Conversation 519-004

TapeTape 519StartMonday, June 14, 1971 at 11:56 AMEndMonday, June 14, 1971 at 12:17 PMTape start time00:59:15Tape end time01:18:00ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Peterson, Peter G.;  Dent, Harry S.;  Flanigan, Peter M.;  Bull, Stephen B.Recording deviceOval Office

On June 14, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Peter G. Peterson, Harry S. Dent, Peter M. Flanigan, and Stephen B. Bull met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:56 am to 12:17 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 519-004 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 519-4

Date: June 14, 1971
Time: 11:56 am - 12:17 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Peter G. Peterson, Harry S. Dent, and Peter M. Flanigan

     Trade negotiations
          -Frederick B. Dent role
          -Tariffs
                -Taiwan
                -Bryce N. Harlow
                     -Acceptance of terms

            -Wilbur D. Mills
                  -Quota bill effort
      -Roger Milliken
      -Division of industry
            -F. B. Dent
      -Acceptance of terms
            -Military concessions
                  -Melvin R. Laird
      -Tax on Japanese
      -Quota bill
            -Effect of Harlow scenario
                  -President-Mills political battle
            -Commitments from industry
                  -Dismissal of quotas
                  -Deal without commitments
                  -Explanation to industry
                  -Public relations
                  -Legislative
-Reason for H. S. Dent-Peterson-Flanigan meeting
      -Possible meeting with President-John N. Mitchell-John B. Connally
      -Milliken’s desire for meeting with President
      -Meeting with Mitchell
-David M. Kennedy in South Korea
-Taiwanese position [on tariffs]
-Japanese
      -Number of categories
      -Imposition of terms
            -Benefits to Japanese
-Need for industry cooperation
      -Benefits of terms
      -Congress
            -Election-year views
      -John W. Byrnes
-Rollback of unfavorable terms
      -US position
      -Mills’ role
            -Arrangements with Japanese
-Military sales incentives
      -South Korea
      -Laird
      -Henry A. Kissinger input
-US strategy

                 -Congressional support
                       -F. B. Dent
                       -[Robert C.?] Jackson role
                 -Milliken’s support
                       -Political situation
                       -Verbal support
                 -President’s position
                 -Need for action
                 -Agriculture forces
                       -South Carolina
                       -North Carolina
                 -Textile forces
                       -People’s Republic of China [PRC] trade
                             -Kissinger
                 -Agriculture
                       -Implementation of bill
                       -Mitchell role
                       -Long-term interests of various parties
                             -Milliken
                             -Congressional factions
                                    -Jacob K. Javits
                 -Effect of bill’s passage
                       -Shoe tariff
                 -Tariff terms
                       -Kennedy
                       -Need for some progress
                       -Mills’ ideas
                             -Benefits

Peterson, et al. left and Stephen B. Bull entered at 12:15 pm

     President’s schedule
          -Robert A. Taft, Jr.
           -Helene (Colesie) Drown’s location

The President and Bull left at an unknown time before 12:17 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

No, no.
We started out with an agreement with them about a 7.5% growth factor.
Yeah.
Now, you remember we agreed to send the industry over there, and the call they chose to have the proof of fiber-safe of effect only pressed in.
from Peter and got everything as well.
And he's a very honorable guy.
He was on the ground floor.
He saw how tough it was.
Their mayonnaise had been grown 75%.
The others had been grown 40% in total.
And they finally came out with something that averaged a little over 9%.
This is Taiwan.
That's a little over 20% of what they had hoped they could attain.
The call on the spot reluctantly agreed to the deal.
He said it's more than they thought, that it was the outer limb that he thought was okay.
Now what happened when they got back here is, you've been here before, you know that it's easier back home, pretty easy to pay.
I couldn't quite understand why they were turning this off so quickly because 9.2 is a hell of a lot better than 70 or 40 or 40.
So perhaps I was too suspicious, and I figured they might have something else somewhere.
So I called Bryce and said, Bryce, here's a scenario I don't understand, so perhaps you know something.
And while I sit down, I do know something.
I've told on various sources that Mills has made a very private deal
push the quota bill next spring as part of his political ambitions.
Now, in my talking with Milligan, he mentioned we think perhaps we could take our chances in 72.
He picked up the 72 days, which ties into the middle thing.
I can't guarantee this, but those are things we're trying to do.
Now, I think there's a divided industry, is my sense of it, to pair together.
Some of them say that's next spring.
It's not a bird in the hand.
It may or may not happen.
Nine or nine and a half is a lot better than what we've got now.
That's one point of view.
And I think Fred Nance, who led the team over there, has that point of view.
Others have taken the position that, you know, it ought to be better than that.
It ought to be better than that.
That's not good.
Now, our assessment of the situation here at that point, the view of that group is that we should have the strength to tell the people what to do.
That's what we're going to do.
Right, right.
Our alternative is now, as I indicated, is now we can go ahead and finish up the negotiation and get the best deal we could.
David's now in.
We could go ahead and get the best deal we could, try to get it somewhere in that 9% range, and then say, hey, you've delivered, it's a great improvement, and leave it at that.
The second alternative is to step up.
and then slap it on the Japanese.
And he's been meeting with the Japanese very confidentially through that Section 204.
The second alternate is obviously to drop the whole thing and simply say we're going for a quota bill.
That brings with it all the other problems that we know about.
The third alternate, which is the one that appeals to me, and I'm guessing to Peter and Harry,
It's something a little different than that.
What worries me most presently about this Bryce Carmel scenario is that you could get books off in a very interesting and obvious way, where they could very reluctantly quote-unquote accept the deal, do a lot of griping about how the negotiation could have been better and it should have been seven and a half instead of nine, feeling they were quite free next spring to play you off against Mills.
Mills was political.
You know, objectives now, having one objective, which is to best you and beat that number, whatever it is.
So I think most of us think that to sign a deal without any, even if we could get it at nine, without trying hard to get some commitments from the industry to the effect that they've thought about their alternatives and they believe this is a good deal and willing to go publicly, you know, and say something.
and hopefully get a commitment, and this may be more than we can get, these fellows from the industry that I know, for at least a minimum period of time, not to push the focus so that you don't get into that, you know, terribly awkward position where you're being bested.
It's perhaps the best route, rather than either dropping it and leaving yourself in the hands of brother males and friends, or making a deal without any commitments from the standpoint of the industry.
So I think we're recommending a conditional deal.
David, get the best deal he can get.
Meet with the industry after he's got it.
Get them all in a room together with Peter and Harry and John and so on, maybe John Conway and so forth.
Explain how difficult it is.
Explain we can't tell them all the things we're doing, obviously.
And try to get both a PR commitment out of them to say something publicly in the behalf of what a fine thing you've done and something on the legislative side.
Now, at that point, we've got another decision.
If they're unwilling to do that, then we can always just call the whole thing off, or we can decide at that point to go ahead.
But at least we will all look them in the eye in the room and try to decide.
And the reason for bothering me today is that you may regret not looking when I first came in to see you and hearing the term.
This is pretty much it.
We didn't take this at the time to expose you to this kind of problem.
So we're being discussed with John Mitchell, but our difficulty is we've got David Kennedy now over in Korea.
The Taiwan East deal is about 9, 9.2.
There are a few problems, but he thinks they can solve them.
We just got a wire.
He's met in Japan very confidentially with some of the top people.
They seem to be able to mark categories and so forth, so that you'll have a better deal than Mills had in Japan.
Yeah, that's right.
was not very good.
And incidentally, they might like the idea of having it imposed on them.
The feeling being that if it's imposed on them politically, they don't have to take the right after having given in.
So maybe this tool, of course, it won't be as bad as you think.
Oh, it gives them a chance to .
The real problem with that is going to be, and I agree with everything Peter said, the difficult part will be to get the industry to go with it.
But my view is that what we have to do is what is best for the industry to help.
If there are people who don't really, I mean, I don't know, if they're going to be part of some tough and unreasonable, I mean, if any industry...
We cannot see if they're going to handle a deal between 7 1⁄2 and 9 1⁄2.
It's a question of that or 40 to 60.
And now, figure out that pool.
So if I do is to, you know, sucker on the industry, we're just not going to do that.
So they go on the line whenever they want.
And they won't get a quote of those next few years.
We get this at 90%.
They've got to realize that's important.
There is no
We've got to say, what the hell?
We don't want all these damn stuff coming in.
They want to wait until the Congress will be meeting in an election year.
The last thing the Congress will have on its damn minds is to try to say, actually, you've gone through a lot of other tax things and great Social Security and all of this and need more, see, in terms of political stuff.
I think there's a lot of deal that we ought to try to get anything decent through in an election year, in my opinion.
They object.
See, they were looking for us to go roll back what they were doing.
And instead, we are agreeing to the current rate of imports plus the 9.2%.
This is where, in talking about it, this is Israel being beaten.
We were going to go back to maybe last year.
And, Mr. President, they have really stuck the stuff in here between December 31st and March 31st.
Thanks to Mr. Mills.
So that was thanks to Mr. Mills.
He gave them this big opportunity, and he arranged with the Japanese that they would have this hiatus period in which they could get all that money.
The point is that the 9.2, will we use 9.2 versus what, 40% or something?
The rate of increase.
But they come back and they say, yes, what you should make them do is make it decent, 31, not so much 31.
That's a tough one.
They started out, just like you and I said in our room in there, they started out at 25% to 30%.
Because there aren't just some areas that they could get from.
There is a military one in Korea.
And I think rather than bother you now, Mel, it's more or less reversed what we decided before.
And I think it's hard with you.
We better wait until Henry gets back, which will be this afternoon, and review the day.
Do you remember there was six or seven of those items that didn't bother you or Henry?
There were some that did, but now it's very adamant that there can't be any military.
David says only everything we've got is very good.
This is the drug.
Averages of, what was it, Peter?
185% of the last five years.
I think what we could do is put a guy like Freddie Dent and a couple of others in this group
I think we should, when we've got a deal, get to them and nail them down first so we don't go in with Bob Jackson.
Bob Jackson is essentially a Southern Democrat.
He's going to avoid tying this whole industry to you.
You're just not going to get us signed, sealed, and delivered.
But if we can split them and get some of them to go with us, and in the long run, Milliken, he's going to lose more money by having the opposition come in and take over this government.
No matter what.
They're all the same.
Sure, but no, particularly as rich as Milligan.
He's got to be for us when the chips are down, and he's got to be.
And he will be, and he's told me he will not open his mouth in opposition to any of this.
Well, the thing is, we're trying to do the best that we can.
And he's over there.
There's been this huge area of bottom walls, and the poor guy sends back.
And we might be in India in a moment.
The other thing, the possibility of persons.
The thing that's wrong with that is they will then charge, they, the Democrats, will charge that the president was ineffective.
He did keep his word.
That's why I think he's going on to what is, you know, I don't feel he should get all the help he can.
But from your standpoint, I'll say, well, here, do something.
We have got to do something, even if it isn't everything.
And the other thing that helps immediately with that is the fact that you take in my state of South Carolina, which is the Texas outskirts.
You've got a whole lot of South Carolina.
We've got tremendous agriculture.
And the other lot of South Carolina is where your Texas outskirts.
But when you get out of the next season, you say the president took the reasonable approach, which avoided retaliation and saved the agricultural exports and brings it from here down to here.
You can make some headway in all kinds of the same situation they have to buy exports.
You see, they won't, by the way, I saw Scott.
I don't think it can be criticized.
The industry people are now saying, too, that you see now with the Texas People's Senate.
What are we going to do about textiles and red china, you see?
THE PRESIDENT.
Oh, yeah.
If they're going to worry about that, they're going to receive dollars.
That's the best.
Mr. President, on the agriculture, everybody who has studied what our CNA will read is going to have to laugh, because we'll control that.
Everybody who has studied this Christmas tree
But that would be if we actually did it.
It's not the bill.
It's the implementation of the bill.
But I can't think next year would be just.
Well, we'll try.
We'll try.
Mitchell, I think, should.
listen, be sensitive, and so forth.
But whether it's all the best we can, we're putting all the money in.
We can't leave the rest of it.
It's best to have some progress rather than none.
And frankly, they want to go there.
I think if you might get sure that Dan is fine, Roger, Roger, they say nothing.
Very much so.
We've got to get Roger talking first.
He's got to know where his long-term interests lie.
It can't be, Justin, whether it's 7.5% or 9%.
Well, his hair is like those for the day.
It's a very important time, I guess.
Of course.
The point is, what is he going to get next year?
It's a very handsome truth.
I just don't think this Congress, maybe no-law strategy, would have been the best.
If I do no-law, despite the support of our group later, which it has in the present time,
In spite of the support group, you get the various other interests involved.
You know what I mean?
Like we did before.
The extracurricular senators and congress senators have got to oppose the political.
They've got to.
Right here.
Or, in addition to that, you've got Chavez and his gang.
But the fact you get that, they don't talk to that damn thing.
The fact Bill's not getting put on the troop,
Uh, particularly if you get this through and you, and you have no real shoe, I mean, you saw the shoe thing.
In terms of boats, the way they come down to about 140 and 150, if they have some inside here in Mexico, about 40 to 50 on the shoes.
He sees us putting him in a box.
And, uh, I don't want to talk to him until it's further down the road.
We want his best advice.
You know, of course, we need to keep straight.
Well, I've been waiting for this season.
See, there's always several things that we haven't got talked about yet.
We can wire bait and tell them there's some reasons we want them to come on here.
and then stick to the course.
My view is go on this deal.
If you can get a 9%, let's do it.
Because I'll tell you, you put your finger on it.
We better have something that we did, rather than something weird.
And so, by golly, and I'm just going to say, look, we'd like to have something better.
This is the best we can get.
And if they want to go up Porterville, then we'll just crack them hard on what you're going to do to your agriculture.
You know what I mean?
No, I'd rather do it.
And you can't tell them to do it unconditionally.
Just say we decided on where we're going to go.
We'll do our very best to sell the industry.
If you screw around and say, well, I don't, you can't do the industry of each over this.
We've got to decide what's best.
If this is the best we can do for the industry, good God, we've fought their battle up and down.
And that mill thing wouldn't help them at all.
Steve, the mill thing isn't.
Do you want me to just step up?
Yes, sir.