Conversation 520-008

TapeTape 520StartTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 12:45 PMEndTuesday, June 15, 1971 at 12:54 PMTape start time02:43:42Tape end time02:54:51ParticipantsNixon, Richard M. (President);  Kissinger, Henry A.Recording deviceOval Office

On June 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White House at an unknown time between 12:45 pm and 12:54 pm. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 520-008 of the White House Tapes.

Conversation No. 520-8

Date: June 15, 1971
Time: Unknown between 12:45 pm and 12:54 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger

     President’s meeting with Willy Brandt
          -Issues
                -Vietnam
                -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                      -Mutual reductions
                      -Simultaneous reductions
                      -Timetable
                      -Prospects
                      -Effect on alliance
                -Military problem
                -Balance of payments problems
                -Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR]
                                          24

                        NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                   Tape Subject Log
                                     (rev. 10/08)



              -Egon Bahr role
              -US-People’s Republic of China [PRC] relations
                   -Kissinger-Bahr conversation

******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1
[National Security]                                               Conv. No. 520-7 (cont.)
[Duration: 7s ]


    FOREIGN RELATIONS


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

******************************************************************************


              -Kissinger-Anatoliy F. Dobrynin meeting
                   -Meeting with President
                         -Presentation of note
                         -Implications

    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] proposal on SALT
        -Five Power Conference
              -Role of Department of State
        -Reaction of PRC
        -William P. Rogers


******************************************************************************

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
[National Security]
[Duration: 20s ]


    NEGOTIATIONS


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 2
                                             25

                         NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/08)




******************************************************************************


    US-PRC relations
        -Press coverage
        -[Forename unknown] Durton [sp?]
                                                                   Conv. No. 520-8 (cont.)
    Vietnam
         -Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meeting
               -Tho Contact with PRC
         -Ellsworth F. Bunker meeting
         -Announcement by President at Midway Island meeting, July 6
               -General Nguyen Van Thieu
               -Implications
               -Kissinger’s role
               -Rogers
               -Kissinger’s meeting with Bunker
         -President’s meeting with Thieu
               -Election benefits to Thieu
               -Trip by President to Vietnam
               -Cover for Kissinger trip to Vietnam
               -Rogers

    Five Power Foreign Ministers’ meeting
         -Kissinger’s message to Dobrynin
         -President’s meeting with Dobrynin
         -President’s stance on foreign ministerial meeting
         -Conduct of foreign relations
               -Andrei A. Gromyko
               -Georges J. R. Pompidou
               -Edward R. G. Heath
               -Walter Scheel

    Records of 1967 negotiations
         -Kissinger’s role
         -Bureaucratic records
               -Leaks
                     -Contact with Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
                     -Trust within Cabinet
               -President’s records on leaving office
                     -Ordering
                                             26

                          NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

                                     Tape Subject Log
                                       (rev. 10/08)



                     -Use by historians
                     -Weakness of leader class

     President’s schedule
          -John B. Connally’s meeting with Kissinger
          -President’s meeting with Dobrynin

Kissinger left at an unknown time before 12:54 pm               Conv. No. 520-8 (cont.)

This transcript was generated automatically by AI and has not been reviewed for accuracy. Do not cite this transcript as authoritative. Consult the Finding Aid above for verified information.

He just called me.
It was necessary.
It was necessary.
It was necessary.
And you certainly warned you.
You said all the things you could practically say.
He asked me to do that.
He said, like, if I saw Vietnam, I spoke to her about Vietnam.
And if I saw, like, it's very well.
I said, of course, if you will, it's better to judge me in progress than another.
I said, naturally, it's all not in the state of the issue.
Anyway, is that detrimental to the alliance?
That's a good question.
And we got across the balance of payments concerns, and not to rush too fast and then be about.
He's just a, you know, he's just a spongy guy.
Yeah.
Well, I'll tell you one thing.
We got to your friend, Barb, that's right.
He's next.
Did you know him?
Yeah, he's up there.
relations with China really improve, they'll get to be as good as they are with Bulgaria.
Oh, boy.
Anyway, he'll report that right back to the Russians.
Oh, no question.
And that's all right.
The Russians will not believe it.
And yet, we got that right where we want.
They know goddamn well what's going on here.
Well, and we've set to bring him out for 2.30 this afternoon.
It's just part of the game, Mr. President.
Sure, I'll see him here.
Yeah, for 10 minutes.
We can bring him right in here, don't you think?
We can bring him right in here.
Bring him in here?
Yeah, he has an autograph.
Oh, sure, we can bring him right in the main office.
And, uh...
Just 10 minutes, really.
It isn't.
But it shows him that you have high-level concerns.
We're building a record.
If they kick us in the teeth after all of this, we'll tell them, look, we did everything we could.
The only bad thing about their proposal, we can't stop their proposal, of a five-pound of their conference, is that after that stage, we'll want to play it into a foreign minister's meeting.
Yes?
I don't think the Chinese will play yet until they hear from us.
I guess they will.
A state that wants a foreign minister.
We can certainly put the brakes on this.
When I see him next week, I'm going to tell him we don't want it.
And when we...
And when I see the Chinese... And when I see he does the Chinese, I'm going to tell them to deal with its others.
The Chinese, one has to say, have played the game on the visitors.
Well, anyway, they've not only played the game to the visitors, they haven't really told the press anything that would be inimical to you.
And they could tell if they told Dutton or any of these guys who are in there how you hamper U.S.-Chinese relations.
They'd love to trend it.
We're playing a very cautious, shrewd game.
We're playing, above all, a big game.
They're not horsing around with little stuff.
Well, we'll get it pretty if Lee Duk To
is there on the 26th.
It's not 100% sure that he'll be there.
He may just be bringing instructions.
The probability is that he'll be there.
If he plays a somewhat softer game, then we know the Chinese have talked to them a little bit.
Well, the dice cast either does or doesn't.
He doesn't.
Now, the thing that I think is important, though, is that our people have been talking about the conqueror, about this life-sex thing.
The more I think about that, I don't think that's in our interest.
I know it's a bullet, and it doesn't really do us any good.
No announcement you could make there is going to be any better than an announcement you can make on your own.
Or as good as an announcement you can make on your own.
It gets the whole TU issue out in the open.
It will infuriate Hanoi.
It just doesn't... And then not going sets up a perfect cover for me to go out there.
If I'm not at Midway and Rogers is there, no one, no matter what we say, it's not that I want to be there, but it just...
It will work, but it...
The cover of my being sent out there on a fact-finding mission while we tell you we're doing it as a substitute.
Would you mind raising this with Munker?
I'll raise it before he sees you.
Yeah, just raise it and say, look, we just feel that it will be interpreted as well.
First of all, what are you talking about?
Hello.
You mean, did you talk to him about coalition government?
Did you talk to him about what you're going to get out?
Did you talk to him about, it's just going to be one goddamn mess.
And it's going to take corruption of the South to get his government better than anything else.
And it isn't going to help him, frankly, in terms of...
I think we can get away with it.
I'd have to get Bunker's judgment, but if Bunker gives us any hope at all, I don't think we ought to do it.
And it would set up a perfect cover with the bureaucracy for going.
Yeah.
Not just for the public, because then Rogers would understand why you're sending me, and he won't want to go, I can assure you.
No, I don't think so.
Well, let's find out how our foreign ministers think, Jesus Christ.
Well, we can slow it down.
I'll tell he, I'll tell Dupree, I've already, I'll tell Dupree that you don't want the foreign ministers meeting.
We can screw it up in the preparations.
This will be months.
You might tell him that you'll study it, but you think it requires a lot of preparation.
Then that already puts it in there.
Yeah, a lot of preparation might be a board of ministers meeting, you see.
I don't want them to think that we want the board of ministers to get together and prepare meetings.
It's ridiculous to continue this goddamn facade, which in fact the foreign ministers and even the Soviet can do anything.
You can't do a goddamn thing.
In fact, in many ways, it's the worst level.
It's high enough to be very visible, and yet Gromyko doesn't have the authority.
And as it happens now in no modern government, as the foreign minister in France, whom did you really conduct foreign policy in Britain, good as you may see it conducted.
And in Germany, Steele doesn't even know most of the things that are going on.
It's a characteristic for him.
He's become an administrator of a large bureaucracy.
I've just read the files on the negotiations, because that's going to be surfaced.
What you've done.
Yeah.
That makes me look good, so I have no personal, and it will even help this administration a little because it shows that I was committed to negotiations before.
But we just don't have records like this in the bureaucracy.
That's why the bureaucracy is furious.
But they can't leak on us like this.
They want the records.
They want you to give them everything.
They want you to be brief and all that sort of thing.
Just as well, we play it close to the vestibule.
It's about like, after this thing, nobody's going to come in to me and say, you just can't shoot.
Why don't we talk more to people?
Why should I talk to people?
And really, why should I ever say anything to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense after this sort of incident?
I'll be goddamned if I'm going to.
I'm not going to do it.
I don't trust them.
I do not trust the bureaucracies and the secretaries.
I'm going to pass it on.
I'm going to keep everything I want secret.
It's going to be kept right here in your home.
Now, you're in much better shape.
It makes it very important after you leave office for you to put out, to compile your records in such a way that the future historians can work with them.
But that's something we don't have to worry about for a long stretch.
Yeah, we just do the best we can.
Thank God, it certainly has something on that.
When you think of the kind of a damn world we've got strong people today and so forth, I must say that the American people have some tradition of this.
First of all, our goddamn leader class is weak as a... Our leader class is a hundred.
Well, that's right.
You're here at 1 o'clock.
Good to see you.
All right.
Thank you.
2.30, we'll see you.
Good.