Conversation 520-006

TapeTape 520StartTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 11:02 AMEndTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 12:34 PMTape start time01:07:16Tape end time02:40:53ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Brandt, Willy;  Bull, Stephen B.;  Sanchez, Manolo;  Kissinger, Henry A.;  Bahr, Egon;  Pauls, Rolf;  Ahlers, Conrad;  Kusterer, Hermann;  Schilling, Wolf-Dietrich;  Obst, HarryRecording deviceOval Office

On June 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon, Willy Brandt, Stephen B. Bull, Manolo Sanchez, Henry A. Kissinger, Egon Bahr, Rolf Pauls, Conrad Ahlers, Hermann Kusterer, Wolf-Dietrich Schilling, and Harry Obst met in the Oval Office of the White House from 11:02 am to 12:34 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 520-006 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 520-006

Date: June 15, 1971
Time: 11:02 am - 12:34 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Willy Brandt and Stephen B. Bull; members of the press were present at
the beginning of the meeting

     Greetings

     Seating

     Photographic session

     Brandt’s trip
          -Visit to Yale University
          -Jamaican stop

     [Camera noise]

The press left at an unknown time after 11:02 am

     Brandt schedule
          -Henry A. Kissinger
          -Egon Bahr
          -State dinner
          -Appointments in US

     Berlin negotiations
           -Soviet Union’s position
                 -Movement
                 -US response
                       -Relation to Brandt
                       -Berlin ties
                 -Possibility of surprises
           -Berlin talks
                 -Possibilities
                 -Displays of Western “willingness”
                 -Comparison with Four Power talks in 1959

                 -Comparison with John F. Kennedy
                 -Soviet military
            -Soviet
                 -Soviet negotiating tactics

Manolo Sanchez entered at an unknown time after 11:02 am

     Refreshments

Kissinger and Bahr entered at 11:13 am

     Greetings

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 12:32 pm

     Previous President-Brandt talk
          -Berlin talks
          -Department of State role
                -Leak problem
                -1959 Berlin talks
                      -Kennedy
          -Substance
          -Soviet movement
          -Soviet tactics
                -Isolation of Berlin
                -Public versus private stance
          -Substance of talks
                -Consular offices in West Berlin

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[National Security]
[520-006-w001]
[Duration: 1m 23s]

     Berlin negotiations

            -Chances of Berlin settlement
                 -US presence in West Berlin
                 -Russian ambassador Valentin M. Falin meeting
                      -Ratification of treaties
                      -Valentin M. Falin’s personal view
                      -Controversies over US and Soviet presence in West Berlin

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     Berlin negotiations
           -Chances of Berlin settlement
                 -Russian ambassador Valentin M. Falin meeting
                       -Benefits of consular offices
           -Scope of talks
           -Need for US-Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] cooperation
           -Negotiating tactics
                 -Need for caution
           -Bahr relationship with Kissinger and [David] Kenneth Rush
           -Soviet tactics
                 -Desire for contact at highest levels
                 -Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
           -Formulation of solutions
           -Strategy
           -Future positions
                 -Ostpolitik
                 -Role of Berlin
           -Linkage
                 -Mutual and Balanced Force [MBFR] talks
                 -Other goals
                 -US-FRG cooperation

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[National Security]
[520-006-w002]

[Duration: 13m 30s]

     Berlin negotiations
           -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Council Meeting
                -Mansfield Amendment
                -Spirit of meeting
                       -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] consideration
                -Meeting of Deputy Ministers
                -Informal discussions
                       -Nature of talks
                       -Russian viewpoint
                       -Melvin R. Laird
                              -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] paper
                              -Consultation with partners in Europe
                -Communications procedures for formal and informal discussions
                       -Private discussions
                              -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
                -Relations between the US and Europe
                       -Recognition of problems related to the Vietnam War in US
                       -Europe's role in Vietnam
                       -Strengthen defense responsibility of European powers
                              -Comparison to US defense budget
                              -Defense improvements
                              -Improvement of European public image in US
                       -Political relations
                              -Discussions of the previous year
                              -Handling relations between US and enlarged European community
                -British entry into Common Market
                       -Willy Brandt contact with British politicians
                       -House of Commons voting
                       -Edward R. G. Heath
                              -Ability to get a majority
                       -Results of entry on Union
                              -Labour voting
                              -Conservatives voting
                       -Uncertainty
                              -Farmers
                       -New European community with British
                              -Community of ten

                             -Open to the world
                             -Free trade
                             -French
                 -US/Common Market relations
                       -Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]
                             -Use for economic discussions
                 -Alliance contacts
                       -Level of contacts
                       -Discussion of economic issues
                       -Benefits
                 -Changing political climate in Western Europe
                       -Consultation and cooperation
                       -Reliance of Europe on US
                             -History
                             -National identities and character
                       -Georges J. R. Pompidou and Willy Brandt conversation
                       -Edward R. G. Heath
                       -Concept of European government
                             -Common policy
                             -Nature
                             -Role of Council of Ministers
                       -Foreign Minister’s consultation
                             -Scope
                             -History
                             -Present efforts
                             -Future
                             -French and British
                       -Need for US/Europe contacts
                             -Georges J. R. Pompidou visit to Brussels
                             -Basis for common action
                       -Role of US

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     European affairs
          -European evolution
               -History
                      -Role of US

            -Contemporary Europe
                 -Economic strength
                       -Germany
                       -France
                       -Great Britain
                 -Future
                       -US “stake” in future
                 -Fear of European economic unity
                       -Rationale
                 -Need for political consultation
                       -Cooperation of Western Europeans
                             -Contribution to world stability
                       -Old politics
                       -US position in alliance
                       -Efforts to strengthen Europe
                       -Efforts towards British inclusion
                       -Edward R. G. Heath
                       -Georges J. R. Pompidou

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[National Security]
[520-006-w003]
[Duration: 8m 58s]

     European affairs
          -Contemporary Europe
               -US economic cost
               -US trade with European Economic Community [EEC]
                      -Compared globally
                      -Future trends
                      -Great Britain
          -Japan
               -Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] meeting
                      -William P. Rogers role
               -Economic competition

                  -Conflicting German/US goals
                         -Resolution
                         -Georges J. R. Pompidou role
                  -Comparison of Germany and Japan
                  -Need for cooperation
                  -US treatment of Japan
                         -US goods from Japan
                         -Strength of Japan and Asian countries
                         -Perseverance of Japanese people
            -Military Links
                  -France and Western Europe
                         -Linkage to North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] integration
                         -Visit of Chief of Staff
                  -British role
                         -European defense improvement role
                         -Isolation of French
                               -US/French talks
                                     -Georges J. R. Pompidou
                               -French policy toward North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]
                         -Georges J. R. Pompidou power to force change
                               -Background
                               -Charles A. J. M. De Gaulle
                         -French concerns
                         -Great Britain
                         -Need for conversation and cooperation with French
                         -US talks with France
                               -Prevention of isolation
                  -France
                         -Position of French language in Europe
                               -French language education in German schools
                                     -Appealing to French sentiment
                                     -External appearance
                                     -Importance
                         -French and English language education and use
                               -English supplant French

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     Defense spending
          -Growing expenditures
               -Michael J. (“Mike”) Mansfield Amendment
                     -Consequences
                            -Burden-sharing
                            -MBFR
               -Assurances to legislators
                     -Content
                     -Alliance systems
               -Brandt’s views on MBFR
                     -Bilateral talks
                            -US-Soviet Union
                     -Multilateral talks
                            -Participants
               -United Nations [UN]
                     -General Assembly
                            -Fairness of voting
                            -Efficacy
               -Bilateral US-Soviet negotiations
               -MBFR
                     -Scope
                     -Initiation

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
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[National Security]
[520-006-w004]
[Duration: 1m 5s]

     Defense spending
          -Growing expenditures
               -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
                     -William P. Rogers
                           -Symbolism around MBFR
                           -Progress
                     -Andrei A. Gromyko

                            -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
                                  -Lack of progress
                       -Discussion with Helmut H. W. Schmidt
                            -Possibility of agreements

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     Defense spending
          -Growing expenditures
                -Brandt visit to Congress
                      -Schedule
                      -Assurances to Congress
                -Security emphasis
                      -Military expenditures
                            -US Senate
                      -Contributions to defense
                            -Burden-sharing
                                  -US
                                  -NATO
                            -US troops in West Germany
                            -Balance of payments
                -Need for Congressional assurances
                      -Mansfield
                -Relative contribution of US and Europe
                      -Mansfield
                -Balance of payments
                -Force reductions
                -Balance of payments
                      -John B. Connally
                -Mansfield resolution
                      -White House efforts
                -Balance of payments
          -Floating of Deutsche Mark
                -Brandt’s concerns
                -Length of action

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[National Security]
[520-006-w005]
[Duration: 35s]

     Defense spending
          -Floating of Deutsche Mark
                -Canadian approach
                -Returning to the old parity
                     -Ending floating

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     Defense spending
          -Floating of Deutsche Mark
                -Necessity
                      -Duration
                -Effect on Europe
                -Effect on markets
                      -Rumors
                      -Speculators
                      -Effect on “decent people”
                      -Elimination of crisis atmosphere
          -International finance
                -Brandt meeting with Connally
                      -Connally trip to Germany
                      -Schedule
                -Strength of currencies
                -Opportunity for leadership
                      -US and Germany
                      -Japan
                      -Other countries
                -Attention to balance of payments
                -Monetary movements
                      -Effect on security
                -Rush

                        -President’s confidence
                        -Dealing with Brandt
                  -Need for economic strength and vitality
                  -Effect on politics
                  -US role
            -World politics
                  -Role of European nations
                  -US role
                  -Soviet role
                  -Japanese role
                  -People’s Republic of China [PRC] role
                  -US-PRC relations
                        -Normalization
                        -UN
                        -Brandt background
                        -Soviet Union
                               -PRC
            -PRC Interest
                  -Soviet Union
                  -Japan
            -Japanese interest
                  -US “nuclear umbrella”
                  -PRC
                  -Soviet Union
            -Western Europe interest
                  -West Germany
            -US
            -Regions
            -Underdeveloped areas
                  -Middle East
                  -Africa
                  -Latin America
                  -South Asia
                        -India
                        -Pakistan
            -Five great powers
                  -Need for Realism
                  -US-PRC relations
                        -Future effect

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
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[National Security]
[520-006-w006]
[Duration: 3m 2s]

     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] relations
          -Use of triangular diplomacy
               -People’s Republic of China [PRC]/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
          -German view of US/People’s Republic of China [PRC] relations
          -People’s Republic of China [PRC]
               -Priority of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]/German relations
               -Federal Republic of Germany [FRG]/People’s Republic of China [PRC]
               -Adolf Hitler
               -Proximity to Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
               -People’s Republic of China [PRC] relationship with East Germany
               -Willy Brandt trip to Moscow to sign treaty
                      -Leonid I. Brezhnev/Aleksei N. Kosygin
                      -Soviet request regarding mentioning People’s Republic of China [PRC]
                            -Implication
                                  -Paranoia
               -Concern for Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]/US relations

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     Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] relations
          -World affairs
               -Concern for US-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] relations
               -US position regarding Japan
               -German concerns

     President and Brandt’s schedule
           -Meeting with Rush and German official
           -Cabinet Room

Kissinger and Bahr left 12:30 pm

     Nuclear arms
          -US-PRC relations
               -Reason for US moves
               -USSR-PRC relations
               -US-USSR relations
               -Prospects of war involving PRC
               -Nuclear arms control deal
                    -Chinese capabilities
                          -Future
                          -Japan

Kissinger, Bahr, Rolf Pauls, Conrad Ahlers, Hermann Kusterer, Wolf-Dietrich Schilling, and
Harry Obst entered at 12:32 pm

     President-Brandt discussions
           -Success

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[National Security]
[520-006-w007]
[Duration: 16s]

     India-Pakistan
           -Indira Gandhi
                 -Relations with Pakistan
                 -Help with refugee situation

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     India-Pakistan
           -Refugee problem

                 -Conflict
                      -India
                             -West Pakistan
                             -East Pakistan
                 -Aid to refugees
                 -Taking sides
                       -Agha Muhommad Yahya Khan
                             -Ability
                             -Difficulties
                 -Focus on refugees
                 -Use of refugee issue

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[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
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[National Security]
[520-006-w008]
[Duration: 31s]

     India-Pakistan
           -Refugee problem
                -Discussions in Pakistan consortium
                     -Pushing Hindus out from East Pakistan

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     India-Pakistan
           -Problems in South Asia
                -Poverty
                -Strength
                -India-Pakistan situation
                      -Kashmir
                            -Vice presidential experience
                      -Need for cooperation
                      -Comparison with US-Europe relations
                            -Germany

                            -France
                       -Problems of keeping armed forces

     Vietnam

     Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
           -Anti-ballistic missile [ABM] elimination
           -Offensive weapons elimination
                 -Timing
           -US-USSR communique
           -Weapons not covered
           -Negotiations between US-USSR
                 -Prospects
                        -Agreement
                        -Timetable
                 -Linkage
                        -SALT progress and Berlin negotiations
                        -Position in Atlantic alliance

     Middle East

The President, Brandt, et al. left at 12:34 pm

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

How are you?
How are you?
Well, come over here.
You remember this chair you usually sit in?
Well, maybe if you were home.
That's what I'd take from you.
Yes, I was in Yale, yes, in Yale, yes, and they would call you to the Jamaican.
First off, I was in Jamaica.
What did you do there?
I was in Jamaica at the time, and they had asked me to join them, and I said, well, if you want to do this, you can do it.
I said, well, if you want to do this, you can do it.
I said, well, if you want to do this, you can do it.
Grab the stills out.
.
.
.
We're going to wrap it up right now.
Yes, yes.
Oh, yes.
here at the bar.
They can join us if you'd like.
It's a very easy party with me.
It's a swag.
But I have about 50 people.
But you won't do it on that day.
After that, I've got several of these regular people who want to see you when you're here.
But it'll be easy.
You won't have to go through any of it.
That is the story.
I think that is the reason for some moderate optimism.
Moderate optimism, that's good.
Well, actually, we know, I know that you're taking the whole problem which is key to this.
uh if you simply look at what appears publicly in the four power thing it doesn't look uh too promising but uh what is occurring privately uh you know some of these other things uh it seems to me that i'd like to get the impression that the
that the Soviet, while taking a very hard position at the beginning, have come much further toward our direction and yours than we have gone toward theirs.
Would you agree?
I would agree.
That is what we want to do here, Mr. Chancellor.
We want to be sure that we take a position that protects you.
Yes.
And we can be a little tougher than you can, as a matter of fact, because you have, with all your ties to Berlin,
I mean, as a person, and also with regard to your, I'm pretty impressed.
I think the fact that he comes far away is a good thing.
Now, we've got him a little further.
He doesn't make it to the table.
That's the way it looks to me.
How do you feel about that?
Well, one has no guarantee that there could be a surprise.
They would be surprised at the negatives.
It doesn't look like that.
If we get it along the line, I see it now, that this would mean, Mr. President, that if you compare it with, well, the four powers discussed in Geneva in 1959 of the crucial argument,
or even if you could compare it with President Kennedy's three exceptions, this would be much more than the West was willing to accept.
29, right?
Very, very, very important.
This would be... Everything is relevant.
You can't get the whole point of it here.
This is more than 59.
Yes, yes.
And this in spite of the fact that all of the military position rather is more favorable for the Soviet Union than it was then.
But still they must have their own reasons why they think they should not be too careful.
I hope this will work out.
The private contacts you mentioned I think have been helpful.
Um, I don't know.
It's a good finding that you Russian men always are very intelligent.
They don't have much freedom of movement, but they have a lot of work to do.
I have authorized those only because I know that with regard to these fellows in Moscow, they tend to want to deal at highest levels.
So I said, okay, talk to them.
And having in mind the fact that we put it all on the channel over there, you, of course, can decide what you want to do with it.
So I said, our man, he's a good man, isn't he?
trying to negotiate, and he speaks very highly of what's going on.
He was suggesting this, but he says that he is somewhat, he says about the same thing you did.
Unless they made a sudden turn, hard line, which they might, that they're gonna make a deal.
And of course, another thing which we have to have in mind is that the deal too.
After all, if they want this, they know very well what happens to the treaty, unless they keep the deal.
So we must never be in a position where .
They're not looking down our throats.
We're not looking down theirs either.
But that's the way to make a decision, because either side can make a break.
And I think we may get something out of it.
Yes.
Here you go.
Would you prefer tea or tea in reverse to coffee?
Would you?
I have a question.
You gave a second vote, don't you, today?
No.
Well, then I'll let you go get it, sir.
Sure.
We, uh, the checks are not yet started our discussion.
I asked him if he was there for women.
And he said, Mr. Chancellor, I can tell you that in our discussions that he takes that we have, even on our previous occasions, the two of us want this.
Any notes that are made on our part are only for paper.
And we do not sign the statement on the bureaucracy.
Because we feel that we have to feel free to tell them where it came from.
he said he felt that unless there is a hard turn
unexpected development, that there is a chance, not a good chance, or I guess he's had a moderately good chance for a room and so on and so forth.
Yes.
And one, Mr. President, if I may repeat, it had pretty much set out just very well.
Yes, which would give us, I mean, not all, but much more than the West was prepared to discuss in 59,
or an even competitive prison, Kennedy Street, essentially, this would have much more of a substance.
Do you agree with that?
I agree.
I told you nine of those words, but I felt that I feel that we're doing better than I thought possible.
We haven't even said it.
Mr. Chastity said it.
They had come up two-thirds toward us, and we had come one-third toward them.
Well, that's a pretty good deal.
Yes.
provided you can still maintain your position.
You know, I know this is interesting, how in all of their public statements, they constantly get back to that same old song, trying to split off Berlin as a separate entity.
They want to cut off as a separate entity.
Yes, that's the public position.
On the other hand, you stood firm on that, and privately they don't go that far.
I think on access, for example, they have essentially accepted our essential points of view.
The big problem now is federal presence got into them.
Soviet presence in West Berlin.
Right.
I don't think that is Soviet.
That is an unnatural Soviet presence in West Berlin.
Well, they want a consular office.
A consular, yes.
Yes.
If I may say a word on our presence, Mr. President.
This is the MGR.
Yes.
When the new president came to see me,
He said, I made just some remarks on the link which we had established between Berlin and the ratification of our treaties.
I repeated that this was no juridical thing, but politically it had to be done this way.
And he then said he would express the personal view.
He wasn't sure that that was the view discovered by the world.
He said that.
It might be that even if we have argued against it, that you were right because, had we not created that link, then Berlin would have been a matter of controversy over years.
That was what we could try.
the solution.
Then he said, since I've said this, I will add something.
We have argued all the time against federal presence.
But I tell you, we of course know that he must have federal presence in West Berlin if we say it
belongs together, not in the sense of being a federal state, but belongs together.
This was quite interesting.
On Soviet presence in West Berlin, Mr. President, when I still was mayor of Berlin, they had three offices, not constantly, but they had interests, they had trade offices, and our ex-coordinator was
was the film, film, uh, film agency.
They all have, uh, covered photos of one another.
They might even have it here.
We've got all the other activities.
Everything they have is covered.
So, uh, I already at one time said that I would prefer to have one of these.
or one house where they had their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their, their,
is the top of the , which is easier to have under control than what is under control.
And that's also a technological element involved.
I mean, it's difficult from your point of view.
One has to be very careful how to
what kind of an office in Berlin, the number, but from the point of view of the West Berliners, take for example businessmen and artists and others who go to the Soviet Union, they now have to go to East Berlin to collect their visa.
If they had a little office in West Berlin, there's no department of the public of West Berliners,
would be regarded as an intrusion, because they would not have to go to the embassy with a G.I.
in order to pick up their visa.
Huh?
Westerners.
I see, I see.
I see the point of the meeting.
They're all on-site by the second of the transfer, and he doesn't get this.
What we want to do is to take a position.
That will be, uh, I'll be consistent with yours, but it will, will, uh, cut you at the same time.
and we can be, if necessary, stronger than, you know, a particular area.
The point being that, to us, this argument is not about the land.
It's about you.
It's about, you know, to me, that's what it really is about.
Sure, the land is important, but we're at a stop.
We therefore are, and Henry is aware of this,
We will bargain.
And we're right on the same screen.
We're exactly the same channel.
We want to agree.
You want to agree.
We want to maintain the linkage, basically, that you did.
Now, the sole distinct agreement.
And so therefore, they're not going to be on our throats for years.
So under certain circumstances, we should just continue without being too anxious.
Because if we were too anxious, then they raised the price.
If we were too anxious, we should just continue to go right forward until we catch one.
Now, that's about the way I would feel.
Is that any careful?
Yes.
Do you have anything there to add?
No, and Egon and I and Egon and Rush have a very close working relationship now, so that we have the beginning of the chapter.
You see, what we do is this.
What we do is we put this right in the channel directly to Moscow.
But we don't sell them the thing that we don't sell them.
I'm not saying we're proud of the university.
We want you to know that we're doing this only because
They brought in some new formulations yesterday to bring for your visit.
which there's no sense bothering you with now.
I'll take it up with me on this.
One has a new population for the final act, which is better than the one they've given us.
It may not be enough yet, but it's an improvement.
One has to do with the federal presence, which probably isn't quite enough.
But it's, again, a slight step in our...
And, uh, this will be one of the key points in the most disciplined class.
So, Stan, I'm sorry to, uh, to remove this.
I feel a little bit on the federal trust thing, just to, uh, the hardest line, uh, that is necessary, or is necessarily, uh, we, we really want to, uh, what is really at stake here is, as I say, it's, uh, naturally, uh, the people who live around us, what is at stake is the whole,
Federal Republic, it's future, it's the same.
Your position as leader, your own, you know, us politics, et cetera, I mean, Berlin is the key.
We've got to get, but we want to, you want to be sure we open that door, we don't fall down the steps.
And for that reason, even though our Soviet friends always have horrible word linkage,
Of course it is challenging.
Let's face it.
You know and I know that we talk about duty-balanced force reductions.
Why do we maintain forces?
And if you are anyone, the reason you maintain forces is because there are tensions.
So if you reduce those factors that cause tensions,
you're there to work and be more or coming here to see forces.
If, on the other hand, you make no progress in producing those things and cause tensions, you're going to have an incentive to maintain the forces.
So there is a need to improve it.
And the future of Europe.
And the forces all over it, right?
And I think we just...
without using that nasty word which sets them off.
They know very well, and they learn everything, don't they?
They like it, they want us to discuss everything separately, but they never do it unless it's in tandem, part of the process.
So we're in a position, I think Linda did,
I'm pleased that you feel we're operating, we are acting consistent with what you want here.
That's what we want.
Yes, this is true for Lynn and also for those letters which were discussed at the last NATO Council meeting.
I think this was a good idea.
I'd like to talk to Tom about how you think that went.
I think it went very well.
I'd like to get your report on it, your reactions to that.
Well, Mr. President, to begin with, as far as the NISPOM meeting
was concerned, I think it was of great importance that one could agree on how to handle the NBFR.
This meeting of the deputy ministers in September, the explorateurs, which eventually might be asked to find out what the Russians really think.
There's one
The thing I would like to mention, my connection, is that the United States would take a paper on MPFR and the NATO Council towards the end of June.
If it were possible, before it is tabled formally,
to have some kind of consultation with some of the main partners in Europe.
This might help, because otherwise things might get rather, you know how things are.
What is this, sir?
What is this?
The formal procedure appears to be a table at its best, but if the Chancellor wanted to send somebody over here,
for some informal discussions.
You could certainly do that.
I would appreciate that.
Those have to be announced.
No, no, not right.
No, of course not.
I've set that up in a private discussion here, where we can do it so we keep it all in the hat.
But we would like to be helpful to them before we do it.
They just want to put something out there.
Especially, Mr. Burton, since some of these things, like I said, these middle-range missiles, which, yes, I would solve.
And we'll come in on the new cover of MPFR.
Then, of course, we are especially interested so that we could have a private discussion for experts.
That was the plan.
Then, on the relations between Europe and the United States as a whole,
I, of course, understand the problems you were facing in this country, and I stand in this case for the opposition in my country as well, and many colleagues in the less European countries that we are most grateful for the position you are in.
you are taking, and we understand that this is a thing which has not come to an end by the decision the Senate did take a few weeks ago, and this will go on.
We will try to make it clear that we want to
strength and the responsibility of the European partners within the alliance.
We have made a modest beginning last year, last winter, on EDIT, this European Development Programme.
It is small in figures if you compare it with your attached budget, but from a principal point of view, this was something very important.
I hope we can add something to that.
There is a study within the United States, 70, which asks for certain improvements in various fields.
I hope we can make a European picture of that.
So to do something which
improves our own defense and that of our Western European partners at the same time.
It shows to the American people that we are serious about this and try to, as I said, strengthen our own position and responsibility within the alliance.
Politically,
It's even more important than when I discussed it or mentioned it last year, I was here, how to handle future relations between an enlarged European community and the United States.
Last year, this seemed to be more hypothetical because nobody could know that we would come so close to the British Empire.
I would say now that only the British themselves now would stop there for you to remind.
And I could not completely exclude that possibility.
I think this is not likely to happen.
I had a word from Teddy just before I left, and he said that he was confident that he would get a majority.
in the House of Commons, and some of my labor friends tell me that they will support Prime Minister even if their party would make it a matter of discipline to vote against.
So my would be that even in this case, the group of laborers who could vote for him would be bigger than the group of conservatives who would vote against him.
So you can .
And, but if this tradition is, I think this, in this case, it still is a lie that has been house-taken decision that the public opinion will accept that this is even a public opinion.
They're letting it.
They're letting it.
Yes, they are.
We're worried about the uncertainty.
Everybody worries about the uncertainty.
Not that what they had is too good.
They think, oh, God, it'll be worse.
Farmers worry.
Yes, and worries.
But I think it's probably the most comfortable thing that they would join.
Then the others would join, too.
We would have a community of ten.
And I think
there's good reason to believe that this community will be more open to the world, more in favor of free trade, and the existing community has been.
This, because our interests and the interests of the British go more in the direction of world trade.
And we would like to, uh, to, uh, uh, elaborate in any manner we could.
I heard you say the Shema.
organized delays between the United States and the community, if that is necessary.
I doubt it at the moment, but it is necessary because these ad hoc contacts which are working now, they are not so bad.
And one could also, of course, take the view that OECD, which may be in a process of revival, could be the forum within which one discuss our economic problems.
Together with us, the Secretary Rogers made a very important statement last week when this OECD meeting was held in Paris.
In any case,
We will take the view that we must come together as often as possible and on a level which is high enough to discuss how to avoid economic clashes and remain certain cases where our economic interests in such means
cannot easily be reconciled, but even then one has to get together and try to make a compromise.
They tried this last week on citrus fruit, which is important.
And I hope they will make progress.
What perhaps even may be more important is this.
that after all these years of stagnation in Western Europe, I have a feeling that we now are at a point where political consultation and cooperation will make progress.
It will not go along the line which was
developed 20 years ago when some people, some good American friends thought that Western Europe had to become a country of the United States.
Europe following that set up.
And we must say this will not happen.
The national identities are so strong they have to be combined.
They wouldn't be because of it.
You would lose a lot of character.
But, you see, President Tompidou, with whom I discussed this
a certain deal early this year.
He will be in Bonn now and a fortnight from now we will follow up the discussion.
In the meantime, he has discussed it with Mr. Heath.
He is thinking, and I agree with him, that we need a kind of a government for those areas where we have a common policy.
And this will be the task, I mean,
Because the end of the decay, it will not be a supranational cellar.
The council of ministers, the national governments, to have their representatives will be the decisive body.
But we need at the same time something like the existing commission of state's care of the overall interest, business or not.
The foreign ministers,
have started what I would call a qualified consultation on certain foreign political issues.
And already the first attempts they have made differ very much from what I experienced when I was a foreign minister because their consultation meant that one of our colleagues would give a report and someone else would say, I also made a journey to Kenya, I can tell you this or that.
But now they are really trying, officials of the foreign office are trying to put political arguments together
trying to find out where this common ground for not only analysis, but also for action.
So I think that even if it has taken a long time, under the new leadership in France, together with the British and ourselves and the others, of course, we will move into the process where Western Europe will
get closer together.
And then, of course, it is even more important that we have these strong links with the United States.
Then again, it is important that President Pompidou, especially during his recent visit to Brussels, made clear that this also was the ideal, the ideal solution, that we needed this strong relationship.
I mean, I do not agree with every one element of his thing, but that is a good basis for common action together with him and with the British.
And I think this will be good for the United States, too, to have something which goes beyond the situation in which we have to live now.
As I have developed my knowledge, the problem in Europe is radically different now from what it was 25 years ago in Europe, when the Europeans beat the war.
They only knew what they did with the United States leadership, and to a certain extent, the United States direction, and did not look for dictatorship.
uh that period has passed now and the european nations are strongly and honestly they are stable politically the great power of yours uh the french the british in its own way under those circumstances uh uh we first began with the proposition that that the where
I have always indicated that the United States has a great stake in that future because of our grounds, our American total.
That is the great role of the spoiler, which some would suggest would be like, well, there are many in this country, just like many in Britain, who fear European countries.
And they hear it because when you have European economic unity, you will have 300 million people with eventually a common currency, with a common trade policy.
And that policy could be, many people believe, detrimental to the United States.
And there are many that argue that at this point.
I did not take that position.
I did not take it because I believe that overriding that economic consideration is the need for
in the European Union.
I think that to the extent that these great peoples of Western Europe can work together, that this is, this in the long run, creates a situation that can be helpful to world stability.
I think that a divided Europe, divided world,
in small ways rather than in large ways, that that might, that that would be, that would be in the interest of the United States if we were a predatory power trying to step in and pick up the pieces.
And of course, it's the old politics, it's the old diplomacy, it's 19th century diplomacy.
But as a matter of fact, British diplomacy was always eager to divide, you know, whatever they thought.
That is not our view.
It's not mine.
We do, in this whole economic field, without taking a presumptuous decision 25 years ago, and even 15 years ago, when the United States, because of its superior wealth, power, et cetera, and Europe because of its weakness, when the United States took the leadership position and said, you do this or that or the other thing,
Now, we say to Europe, we welcome the efforts of Europeans to strengthen the market.
We recognize that this presents real problems for us in a competitive situation.
We're prepared to deal with those problems.
But what we need is to, once that new force is created,
Uh, we've got all of that in a, in a, in a consultative procedure and, uh, a method whereby we can ask competition to help us both.
Uh, this is not going to be easy.
Uh, and we will find American, uh, the, the ideas of the Americans safe and, uh, actually growth in this country.
Um, this is the plan for the, for the whole, uh,
Let's have the development of a policy, I believe it's called this, third economic force in the world.
And when I say a third force, it would be the first force, because Europe will be, where people will have eyes jammed to you here, I mean, Western Europe.
And potentially we could, so under these circumstances,
You can make that case.
But all of us who have to be accountable to history, I think, have to come down on the side of welcoming these steps further and allowing them to come to their own time, each nation making this
It's based on its national song, and that's our position on it.
Yes, I've been taught this way to heed, and also taught me to... Of course, they play a somewhat independent role here, but they've had to be served with an honest standpoint.
Right.
Yes.
If I may make one or two comments on this, Mr. President.
One is that I will not say that the United States had to pay the economic price, as it has been for some time, in order to support or promote political, because the figures show that United States trade with the existing EEC
has increased considerably more than trade with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
It has increased more than with any other region within the world.
This would be even more the case in the future.
A second remark would be on Japan.
I would think, especially since I have looked into the records from that OECD meeting where Senator Rogers presided, that if our assistance could be in contact, we would like to discuss
how we could do certain things together in order to influence the Japanese.
Or how to make it more difficult for them to
Direct activity is too much of a problem because we are close.
So we get better.
The community has been very calm with the Japanese.
And we've been very tolerant with the Japanese.
And we've resolved on our inspectors, on our transistors, or how cold it was.
They were all in here.
But now, actually, you can see the reaction of our people in that respect.
How do you hold the Japanese?
And this is a problem.
It may be that looking this way now, it may be looking to the future.
We have to find a way.
Because they are a potent people.
The Japanese and Asia, let's face it, are like the Germans.
They're strong, competitive.
Imagine if they still got dry.
You've got, you're strong.
You're, you still got, you work hard enough.
What I meant is, compared to your neighbors, you do damn well.
But I know we've all got, everybody's got their problems now, inflation and all the other things.
But the Japanese, they'll find their problems eventually.
You work hard, but you're hungry.
Let's face it.
As the Japanese get more, they're going to get a little battered, and they're going to want to spend a little more hours in the houses and the cocktail houses and so forth.
They had to develop an army first of all.
What's that?
They had to develop an army.
Yes.
An army first of all.
They had no expenses.
They had no expenses.
Nearly no expenses.
Not one percent.
Two percent.
Nothing.
So they do have to go.
Yes.
Apart from that, Mr. President, for France, I think that...
But in a very patient way, we should go on trying to strengthen military links with France without quarreling with them for the time being about NATO integration.
With me.
U.S. and Western Europe, but what the U.S. could do in the future, we would welcome them, as I understand.
The top people have been, well, exactly, their chief of staff has been there and so on.
This is all good.
We try to find a way to create as many links as possible together with them.
And we discussed with the British to go on with the same.
And we have at least brought them into a little piece of that European Defense Improvement Program.
So if we go on and on this line, we may not discuss theories and principles that do practical things.
And as a result of that, I think they will not be
is not as much of a deposition of their own energy as they have been.
I think it's very important that the French not feel isolated.
It's very important that any country in Latin America not feel isolated, but the French must not feel that way.
That's why our talks with Pompidou have been very crucial.
Pompidou cannot change.
the French policy toward NATO.
After all, he came from a political tradition, and they aren't allowed to do it.
On the other hand, you've got to manage easy for them on bilateral relations, and it would be very easy for them to have cooperation with the British and the Russians in France.
If Britain should be a part of Europe, France has got to be a part of it.
It would be uneasy for them to get the feeling now, as Britain goes then to Europe, in other places.
I would say to me that the French have their concerns.
I mean, I don't mean Britain.
But I think it's going to take a lot of constant communication, discussion with the French to keep them in isolation, going their own way.
So economically, the cooperation goes forward.
And I think the military side, they're forthcoming in our talks with us.
But again, recognizing the delicacy of their positions.
We try to take into account the psychological factors involved.
I need to give an example before I probably will come in the beginning of next month.
I tried to prepare something in the field of language.
The French now are very nervous that the position of the French language might be seriously weakened as a result of British entry.
He gave them some assurances that all the officials he would send to Brussels should be those who speak French.
And I will change, which is very difficult in our system because our states are responsible for schools, and I've had ministers and presidents together change an arrangement they have now where every part of German English has to be the first language.
And we want to make it possible to have exceptions from that, so that especially in those areas which are close to France, that we start with French and have English in the same language.
This would be very good for the French.
A very small price to pay, but eternally important.
We forget sometimes of these matters, particularly the French.
Beneath that, the exterior of the cynicism and so forth, they're very, very quiet.
They're quite much fine emotionally.
They have a good price to pay.
And after all, they're on Earth.
They're on Earth only.
Yes.
You told me, too, by the way, how can he have made such strange statements about your friends in English?
You know, I said, try it.
He, of course, knows that.
with regard to the problem, uh, we, we actually, uh, have to see the problem here.
That is,
We have to recognize, as I said earlier, that there is a growing disenchantment in this country with foreign expenditures of the like.
There is a feeling that other parts of the world should pay a greater burden.
A burden?
I don't know.
The longest-manned field I went to in Ireland wasn't coming because of
We gave assurances, one, that we would do our best to get others to, you know, bear their share of the burdens.
And second, that, of course, that we did, we were working on it via honors.
It had to be done in a, in an orderly way and in a mutual way.
The, it however, it however has to be recognized that
that to the extent, uh, uh, you can, in a, in a particular way, people reassure, uh, uh, peers, senators, senators, etc., etc., and reassure them of, uh, the, uh, shared, we know all these, without getting into the specifics of offset and all the rest, that's a matter to be negotiated.
The main thing is the spirit, the main thing is the,
It is the presence of those who believe that we, this government, are not weak enough.
However, on any of our, it seems to me there, that this must be, I emphasize again, I take into account this film.
I think we will have some private consultation.
That process must be ordered.
Yes, it must be ordered.
And we must not rush in with some half-baked scheme that, uh, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh, that, uh
to almost everything there.
I mean, we need that period of bilateral explorations and then we have to make a decision together if and when it should loop into the period of multilateral talks.
I think we both agree that
And this could not be for a longer time the thing between the United States and the Soviet Union, but that European plan is what must be, which does not necessarily mean that everyone has to be.
Yes, yes, one can agree upon that.
The group could negotiate on behalf of the rest, otherwise it may be too late, but I don't know.
Almost had to be done, matter of fact.
Yes, couldn't have all 50.
No, no way, no way.
And, well, actually, those with the biggest stakes have to have the biggest voices.
We can talk all we want about the United Nations, for instance.
That's why it's ridiculous to suggest that the General Assembly, where a country with 25,000 has the same voters and the same voices, a country with 200 or 400, maybe 250,000.
It's interesting.
It's a nice debate in society.
It isn't going to work in terms of, oh, no major power is going to submit its interests to the decision of that.
I think it's safe to tell the Chancellor that this people have got many schemes in which this negotiation could work.
But not one of them is purely bilateral, the U.S.-Soviet.
The big problem is that if everybody negotiates, it's going to be a disaster.
And how do we find a group that can make contributions and still have a good negotiation?
We will have some suggestions when the U.S. comes over.
See, for us, of course, it's very important also what should be the territory or territories which would be covered by a nuclear-fired arrangement.
And two, how should one start?
I saw the other day that the Secretary of State had made a remark on possibly starting with this symbolic thing, which is no bad idea.
And this man was in Moscow last year, and it was made at Howard City.
He had faced a progression of MDR with Rosico.
His first reaction was that they had not made enough progress in thinking about the process.
Then he returned to it and made the remark that he could believe that one could agree upon some symbolic goal.
Yes.
When I discussed this with Edmund Schwedemann, the Minister of Defense, who
has worked on the problem earlier, he said this will not be so bad because it would be something which would hurt anyone and still is something quite for more serious discussions.
Mr. President, as far as the problem, the other problems are concerned, I was going to see
centers of today and tomorrow, and production, and I have a group of them, of the men you've talked to, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and I have a group of them, and production, and
and recently others, especially in the United States, have their own efforts in the field of security.
This is important.
That's why I've said this, because I'm looking at the experts to give you the details, if I may, just to show you a few words about it.
I think there is agreement that
that our military expenditures should be accepted as part of such an agreement.
However, we intend to buy a number of fountains.
And I saw in the record of the Senate that some of the senators thought that this was nonsense because we had to buy those things.
Anyhow, this is not constant because this decision which we made to buy these 175 bedrooms brought us the great criticism from the church who said that, why don't we do things together?
thought this was the right thing to do both militarily and it will also help as part of this offset arrangement.
Then there is that the experts are quarreling about a budget contribution.
This is difficult ground because as you have said before, Mr. President, burden sharing as such
It is not a bilateral problem, but a problem for the United States as a whole.
We have this NATO through statute which creates problems.
Still, I think one perhaps could come closer to each other's position if one could specify what would come under that headline of
of the budget contributions.
For example, my friends in the U.S. Army have the baseless question of the last few years that the barracks of U.S. troops in our country are in a bad shape.
They think they need 360 million Dutch marks to get them rehabilitated.
And we would be happy to include that into it.
Something would have to be done about it anyhow.
If we make it a part of the agreement, the Treasury would not pay for it.
We will make an account for it, but we will probably not have to be able to pay for it.
We would have some given agreement, but the administrative side would have to be with the U.S. forces and not with us.
And I also understand that our federal bank has some new ideas, which could help in the field of offset, not in the way which was done months before, in which I think was a bad thing, to decide upon a credit which is connected with the interest rates, and which would cause what bring you a lot of criticism.
But I think they find other methods.
which would reduce your balance of debt problem and not be connected with a firm the other way around.
If necessary, our budget could jump in there, too, with a certain amount of money.
I just indicate this, that I think there is room for the experts to move beyond what they have discussed.
I think the main point here is
I was watching the press to a certain extent there, the senators and the press, just to feel reassurance.
That's what they do.
Yes.
And would you agree with me that that's really good?
We told them always, when I say, when we were fighting, the man's the only thing.
and we just kind of go all out in terms of saying, well, we've already discussed our idea, we're already working on it, and we are making progress, except we can't have the Senate like that.
So if you come in at this point, I think it could be very fortuitous to reassure them without being specific.
I think there are two factors.
One is,
the relative contribution of European and American efforts to live common defense.
I think it is important that one can make a strong case to the centers of what you're doing in the defense field and what you're planning to do so that the charge that we are carrying is also European.
I think the force reduction that we can handle because people have good studies, good consulting, good negotiations, but the knowledge of things, the pressure is getting, one of us is getting greater and greater.
The Secretary of Congress last night at that dinner challenge, he told me that a group of senators who just came back from Europe, two weeks after the long chunk all the way on the balance of things,
So we have to be able to show some brothers or their brother forces, no matter what they do, in the other fields.
And this is where I'll say this is important.
We have no particular formula to suggest to you today.
But that really is the only problem.
As you know, the White House fought with great energy on the match field for resolution.
I bet we have made all the political arguments, the balance of payments one.
Yes, the one that really came on, came on.
You see, we must not allow the balance of payments issue to be so overriding that it forces a wrong decision in our security issue.
And that's where we bring this down to.
just one of those accidents in the economic history of the present time.
What you do is not a very good problem.
As far as anything is concerned, Mr. President, I hope you did not misunderstand the action we take more than a month ago on floating the mark.
This is...
something which will not go on for a very long period of time.
Not like the Canadians who have used it as a moral development system, we couldn't do that.
For many reasons, we have said to our European partners that we hope we will return to the old melody.
Nobody can guarantee that after the end of the floating this will be possible.
necessary that we make a little change.
If we make it, we will try to make it so that our partners can...
In no way it was meant that oil was in reality something hostile to not a point of power.
I mean, by solving this big influx of your others, we think that we...
get something which was necessary for ourselves and also, from your point of view, because you discussed my curations, which went as far as it did.
But as I said, we will not end the floating in July, but another few months, I think, might be.
But listen, that was my idea, if I can be frank.
It wasn't.
Yes, that is some of the statements.
Yes.
You know, the one problem about monetary things, monetary prices, as we know, is that the only people that profit from them are the international.
that sit there like a bunch of vampires and suck the blood out every time there's a movement.
Yes, I have very low patience for these people, actually.
But nevertheless, what happens here is that what they really thrive upon are rumors.
and there's talk and there's rumor and so forth and so on.
And they meet people who win and they start forcing this price up or this one down.
And every time the money passes by, whether it's the market or dollar, they reach in and take a little out.
And all this does is to cause great problems for the decent people in your country and ours that are trying to, you know, produce and create jobs and save or whatever the case might be.
We want to be, and we know that you too, your people on the financial side, we probably are exposed to your consultation in this field.
It's very important to see that our state is in a situation where we can and don't create the enormous crisis that some people here are talking about because of the
about what might happen with regard to the market, the bullies, whatever the case might be, the martial law market could go down 300 months, but you know, all that kind of talk and how that's impacted.
We have, uh, have you had a chance to, uh, to meet Secretary Conley?
No, I didn't know he was in, uh, in, uh, Germany.
Is there any chance you saw him?
Are you seeing him here?
I do not know if that makes sense, but whether he is or isn't, let me say it on some, because this is, of course, he's not, he's not a man.
He's a, he's a very strong man.
He has, like, a total confidence, and at some point, he's a little, he's a strong man, able man, and he, uh,
It's the faith that makes this fact.
It's because you have to represent strength or expertise and so forth.
If something happens to the lira or, well, so be it.
If something happens to the lira or something happens to the mark or the dollar and the Japanese coming along, even the yen now has massive effect.
The pound even blows at this point.
So we have a responsibility.
I don't pretend to be a financial expert.
I guess none of us do.
But it's too complicated.
But nevertheless, we do have a responsibility and a great opportunity to provide some leadership in this field.
Because the mark, the dollar, the strength of currency depends upon the strength of an economy.
You've got a strong economy.
We've got a strong economy.
We just have to be one of those small, or if not small, rather end-grown countries that simply are in control.
The Swiss are what's going to happen.
The Dutch and so forth, that doesn't matter all that much.
But movements, in your case, in our case, the Japanese, who seem to have a race, this is what a game is.
Yes, it's important that we survive the crisis.
The only, the aftermath of it is, if you will find here, if you already find, if you will, that this puts an enormous amount of attention on that pounce of hands, and they say, well, what caused the crisis?
So therefore, you have a lot more attention on that than you otherwise would have, because we did have the crisis.
So what we have to do is wrestle with that problem and handle it in a way that the doubters cannot allow, that I can't handle.
It's just something we can't allow.
It's important.
We cannot allow those matters to be the tail that wags the dog.
because for the security of our nation's concern, we've got to put that first.
I think it's already a custom that people would raise these forms of pay rate in the Commonwealth.
But sometimes it's very difficult to solve.
I do have the same problem with your business people.
I think looking over the future here, Russia is extremely pleased with this.
Being in your bodies, you might as well take a competency run.
I would say of our two, I'd put it in the top 31 of our clusters in the world.
It is important.
Actually, many things, most things, have to be done through the dark.
We are learning channels.
I mean, we've got to negotiate all sorts of times when...
It is very helpful to have a direct contact time because, you know, you're busy, I'm busy, and it's just sometimes well for us to step in and push something.
So I'd like you to feel that if you ever have a concern, like what you mentioned a moment ago about having a lot of things, no problem, I get it through.
You can't do this with many doctors, as you well know.
You can't do it.
You've got to have time.
But we...
relations are so important to the future of Europe.
And frankly, we can talk about political entity growth out of the economic movement that takes place.
A German economic strength and German vitality.
I said this to my agent, it's true.
And it's important.
played recently in the last third of this century a very major role in the world.
I mean, I cannot say that about some other nations of Europe, and I won't say which ones I wouldn't say about.
I don't have the facts, and this is because of your self, but certain national strength, characteristic, or something like that, as a guy, which is...
which you have.
The United States is going to play a role.
They're playing.
We have because of our strength.
Also, we have some pride in that.
It's inevitable, too, that the Soviet Union is going to play a major role.
It's inevitable that the Japanese are going to play a major role, also because they're strong people, not because of their systems of government.
And it's inevitable that the Chinese are going to play a role.
Now, I'm sure, as you know, we've had this very ordered
the careful movement on Chinese power.
I think I can tell you that the purpose of that is really not directly against anybody else.
They look way ahead in the kind of world that is going to be here in 15 years from now, 20 years from now, a possible leader who can affect that future kind of law, the deteriorating Chinese
who are the ablest people in the world with great strength, allow them to be isolated from the rest of the world.
And over a period of time, over a period of time, you cannot be super sensitively, because the historical facts will not allow that at this point.
Over a period of time, it is necessary for the United States to play a role in helping to bring
the Chinese mainland into a more formal relation with the rest of the world.
When I say more formal, it does not mean that tomorrow or six months from now that we're going to see mainland China and the United Nations recognized, etc., etc.
The way I see the world, and I'm sure you do too, because you, like myself, are a realist.
You came up through the heart of the old politics.
The Soviet Union is going to look to its interests.
And had the Soviet Union actually been concerned about this huge Chinese colossus and the danger that it presents to them in the future,
The Chinese are going to look to their interests.
They are concerned, actually, and should be, about the Soviet Union on one side and Japan on the other side, as they should be, because the Japanese are a people of the people.
Japan will look to their interests.
They have the American nuclear problem.
I hear they look at China.
They look at the Soviet Union.
What role will they play?
And this whole great montage here says Western Europe.
Each nation going to its entrance.
But Western Europe, and particularly your people in your country, will play, and has got to play a great part.
What you really have here, it seems to me, is if you had the United States in,
You really don't have a hand, five fingers.
You've got the United States, of course, North America.
You've got the European community.
You've got the Soviet Union.
You've got China.
You've got Japan.
Now, that is what the world is going to look like as we go ahead.
Now, other parts matter.
Natural gas problems in the Middle East can be very dangerous.
Africa, a huge number of people, a great unexplored continent, or undeveloped continent.
Latin America, it all has problems.
Solidation in India, Pakistan, and the rest.
All this work, we don't downgrade any people in Indonesia at all.
But in Rios, we know, the production of the world is, we also know we're a strong people.
Maybe 100 years from now, these powers that we speak of may no longer be there.
We don't know.
Who can say?
But the decade, I mean the decade, the generation for which we are responsible, and I'm referring not just to ours, but the next 25 years, is one where those five great power centers
Our job is to find a way, of course, to look for it, to look for yours, to look for ours, but I think to find a way to see that these five can develop a live and let live attitude.
uh it isn't going to be easy because if you ever proceed on the assumption well everybody's going to love each other or like each other and they have to know each other that's nonsense and people that know each other well we should compete we have differences and we all on the other hand
So that's really what it's been.
I'm not at all thinking on our very honest initiative on the Chinese side.
It's not an intrusion.
As I said, it's just looking for part of the future, recognizing that we have to change the situation before we have a dangerous problem, facing a spying issue about censorship.
Are they?
Yes.
I don't think it will be caused anything here.
You are playing a triad game.
A triad?
A triad game.
Yeah.
You need to pair with the Chinese against the Soviets.
There's one thing about games.
You might say another one.
Yeah.
It is good to know you have a cycle center as a football team.
I would like to, uh, to follow up with, uh,
I said about it last year, if I were responsible for the United States, I would do exactly what you are doing.
In my case, I have to modify, because Germany is not located where the United States are, and isn't as big and influential.
So in our case, looking at the map,
I think it is necessary not to do anything which is hostile, vis-a-vis the Chinese.
We have to play with them, as you know, not certainly play.
But we want to get our normalization with the Soviet Union first, and then follow up the thing
with the Chinese.
There's a story from the last war, when they said that a father shows his little son to them on the globe, where Germany is located.
And after he has explained this to his son, the son asks his father, does the Fuhrer know this, where Germany is located?
I'm not the Führer, but I know where Germany is.
I'm thinking where Russia and where China is.
Yeah, sure.
From our geographical point of view, and also because the Chinese are trying to play with the East German province.
You see, this is an interesting thing.
There's a little thing which I would mention.
When I came to Moscow in August last year to sign the treaty,
The night I arrived, they had someone to contact me on, to ask me if I would be kind enough during my stay in my daughter's restoration at the Kosovo, not to mention your workshop.
I didn't.
They didn't.
But I don't know the states that they will ask for it.
So it must be a road in their feet.
But they're a little paranoid about it.
Yes, yeah.
But actually, in all of these things, we have a thousand times more intense diplomatic dealings with the Russian people than we have with the Israelis.
Sure, yeah.
Yes.
I don't see why they're going to do anything at all.
We, at the present time, are facing, whether it's salt, or Berlin, or the Medici, or, uh, uh, BFR.
or trade or anything else.
For us, the big game at present time is the Soviet Union.
What we're looking for is a way to the future.
And also, we have to remember, we're descending taller, too.
We are out there.
You see, we are right there in this city, but we also have some responsibilities for Japan.
This is Japan.
So you see, I agree.
You're absolutely right.
Here you are.
You've got to find a way to have your...
Your primary concern has got to be your rights and so on.
Absolutely.
President, would you...
In fact, I have a son-in-law.
I can give that to Halloween.
but uh yes
On looking into the future, Mr. President of China, how do you think the problem of nuclear arms and that's one of the reasons why we have to make this move?
At the present time, the Soviet can't make it.
They're just like that.
It's a rather, it's a rather anomaly, isn't it?
I write that the United States, the great capitalist power, can have a better relation at the moment with the Chinese than the Soviet Union, the Communist Party.
So, let's suppose, let's suppose that's our point.
Let us suppose we just go right down this road.
The Soviet, sitting like this with the Chinese, the United States, acting as if they didn't go there, Soviet Union, the United States makes a deal under their arms.
the other nuclear powers, the British and French, here goes China, going up, up, up, up.
My God, you can't let that happen.
So looking to the future, not even the present, looking to the future,
Any nuclear arms control deal isn't worth the paper it's written on unless you eventually bring the Chinese in.
They're not a danger now, but they are developing ICBMs very well.
They already have 25 RBMs, and they're that capable people.
25 years from now, they could be a very serious nuclear power.
They're now third.
They're ahead of the right.
They're ahead of the British and ahead of the French in ICBMs, in British and French.
I mean, this could be a good place to throw them through Japan.
Oh, what will Japan do?
Japan then would have no choice but either to accommodate to them or to do it itself.
And the Japanese, as you know by their constitution, are not allowed to.
And they don't want to.
They have a psychopathic violence against them.
But on the other hand, we have a situation here where they
I mean, well, we can talk some more about this, but I want to say a few things.
I mean, that's a problem.
We've had a lot of guests that have met up with me in the past, I guess.
I've seen the neighbors and all the guests that I've met in the last six years.
Yes, many of us, I should say, as I was telling you earlier, I don't know if you've seen them, but I know certainly you've seen them, and they've all been here.
Well, chances are, I've got everything settled, so...
In any case, I'll go to that.
In here, that Kennedy asked me whether we actually could have a wedding on that night.
Yeah.
If I might ask.
Yes, going here, if we could do something to, if he respects that, take back the energy.
Well, let me say what our position has been, one of...
Actually, we're hoping to reproduce it in a couple over a second.
We're, of course, hoping to do it in Pakistan as much as we can.
We are trying very desperately to stay out of the Pakistan fire.
There are enough problems to where those aren't becoming involved in the civil strife.
But what more can be done here?
You see, there's more lending service to the Indians.
And the Pakistani, of course, are more lending.
And consequently, while this issue is one that concerns the Indians, because of the huge load, we'd probably like to use it
to give the finishing touches to Pakistan.
Now, I don't think that's in their interest, because let us suppose if India is one of India's main problems, they have an unproblematic problem, it seems to me, having the West Bank out, and India will have the East Bank out there, too, you know?
But that's for them to decide, it's for the Pakistan and India and the rest of them.
I think we should be very forthcoming in terms
But helping refugees, that's what we're doing.
We are, and it seems to me that everybody in the entire world should.
I think in terms, however, of taking sides, India versus Pakistan, I think we should be very present.
That's our view.
And I hope that people will address it.
You see, we don't vote for the Olympics.
After all, India is much bigger than Pakistan.
It's having a terrible problem.
The idea is good, man.
trying to do a difficult job trying to hold those two parts of the country separated by thousands of miles together.
But I think that we must not allow ourselves to be involved either way.
We must not allow Pakistan to involve us on their side against the Indians.
We must not allow the Indians to involve us on their side against them.
But if we can focus on the wreckage and say,
We're helping the refugees wherever they are in the foreign Pakistan.
We will not allow the refugee issue to be used by one to keep the other ones overhead.
I think that's the position that we take.
Does that sound right?
Yes, yes, yes.
But I think this also could include that under the discussions within the Pakistan consortium,
could tell them that they should not push people out in the manner they do.
I mean, there is a tendency that they will push all the Hindus out of East Afghanistan.
This would be much more than they have announced.
That's a terribly sad part of the world.
We think we've got problems with Europe and America and the rest, but my God, South Asia is just unbelievable business, you know.
You go down there and you see the poverty, the hopelessness.
I don't mean that there aren't strong people and leaders in the rest of America.
You've got to admire them for trying.
But if you look at India and Pakistan, these two countries,
armed with a team against each other about one miserable problem.
Kashmir.
Well, it's a nice place.
Nehru was psychopathic about it because he came and availed Kashmir.
But here was Nehru.
We're a leader.
I remember seeing him in 1952 in his vice chair.
He spoke for four hours.
I gave him, I don't know what he did.
He spent three hours talking about Kashmir.
He said about India, who were just 400 million people.
And yet, if you ever talk to leaders of either side, even those who have been in the agreement, you say, we can't think about that.
So here they are, lying up against each other about that.
If you look at Pakistan, of course, if you look at them, they can only find ways to do all of that, to kind of cooperate and do it all together.
There's the Germans, the French, and the others.
my God, it could make such a difference.
Well, there's much more than does here, because each of you, Europe, are so strong, and you're people that do pretty well, but these people, they can't afford to be at each other.
They have difficulties in keeping their heads above water.
If they have no armed forces, whatever, but with armed forces, they can't make it.
And we all play...
Yeah, I wanted to, I wanted to, to, to, uh, I can cover Vietnamese with an idea that you don't know that you should know.
The reason why you
is that the APM system, of course, is one of the defenses.
Whereas if you're only fighting off a part of the offensive, for example, IC units, you're leaving out airplanes, you're leaving out submarines, of course, the rest.
Now, there's a lot of hard negotiating to go on.
It will start again in July, and we'll have sessions.
But a lot of preliminary negotiations
Now, you can't ever be sure of the history, you can't be sure of how far it went.
But in this field, the history, now the reason this is, of course, terribly important, I was saying to the Chancellor earlier,
Even though our Soviet friends are always saying there is no linkage, we have no linkage.
They will make progress on salt.
That makes it more likely we make progress on their land.
And the other side of the coin, if we're able to make progress in Berlin, it makes it more likely to make progress in salt.
So we therefore have a common energy, it seems to me, in making progress.
The other thing I should say about salt, though, that you can be very sure
that nothing is being done in any way.
It is not visual.
It will not be simultaneous.
And it will, of course, anyway, we have our own position in the alliance.
I mean, that's all.
That's not that we have.
But we are moving forward, and it's hopeful.
So it is the one area of the world which is quite hopeful over it.
and she was moving by hand, but of course, it's the ladies, you know, they tap into the light.
You've got people who hate each other as long as those people have them.
It's, they set it off to predict.
The wheel, that's probably the one.
It's coming off.
I'm gonna take you out of this place in the car, because it'd be easier for you.