursuing him.
You don't know whether you're going to pursue it.
The Russians, they may knock it in the head anyway.
Unnecessary concern.
Frankly, it is an assault thing, particularly.
I know he just, you know, watered it in the mouth and really wanted to tell people how it was worked out.
But frankly, clearly apart from the rubbish problem, he should have told people how it was worked out.
It's not good to reveal...
We said this, and they did this, and we did this, and they did that.
But you see, they're revealing it now, isn't it?
The Russians aren't going to like it for one day.
It now hurts the process.
Henry has got to realize it.
That's why his grievance and so forth worries me some.
But I don't think his grievance is what it means.
But he's got that well not just to have an absolute close look as to how it happened.
Absolutely close, and that's to be absolute.
Great consternation.
The Chinese one, that we need to break that to him now.
I think the European should come almost instantly, because Henry's going to go on the 30th.
The Chinese one, we don't know whether he's going to happen or not.
Uh, from now on we are better advised to say we've got a communication from Yahya.
For a few days in between the two.
I don't, we did not say anything at that time.
Wait a while and then send it.
Yeah, yeah.
You see what I mean, Chef?
Uh, I think I should, I should sort of wait and say, look, we've got a communication from Yahya.
It's zero and secure.
I just wonder if you've got an ambassador involved in that and everybody else.
You're not sitting here involved.
We've got an arm-wrestling club going on, you know.
Or... We've got a little tour on the... We'll advance easy after the fact.
We've got a little conclusion there.
No problem.
It's like, you know, it's fun.
So you understand it.
Yeah.
He says it will make it harder when he's got his stuff still coming in.
There's a very simple reason if you don't.
You know what the simple answer to that is?
That they want to agree on offensive weapons.
And they won't stop until they're 70% satisfied.
But the point is, now it makes the appropriation piece.
Our weapons were even more important because there's an agreement now, agreed to.
They aren't stopping their offensive weapons.
Joe didn't know how to stop their defensive ones.
They're building new defensive ones.
I think we can handle that, but not that there's no bleed out of them.
I'll complain.
He did indicate it to Mr. Rogers.
I said the only people who knew about it were Rogers because of the negotiations aspect.
You and I.
Well, Mr. Lee, he's much more worried about his own problems.
Sure.
You can tell him, we'll work that out.
He's got a lot of, he's got a whole book full of
of little Ida's, uh, he won't get through the slightest trouble.
But the main thing is, I want him to be an advocate of this stuff.
I want him to say, uh, please, just help me.
Well, if he thinks that they think he will be doing treatment, he must think it's an upbeat thing.
Well, the point is, I want Claire, and Roger, and everybody to say, this is great.
Ah!