On May 21, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Ronald L. Ziegler, Henry A. Kissinger, Stephen B. Bull, Gerard C. Smith, Paul H. Nitze, Llewellyn E. ("Tommy") Thompson, Jr., Philip J. Farley, Alexander P. Butterfield, and William P. Rogers met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:53 am to 10:43 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 503-006 of the White House Tapes.
Transcript (AI-Generated)This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.
Here.
On the consumer price index, which is very good, I advise, yeah, hold on, increase the treatment to 1%, which means for the first four ounces, less than half of what it was in the previous one.
Thanks.
But I question whether or not I should bring Connolly in for this.
I don't want to use him too much.
And what I thought I would do in this case would be to get some good language.
I'll talk to the secretary, talk to George Shultz and so forth, and just respond, you know, myself.
I would say that the president feels type of thing.
Instead of bringing someone out as such.
If you agree, fine.
I think that is the president's, you can say the president's opinion.
We still recognize the runaway spending in Congress.
The runaway spending in the Congress that we have.
We are going to continue to fight.
You see, both of us, the budget continues
The food price went up substantially.
The food price went up substantially, but 1% on 4%.
But this week, I'm sorry.
It's going up to three tenths.
It's two tenths last week.
It's done two tenths.
It was one.
Three to three.
Three to six tenths.
Last year, it was five, six.
They moved them up.
They moved at a rate of six per year.
Six to six.
here it's looking at three and six three and a half percent right a little less we can get the damn inflation here very well oh i think henry bridges came out quite well yes sir
As a matter of fact, he referred to it in January.
He said the prices took an initiative.
But this is not the highest level.
He said that's it.
We're not going to tell you what it was, but it was the highest level.
Okay.
I know scientists.
I was there.
If they had any understanding, after I got through with them, what would you tell them?
What would you tell them?
Absolutely.
Absolutely.
I...
I don't care about that.
I keep...
I was, and then on this, there's an accidental war thing, so when I raised it, I thought you wanted to have that come to Jim, but you had to come back and make the deal with Jim.
You know, I don't want to... No, no, the way I've got it set is... Am I going to give him a letter?
We don't have one.
He doesn't need one.
What's he supposed to do then?
But for the rest of the week, I'm going to bring the accidental war and hotline thing to avoid... Do I say it in this meeting?
Yeah, just to go ahead with what needs to be done.
You say you may change your mind later.
I would say you made some progress in the National War.
Hotline.
Hotline.
But I believe that you were part of the total package.
Right.
If I change my mind later, Bill?
Yeah, I told you to say that, Mr. Chairman.
Right.
And I'll say it again.
Because the way we should do it is, rather than have Smith announce, say that he settled it with Semyonov,
And then say, how does he visualize spending the next week?
Say one thing would be helpful, Mr. President.
You could say that you think in order to get the maximum impetus to this new initiative, that there would not be too much speculation about the details of the position, and that there
That they just save it all for Helsinki, when we'll have the possession.
Or because they may give the whole damn thing away next week.
Because they still, they've already leaked, or some of them have leaked, the fact that first an ABM agreement, and then offensive, which is what they really want.
That's not the way it's going to be.
So that's, and then you might ask each of them how they visualize it.
I think I should tell them now that there's been speculation about ABM and the fancy question.
That position has been rejected.
And I want you to be clear against these practical parallels.
We've got to maintain that position.
And one other point you might usefully make, Mr. President, if you could, they could hear from you, that my, I mean, USA, you were,
My ABM decision is safeguard.
You could say my ABM decision is to be based on safeguard so that they don't go waffling back to Washington.
If you could make that point, it would be tremendously helpful.
Well, that's perfect.
But we can get safeguard, Mr. President.
There's no question about it.
Well, the numbers is a bargaining point that you don't need to get into.
That we can settle.
But if you could say that it should be based, that it must be based on safeguards.
Well, what I told the press is that ABM can be put into...
In total agreement, because that covers the whole ABM field.
Offensive weapons can't cover the whole ABM field.
Offensive because it's got nerves, it's got a lot of other aspects.
That's right.
That's part of it too.
Right.
Right.
Those scientists, oh, they applauded them.
About eight of them.
Did you read them?
Yes.
And I said now, listen, I said to them now, let me tell you something.
You're all old friends.
to tell you in strictest confidence about it.
I don't want to tell you how it was done, but this was done personally by the President.
And he did it with enormous courage.
He didn't even tell the JCS, that's their black sheet, that the JCS didn't know until it was all done.
Now, you all know how hard this is.
You'd know it would
or if he hadn't done it that way, if ever one of them said.
I said, now, if you people go back and start flooding us with other ideas, and if you now keep, we know you're going to, 90% of you are going to support another candidate next year.
That we understand.
But when the president says something, does something with this courage, you owe him.
at least the assurance, and I can tell you there is an oath granted, I said to them, I tell you no matter what you hear, he did this alone.
And, uh, oh, two of them came to my office afterwards and said, we want you to know we know the president did it.
We won't forget it.
And, uh, no.
I had a meeting this afternoon in Vietnam
I was going to ask you a question.
I was going to ask you a question.
I was going to ask you a question.
I was going to ask you a question.
I was going to ask you a question.
I was going to ask you a question.
I was going to ask you a question.
This is a slow-burning thing, Mr. President, and these guys, I haven't seen them this positive since yesterday.
I'll take an apple and an orange.
Very strong.
Come here.
Well, I guess we better sit over here so we can get on top.
Good.
Good.
Good.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Uh...
I have sent you with this morning's announcement.
It's easy.
It's me that, for a week, has left Indiana.
I was far from understanding this.
We looked at it publicly in a way that both us and you, at that time, probably is more dangerous than an infection.
The reason that shows, uh, um...
our people, who are defensive array that come through submission, indicating how this thing is going to come out, and we're getting something that's concrete, and getting something that has an understanding, etc.
And the deal finally is made, and we've all got it buttoned up, then we'll just all sit down and decide how it's going to be sold, and we can sell it.
Again, on the other hand,
It goes along this way, and it's going out in the press and the columns and so forth and so on.
Basically, all of a sudden, I mean, with friends and supporters of defense, and they are only part, there are many other experts around the country who may be concerned about this issue.
I think the important thing is, I mean, if we could keep the mind going, the important thing is to have nothing, is to make a deal.
That is in our interest, of course, and therefore it will have to be put you in a position of second.
In order to make that deal, nothing at all will be served, and a great deal of harm could be done by having any pain in what we were thinking about get out.
So we're keeping the lid on here.
Bill's keeping the lid on in state.
And of course, we're not going to say a hell of a lot.
within the bureaucracy here.
I just think we're just going to keep very, very, you know, you could do that.
Take, for example, one particular thing that comes to mind, the business about Washington, Moscow, or safeguard.
Now, there, our position and my position, I'll say, is very strong on this, is safeguard.
I think we can get that.
I think, however, it is...
In order, however it eventually sorts out, we must take that position now, if there were any need, any need like that, we are moving away from safeguards.
We would have a hell of a time, not just with some of our press, but Stu Jackson, for example, would be down on our throats like dead, but there's been a lot of guys who fought and bled and died for ADM, but say, now, what are we going to do?
We're going to give up safeguards, we're going to protect Washington, D.C., and all that sort of thing.
So I think it's very important for you to take a
absolutely hard line on the safeguard issues, for example, that I was thinking about.
Sure, nothing comes out that would indicate that there's any change in our position in that respect that left to cry.
And, of course, this is the problem of yesterday, and I think quite possibly today, and so forth.
Naturally, it will be in the Soviet interest
to get us tied down as officially and formally as possible, so that it's much more susceptible to being tied down than is the other case.
To get us tied down on that, which would mean an agreement to leave them as free as possible, with rather a fuzzy understanding with regard to the agreement can't be reached with offensive weapons.
Now, the United States is a negotiator, and they're ready to negotiate a deal, but we're going to be tied, and they're going to, more than they are, we're going to be tied in the area where they want to tie us, and they're going to be just having a roll around without and not tied in the area where we want to tie this.
That will raise the level of us here.
I have to just say, now this is a matter of the highest importance.
a negotiation involving the security of both countries, and we are going to, we're certainly not going to discuss it, but it will be, once every settlement is reached, it is obviously going to be one that will be in the mutual interest of both parties, and one that will protect the interests of both parties.
That's all we can agree to, and that's all we can expect to have agreed to.
And it's, I have the impressions of Senators, columnists,
experts, et cetera, you know, coming into it and stirring people up and raising them.
I just summarize it this way by saying, looking at our Soviet friends sitting there, and we don't have that much of an attitude from this side, our side, in press conferences or reports, and you are, you work very, very hard, I think you do really well, and we have, we have from the highest level
to reach this year on both.
Our line is the two.
They must be concluded together.
For their domestic problems and for ours, each of us, if and when we do get an agreement, support for an agreement, it does not appear to be clear very much
is talk about this and that and the other thing that could happen before we get it.
Because first, that kind of talk always raises fears that are far greater than anything we would possibly reach.
I think that's the divine building that we need.
And I don't think we'll have any physical difficulty doing that.
I don't think we're going to have whatever you work out is going to be
It has to have a joint resolution or it'll be an executive agreement that we want to know that you wrote out.
And I want to emphasize what the President said, that although we're in sort of an afterglow of success, and we're going to take this money, we're going to invest it, and we're offering it quickly, because those, like Goldberg and the others, they're going to think of every possible tactic, and maybe what you're going to do is you're going to look as if you've been indebted to them anyway.
He's a non-converter.
I called him and said that.
I called him out to it.
I said, okay, so we can't do anything.
We can't do this.
We can't do this.
We can't do this.
We can't do this.
Anyway, that just means that he and his colleagues are all going to try to do everything they can to shoot at us.
But I don't believe that's going to be the effective attack because actually we're going to have a better agreement than they would have accepted.
They would accept almost anything.
That's what I mean.
So I think we'll be consistent.
Not them, but the dangerous part will be those like Gabe and others who have a feeling that we haven't got anything for it.
And that's going to be a little tougher to explain, because even though we're competing, we have, I think we will have a good agreement.
They're going to say, well, that's a little quiet.
Why do you do it this way?
It doesn't make any sense.
Why do you trust those veterans?
I have a real strong opposition developing from there.
I think you'll be, gentlemen, if you excuse me, I think you'll be an undercurrent of opposition from there.
We'll do in order to, for example, handle the problem.
Right.
Because we're ready to stop.
Yeah, they're just going to have to take that.
I think that's one advantage that we, that I would have, that I have given them, because they, at the same time, it's just a lot of people.
So they won't take anything in order to, well, they all have their own options, but just give up on their building, and they'll be nice guys.
I think we can solve it, but it would be very difficult
But it's great to have that.
It would be very helpful to keep the greatest amount of mystery possible about what's going on during the process of selling to us.
So that people just get a look.
Don't get excited about what you hear.
Don't get excited about what you think.
All this speculation.
We've got top negotiators there.
We've got a sound position.
Work something out.
Let's try to tie this down.
And we have the agreement then.
And then we'll see.
That's what I think.
So talking in between is going to be very difficult, of course.
And we also have to keep in mind, they will say, well, we're not going to accept that.
We're not going to accept the position that the executive is bringing us.
We don't know anything about it.
We're going to have to keep it up.
If this is going to be a treaty, we're not going to ask for it.
We don't know something about it.
If it's not going to be a treaty, what's it going to be?
Are you going to do this practically?
to do it and tell us the way to do it on a different basis.
But that's only something that goes kind of back and forth on a different basis.
We got away with it, but it's going to be a little bit tougher.
So we'll have that to continue, but I don't think it's going to be a problem now.
I think it's going to be a problem in the fourth or fifth week.
We already had a jury that's done a request, and I've had a request to probably testify in the second session.
But not this weekend, almost.
I think, I think, Jerry, you and your colleagues can help us to figure out why the legislative leaders, where you just look here, and you said, you're trying to get people who are totally committed to a population where you're not agreeing, you're totally committing also to national security as a country, and that you haven't negotiated with these people.
that what we're interested in is the success of the negotiations, or just as much as we possibly can.
But consultation, information, and so forth, which would be derogatory to the success of the negotiations is something that we wouldn't have close to trust in.
Well, I think, Mr. President, on that record,
first grade, there hasn't been a week of .
In a general sense, I would urge to avoid any sense of being defensive about this proposition.
I think it would be advantage of security.
The form in which it takes is not all that important.
I would suggest
I think the United States government has a slight feeling of defensiveness about this.
I agree.
I suggest that it has a negotiated technique, which is not as much as possible, to stay away from the question for opposition of the Helsinki.
Look, let's figure out the specifics, the substance of the understanding.
And when we get to the law, then it'll be time to see whether this is going to get through.
Does it please or understand you or do you think it would be a little more approachable?
I think it would be a little more of this.
You know, I think that the faith in Christ, you know, I have a message that is that in person there will be agreement.
There will be one.
There will be an argument.
There will be an argument.
There will certainly be an argument.
But that will come for reasons that are probably not too much related to what's been said here in the ocean.
There may be very, very, very, very small amount for us to...
those verses are, but I think it just happens that they would not have moved this way unless they wanted freedom, that they wanted so we, and I think in our college campus, of course, and ourselves, that's one thing we're going to avoid, because it's too bad.
It's just a lot of time.
Do you think at the end of this particular session that you could have the freedom to
If you want it, yes.
Wouldn't it be better to have that rather than having that copy so soon?
You know, after all, anything that you can get like that should be used when you need it.
I didn't ask the person to do this.
They might do it just to let you know we've got another possibility.
And you have a set of options.
You could break out one of the things like the hotline upgrade, which also is ready for servicing.
If you want to keep those options there, then move on when you want to.
It's still in the moment.
We're not going to be able to end this.
You've got five weeks now.
The pressure will not be.
The pressure is to come together as a proposal.
Sure.
This time it's for real.
For other countries.
To have accession without having permission must have to be a treaty.
A treaty, if you want accession, but it wouldn't be necessary to protect.
The rest is to fit into your China policy.
That's when the French and the British joined in with the recession.
I don't know as far as the track is concerned.
I get how a lot of them are going on in three lines.
It's a lot of noise.
At 8 a.m., this is their advantage because they have one.
But I think at some stage, you've got to be able to trust more of the audience.
That's how we set it up.
The whole, the whole sense of this proposition is...
And you go on and have to keep working for our competency, but this is not, as we must understand, this is a terrible, everybody, we all know that.
And because there are a lot of topics, probably nobody, no, but there's this potential in the public, and I think there's all this fear about this, and the missile sites, and the concerns, and I find that the movie is pretty good, but not close to it.
It's been very good.
All right, that's very easy.
Let's be careful not to have this one because that may prevent one three years from now.
We just stated that the president and our objective is to continue the negotiations along the lines of the more comprehensive approach that you took in April, which is the bottom.
This is the three.
The best possible position to get the right control of our offensive forces.
You know, they don't come through face-to-face.
We've got a line that he was off, but he's certainly in a lot of plans for this.
And what is it that's not going to take him to do?
And so this is one of our times to have him.
You know, the big ol'
Well, I was this person to this.
If they see that I didn't fill the next week, they'll say, oh, you know, okay, thanks.
So, I mean, in one way or another, the one point I made is to still pay attention to God.
I don't know if I should still be somewhere here, but I clearly don't want to have a European security conference.
I want to get together next week somewhere.
I would like to agree to some of the questions.
They favor this.
Actually, this is still, I'm excited to,
I don't think you will have any trouble in the part of my council because this foreshadows an arrangement that doesn't claim that they have a right to be concerned about it.
So I think that, you know, particularly from cities, it will be a little more complicated than it is today for the European Security Council.
They really don't like the idea very much of having a security unit in the United States to handle all these things.
They want to be involved in a 5% increase.
Well, I think, I think that's all it is.
It seems to me that this is a very good thing.
It's the only way to keep us in development.
Right.
All of Jerry's and everybody's support is actually, we'll leave it to the negotiators, but this is very good for everybody.
Well, it is.
So, basically, you know, it's a very positive policy because everybody is, is, is, is, is, is, is, is, is, is, is, is, is.
distinguished from ours, is highly, uh, influenced by, uh, bald men.
Now, there's, there's, there's bald men.
There's bald men.
There was a big hand in that, too.
There was a big hand in that, too.
All these scientists build things for peace.
So that's the whole line.
They stay there.
All right, all right, we'll try to build something for guests.
That's right, that's right, that's right.
We'll be all excited.
We'll start, that's right, that's right.
Have a good time.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Oh, shit.