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Conversation 502-014

TapeTape 502StartThursday, May 20, 1971 at 1:45 PMEndThursday, May 20, 1971 at 2:05 PMTape start time02:10:42Tape end time02:25:54ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Ziegler, Ronald L.;  Dart, Justin W.;  Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob");  Scali, John A.;  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office
AI Summary

President Nixon met with his senior advisors to coordinate the administration's messaging strategy following the announcement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement. The participants discussed managing the press, addressing potential discrepancies between U.S. and Soviet translations of the agreement, and ensuring the President received proper credit for the diplomatic breakthrough. Kissinger provided updates on his communication with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, while the group planned briefings to counter potential negative interpretations from the media and ensure a unified administration position.

SALT agreementNixon administrationPress relationsAnatoliy DobryninDiplomatic negotiationsMedia strategy
AudioNARA Description

On May 20, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Justin W. Dart, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, John A. Scali, and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House from 1:45 pm to 2:05 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 502-014 of the White House Tapes.

Nixon Library Finding Aid
Conversation No. 502-14

Date: May 20, 1971
Time: 1:45 pm - 2:05 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Ronald L. Ziegler.

     John A. Scali's [?] briefings
          -Forthcoming meeting with [Arnold] Eric Sevareid
                -Howard K. Smith
                -John W. Chancellor
          -Major briefing at 12:45, May 20, 1971
                 -Open attendance
          -Meeting at 2 o'clock, May 20, 1971
                -Sevareid
                -Smith
                -Chancellor
                -Marvin L. Kalb
                -Richard G. Valeriani
                -William A. Gill, Jr.

           -Meeting at 4 o'clock, May 20,1971
                -Max Frankel
                -Chalmers Roberts
                -Associated Press [AP] and United Press International [UPI] diplomatic press
                -William S. White
                -Roscoe Drummond
           -Ziegler's views
                -Gerard C. Smith
                -Scali
                -Henry A. Kissinger's comments
                -Impact on press
                -Press

[The President talked with Justin W. Dart at an unknown time between 1:45 pm and 1:48 pm]

[See Conversation No. 3-85]

[Conversation No. 502-14A]

[End of telephone conversation]

     Meeting with Kissinger

Ziegler left and H.R. (“Bob”) Haldeman and Scali entered at 1:48 pm.

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] agreement announcement, May 20, 1971
           -Press response
           -J. Henry Smith
           -Television instant analysis
           -Daniel Seymour's reaction
                 -Seymour's meeting with President several years ago
           -Staff
           -Television viewers response
           -Time of announcement in Washington, D.C. and Moscow
     Personnel Management
           -Scali [?]
                 -George A. Lincoln [?]
                 -National Security Council [NSC]
                 -Responsibility

Kissinger entered at 1:52 pm.

     SALT agreement
         -Soviet translation, US translation
         -Kissinger's phone call to Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
              -Treaty
              -Agreement
         -Dobrynin's press release
              -Text President read

     President schedule
           -Future conversation with Scali

Scali left at an unknown time before 1:55 pm.

     SALT agreement
         -Two o'clock briefing, May 20, 1971
         -US and Soviet text
         -Kissinger's call to Dobrynin
         -AP report from Moscow
               -Two stage procedure
                    -Anti-ballistic missile [ABM] agreement
         -Letter
         -Television
         -Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield's statement
         -Soviet domestic radio
               -One and two stage procedures

Ziegler entered at 1:55 pm.

           -Photographs
                -Oliver F. (“Ollie”) Atkins
                -Release to the public

Ziegler left at 1:57 pm.

            -Dobrynin press release, May 20, 1971
                 -US text of SALT agreement
           -Kissinger's views of Soviets
                -SALT
                -Cambodia
                -Vietnam
                -President's views
                      -State Department

           -Upcoming Berlin meeting
                 -D[avid] Kenneth Rush
           -US and Soviet desires
           -Unknown person's (Dobrynin?) views
           -Kissinger’s talk with Ronald W. Reagan
           -Unknown person (Dobrynin?)
           -Mansfield's statement
           -Treaty
           -Administration's position
           -Kissinger's calls to Dobrynin on May 19, 1971
           -President's television announcement
                 -Press interpretation
                       -AP in Moscow
           -Aleksei N. Kosygin's letter on SALT agreement
           -Press inquiries on the SALT agreement
                 -Kissinger’s response
           -President's initiative on SALT
           -Kissinger's role in SALT agreement
           -Smith's role in SALT agreement
                 -Vienna
                 -Smith's views
                 -Kissinger's views
                       -Design of negotiations
           -Credit for the SALT agreement
                 -Smith
                 -Vienna
                 -Paul W. McCracken

     Scali’s [?] schedule
           -Television

Kissinger left at 2:05 pm.
Transcript (AI-Generated)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

He's going to at 2 o'clock.
He's going to be with Severide, Smith, and Chancellor.
He did the major backgrounder at 1245.
The major one.
The big one.
He opened all.
That's completed.
2 o'clock, you've got Severide, Smith, and Chancellor, Cal, Berlariani, and Gill, because of the...
Right.
on the air tonight.
Then at 4 o'clock, he does Franco, Roberts, the AP and the UPI diplomatic guys, William S. White, Drummond.
Do that together?
Yeah, do them all together.
Mix them all into a group of about 20.
You know, those who will be writing follow-up columns and so forth.
That is at 4 o'clock.
He's not going to say how long.
He's due to do them at 2 o'clock, sir.
The one over here went very well.
Seth was there and dived in a few places, and we covered basically the same ground.
Oh, it's hit with great impact.
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.
Great impact.
You know, they're kind of wandering around like, oh,
It really happened, didn't it?
And you can sense by their mood.
They're up.
They're up.
They always are.
I hear you've been sick, and I guess I'll tell you that I'm glad your operation was successful, and, uh, to wish you well, and tell you how much we're glad we already had it ready.
Your daughter, Jane, is working at Buck Crow.
Oh, well, good.
That makes your place all the better, or the other way?
Yeah, right.
Well, I'll tell you, after all the money you've raised, it isn't that you deserve a little rest, so play a lot of golf.
When it gets better, we'll be ready for a bigger battle next year.
Fair enough.
Okay, goodbye.
Let me say, I've got a couple things for you.
I've been thinking about the...
I want to tell you, I noted you started the applause this morning.
You're more observant than I am.
Don was looking to see if I had started it or was joining with him in starting it.
I said, no, I wouldn't want to get caught leading it.
Part of how people are embarrassed to start it.
But they wanted to.
They really did.
They felt good about it.
You could feel it.
Many of them, I don't think, will realize, because it's a terribly complicated thing, how important this is.
I think some did, though.
I did.
I think Hattie Smith there was good.
and uh i think you gave it the importance the television came off very well the analysis i think helped it because people were kind of thinking well goodness from that you know it's such a good statement but i think that was interesting dan seymour's here for some other meeting boy he was
He came roaring in the office.
He says, Jesus Christ.
He was just bouncing off the walls.
He had the statement there, and he said, this is really, a couple more like that, if you can, or one more like that, if you've got it made.
The point is, he saw it instantly.
He remembered, and I'd forgotten, that when he was in here talking with you a couple years ago, when you first came in, you were talking about the key to this whole thing was how we set things with the Russians.
And he said, obviously, you've been working at it,
Thank God.
The least you can start.
The hard thing is to know how important to treat.
My staff said, what's it mean?
And I said, it's damn important.
That's right.
You've got to think about it.
And yet you couldn't.
I mean, you're in the Soviet Union.
That's what I said.
Imagine, both cut off at the same minute.
But even going to the bathroom.
That's what you're saying, 12 noon.
I've been thinking about your situation, and I think I determined what you ought to do.
We haven't done anything.
Lincoln has really given me that you would come on to the NFC and do operational responsibilities.
A little tempest in a teapot.
The Russians made their own translation.
It isn't exactly like ours.
And I've just got the freedom on the phone and said if you want to play games with us, you go.
They put in the word treaty rather than agreement.
Well, so.
Oh, they better know that.
I know they better know about it.
So what the Russians are doing this afternoon is to pre-initiate the issue of press release, authenticating our text, the text you read, saying that that is the authentic text.
I just don't want to have to spend our time in the briefings explaining why we weren't taken to the cleaners and the Russians have a different text from ours.
And so... We're all out of this painting.
Well, that's the thing I wanted to talk about now, about you and .
Yes, sir.
Thank you.
Well, .
They issued their own text, so they issued that public.
And the word treaty is substitute for agreement.
Well, that does have .
Well, I called the briefing, and Travis came.
And then there is an AP report from Moscow saying there'll be a two-stage procedure, first an ABM agreement,
But for that we have the letter, I mean.
We only have the letter.
We've got the...
The first day when you come and tell her this, to humiliate you.
Mansfield, you know about it, made a very strong statement.
By when they said two-stage...
They want...
I think that when you get into one stage, two stage, and all that sort of thing...
They want to prove to their own...
This was on the domestic radio in Moscow.
They want to prove that.
Yeah, but when they say two stage, one stage, this is all a question of...
If you could buzz off... Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Whether you wanted to...
Now, you know, Adams took a picture of the release day yesterday.
That's what it means.
We have to pay for it.
It shows on the stage.
It shows all those...
I think it's a good...
Yes.
Fine.
You just put the pictures up for you to use in the meetings.
Okay.
Okay.
Bye.
And that's obviously .
He said he would have a press conference.
No, he'll issue a press release at the end of the day confirming the authenticity of our text.
He'll just say this is the official text and release how.
So we're reading the general press very well.
How do you feel about it?
I think it went very well.
Of course, it was a cinch.
It's so rare that there's now they're nitpicking a statement, which is basically what they really want.
They're going through the motions of nitpicking it, but they're very eager for me to reassure them it's not like Cambodia or Vietnam.
I'm sure they can nitpick it.
Everybody else nitpicks it, of course.
Christ, if they realize how long it took to get this far, it's going to be a... We were smart to play it exactly as we did.
We didn't overstate the damn thing.
We said about the right thing.
And I think we've got help.
I'm just...
If they screw it up, I just won't let Rush come to the next sermon meeting.
I'll just tell them there's no trusting them, that this channel is useless.
But they won't screw it up.
Right now, they want a deal.
No question.
So do we.
No.
Where did that do?
Oh, he said, good God.
Oh, yes.
He said, of course.
Talk to Reagan.
He said, great.
I have a thought.
Just, I think, something to consider.
It's so excessive eagerness.
I really do.
I was thinking it might help you in your hours and so forth as well.
No, I really, let's do it at the next announcement we can make.
But he mustn't think he's got us with.
Oh, right.
That's why it's pretty good to put out this leader's thing and so forth.
Mansfield made a good statement today.
Very strong.
The person is concerned whether they use
He said, we didn't have to do any explaining.
I called Duprin and I went over it with him word for word tomorrow and yesterday at noon.
I called him again at four to say, now be damn sure there's no mix-up.
And, uh, it's okay.
It's all right.
You're going to be on television tonight.
I mean, the average person, a different agreement, 3D, all they know is something could happen.
Yeah, and if they were to join the U.S., it was always a two-stage thing there.
Well, no, that's the AP interpretation of the agreement.
From Moscow.
Yeah, from Moscow.
Well, this is the apartment.
At that time, we will read to the other, you know what I mean?
It's in there like a scenario, isn't it?
Oh, yeah.
In the letter of Kosygin, it says it will be discussed before the thing is concluded.
Discussed.
In this case, actually, discussed helps us.
Because a lot of the press are asking, are you going to discuss it consecutively or simultaneously?
I've just said flatly, we'll discuss it simultaneously.
How was that?
Beyond my trust center was an initiative by the press, but beyond the details, there was no issue at all about my role.
Nobody even asked that I had anything to do with it.
I don't want Jerry to hog all the credit.
They asked him whether he brought it back from Vienna, and he certainly didn't deny it.
Yeah.
Push that a little harder.
He deserves next to nothing, almost everything, the whole concept of it, we ran down his throat.
The whole design of the negotiation, every option we developed over his dead body.
The only thing he deserves credit for is that he...
Took his orders.
Took his orders.
Sir, you say he really brought it back to him.
I'd rather go out and discuss that.
Maybe that's what he said rather than...
Oh, yeah, no.
No, please.
Can I put it in this way?
Well, Jerry, credit is for everybody, but the primary credit must go to the president.
Can I call him that number to understand?
He says that.
Do you read?
He can't say anything against it now.
Well, if he put credit, he thought he had to throw it back.
from Vienna, and he wanted to give you only the credit of having said no all along.
Okay.
I'll report to you after this meeting.
This is the TV cast.
How long does it go?
Forty-five minutes.
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